1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
131 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
133 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
134 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
135 if !send_from_initiator {
136 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
137 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
141 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
142 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
143 if send_from_initiator {
144 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
145 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
147 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
150 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
151 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
152 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
155 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
156 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
157 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
159 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
160 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
161 if send_from_initiator {
162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
163 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
164 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
165 // well as an additional HTLC.
166 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
168 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
174 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
183 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
191 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
192 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
193 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
194 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
195 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
196 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
197 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
198 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
199 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
200 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
202 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
204 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
208 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
211 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
215 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
216 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
218 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
225 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
226 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
227 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
230 let payment_event = {
231 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
232 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
233 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
235 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
238 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
240 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
241 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
245 // deliver(1), generate (3):
246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
247 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
248 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
252 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
253 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
254 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
261 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
263 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
270 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
275 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
278 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
281 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
282 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
284 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
294 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
295 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
305 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
307 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
310 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
315 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
316 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
324 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
325 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
326 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
329 let payment_event = {
330 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
331 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
332 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
334 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
337 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
339 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
340 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
341 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
344 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
359 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
360 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
361 // update_fee (never committed) ->
363 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
364 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
365 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
366 // <- (1) RAA delivered
367 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
368 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
369 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
370 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
372 // B should send no response here
373 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
374 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
377 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
380 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
381 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
382 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
387 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
388 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
389 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
391 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
396 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
398 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
399 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
402 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
406 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
408 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
412 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
413 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
414 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
415 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
420 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
424 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
425 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
426 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
428 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
432 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
433 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
436 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
437 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
438 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
440 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
442 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
443 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
448 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
456 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
457 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
461 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
466 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
467 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
468 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
469 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
470 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
471 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
472 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
473 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
474 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
475 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
479 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
480 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
482 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
486 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
487 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
488 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
491 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
492 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
493 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
497 fn test_1_conf_open() {
498 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
499 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
500 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
503 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
504 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
505 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
506 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
514 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
516 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
519 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
520 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
523 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
524 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
525 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
527 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
528 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
529 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
531 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
532 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
534 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
536 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
537 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
539 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
541 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
542 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
544 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
547 added_monitors.clear();
549 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
551 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
552 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
554 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
555 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
556 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
557 added_monitors.clear();
560 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
561 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
563 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
564 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
566 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
567 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
568 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
569 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
573 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
595 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
600 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
603 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
606 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
609 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
610 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
611 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
612 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
613 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
619 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
620 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
623 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
628 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
633 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
638 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
642 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
643 let channel_value = 5000;
645 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
646 let channel_id = chan.2;
647 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
648 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
650 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
651 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
652 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
654 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
655 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
657 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
658 *feerate_lock = feerate;
660 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
662 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
664 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
666 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
668 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
670 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
672 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
673 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
674 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
675 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
676 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
677 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
681 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
682 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
685 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
686 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
689 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
691 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
692 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
693 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
694 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
695 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
696 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
697 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
698 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
699 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
702 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
716 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
718 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
719 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
720 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
721 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
723 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
724 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
725 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
726 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
728 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
730 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
733 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
736 htlc_signatures: res.1
739 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
741 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
744 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
746 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
747 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
748 //Should produce and error.
749 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
750 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
752 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
753 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
757 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
761 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
762 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
765 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
768 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
771 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
774 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
775 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
776 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
777 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
778 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
784 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
787 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
789 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
790 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
792 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
793 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
794 added_monitors.clear();
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
798 // node[1] has nothing to do
800 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
801 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
804 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
805 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
806 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
810 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
812 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
813 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
819 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
822 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
824 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
826 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
828 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
830 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
831 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
833 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
835 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
839 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
842 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
846 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
848 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
849 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
850 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
851 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
856 fn test_update_fee() {
857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
861 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
862 let channel_id = chan.2;
865 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
866 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
867 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
868 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
869 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
870 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
871 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
872 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
873 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
874 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
875 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
878 // Create and deliver (1)...
881 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
882 feerate = *feerate_lock;
883 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
885 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
888 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
889 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
890 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
892 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
896 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
898 // Generate (2) and (3):
899 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
900 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
904 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
905 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
908 // Create and deliver (4)...
910 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
911 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
913 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
915 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
916 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
917 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
918 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
919 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
928 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
931 // Handle (3), creating (6):
932 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
934 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
935 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
938 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
939 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
942 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
944 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
945 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
953 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
955 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
956 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
958 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
960 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
962 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
965 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
970 fn fake_network_test() {
971 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
972 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
976 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
978 // Create some initial channels
979 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
980 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
981 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
983 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
984 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 // Send some more payments
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
994 // Test failure packets
995 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
996 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
998 // Add a new channel that skips 3
999 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1001 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1010 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1011 hops.push(RouteHop {
1012 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1013 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1014 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1015 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1017 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1019 hops.push(RouteHop {
1020 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1025 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1027 hops.push(RouteHop {
1028 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1030 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1033 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1035 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1036 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1039 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1040 hops.push(RouteHop {
1041 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1046 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1048 hops.push(RouteHop {
1049 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1054 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1056 hops.push(RouteHop {
1057 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1059 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1062 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1064 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1065 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1068 // Claim the rebalances...
1069 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1070 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1072 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1073 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1075 // Send some payments across both channels
1076 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1077 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1078 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1082 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1084 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1086 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1088 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1089 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1090 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1092 // Close down the channels...
1093 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1111 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1112 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1113 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1114 // commitment dance rounds.
1115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1118 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1124 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1126 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1135 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1138 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1140 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1141 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1143 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1146 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1147 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1149 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1170 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1172 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1189 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1201 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1206 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1210 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1217 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1221 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1242 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1266 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1268 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1274 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1278 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1279 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1281 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1282 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1283 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1284 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1285 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1287 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1290 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1292 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1294 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1295 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1297 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1298 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1303 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1304 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1306 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1307 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1308 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1313 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1317 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1323 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1328 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1348 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1349 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1351 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1353 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1355 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1357 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1359 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1360 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1361 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1364 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1366 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1369 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1373 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1378 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1380 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1381 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1385 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1387 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1389 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1390 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1393 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1394 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1395 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1396 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1401 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1402 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1403 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1405 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1407 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1409 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1410 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1411 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1412 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1418 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1424 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1427 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1428 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1431 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1434 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1435 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1436 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1438 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1439 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1440 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1442 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1444 amount_msat: 3460001,
1445 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1450 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1453 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1460 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1461 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1463 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1466 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1469 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1472 htlc_signatures: res.1
1475 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1477 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1479 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1480 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1482 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1483 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1485 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1487 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1491 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1497 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1510 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1515 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1517 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1519 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1521 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1522 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1523 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1526 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1527 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1528 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1529 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1531 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1535 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1536 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1537 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1540 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1542 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1547 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1548 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1550 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1555 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1565 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1572 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1593 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1598 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1601 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1602 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1603 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1604 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1605 // commitment transaction fee.
1606 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1608 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1609 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1610 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1613 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1615 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1616 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1620 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1621 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1622 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1623 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1629 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1631 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1632 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1633 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1634 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1636 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1637 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1638 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1639 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1640 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1641 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1642 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1644 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1645 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1646 match msg_events[0] {
1647 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1648 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1655 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1656 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1657 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1664 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1665 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1672 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1679 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1680 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1681 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1694 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1695 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1698 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1700 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1703 // Add a pending HTLC.
1704 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705 let payment_event_1 = {
1706 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1709 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1715 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1717 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1721 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1731 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1759 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1768 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1784 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1787 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1790 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1792 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1800 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1804 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1806 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1808 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1809 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1829 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1831 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1835 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1838 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1840 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1842 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1845 // adding pending output.
1846 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1847 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1848 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1849 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1850 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1851 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1852 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1853 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1854 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1856 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1857 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1858 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1860 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1861 let payment_event_1 = {
1862 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1865 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1866 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1867 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1871 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1872 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1874 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1875 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1880 // split the rest to test holding cell
1881 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1882 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1884 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1886 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1887 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1890 // now see if they go through on both sides
1891 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1892 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1893 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1895 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1898 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1900 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1901 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1907 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1908 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1909 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1914 // flush the pending htlc
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1916 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1919 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1925 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1930 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1935 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1936 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1937 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1940 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1942 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1943 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1946 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1949 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1952 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1957 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1960 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1961 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1962 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1964 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1968 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1974 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1978 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1982 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1992 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1993 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1996 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1997 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2002 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2016 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2025 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2036 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2039 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2041 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2051 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052 // initial fulfill/CS.
2053 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2063 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091 // on-chain as necessary).
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2098 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2105 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2112 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2116 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2130 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2152 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2165 // Create some initial channels
2166 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2171 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2178 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2189 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2195 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2201 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2204 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2210 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2223 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2226 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2227 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2229 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2232 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2233 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2234 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2235 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2243 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2244 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2245 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2247 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2248 let node2_commitment_txid;
2250 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2252 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2253 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2255 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2256 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2257 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2259 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2261 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2262 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2267 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2268 // confusing us in the following tests.
2269 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2271 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2272 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2273 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2276 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2277 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2280 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2281 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2288 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2294 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2296 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2297 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2298 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2304 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2307 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2309 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2310 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2313 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2325 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2327 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2328 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2329 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2331 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2332 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2333 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2334 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2337 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 fn test_justice_tx() {
2343 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2344 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2345 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2348 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2349 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2350 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2352 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2353 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2354 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2355 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2359 // Create some new channels:
2360 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2362 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2363 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2364 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2365 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2367 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2368 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2369 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2373 // Revoke the old state
2374 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2377 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2379 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2383 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2385 node_txn.truncate(1);
2387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2388 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2391 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2393 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2394 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2396 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2398 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2399 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2401 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2403 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2404 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2406 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2407 // Create some new channels:
2408 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2410 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2414 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2417 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2418 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2419 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2422 // Revoke the old state
2423 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2425 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2427 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2431 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2435 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2437 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2442 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2452 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2453 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2458 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2459 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2460 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2461 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2462 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2464 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2465 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2467 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2468 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2474 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2477 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2478 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2486 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2487 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2493 // Create some new channel:
2494 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2496 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2498 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2499 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2500 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2502 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2503 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2504 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2505 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2506 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2510 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512 //Revoke the old state
2513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2516 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2519 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2523 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2525 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2528 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2529 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2532 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2533 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2536 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2537 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2538 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2540 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2544 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2551 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2552 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2558 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2560 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2562 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2563 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2564 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2565 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2567 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2570 //Revoke the old state
2571 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2574 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2576 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2582 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2586 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2587 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2589 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2590 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2591 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2592 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2593 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2594 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2596 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2597 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2598 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2600 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2601 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2602 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2604 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2607 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2610 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2614 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2615 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2618 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2619 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2620 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2622 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2628 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2629 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2630 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2631 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2632 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2633 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2634 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2635 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2636 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2638 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2639 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2640 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2641 // PaymentSent event).
2643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2646 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2648 // Create some initial channels
2649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2650 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2652 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2653 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2654 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2656 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2658 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2659 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2660 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2662 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2663 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2665 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2666 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2667 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2669 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2671 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2673 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2674 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2675 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2676 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2679 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2680 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2682 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2683 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2684 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2685 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2686 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2687 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2691 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2692 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2693 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2694 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2695 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2697 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2698 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2699 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2700 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2702 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2703 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2704 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2705 added_monitors.clear();
2707 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2709 match forwarded_events[0] {
2710 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2713 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2714 } else { panic!(); }
2715 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2716 } else { panic!(); }
2717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2727 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2736 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2737 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2738 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2740 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2741 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2745 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2746 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2747 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2748 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2749 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2750 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2751 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2752 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2753 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2756 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2761 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2762 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2764 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2771 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2772 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2773 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2774 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2776 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2777 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2778 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2779 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2780 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2781 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2784 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2785 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2786 let commitment_spend =
2787 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2788 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2789 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2790 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2793 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2794 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2795 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2799 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2800 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2801 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2804 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2806 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2809 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2810 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2812 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2813 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2814 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2815 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2816 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2818 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2820 let mut first_claimed = false;
2821 for event in events {
2823 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2824 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2825 assert!(!first_claimed);
2826 first_claimed = true;
2828 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2829 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2832 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2833 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2837 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2840 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2841 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2842 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2843 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2844 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2845 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2847 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2851 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2852 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2853 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2854 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2855 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2857 // Create some intial channels
2858 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2859 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2861 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2862 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2863 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2865 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2867 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2868 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2870 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2872 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2875 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2879 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2880 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2881 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2882 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2883 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2887 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2888 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2890 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2891 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2896 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2897 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2898 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2899 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2900 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2903 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2904 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2906 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2908 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2909 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2911 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2913 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2916 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2920 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2922 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2924 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2925 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2930 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2932 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2933 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2934 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2935 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2936 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2949 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2959 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2963 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2974 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2978 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2979 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2980 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2981 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2985 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2986 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2987 // and fail backward accordingly.
2989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2994 // Create some initial channels
2995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2998 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2999 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001 // Revoke the old state
3002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3004 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3006 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3007 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3008 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3018 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3020 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3024 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3026 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3032 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3033 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3034 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3035 // commitment transaction anymore.
3036 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3037 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3038 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3039 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3040 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3041 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3043 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3044 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3045 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3046 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3047 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3053 // Create some initial channels
3054 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3057 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3058 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3061 // Revoke the old state
3062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3064 let value = if use_dust {
3065 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3066 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3067 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3070 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3072 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3074 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3078 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3082 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3085 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3087 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3099 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3100 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3101 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3115 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3119 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3120 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3123 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3124 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3125 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3126 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3127 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3133 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3134 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3139 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3142 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3143 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3146 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3147 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3149 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3152 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3154 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3157 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3158 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3161 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3162 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3168 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3169 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3181 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3182 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3183 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3184 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3188 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3189 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3190 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3192 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3196 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3197 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3198 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3199 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3200 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3201 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3208 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3209 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3210 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3211 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3212 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3214 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3215 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3218 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3220 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3223 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3224 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3225 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3226 // that we should update our routing table for.
3227 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3228 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3242 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3251 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3252 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3253 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3257 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3258 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3259 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3260 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3261 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3265 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3266 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3267 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3268 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3269 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3273 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3277 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3278 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3280 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3282 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3283 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3286 let payment_event = {
3287 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3288 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3289 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3291 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3292 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3295 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3296 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3298 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3301 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3306 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3309 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3310 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3311 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3312 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3313 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3315 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3316 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3322 onion_routing_packet,
3324 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3326 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3328 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3330 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3331 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3336 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3337 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3346 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3347 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3348 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3352 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3353 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3355 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3356 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3357 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3358 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3360 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3362 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3363 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3364 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3366 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3368 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3370 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3372 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3373 // registering new transactions
3374 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3375 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3379 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3380 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3384 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3388 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3390 let mut payment_event = {
3391 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3394 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3396 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3400 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3402 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3404 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3405 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3406 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3407 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3410 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3411 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3413 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3415 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3416 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3417 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3419 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3420 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3424 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3425 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3426 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3427 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3432 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3434 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3435 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3437 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3439 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3441 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3442 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3444 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3445 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3446 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3447 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3448 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3449 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3450 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3452 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3456 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3457 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3458 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3459 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3460 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3468 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3470 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3473 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3474 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3476 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3477 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3479 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3480 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3484 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3485 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3489 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3490 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3491 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3493 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3494 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3495 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3497 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3498 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3499 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3500 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3502 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3503 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3504 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3506 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3507 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3508 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3509 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3511 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3512 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3514 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3515 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3517 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3519 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3522 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3523 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3524 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3529 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3530 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3531 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3536 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3537 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3541 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3542 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3545 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3546 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3550 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3553 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3554 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3555 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3556 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3557 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3558 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3560 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3563 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3565 let payment_event = {
3566 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3569 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3571 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3573 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3575 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3576 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3579 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3580 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3584 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3585 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3586 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3589 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3590 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3591 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3592 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3595 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3596 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3597 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3605 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3607 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3608 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3609 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3610 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3612 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3613 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3614 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3616 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3617 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3619 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3620 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3621 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3622 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3623 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3624 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3625 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3626 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3627 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3628 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3629 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3630 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3631 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3632 // Everything was delivered...
3633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3636 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3637 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3639 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3643 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3644 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3645 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3647 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3649 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3650 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3652 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3653 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3654 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3656 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3657 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3658 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3660 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3666 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3667 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3669 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3671 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3672 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3673 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3674 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3675 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3676 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3677 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3678 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3679 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3684 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3685 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3687 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3688 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3690 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3691 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3692 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3697 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3698 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3700 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3702 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3703 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3704 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3707 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3709 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3713 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3714 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3715 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3723 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3724 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3726 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3728 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3730 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3732 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3733 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3734 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3735 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3736 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3737 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3738 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3739 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3740 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3741 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3742 // Everything was delivered...
3743 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3746 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3747 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3750 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3752 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3754 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3755 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3758 // Channel should still work fine...
3759 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3760 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3761 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3765 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3766 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3767 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3768 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3769 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3773 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3774 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3775 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3776 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3777 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3781 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3782 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3786 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3787 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3788 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3789 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3790 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3792 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3793 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3795 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3796 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3798 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3800 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3801 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3802 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3809 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3812 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3813 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3814 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3815 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3816 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3817 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3822 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3823 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3824 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3832 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3833 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3834 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3835 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3836 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3837 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3838 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3843 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3844 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3845 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3850 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3851 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3852 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3853 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3854 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3855 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3860 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3861 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3862 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3864 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3865 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3866 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3868 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3869 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3870 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3872 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3873 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3874 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3876 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3877 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3878 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3879 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3880 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3881 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3882 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3883 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3885 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3886 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3887 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3888 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3889 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3890 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3892 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3893 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3894 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3895 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3899 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3900 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3902 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3903 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3906 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3908 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3909 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3910 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3911 let mut found_announcement = false;
3912 for event in msgs.iter() {
3914 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3915 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3917 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3921 assert!(found_announcement);
3925 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3926 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3927 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3931 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3932 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3934 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3936 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3937 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3938 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3941 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3942 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3944 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3948 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3951 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3954 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3955 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3956 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3957 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3958 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3959 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3960 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3963 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3964 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3966 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3967 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3968 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3973 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3974 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3975 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3981 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3982 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3984 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3985 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3986 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3987 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3988 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3989 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3991 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3992 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3993 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3994 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3996 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3997 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3999 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4000 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4002 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4004 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4005 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4006 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4007 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4008 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4009 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4010 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4011 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4015 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4016 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4017 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4020 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4021 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4024 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4025 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4026 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4027 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4028 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4029 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4030 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4033 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4034 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4035 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4038 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4039 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4040 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4043 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4044 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4049 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4050 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4052 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4053 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4055 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4056 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4057 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4059 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4065 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4066 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4069 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4073 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4074 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4075 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4076 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4077 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4079 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4081 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4083 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4084 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4085 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4086 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4087 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4088 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4089 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4093 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4094 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4095 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4098 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4101 let mut block = Block {
4102 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4105 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4106 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4107 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4108 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4109 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4110 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4111 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4118 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4119 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4120 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4121 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4125 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4126 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4127 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4132 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4133 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4134 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4137 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4138 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4142 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4144 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4146 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4149 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4151 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4152 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4154 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4156 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4159 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4160 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4161 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4162 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4172 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4174 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4175 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4180 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4181 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4182 match fail_commit[0] {
4183 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4185 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4187 _ => unreachable!(),
4189 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4191 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4193 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4194 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4195 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4196 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4198 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4203 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4204 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4205 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4209 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4213 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4214 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4215 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4216 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4217 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4218 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4220 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4222 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4224 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4225 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4226 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4227 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4229 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4230 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4231 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4232 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4233 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4234 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4235 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4236 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4237 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4238 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4240 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4241 let config = UserConfig::default();
4242 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4243 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4244 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4245 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4246 default_config: config,
4248 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4249 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4250 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4255 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4256 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4258 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4259 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4260 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4263 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4264 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4265 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4266 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4268 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4269 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4270 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4271 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4273 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4274 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4275 for node in nodes.iter() {
4276 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4277 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4278 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4281 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4285 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4286 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4290 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4291 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4292 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4293 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4294 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4295 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4297 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4298 let channel_value = 100000;
4299 let push_msat = 10001;
4300 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4301 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4302 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4303 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4304 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4305 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4306 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4308 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4310 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4311 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4313 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4315 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4316 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4317 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4318 added_monitors.clear();
4321 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4322 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4324 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4325 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4326 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4327 added_monitors.clear();
4329 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4334 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4335 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4336 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4337 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4339 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4340 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4341 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4342 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4343 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4344 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4345 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4346 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4347 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4348 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4350 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4351 let config = UserConfig::default();
4352 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4353 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4354 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4355 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4356 default_config: config,
4358 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4359 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4360 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4365 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4366 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4368 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4370 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4371 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4373 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4374 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4375 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4376 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4377 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4379 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4380 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4384 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4385 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4386 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4388 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4389 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4390 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4391 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4393 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4394 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4395 for node in nodes.iter() {
4396 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4397 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4398 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4401 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4405 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4409 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4410 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4411 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4412 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4413 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4414 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4415 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4417 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4418 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4423 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4424 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4426 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4427 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4428 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4429 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4430 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4431 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4432 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4433 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4434 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4435 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4437 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4438 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4439 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4440 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4441 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4442 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4444 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4445 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4446 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4451 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4452 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4454 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4455 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4458 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4460 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4461 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4465 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4466 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4470 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4471 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4472 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4473 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4474 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4475 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4476 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4477 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4478 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4480 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4481 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4482 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4483 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4484 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4487 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4489 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4490 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4492 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4493 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4494 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4495 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4497 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4499 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4500 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4501 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4502 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4503 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4506 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4507 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4508 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4509 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4510 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4511 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4514 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4515 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4516 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4517 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4518 assert!(read.is_empty());
4519 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4522 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4523 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4524 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4525 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4526 assert!(read.is_empty());
4527 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4530 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4531 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4532 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4533 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4535 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4536 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4537 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4539 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4541 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4544 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4545 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4546 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4547 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4549 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4550 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4551 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4553 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4555 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4556 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4558 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4559 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4560 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4561 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4562 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4565 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4566 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4569 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4570 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4572 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4573 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4575 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4576 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4578 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4579 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4580 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4581 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4582 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4583 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4584 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4586 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4587 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4594 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4595 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4597 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4598 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4599 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4600 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4601 for event in events.drain(..) {
4603 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4604 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4605 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4606 all_outputs.push(outp);
4609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4612 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4613 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4623 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4624 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4630 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4631 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4632 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4634 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4635 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4636 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4637 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4638 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4641 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4643 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4644 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4645 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4646 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4647 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4651 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4652 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4653 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4657 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4659 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4660 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4661 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4663 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4665 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4666 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4667 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4668 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4670 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4671 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4673 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4676 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4677 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4678 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4682 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4683 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4684 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4689 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4691 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4692 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4693 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4694 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4695 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4697 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4698 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4699 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4701 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4703 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4704 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4705 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4707 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4708 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4709 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4710 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4711 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4715 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4721 // Create some initial channels
4722 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4724 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4726 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4727 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4728 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4730 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4731 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4733 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4735 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4737 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4741 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4742 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4745 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4746 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4747 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4749 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4750 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4751 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4753 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4755 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4757 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4758 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4759 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4763 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4764 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4765 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4766 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4767 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4769 // Create some initial channels
4770 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4772 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4773 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4775 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4777 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4778 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4779 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4781 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4782 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4786 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4789 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4791 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4792 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4795 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4796 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4798 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4799 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4800 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4801 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4803 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4804 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4805 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4806 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4807 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4811 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4815 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4817 // Create some initial channels
4818 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4820 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4821 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4822 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4823 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4825 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4827 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4828 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4830 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4832 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4833 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4834 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4835 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4837 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4838 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4840 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4841 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4842 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4846 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4847 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4849 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4850 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4851 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4853 // Create some initial channels
4854 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4856 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4857 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4858 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4861 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4863 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4864 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4867 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4868 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4870 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4871 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4872 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4873 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4874 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4875 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4876 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4878 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4879 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4880 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4881 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4883 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4885 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4886 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4887 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4888 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4889 // transactions next...
4890 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4891 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4894 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4895 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4896 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4899 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4902 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4903 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4905 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4906 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4908 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4909 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4910 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4911 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4912 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4916 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4917 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4918 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4921 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4923 // Create some initial channels
4924 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4926 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4927 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4928 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4929 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4931 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4932 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4934 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4936 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4937 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4938 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4940 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4941 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4943 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4944 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4945 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4946 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4948 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4949 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4950 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4952 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4953 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4954 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4955 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4957 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4959 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4962 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4963 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4964 // transactions next...
4965 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4966 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4967 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4968 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4970 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4971 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4974 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4975 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4977 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4982 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4983 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4985 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4986 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4987 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4988 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4989 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4990 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4991 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4992 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4996 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4997 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4998 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4999 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5000 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5002 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5005 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5006 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5007 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5008 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5010 // Create some initial channels
5011 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5012 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5014 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5015 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5016 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5017 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5018 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5020 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5022 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5024 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5025 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5026 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5027 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5029 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5030 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5031 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5032 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5033 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5035 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5036 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5038 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5040 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5041 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5042 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5043 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5044 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5045 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5046 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5047 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5049 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5051 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5052 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5053 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5055 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5056 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5058 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5062 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5063 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5064 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5069 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5070 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5071 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5072 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5076 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5077 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5078 match msg_events[0] {
5079 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5082 match msg_events[1] {
5083 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5086 match msg_events[2] {
5087 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5088 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5090 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5091 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5092 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5096 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5097 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5098 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5099 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5100 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5101 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5102 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5103 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5104 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5105 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5106 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5108 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5110 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5116 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5117 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5118 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5119 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5122 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5123 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5124 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5125 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5127 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5128 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5130 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5131 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5132 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5134 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5135 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5136 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5137 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5138 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5140 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5142 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5143 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5144 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5145 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5146 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5147 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5149 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5150 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5151 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5153 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5154 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5156 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5157 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5159 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5160 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5161 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5162 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5163 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5164 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5166 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5167 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5168 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5169 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5170 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5171 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5172 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5174 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5175 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5176 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5177 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5180 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5181 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5183 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5186 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5190 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5191 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5193 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5194 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5195 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5196 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5197 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5198 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5199 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5200 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5201 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5202 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5203 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5204 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5205 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5207 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5209 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5210 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5211 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5212 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5213 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5214 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5215 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5218 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5219 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5223 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5225 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5226 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5227 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5228 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5229 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5230 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5231 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5232 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5233 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5234 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5235 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5241 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5243 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5244 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5245 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5252 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5258 // Create some initial channels
5259 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5261 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5262 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5263 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5264 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5265 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5267 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5268 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5270 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5272 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5273 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5275 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5279 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5280 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5283 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5284 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5285 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5286 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5287 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5288 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5289 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5293 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5294 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5296 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5297 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5298 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5299 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5301 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5304 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5305 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5306 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5307 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5308 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5309 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5310 // use the same payment hashes.
5311 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5316 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5319 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5320 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5321 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5322 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5324 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5325 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5327 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5328 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5329 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5330 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5331 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5333 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5334 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5335 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5336 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5338 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5340 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5342 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5343 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5345 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5347 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5349 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5351 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5352 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5354 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5356 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5359 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5361 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5362 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5365 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5367 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5368 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5370 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5371 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5372 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5373 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5374 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5376 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5377 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5378 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5379 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5380 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5381 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5386 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5387 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5388 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5389 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5390 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5393 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5394 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5395 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5397 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5400 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5401 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5402 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5405 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5409 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5410 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5411 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5412 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5413 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5414 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5415 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5416 if deliver_last_raa {
5417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5419 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5422 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5423 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5424 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5425 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5427 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5428 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5429 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5431 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5432 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5433 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5435 if announce_latest {
5436 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5438 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5440 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5441 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5442 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5449 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5453 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5454 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5455 if deliver_last_raa {
5456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5458 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5462 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5463 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5464 let mut a_done = false;
5465 for msg in cs_msgs {
5467 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5468 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5469 // should be failed-backwards here.
5470 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5471 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5472 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5473 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5475 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5480 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5481 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5482 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5484 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5485 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5488 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5489 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5490 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5491 if announce_latest {
5492 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5493 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5494 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5497 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5503 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5504 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5505 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5506 let mut as_updates = 0;
5507 for event in as_events.iter() {
5508 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5509 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5510 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5511 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5513 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5515 if network_update.is_some() {
5518 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5520 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5521 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5522 if announce_latest {
5523 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5524 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5526 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5528 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5529 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5530 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5531 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5532 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5533 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5534 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5535 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5536 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5538 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5540 if network_update.is_some() {
5543 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5545 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5546 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5547 if announce_latest {
5548 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5550 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5552 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5553 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5554 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5555 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5556 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5557 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5561 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5562 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5566 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5567 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5571 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5572 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5573 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5574 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5578 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5582 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5584 // Create some initial channels
5585 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5587 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5588 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5589 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5590 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5592 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5593 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5594 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5596 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5597 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5599 let htlc_timeout = {
5600 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5601 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5602 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5603 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5604 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5605 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5609 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5610 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5611 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5613 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5614 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5615 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5616 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5617 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5618 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5619 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5620 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5621 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5622 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5623 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5627 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5628 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5629 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5630 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5634 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5635 let seed = [42; 32];
5636 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5637 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5638 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5639 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5640 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5641 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5644 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5646 // Create some initial channels
5647 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5649 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5650 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5651 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5653 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5654 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5655 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5656 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5657 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5659 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5660 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5661 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5662 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5663 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5665 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5666 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5667 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5668 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5669 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5670 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5671 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5672 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5675 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5676 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5677 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5678 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5680 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5682 let htlc_timeout = {
5683 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5684 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5685 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5686 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5690 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5691 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5692 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5694 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5695 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5696 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5697 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5698 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5699 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5700 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5701 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5702 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5703 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5704 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5705 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5709 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5717 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5718 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5720 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5721 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5722 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5724 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5725 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5726 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5728 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5729 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5730 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5732 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5733 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5734 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5737 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5742 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5744 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5746 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5747 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5748 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5751 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5752 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5753 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5755 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5757 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5758 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5761 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5762 let mut block = Block {
5763 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5766 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5767 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5768 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5770 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5773 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5776 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5780 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5781 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5783 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5784 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5787 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5789 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5790 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5791 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5793 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5794 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5796 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5797 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5798 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5800 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5803 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5806 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5810 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5811 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5813 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5814 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5815 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5816 // actually revoked.
5817 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5818 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5819 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5820 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5823 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5824 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5825 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5827 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5830 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5832 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5834 if check_revoke_no_close {
5835 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5839 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5840 let mut block = Block {
5841 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5844 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5845 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5846 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5848 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5849 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5850 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5854 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5856 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5857 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5858 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5859 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5860 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5861 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5865 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5866 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5867 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5868 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5869 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5870 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5871 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5873 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5874 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5875 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5877 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5878 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5879 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5881 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5882 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5886 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5887 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5888 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5889 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5890 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5895 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5899 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5900 //Force duplicate channel ids
5901 for node in nodes.iter() {
5902 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5905 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5906 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5907 let push_msat=10001;
5908 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5909 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5910 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5912 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5913 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5917 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5918 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5921 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5923 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5924 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5925 let push_msat=10001;
5926 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5928 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5929 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5930 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5931 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5932 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5934 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5935 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5936 let push_msat=10001;
5937 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5938 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5939 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5941 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5942 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5943 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5945 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5946 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5947 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5949 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5950 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5951 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5953 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5954 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5955 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5956 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5957 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5958 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5962 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5968 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5969 let push_msat=10001;
5970 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5971 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5972 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5973 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5975 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5976 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5977 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5978 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5983 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5986 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5987 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5988 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5989 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5991 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5995 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5996 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5998 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5999 // pending_update_fee.
6001 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6002 *feerate_lock += 20;
6004 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6007 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6008 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6009 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6010 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6011 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6016 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6018 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6019 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6020 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6022 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6023 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6024 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6026 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6027 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6028 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6029 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6031 // Flush the pending fee update.
6032 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6033 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6035 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6038 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6039 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6040 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6041 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6042 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6043 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6044 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6045 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6046 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6048 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6049 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6052 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6053 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6054 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6055 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6056 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6057 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6058 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6059 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6060 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6066 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6067 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6068 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6070 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6074 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6075 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6077 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6078 // pending_update_fee.
6080 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6081 *feerate_lock += 200;
6083 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6086 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6088 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6089 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6090 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6097 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6098 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6099 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6101 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6103 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6104 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6105 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6107 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6108 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6109 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6110 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6111 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6112 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6113 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6115 // Flush the pending fee update.
6116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6117 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6123 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6124 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6125 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6126 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6127 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6128 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6129 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6130 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6131 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6133 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6134 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6137 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6138 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6139 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6140 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6141 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6142 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6143 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6144 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6145 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6150 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6151 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6152 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6153 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6154 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6156 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6157 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6160 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6164 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6167 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6170 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6171 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6174 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6177 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6179 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6182 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6185 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6186 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6187 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6190 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6191 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6193 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6194 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6195 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6196 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6198 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6199 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6200 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6202 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6203 // pending_update_fee.
6205 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6206 *feerate_lock += 20;
6208 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6211 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6212 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6213 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6214 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6215 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6222 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6223 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6224 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6226 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6228 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6229 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6230 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6231 let payment_event = {
6232 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6235 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6238 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6240 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6243 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6245 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6246 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6248 // Flush the pending fee update.
6249 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6250 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6252 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6253 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6256 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6257 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6260 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6261 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6267 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6269 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6271 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6272 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6273 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6274 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6275 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6279 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6280 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6283 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6284 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6285 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6286 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6287 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6288 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6289 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6290 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6291 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6292 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6297 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6298 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6299 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6301 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6302 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6304 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6307 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6309 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6310 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6313 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6314 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6318 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6319 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6320 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6323 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6324 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6331 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6334 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6335 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6337 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6341 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6342 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6349 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6351 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6352 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6355 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6359 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6360 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6361 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6367 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6368 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6370 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6371 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6373 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6374 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6375 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6377 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6381 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6382 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6383 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6387 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6388 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6390 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6391 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6392 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6396 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6397 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6398 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6399 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6403 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6404 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6405 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6407 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6408 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6409 let payment_event = {
6410 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6415 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6416 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6420 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6426 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6427 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6429 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6430 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6431 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6433 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6434 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6438 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6439 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6443 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6444 let channel_value = 100000;
6445 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6446 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6448 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6450 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6451 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6453 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6454 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6455 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6457 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6458 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6460 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6463 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6465 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6466 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6470 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6471 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6472 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6474 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6475 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6476 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6479 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6480 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6482 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6483 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6484 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6485 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6486 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6487 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6489 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6493 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6494 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6499 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6501 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6502 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6503 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6504 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6505 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6507 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6508 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6509 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6513 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6514 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6515 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6516 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6517 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6519 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6520 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6521 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6523 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6527 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6528 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6529 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6533 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6534 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6536 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6537 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6538 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6539 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6540 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6541 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6543 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6547 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6548 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6549 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6552 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6553 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6556 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6559 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6560 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6561 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6563 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6567 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6568 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6575 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6576 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6578 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6579 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6582 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6583 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6584 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6586 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6590 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6591 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6595 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6597 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6598 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6599 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6601 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6602 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6603 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6605 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6606 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6607 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6609 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6613 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6614 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6615 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6616 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6617 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6618 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6620 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6622 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6623 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6624 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6626 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6627 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6629 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6630 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6631 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6632 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6633 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6634 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6635 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6636 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6637 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6638 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6639 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6640 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6641 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6645 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6646 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6652 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6653 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6654 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6660 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6661 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6668 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6669 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6673 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6675 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6678 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6683 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6684 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6685 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6687 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6691 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6692 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6697 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6698 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6700 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6703 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6704 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6706 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6709 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6712 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6714 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6715 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6716 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6718 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6722 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6723 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6728 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6729 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6731 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6739 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6740 failure_code: 0x8000,
6743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6745 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6746 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6747 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6753 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6754 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6759 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6762 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6764 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6767 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6768 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6769 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6772 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6773 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6774 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6775 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6776 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6777 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6783 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6785 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6787 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6788 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6789 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6791 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6795 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6796 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6806 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6809 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6811 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6813 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6814 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6815 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6816 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6817 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6818 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6819 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6825 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6827 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6829 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6830 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6831 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6833 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6837 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6838 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6843 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6844 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6846 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6847 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6850 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6851 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6853 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6855 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6859 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6861 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6862 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6863 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6864 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6865 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6866 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6867 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6872 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6873 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6875 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6876 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6877 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6883 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6884 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6885 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6890 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6892 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6897 let mut payment_event = {
6898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6900 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6902 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6904 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6906 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6908 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6909 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6911 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6912 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6915 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6916 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6920 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6921 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6922 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6924 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6925 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6926 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6928 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6930 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6936 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6941 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6942 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6944 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6946 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6947 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6948 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6949 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6950 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6951 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6959 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6960 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6961 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6962 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6964 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6965 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6968 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6969 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6971 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6973 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6974 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6975 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6976 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6978 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6979 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6981 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6982 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6984 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6987 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6988 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6989 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6992 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6993 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6995 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6997 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6998 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7003 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7004 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7009 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7010 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7011 if announce_latest {
7012 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7014 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7017 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7019 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7021 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7023 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7024 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7026 let mut first_failed = false;
7027 for event in events {
7029 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7030 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7031 assert!(!first_failed);
7032 first_failed = true;
7034 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7043 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7044 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7045 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7048 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7049 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7050 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7051 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7052 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7053 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7054 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7059 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7062 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7064 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7065 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7067 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7068 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7070 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7072 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7076 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7078 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7079 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7081 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7082 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7084 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7085 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7087 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7088 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7089 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7090 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7091 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7092 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7093 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7094 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7096 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7097 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7098 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7101 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7102 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7103 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7105 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7106 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7107 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7108 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7109 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7110 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7111 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7113 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7115 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7119 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7120 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7121 else { first = false; }
7123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7126 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7127 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7128 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7138 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7139 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7140 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7144 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7145 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7147 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7148 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7149 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7150 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7151 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7157 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7158 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7160 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7163 } else { assert!(false) }
7165 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7166 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7167 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7168 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7169 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7171 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7174 } else { assert!(false); }
7176 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7177 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7178 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7179 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7180 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7181 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7183 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7185 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7186 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7187 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7191 } else { panic!(); }
7192 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7194 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7195 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7196 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7197 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7198 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7200 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7203 } else { assert!(false); }
7207 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7208 // We want to be sure that :
7209 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7210 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7211 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7212 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7213 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7219 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7220 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7221 // during signing due to revoked tx
7222 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7223 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7228 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7232 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7233 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7234 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7235 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7240 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7241 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7243 // Restore node A from previous state
7244 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7245 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7246 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7247 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7248 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7249 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7250 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7252 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7253 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7254 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7255 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7256 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7257 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7259 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7260 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7264 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7265 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7266 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7267 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7271 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7272 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7274 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7276 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7277 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7281 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7282 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7285 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7286 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7287 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7288 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7289 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7290 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7291 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7293 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7294 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7299 panic!("Unexpected event")
7303 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7304 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7305 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7306 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7309 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7310 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7312 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7313 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7314 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7315 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7316 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7317 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7318 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7319 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7323 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7324 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7325 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7326 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7333 // Create some initial channels
7334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7336 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7337 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7338 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7339 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7340 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7341 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7346 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7347 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7350 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7351 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7353 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7355 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7356 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7357 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7359 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7361 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7362 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7363 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7364 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7365 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7366 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7367 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7368 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7374 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7375 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7377 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7378 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7379 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7380 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7384 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7385 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7386 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7391 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7393 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7394 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7398 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7399 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7401 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7402 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7403 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7404 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7405 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7406 for e in msg_events {
7408 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7409 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7410 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7411 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7412 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7419 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7420 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7421 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7422 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7423 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7424 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7426 // Reestablish chan_1
7427 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7428 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7429 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7430 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7431 // Reestablish chan_2
7432 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7433 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7434 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7435 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7436 // Reestablish chan_3
7437 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7438 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7439 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7440 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7442 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7443 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7444 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7445 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7446 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7447 for e in msg_events {
7449 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7450 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7451 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7452 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7454 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7455 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7458 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7461 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7462 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7466 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7467 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7468 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7469 // to forward through that channel.
7470 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7471 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7472 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7473 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7474 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7476 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7477 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7478 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7479 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7481 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7483 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7484 // not send for private channels.
7485 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7486 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7487 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7488 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7489 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7491 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7492 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7493 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7496 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7497 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7500 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7501 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7502 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7503 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7504 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7505 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7506 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7507 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7509 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7511 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7512 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7513 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7515 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7517 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7519 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7520 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7521 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7522 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7523 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7524 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7525 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7526 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7527 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7529 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7530 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7532 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7535 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7536 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7538 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7539 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7540 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7541 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7542 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7544 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7546 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7548 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7549 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7551 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7552 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7554 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7555 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7556 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7557 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7558 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7560 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7561 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7562 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7563 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7565 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7566 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7567 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7568 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7569 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7570 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7572 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7574 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7575 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7576 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7577 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7578 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7579 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7580 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7582 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7583 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7584 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7585 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7589 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7590 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7592 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7593 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7595 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7597 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7598 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7599 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7600 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7601 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7602 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7603 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7604 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7606 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7607 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7608 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7609 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7610 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7611 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7612 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7613 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7617 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7622 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7623 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7624 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7633 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7634 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7635 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7637 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7638 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7639 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7640 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7641 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7642 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7644 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7645 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7646 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7647 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7651 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7652 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7654 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7655 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7656 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7657 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7660 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7664 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7665 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7666 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7667 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7668 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7669 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7670 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7671 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7675 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7676 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7677 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7678 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7680 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7681 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7682 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7683 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7684 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7685 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7686 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7687 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7688 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7689 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7690 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7691 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7692 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7696 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7698 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7699 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7701 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7703 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7704 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7705 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7708 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7709 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7710 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7711 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7712 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7713 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7714 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7715 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7719 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7721 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7722 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7726 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7727 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7728 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7730 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7731 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7734 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7736 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7737 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7738 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7739 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7740 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7741 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7742 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7743 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7744 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7745 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7746 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7748 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7749 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7750 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7752 // Revoke local commitment tx
7753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7755 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7756 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7757 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7758 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7761 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7763 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7764 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7765 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7767 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7768 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7769 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7771 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7772 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7773 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7774 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7777 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7778 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7779 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7780 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7781 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7782 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7783 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7785 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7792 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7794 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7796 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7797 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7798 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7799 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7802 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7803 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7804 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7805 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7806 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7808 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7809 // available, which we check here:
7810 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7811 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7812 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7814 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7815 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7817 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7818 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7819 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7820 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7822 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7823 // output, checked above).
7824 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7825 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7826 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7828 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7829 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7830 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7831 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7832 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7836 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7837 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7838 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7839 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7840 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7842 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7845 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7846 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7847 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7848 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7849 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7852 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7858 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7859 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7860 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7861 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7863 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7864 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7867 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7868 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7869 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7870 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7871 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7872 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7873 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7877 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7878 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7879 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7880 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7882 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7883 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7884 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7885 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7886 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7887 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7888 // up bumped justice generation.
7889 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7892 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7897 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7898 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7899 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7902 // Provide preimage for one
7903 // Check aggregation
7905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7910 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7911 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7912 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7914 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7915 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7916 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7917 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7918 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7920 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7921 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7922 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7926 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7930 let feerate_timeout;
7931 let feerate_preimage;
7933 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7934 // 9 transactions including:
7935 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7936 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7937 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7939 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7940 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7941 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7942 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7943 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7944 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7945 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7947 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7948 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7949 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7950 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7952 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7953 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7954 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7955 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7957 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7958 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7959 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7960 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7964 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7965 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7967 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7968 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7970 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7971 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7973 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7974 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7975 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7977 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7978 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7979 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7980 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7981 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7983 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7984 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7985 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7986 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7987 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7992 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7993 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7997 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7998 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7999 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8000 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8001 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8002 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8003 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8004 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8008 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8009 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8010 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8012 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8013 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8015 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8017 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8018 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8019 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8021 // Must revoke without gaps
8022 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8023 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8025 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8026 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8027 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8029 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8030 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8031 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8033 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8037 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8038 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8039 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8041 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8042 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8043 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8044 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8046 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8047 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8048 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8049 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8051 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8053 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8055 // Revoke local commitment tx
8056 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8058 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8059 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8061 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8063 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8064 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8066 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8068 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8069 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8070 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8071 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8072 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8073 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8077 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8078 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8079 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8081 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8082 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8083 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8088 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8089 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8090 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8094 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8096 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8098 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8099 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8100 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8101 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8102 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8104 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8105 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8109 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8111 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8112 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8113 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8115 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8116 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8124 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8130 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8131 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8132 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8134 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8136 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8137 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8138 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8139 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8143 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8144 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8145 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8151 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8152 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8153 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8155 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8156 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8157 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8161 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8162 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8166 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8169 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8170 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8171 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8173 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8174 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8175 route.paths.push(path);
8176 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8177 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8178 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8179 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8180 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8181 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8182 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8183 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8187 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8188 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8194 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8197 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8198 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8199 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8201 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8202 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8206 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8207 // values from previous calls.
8208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8209 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8210 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8212 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8214 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8215 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8217 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8225 #[allow(deprecated)]
8226 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8227 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8228 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8236 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8238 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8239 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8240 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8241 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8242 } else { panic!(); }
8244 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8246 header: BlockHeader {
8248 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8249 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8250 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8254 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8255 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8256 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8257 } else { panic!(); }
8259 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8260 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8261 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8262 block.header.time += 1;
8263 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8264 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8265 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8268 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8269 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8271 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8272 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8273 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8274 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8276 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8277 // values from previous calls.
8278 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8279 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8282 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8283 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8284 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8285 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8292 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8293 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8294 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8295 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8296 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8299 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8301 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8302 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8303 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8304 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8306 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8307 // resulting events.
8308 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8311 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8312 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8313 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8314 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8316 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8317 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8318 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8319 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8322 // We should fail the payment back
8323 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8324 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8325 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8326 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8334 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8335 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8336 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8338 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8339 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8340 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8341 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8343 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8344 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8345 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8346 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8348 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8349 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8350 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8351 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8355 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8356 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8357 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8358 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8360 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8361 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8362 // commitment at same time.
8364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8367 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8369 // Create some initial channel
8370 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8371 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8373 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8374 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8376 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8377 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8379 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8380 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8381 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8382 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8384 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8385 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8386 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8387 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8388 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8389 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8390 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8391 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8394 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8395 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8396 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8397 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8398 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8400 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8401 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8403 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8404 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8405 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8406 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8407 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8408 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8409 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8410 } else { assert!(false); }
8411 } else { assert!(false); };
8412 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8414 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8415 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8419 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8420 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8421 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8422 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8423 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8428 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8430 // Create some initial channel
8431 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8432 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8434 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8435 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8437 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8438 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8440 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8441 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8442 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8443 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8444 let watchtower_alice = {
8445 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8446 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8447 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8448 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8449 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8450 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8451 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8452 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8455 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8456 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8457 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8458 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8459 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8461 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8463 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8464 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8468 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8469 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8470 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8471 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8472 let watchtower_bob = {
8473 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8474 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8475 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8476 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8477 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8478 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8479 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8480 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8483 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8484 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8486 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8487 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8489 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8493 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8494 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8495 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8496 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8497 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8498 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8499 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8500 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8501 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8502 } else { assert!(false); }
8503 } else { assert!(false); };
8504 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8507 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8508 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8509 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8511 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8514 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8515 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8516 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8520 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8521 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8522 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8524 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8525 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8526 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8527 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8528 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8529 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8534 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8535 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8536 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8539 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8540 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8542 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8543 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8544 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8545 // before receiving funding_signed.
8546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8551 // Create an initial channel
8552 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8553 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8554 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8555 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8556 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8558 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8559 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8561 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8564 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8565 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8566 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8567 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8568 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8572 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8573 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8574 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8575 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8576 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8577 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8578 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8585 // Create some initial channels
8586 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8588 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8589 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8590 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8591 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8592 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8593 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8595 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8596 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8597 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8598 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8599 // this test before #653 fix.
8600 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8601 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8603 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8606 let htlc_timeout = {
8607 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8608 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8609 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8610 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8614 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8615 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8616 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8617 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8620 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8621 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8622 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8623 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8625 // Steps of the test:
8626 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8627 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8628 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8629 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8630 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8631 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8632 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8633 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8637 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8639 // Create some initial channels
8640 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8641 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8643 // Steps (1) and (2):
8644 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8645 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8647 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8648 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8649 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8650 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8651 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8652 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8653 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8655 // Steps (3) and (4):
8656 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8657 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8658 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8659 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8660 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8661 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8663 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8664 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8665 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8666 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8667 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8669 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8670 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8671 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8672 if broadcast_alice {
8673 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8675 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8677 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8678 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8682 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8683 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8684 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8686 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8687 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8688 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8689 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8690 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8691 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8693 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8694 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8695 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8696 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8697 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8700 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8701 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8706 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8707 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8708 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8713 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8714 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8715 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8720 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8721 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8722 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8728 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8730 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8733 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8735 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8736 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8737 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8742 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8745 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8746 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8747 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8748 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8749 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8750 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8751 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8752 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8753 if broadcast_alice {
8754 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8758 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8759 if broadcast_alice {
8760 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8761 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8762 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8763 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8765 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8766 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8768 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8769 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8774 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8775 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8777 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8778 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8779 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8780 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8782 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8783 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8784 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8786 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8787 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8788 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8789 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8790 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8791 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8792 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8794 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8795 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8801 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8802 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8803 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8804 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8805 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8809 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8810 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8811 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8813 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8814 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8815 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8816 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8817 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8818 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8822 // Create an initial channel
8823 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8824 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8825 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8826 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8828 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8829 // that it is rejected.
8830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8832 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8835 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8836 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8837 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8838 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8839 // move forward with it.
8840 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8841 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8847 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8848 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8850 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8853 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8854 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8856 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8857 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8858 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8859 added_monitors.clear();
8861 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8863 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8864 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8866 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8869 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8870 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8871 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8872 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8873 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8875 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8878 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8879 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8880 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8881 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8882 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8888 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8889 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8890 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8891 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8892 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8893 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8895 let funding_created = {
8896 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8897 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8898 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8899 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8902 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8903 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8904 // still needs to be cleared here.
8905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8907 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8909 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8910 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8912 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8913 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8914 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8915 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8916 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8918 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8922 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8923 // everything is functional.
8924 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8926 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8927 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8928 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8929 added_monitors.clear();
8932 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8933 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8934 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8937 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8938 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8939 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8940 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8944 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8945 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8947 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8948 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8949 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8953 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8955 // Create some initial channels
8956 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8957 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8958 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8961 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8962 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8964 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8965 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8966 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8968 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8969 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8971 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8972 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8974 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8975 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8976 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8978 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8979 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8980 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8982 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8983 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8984 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8986 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8987 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8992 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8993 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8997 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8998 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8999 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9000 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9001 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9002 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9004 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9005 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9006 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9010 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9011 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9013 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9014 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9015 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9016 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9022 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9023 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9024 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9026 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9027 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9028 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9029 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9032 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9033 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9036 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9039 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9040 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9044 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9046 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9047 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9048 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9050 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9051 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9052 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9053 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9054 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9055 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9056 } else { panic!(); }
9057 } else { panic!(); }
9058 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9061 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9062 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9063 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9064 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9065 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9066 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9067 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9068 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9069 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9070 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9071 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9072 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9073 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9074 // until we learned about an additional block.
9076 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9077 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9081 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9082 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9085 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9086 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9087 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9088 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9090 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9091 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9094 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9095 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9097 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9098 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9099 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9101 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9102 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9103 if test_height_before_timelock {
9104 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9105 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9106 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9107 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9109 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9110 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9111 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9112 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9113 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9114 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9116 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9117 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9119 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9120 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9121 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9122 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9123 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9124 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9127 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9128 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9129 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9130 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9131 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9132 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9133 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9134 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9135 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9140 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9141 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9142 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9146 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9147 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9148 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9150 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9155 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9156 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9157 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9158 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9159 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9160 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9162 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9163 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9164 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9173 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9175 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9176 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9177 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9180 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9182 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9186 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9188 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9190 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9191 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9192 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9194 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9195 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9196 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9197 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9198 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9200 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9201 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9202 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9203 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9205 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9206 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9207 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9208 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9209 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9210 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9211 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9212 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9214 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9215 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9216 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9217 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9218 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9219 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9220 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9222 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9223 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9224 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9225 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9229 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9230 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9232 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9233 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9234 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9237 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9238 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9239 // the commitment state.
9240 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9242 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9244 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9245 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9248 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9250 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9251 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9253 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9254 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9256 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9257 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9261 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9265 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9267 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9268 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9269 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9270 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9271 let params = RouteParameters {
9272 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9273 final_value_msat: 10000,
9274 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9276 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9277 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9279 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9280 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9282 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9284 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9285 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9286 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9287 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9291 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9297 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9298 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9299 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9300 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9302 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9303 let params = RouteParameters {
9304 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9305 final_value_msat: 10000,
9306 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9308 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9309 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9310 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9311 let route = find_route(
9312 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9313 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9316 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9317 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9322 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9323 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9324 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9327 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9328 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9329 enum ExposureEvent {
9330 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9332 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9334 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9335 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9338 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9339 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9342 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9343 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9344 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9345 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9346 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9347 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9348 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9349 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9352 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9353 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9358 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9359 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9360 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9361 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9363 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9365 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9366 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9367 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9369 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9372 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9373 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9377 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9378 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9381 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9384 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9385 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9386 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9388 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9389 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9390 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9391 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9393 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9394 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9396 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9397 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9399 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9400 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9403 if dust_outbound_balance {
9404 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9405 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9406 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9407 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9408 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9409 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9412 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9413 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9414 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9415 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9416 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9420 if dust_outbound_balance {
9421 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9422 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9423 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9424 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9425 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9428 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9429 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9430 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9431 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9436 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9437 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9438 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9439 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9440 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9442 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9443 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9444 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9446 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9448 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9449 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9450 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9452 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9454 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9455 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9456 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9458 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9459 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9460 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9461 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9463 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9464 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9466 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9467 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9468 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9470 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9471 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9473 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9475 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9478 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9479 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9480 added_monitors.clear();
9484 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9485 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9486 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9487 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9488 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9489 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9490 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9491 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9492 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9493 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9494 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9495 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9496 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);