_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use crate::ln::msgs;
  31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 562 }
 563
 564 #[test]
 565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 584 }
 585
 586 #[test]
 587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 593
 594         {
 595                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 596                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 597         }
 598         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 600
 601         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 602         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 603         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 604                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 605                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 606                 },
 607                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 608         };
 609         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 610
 611         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 612         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 614
 615         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 616         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 618
 619         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 620         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 627 }
 628
 629 #[test]
 630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 635         let channel_value = 5000;
 636         let push_sats = 700;
 637         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 638         let channel_id = chan.2;
 639         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 641         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 642
 643         let opt_anchors = false;
 644
 645         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 646         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 647         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 648         // remote limit.
 649         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 650         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 651         {
 652                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 653                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 654         }
 655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 657         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 658
 659         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 660
 661         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 662
 663         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 664         {
 665                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 666
 667                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 668                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 669                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 670                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 671                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 672                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 673         }
 674
 675         {
 676                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 677                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 678                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 679         }
 680         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 681         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 683
 684         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 685
 686         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 687         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 688         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 697                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 698                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 703                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 704         };
 705
 706         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 707         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 708                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 709
 710         let res = {
 711                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 713                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 714                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 715                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 716                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 717                         push_sats,
 718                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 719                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 720                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 721                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 722                         &mut htlcs,
 723                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 724                 );
 725                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 726         };
 727
 728         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 729                 channel_id: chan.2,
 730                 signature: res.0,
 731                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 732         };
 733
 734         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 735                 channel_id: chan.2,
 736                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 737         };
 738
 739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 740
 741         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 742         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 743         //Should produce and error.
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 745         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 749 }
 750
 751 #[test]
 752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 756         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 757         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 758
 759         // balancing
 760         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 761
 762         {
 763                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 764                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 765         }
 766         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 768
 769         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 770         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 771         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 772                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 773                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 774                 },
 775                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 776         };
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 778         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 779         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 781
 782         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 783
 784         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 785         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 786         {
 787                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 789                 added_monitors.clear();
 790         }
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 792         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 793         // node[1] has nothing to do
 794
 795         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 797         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 798
 799         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 800         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 801         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 805         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 806
 807         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 812         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 815         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 817         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 818
 819         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 825         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 826         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 827
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 831
 832         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 833
 834         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 836         match events[0] {
 837                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 839         };
 840
 841         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 842
 843         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 844         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 845         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 848 }
 849
 850 #[test]
 851 fn test_update_fee() {
 852         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 853         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 855         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 856         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 857         let channel_id = chan.2;
 858
 859         // A                                        B
 860         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 861         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 862         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 863         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 864         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 865         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 866         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 867         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 868         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 869         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 870         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 871         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 872
 873         // Create and deliver (1)...
 874         let feerate;
 875         {
 876                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 877                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 878                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 879         }
 880         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 882
 883         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 884         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 885         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 886                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 887                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 888                 },
 889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 890         };
 891         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 892
 893         // Generate (2) and (3):
 894         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 895         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 897
 898         // Deliver (2):
 899         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 900         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902
 903         // Create and deliver (4)...
 904         {
 905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 911         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 912         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 913                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 914                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 915                 },
 916                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 917         };
 918
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 922         // ... creating (5)
 923         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 925
 926         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 929         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 930         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 931
 932         // Deliver (5):
 933         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 934         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 936
 937         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 938         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 939         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 944         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946
 947         // Deliver (7)
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 950         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 952
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 956
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 959         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 962 }
 963
 964 #[test]
 965 fn fake_network_test() {
 966         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 967         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 971         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 972
 973         // Create some initial channels
 974         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 975         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 976         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 977
 978         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 983
 984         // Send some more payments
 985         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 988
 989         // Test failure packets
 990         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 991         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 992
 993         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 994         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
 995
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003
1004         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019                 fee_msat: 0,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021         });
1022         hops.push(RouteHop {
1023                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1028                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029         });
1030         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033
1034         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050         });
1051         hops.push(RouteHop {
1052                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053                 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055                 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1057                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058         });
1059         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062
1063         // Claim the rebalances...
1064         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066
1067         // Close down the channels...
1068         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 }
1081
1082 #[test]
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086         // commitment dance rounds.
1087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093
1094         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099         }
1100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101
1102         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106
1107         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109         // another HTLC.
1110         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111         {
1112                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1116         }
1117
1118         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120         {
1121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1123         }
1124
1125         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129
1130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137
1138         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141
1142         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143
1144         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148
1149         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153
1154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160         }
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177
1178         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181                 match event {
1182                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184                         },
1185                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1186                 };
1187         }
1188
1189         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1191         }
1192
1193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1194 }
1195
1196 #[test]
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204
1205         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211
1212         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213
1214         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216
1217         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219
1220         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1223 }
1224
1225 #[test]
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234
1235         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1236
1237         // balancing
1238         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241
1242         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245
1246         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250
1251         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253
1254         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1261                 }
1262         }
1263         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264
1265         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269
1270         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272
1273         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281                 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282         } else {
1283                 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1284         };
1285
1286         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288
1289         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292
1293         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297
1298         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1300         for e in events {
1301                 match e {
1302                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306                         },
1307                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313                         },
1314                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326
1327         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329
1330         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1335         match err {
1336                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1337                         match &fails[0] {
1338                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1341                         }
1342                 },
1343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344         }
1345         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347
1348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1349 }
1350
1351 #[test]
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358
1359         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363
1364         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365
1366         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1370                 channel_id: chan.2,
1371                 htlc_id: 0,
1372                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1376         };
1377
1378         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379
1380         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383
1384         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385
1386         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387
1388         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396
1397                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402         };
1403         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1411         };
1412
1413         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1416
1417         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420
1421         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422                 offered: false,
1423                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425                 payment_hash,
1426                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1427         };
1428
1429         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1430
1431         let res = {
1432                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1436                         commitment_number,
1437                         95000,
1438                         local_chan_balance,
1439                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441                         feerate_per_kw,
1442                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444                 );
1445                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1446         };
1447
1448         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1449                 channel_id: chan.2,
1450                 signature: res.0,
1451                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1452         };
1453
1454         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457
1458         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463         };
1464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465
1466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469         match events[0] {
1470                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473                 },
1474                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475         };
1476         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478
1479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1480 }
1481
1482 #[test]
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488         // this situation.
1489         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494         let opt_anchors = false;
1495
1496         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498
1499         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500
1501         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502
1503         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1506         }
1507
1508         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1514 }
1515
1516 #[test]
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524         let opt_anchors = false;
1525
1526         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533
1534         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1537         }
1538
1539         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548                 channel_id: chan.2,
1549                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1554         };
1555
1556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1564 }
1565
1566 #[test]
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572
1573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577         let opt_anchors = false;
1578
1579         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586
1587         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591         // commitment transaction fee.
1592         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593
1594         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1597         }
1598
1599         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1603 }
1604
1605 #[test]
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615         let opt_anchors = false;
1616
1617         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618         // HTLC.
1619         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623
1624         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631
1632         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634         match msg_events[0] {
1635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637                 },
1638                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1639         }
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651
1652         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658
1659         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665
1666         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1680
1681         let feemsat = 239;
1682         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686
1687         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691
1692         // Add a pending HTLC.
1693         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694         let payment_event_1 = {
1695                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697
1698                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701         };
1702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703
1704         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709
1710         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1718                 channel_id: chan.2,
1719                 htlc_id: 1,
1720                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1724         };
1725
1726         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748
1749         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752
1753         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1755 }
1756
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1759 }
1760
1761 #[test]
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773
1774         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776
1777         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779
1780         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781                 ($node: expr) => {{
1782                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1786                         payment_event
1787                 }}
1788         }
1789
1790         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794
1795         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796
1797         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798         {
1799                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804
1805                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1809         }
1810
1811         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813         loop {
1814                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1821                         break;
1822                 }
1823
1824                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825                         .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829
1830                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1835                 );
1836
1837                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1842         }
1843
1844         // adding pending output.
1845         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854         // policy.
1855         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858
1859         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860         let payment_event_1 = {
1861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863
1864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867         };
1868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869
1870         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872         {
1873                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1877         }
1878
1879         // split the rest to test holding cell
1880         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884         {
1885                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1887         }
1888
1889         // now see if they go through on both sides
1890         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896
1897         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898         {
1899                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1904         }
1905
1906         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912
1913         // flush the pending htlc
1914         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917
1918         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922
1923         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927
1928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931
1932         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933
1934         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937
1938         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940
1941         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947
1948         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955
1956         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958         match events[0] {
1959                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1963                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1964                         match &purpose {
1965                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1966                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1967                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1968                                 },
1969                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1970                         }
1971                 },
1972                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1973         }
1974         match events[1] {
1975                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1976                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1977                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1978                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1979                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1980                         match &purpose {
1981                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1982                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1983                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1984                                 },
1985                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1986                         }
1987                 },
1988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1989         }
1990
1991         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1992         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1993         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1994
1995         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1996         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1997         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1998
1999         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2000         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2001         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2002         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2003         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2004
2005         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2006         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2007 }
2008
2009 #[test]
2010 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2011         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2012         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2013         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2014         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2015         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2016         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2017         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2018         // To test this we:
2019         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2020         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2021         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2022         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2023         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2024         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2025         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2026         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2027         //    claim,
2028         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2029         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2030         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2031         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2032         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2033         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2035         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2036         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2037         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2038
2039         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2040         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2041         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2042         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2043         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2044
2045         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2046         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2047         let send_1 = {
2048                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2049                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2050                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2051                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2052                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2053         };
2054
2055         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2056         // initial fulfill/CS.
2057         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2058         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2060         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2061
2062         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2063         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2064         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2065         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2067         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2068
2069         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2070         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2072         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2073         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2076         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2079         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080
2081         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2083         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2084
2085         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2087         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2088
2089         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2092
2093         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2094         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2095         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2096         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2097         // on-chain as necessary).
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2099         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2101         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2102         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2103
2104         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2107
2108         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2109         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2110
2111         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2112         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2113         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2115         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2116         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2117
2118         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2119         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2120         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2121         let send_2 = {
2122                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2123                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2124                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2125                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2126                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2127         };
2128
2129         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2130         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2132         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2135
2136         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2139
2140         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142
2143         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2146         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2147
2148         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2151
2152         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2154
2155         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2156         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2157
2158         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2159         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2160 }
2161
2162 #[test]
2163 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2164         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2165         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2169         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2170
2171         // Create some initial channels
2172         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2174         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2175         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2176
2177         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2178         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2179         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2180         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2181         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2182         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2183
2184         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2188         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2189
2190         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2191         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2194         {
2195                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2197                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2198                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2199                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2200         }
2201         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2202         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2203         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2204         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2205         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2206
2207         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2208         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2209
2210         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2211         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2212         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2213         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2215         {
2216                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2218                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2219                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2220                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2222         }
2223         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2224         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2225         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2226         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2227         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2228
2229         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2230                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2231                         {
2232                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2233                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2234                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2235
2236                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2237                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2238                                 match events[0] {
2239                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2240                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2241                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2242                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2243                                         },
2244                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2245                                 };
2246                         }
2247                 }
2248         }
2249
2250         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2251         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2252         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2254         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2255         let node2_commitment_txid;
2256         {
2257                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2258                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2259                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2260                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2261
2262                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2263                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2264                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2265                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2266                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2267         }
2268         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2269         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2270         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2271         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2272         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2273
2274         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2275         // confusing us in the following tests.
2276         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2277
2278         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2279         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2280         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2281         // buffer space).
2282
2283         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2284                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2285                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2286                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2287                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2288                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2289                                 msg.clone()
2290                         },
2291                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292                 };
2293                 match events[1] {
2294                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2295                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2296                         },
2297                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2298                 }
2299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2300
2301                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2302                 {
2303                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2304                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2305                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2306                                         false
2307                                 } else { true }
2308                         });
2309                 }
2310
2311                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2312
2313                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2314                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2315
2316                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2317                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2318                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2319                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2320                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2321                                 msg.clone()
2322                         },
2323                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324                 };
2325                 match events[1] {
2326                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2327                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2328                         },
2329                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2330                 }
2331                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2332                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2333
2334                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2335                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2336                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2337         };
2338         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2339         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2340         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2341         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2342
2343         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2344                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2345         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2346         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2347 }
2348
2349 #[test]
2350 fn test_justice_tx() {
2351         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2352         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2353         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2354         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2355         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2356         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2357         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2358         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2359         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2360         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2361         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2362         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2363         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2367         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2368         // Create some new channels:
2369         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2370
2371         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2372         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2373         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2374         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2375         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2376         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2377         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2378         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2379         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2380         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2381         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2382         // Revoke the old state
2383         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2384
2385         {
2386                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2387                 {
2388                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2389                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2390                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2391
2392                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2393                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2394                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2395                 }
2396                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2397                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2398                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2399
2400                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2401                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2402                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2403                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2404                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2405                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2406                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2407                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2408                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2409         }
2410         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2411
2412         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2413         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2414
2415         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2416         // Create some new channels:
2417         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2418         {
2419                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2420                 node_txn.clear();
2421         }
2422
2423         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2424         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2425         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2426         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2427         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2428         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2429         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2430         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2431         // Revoke the old state
2432         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2433         {
2434                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435                 {
2436                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2437                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2438                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2439
2440                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2442                 }
2443                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2444                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2445
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2449                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2450                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2451                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2452                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2453         }
2454         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2455         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2457 }
2458
2459 #[test]
2460 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2461         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2462         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2463         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2464         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2465         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2466         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2467         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2468         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2469         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2470         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2471         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2472         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2473         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2474         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2475
2476         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2477         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2479         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2480         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2481         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2482
2483         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2485
2486         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2487         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2488         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2490         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2491 }
2492
2493 #[test]
2494 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2495         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2496         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2497         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2501
2502         // Create some new channel:
2503         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2504
2505         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2506         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2507         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2508         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2509         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2510
2511         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2512         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2515         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2516         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2517         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2518         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2519         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520
2521         //Revoke the old state
2522         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2523
2524         {
2525                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2527                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2528                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2530                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2531                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2532                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2533
2534                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2535                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2536
2537                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2538                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2539
2540                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2541                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2542                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2543                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2544                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2545                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2546                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2547                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2548
2549                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2550                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2551                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2552
2553                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2558         }
2559         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2562 }
2563
2564 #[test]
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2572
2573         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2574
2575         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2581
2582         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2584
2585         //Revoke the old state
2586         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587
2588         {
2589                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2599                 }
2600
2601                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2603
2604                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2606
2607                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2614
2615                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2619
2620                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2623
2624                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2632
2633                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2640         }
2641         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2644 }
2645
2646 #[test]
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2656         // towards B.
2657         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660         // PaymentSent event).
2661
2662         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2666
2667         // Create some initial channels
2668         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2669         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2670
2671         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2676
2677         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2680
2681         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2683
2684         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2699
2700         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2706         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2707         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2708         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2709         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2710         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2713         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2714         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2715         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2716         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2717
2718         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2719         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2720         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2721         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2722         {
2723                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2724                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2725                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2726                 added_monitors.clear();
2727         }
2728         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2729         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2730         match forwarded_events[0] {
2731                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733         }
2734         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2735         match forwarded_events[1] {
2736                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2737                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2738                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2739                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2740                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741                 },
2742                 _ => panic!()
2743         }
2744         match forwarded_events[2] {
2745                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2746                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2747                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2748                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2749                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750                 },
2751                 _ => panic!()
2752         }
2753         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2754         {
2755                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2756                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2757                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2758                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2759                 added_monitors.clear();
2760         }
2761         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2762         match events[0] {
2763                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765         }
2766         match events[1] {
2767                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2768                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2769         }
2770
2771         match events[2] {
2772                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2773                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2774                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2775                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2776                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2777                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2778                 },
2779                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2780         };
2781         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2782                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2783                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2784                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2785                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2786                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2787                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2788                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2789                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2790                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2791                         if $htlc_offered {
2792                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2795                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2796                         } else {
2797                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2800                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2801                         }
2802                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2803                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2804                         node_txn.clear();
2805                 } }
2806         }
2807         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2808         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2809         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2811
2812         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2814         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821         assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2822         let commitment_spend =
2823                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2824                         if node_txn.len() == 6 {
2825                                 // In some block `ConnectionStyle`s we may avoid broadcasting the double-spending
2826                                 // transactions spending the HTLC outputs of C's commitment transaction. Otherwise,
2827                                 // check that the extra broadcasts (double-)spend those here.
2828                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2829                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2830                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2831                         }
2832                         &node_txn[0]
2833                 } else {
2834                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2837                         &node_txn[2]
2838                 };
2839
2840         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2841         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2842         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2843         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2845         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2846         let funding_spend_offset = if node_txn.len() == 6 { 3 } else { 1 };
2847         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset], chan_1.3);
2848         assert_eq!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2849         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 1], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2850         check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 2], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2851         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2852         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2853
2854         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2855         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2856         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2857         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2858         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2860         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2861         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2862         let mut first_claimed = false;
2863         for event in events {
2864                 match event {
2865                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2866                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2867                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2868                                         first_claimed = true;
2869                                 } else {
2870                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2871                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2872                                 }
2873                         },
2874                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2875                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2876                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2877                 }
2878         }
2879         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2880 }
2881
2882 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2883         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2884         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2885         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2886         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2887         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2888         //            \                                  \
2889         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2890
2891         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2894         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2895         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2896         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2897         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898
2899         // Create some intial channels
2900         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2901         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2902
2903         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2904         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2905         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2906
2907         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2908
2909         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2910         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2911         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2912         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2914         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916
2917         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2918         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2919         match events[0] {
2920                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2921                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2922                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2923                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2924                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2926                 },
2927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928         };
2929         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2930         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2934         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2935         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2936         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2937
2938         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2939         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2940         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2941         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2942         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2943         let timeout_tx;
2944         {
2945                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2948                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2949
2950                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2952
2953                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2954                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2957
2958                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2959                 node_txn.clear();
2960         }
2961
2962         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2964         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2965
2966         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2967
2968         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2970         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2971         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2972         match events[0] {
2973                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2974                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2975                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2976                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2977                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2978                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2979                 },
2980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981         };
2982
2983         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2984         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2985         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2986
2987         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2988         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2989
2990         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2992         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2993         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2994         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2995         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2996         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2997         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2998         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2999 }
3000
3001 #[test]
3002 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3003         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3004         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3005         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3006 }
3007
3008 #[test]
3009 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3010         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3011         // and fail backward accordingly.
3012
3013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3016         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3017
3018         // Create some initial channels
3019         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3020         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3021
3022         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3023         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3024         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3025         // Revoke the old state
3026         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3027
3028         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3029
3030         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3031         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3032         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3034         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3035
3036         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3038         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3039         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3040         match events[0] {
3041                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3042                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3043                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3044                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3045                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3046                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3047
3048                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3049                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3050                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3051                 },
3052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3053         }
3054 }
3055
3056 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3057         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3058         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3059         // commitment transaction anymore.
3060         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3061         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3062         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3063         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3064         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3065         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3066         // transactions:
3067         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3068         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3069         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3070         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3071         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3075         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3076
3077         // Create some initial channels
3078         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3079         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3080
3081         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3082         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3083         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3084         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3085         // Revoke the old state
3086         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3087
3088         let value = if use_dust {
3089                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3090                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3091                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3092         } else { 3000000 };
3093
3094         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3095         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3096         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3097
3098         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3099         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3101         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3102         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3103         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3104         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3105         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3106         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3107         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3108         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3109         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3110
3111         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3112         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3114         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3115         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3116         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3117         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3118         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3119         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3120         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3121         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3123         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3124         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3125         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3127
3128         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3129         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3132         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3133         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3135         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3137         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3138         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3139         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3140         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3142         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3143         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3144         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3146
3147         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3148         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3149         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3150         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3151         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3152         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3154
3155         if deliver_bs_raa {
3156                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3157                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3158                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3161                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3162                 match events[0] {
3163                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165                 };
3166                 match events[1] {
3167                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3168                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3169                 }
3170                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3171                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3172         }
3173
3174         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3175         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3176
3177         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3179         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3180
3181         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3182         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3183         match events[0] {
3184                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3186         }
3187         match events[1] {
3188                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3189                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3190                 },
3191                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192         }
3193         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3194                 match events[2] {
3195                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3196                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3197                 };
3198                 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3199                 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3200                 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3201                 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3202                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3203                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3204                         },
3205                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206                 }
3207         }
3208         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3210
3211         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3212         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3213         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3214                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3215                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216         }
3217         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3218                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3219                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3220                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3221                 },
3222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223         }
3224         if deliver_bs_raa {
3225                 match events[0] {
3226                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3227                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3228                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3229                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3230                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3231                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3232                         },
3233                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234                 }
3235         }
3236         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3237                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3238                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3239                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3240                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3241                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3242                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3243
3244                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3245                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3246                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3247
3248                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3249
3250                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3251                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3252                         match events[0] {
3253                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3254                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3255                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3256                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3257                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3258                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3259                                         }
3260                                 },
3261                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262                         }
3263                         match events[1] {
3264                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3265                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3266                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3267                                 },
3268                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269                         }
3270                         match events[2] {
3271                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3272                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3273                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3274                                 },
3275                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276                         }
3277                 },
3278                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3279         }
3280
3281         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3282         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3283         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3284 }
3285
3286 #[test]
3287 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3288         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3289         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3290         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3291         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3292 }
3293
3294 #[test]
3295 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3296         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3297         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3298         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3299         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3300 }
3301
3302 #[test]
3303 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3308         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3309
3310         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3311         {
3312                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3313                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3314                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3315
3316                 let payment_event = {
3317                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3318                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3319                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3320                 };
3321                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3322                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3323         }
3324
3325         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3326         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3327         {
3328                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3330
3331                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3332         }
3333
3334         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3335         {
3336                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3337
3338                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3339                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3340                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3341                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3342                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3343                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3344
3345                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3346                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3347                         channel_id: chan.2,
3348                         htlc_id: 0,
3349                         amount_msat: 0,
3350                         payment_hash,
3351                         cltv_expiry,
3352                         onion_routing_packet,
3353                 };
3354                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3355         }
3356         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3357         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3358         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3359         match events[0] {
3360                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3361                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3362                 },
3363                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3364         }
3365         match events[1] {
3366                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3367                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3368                 },
3369                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3370         }
3371         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3373 }
3374
3375 #[test]
3376 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3377         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3378         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3382         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3383         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3384                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3385                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3386                 // connect_style.
3387                 return;
3388         }
3389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3390
3391         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3392         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3393         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3394         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397
3398         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3399         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3400         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3401
3402         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3403         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3404         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3407
3408         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3409         // registering new transactions
3410         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3411 }
3412
3413 #[test]
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3422
3423         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3424
3425         let mut payment_event = {
3426                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428
3429                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3432         };
3433
3434         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3436
3437         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3438
3439         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3443
3444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3449
3450         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3453
3454         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3458         let tx = {
3459                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3464                 node_txn.remove(0)
3465         };
3466
3467         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3468
3469         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3473
3474         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3475         {
3476                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3478         }
3479         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3486
3487         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3488 }
3489
3490 #[test]
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3496
3497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3502
3503         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3504
3505         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3511
3512         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3514
3515         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3517 }
3518
3519 #[test]
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3527
3528         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3533         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3535
3536         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3538
3539         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3540
3541         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3543
3544         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3546         // broadcasted.
3547         {
3548                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3549         }
3550
3551         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555
3556         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3558 }
3559
3560 #[test]
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3569
3570         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573
3574         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3578
3579         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3582
3583         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3587
3588         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590
3591         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3593
3594         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3595         {
3596                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3598                 match events[0] {
3599                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3602                         },
3603                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604                 }
3605                 match events[1] {
3606                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3609                         },
3610                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611                 }
3612                 match events[2] {
3613                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615                 }
3616         }
3617
3618         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3620 }
3621
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3628
3629         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3632                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3636                 chan_id
3637         } else {
3638                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2
3639         };
3640
3641         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3642
3643         let payment_event = {
3644                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646
3647                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3648                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3649                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3650         };
3651         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3652
3653         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3654                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3655         } else {
3656                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3657                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3658                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3659                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3660                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3661
3662                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3663                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3664                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3665                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3666
3667                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3668                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3669                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3670                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3671                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3672
3673                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3674                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3675                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3676                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3677                                         }
3678                                 }
3679                         }
3680                 }
3681         }
3682
3683         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3686                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3687                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3688                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3689                         //
3690                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3691                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3692                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3693                         //
3694                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3695                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3696                 }
3697                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3698                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3699                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3700         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3701                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3702                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3703         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3704                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3705                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3706         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3707                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3708                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3710                 // Everything was delivered...
3711                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712         }
3713
3714         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3715         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3716                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3717                 match events_1[0] {
3718                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3719                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720                 };
3721                 match events_1[1] {
3722                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3723                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724                 };
3725         } else {
3726                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3727                 match events_1[0] {
3728                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3729                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730                 };
3731         }
3732
3733         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3734         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3735         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3736
3737         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3738
3739         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3740         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3741         match events_2[0] {
3742                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3743                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3745                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3746                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3747                         match &purpose {
3748                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3749                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3750                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3751                                 },
3752                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3753                         }
3754                 },
3755                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3756         }
3757
3758         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3760         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3761
3762         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3763         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3764         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3765                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3766                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3768                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3769                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3770                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3771                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3772                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3773                 },
3774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775         };
3776
3777         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3778                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3779
3780                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3782                 match events_4[0] {
3783                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3784                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3785                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3786                         },
3787                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788                 }
3789
3790                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3791                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3792                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3793                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3794
3795                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3796                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3797                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3798                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3799
3800                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3801                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3802                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3803                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3804                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3805
3806                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3807                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3808                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3810                                         }
3811                                 }
3812                         }
3813                 }
3814         }
3815
3816         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3817         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3818         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3819                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3820                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3821                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3822                 } else {
3823                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3824                 }
3825         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3826                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3827                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3828         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3829                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3830                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3832                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3833                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3834         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3835                 // Everything was delivered...
3836                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3837         }
3838
3839         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3840                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3841         }
3842
3843         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3844         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3846
3847         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3848                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3849         }
3850
3851         // Channel should still work fine...
3852         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3853         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3854         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3855 }
3856
3857 #[test]
3858 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3859         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3860         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3861         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3862         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3863 }
3864
3865 #[test]
3866 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3867         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3868         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3869         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3870         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3871 }
3872
3873 #[test]
3874 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3875         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3876         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3877         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3878         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3879         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3880         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3881         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3882         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3883         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3884
3885         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3886
3887         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3888         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3889         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3890         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3891         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3892         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3893
3894         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3895         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3896         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3897 }
3898
3899 #[test]
3900 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3901         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3902         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3903         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3904         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3905         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3906         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3907         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3908
3909         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3910
3911         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3912         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3913         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3915
3916         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3918         match events_1[0] {
3919                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3921         }
3922
3923         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3924         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3926
3927         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3928         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3929         match events_2[0] {
3930                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3931                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3932                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3933                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3934                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3935                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3936                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3937
3938                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3939                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3940                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3941                         match events_3[0] {
3942                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3943                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3944                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3945                                 },
3946                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3947                         }
3948
3949                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3950                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3951                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3952                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3953                 },
3954                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3955         }
3956
3957         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3958         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3959
3960         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3961         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3962         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3963         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3964         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3965         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3966
3967         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3968         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3969         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3970         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3971
3972         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3973         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3974
3975         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3976         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3977
3978         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3979
3980         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3981         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3982         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3983         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3984         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3985         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3986         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3987         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3988         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3990
3991         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3992         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3993         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3994         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3995         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3996         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3997         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3999
4000         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4001         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4002         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4003         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4004         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4008
4009         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4010         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4013
4014         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4015         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4016         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4018
4019         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4020         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4022
4023         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4024
4025         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4026         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4027         match events_5[0] {
4028                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4029                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4030                         match &purpose {
4031                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4032                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4033                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4034                                 },
4035                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4036                         }
4037                 },
4038                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039         }
4040
4041         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4042         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4044
4045         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4047 }
4048
4049 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4050         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4051         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4056
4057         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4058
4059         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4060                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4061                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4062                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4063                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4064                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4065                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4066                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4067                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4069                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4070                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4071                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4072                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4073                 our_payment_hash
4074         } else {
4075                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4076         };
4077
4078         let mut block = Block {
4079                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4080                 txdata: vec![],
4081         };
4082         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4083         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4084         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4085         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4086                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4087                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4088                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4089         }
4090
4091         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4092
4093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4094         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4095         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4096         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4097         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4098         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4099
4100         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4101         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4102         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4103         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4104         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4105         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4106 }
4107
4108 #[test]
4109 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4110         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4111         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4112 }
4113
4114 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4115         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4116         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4117         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4119         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4120         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4121         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4122
4123         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4124         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4125         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4126         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4127
4128         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4129         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4130         {
4131                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4132         }
4133         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4135
4136         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4137         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4138         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4139         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4140         if forwarded_htlc {
4141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4142                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4143                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4144                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4145                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4146         }
4147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4148
4149         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4151         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4152         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4153
4154         if forwarded_htlc {
4155                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4156                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4157                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4158                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4159                 match fail_commit[0] {
4160                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4161                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4162                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4163                         },
4164                         _ => unreachable!(),
4165                 }
4166                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4167         } else {
4168                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4169         }
4170 }
4171
4172 #[test]
4173 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4174         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4175         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4176 }
4177
4178 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4179         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4180                 {
4181                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4182                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4183                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4184                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4185                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4186                                 match event {
4187                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4188                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4189                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4190                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4191                                                 }
4192                                         },
4193                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4194                                 };
4195                         }
4196                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4197                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4198                                         txn.push(tx);
4199                                 }
4200                         }
4201                         txn
4202                 }
4203         }
4204 }
4205
4206 #[test]
4207 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4208         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4212         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4213
4214         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4215         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4216         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4219         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4220         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4221         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4222         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4223
4224         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4226
4227         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4228         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4229         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4230         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4231         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4232 }
4233
4234 #[test]
4235 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4236         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4237         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4238         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4239         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4240         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4241         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4242
4243         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4244         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4245         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4247         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4248
4249         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4250         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4251         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4252         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4253
4254         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4255         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4256         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4257         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4258         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4259
4260         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4261         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4262         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4263 }
4264
4265 #[test]
4266 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4267         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4268         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4269
4270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4274
4275         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4276         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4277         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4278         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4279         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4280
4281         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4282         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4283         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4285         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4286
4287         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4288         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4289         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4290
4291         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4292         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4293         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4294         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4295         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4296 }
4297
4298 #[test]
4299 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4303         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4304
4305         // Create some initial channels
4306         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4307
4308         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4309
4310         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4311         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4312         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4313
4314         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4315         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4316         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4318         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4320         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4321         match events[0] {
4322                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4323                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4324         }
4325         match events[1] {
4326                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4327                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4328         }
4329
4330         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4331         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4332         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4333         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4334         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4335         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4336         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4337
4338         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4339         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4340         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4341
4342         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4343         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4344         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4345 }
4346
4347 #[test]
4348 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4353
4354         // Create some initial channels
4355         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4356
4357         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4358         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4359
4360         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4361
4362         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4363         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4364         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4365
4366         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4367         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4369         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4370         match events[0] {
4371                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4372                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4373         }
4374         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4375
4376         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4377         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4378         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4379         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4380         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4381         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4382
4383         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4384         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4385         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4386         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4387
4388         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4389         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4390         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4391         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4392         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4393 }
4394
4395 #[test]
4396 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4398         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4399         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4400         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4401
4402         // Create some initial channels
4403         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4404
4405         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4406         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4407         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4408         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4409
4410         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4411
4412         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4413         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4415         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4416
4417         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4418         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4419         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4420         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4421
4422         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4423         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4424
4425         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4426         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4427         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4428 }
4429
4430 #[test]
4431 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4432         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4433         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4436         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4437
4438         // Create some initial channels
4439         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4440
4441         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4442         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4443         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4444         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4445
4446         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4447
4448         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4449         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4450         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4452         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4453         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4454
4455         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4456         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4457         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4458         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4459         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4460         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4461         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4462
4463         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4464         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4465         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4466         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4468         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4469
4470         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4471         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4472         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4473         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4474         // transactions next...
4475         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4476         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4477
4478         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4479         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4480         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4481                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4482         } else {
4483                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4484                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4485         }
4486
4487         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4488         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4489
4490         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4491         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4492
4493         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4494         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4495         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4496         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4497         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4498 }
4499
4500 #[test]
4501 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4502         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4503         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4507
4508         // Create some initial channels
4509         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4510
4511         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4512         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4515
4516         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4517         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4518
4519         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4520
4521         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4522         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4523         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4525         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4526         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4527
4528         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4529         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4530         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4531         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4532
4533         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4534         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4535         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4536
4537         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4538         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4539         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4540         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4542         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4543
4544         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4545         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4546
4547         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4548         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4549         // transactions next...
4550         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4551         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4552         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4553                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4554         } else {
4555                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4556                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4557         }
4558
4559         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4560         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4561
4562         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4563
4564         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4565         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4566
4567         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4568         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4569
4570         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4571         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4572         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4573         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4574         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4575         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4576         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4577         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4578 }
4579
4580 #[test]
4581 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4582         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4583         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4584         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4585         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4586         // channel.
4587         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4588         // gets broadcast.
4589
4590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4593         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4594
4595         // Create some initial channels
4596         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4597         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4598
4599         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4600         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4601         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4603         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4604
4605         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4606         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4607         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4608
4609         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4610         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4611         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4612         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4613         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4615         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4616         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4617         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4618         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4619         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4620
4621         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4622         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4624         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4625
4626         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4627         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4628         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4629         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4630         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4631         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4632         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4633         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4634         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4635         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4636
4637         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4638         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4639         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4641         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4642         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4643         match events[0] {
4644                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4645                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4646         }
4647         match events[1] {
4648                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4649                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4650                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4651                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4652                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4653                 },
4654                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655         }
4656         {
4657                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4658                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4659                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4660                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4661                 b_txn.clear();
4662         }
4663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4664         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4666         match msg_events[0] {
4667                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4669         }
4670         match msg_events[1] {
4671                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4672                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4673         }
4674         match msg_events[2] {
4675                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4676                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4677                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4678                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4679                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4680                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4681                 },
4682                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4683         };
4684         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4685         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4686         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4688         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4689         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4690         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4691         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4692         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4693         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4694         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4695         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4696         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4697
4698         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4700 }
4701
4702 #[test]
4703 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4704         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4705         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4706         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4707         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4710         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4711         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4712         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4713         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4715                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4716         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4717
4718         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4719         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4720         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4721
4722         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4724         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4725         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4726         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4727
4728         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4729
4730         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4731         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4732         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4733         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4734         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4735                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4736         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4737         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4738
4739         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4740         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4741         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4742
4743         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4744         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4746         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4747         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4748
4749         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4750         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4751                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4752                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4753                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4754                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4755
4756                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4757                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4758
4759                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4760                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4761                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4762                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4763
4764                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4765                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4766                 } else {
4767                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4768                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4769                 }
4770
4771                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4773                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4774                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4775                 }
4776                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4777         }
4778
4779         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4780         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4781
4782         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4784         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4785         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4786         match events[0] {
4787                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4788                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4789         }
4790         match events[1] {
4791                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4792                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4793         }
4794         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4795         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4796         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4797         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4798         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4799         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4800         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4801         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4802         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4803         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4804         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4805         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4806         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4807
4808         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4809         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4810         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4811         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4812         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4813         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4814         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4815         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4816         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4818
4819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4821         {
4822                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4823         }
4824         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4825
4826         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4827         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4828         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4829         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4830         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4831         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4832         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4833         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4834         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4835         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4836         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4838
4839         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4840         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4841
4842         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4843         match events[0] {
4844                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4845                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4846                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4847                 }
4848                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4849         }
4850 }
4851
4852 #[test]
4853 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4854         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4855         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4856         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4857         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4858
4859         // Create some initial channels
4860         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4861
4862         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4863         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4864         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4865         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4866         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4867
4868         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4869         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4870         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872
4873         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4877         match events[0] {
4878                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4879                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4880         }
4881         match events[1] {
4882                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4883                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4884         }
4885         let node_tx = {
4886                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4887                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4888                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4889                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4891                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4892                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4893                 node_txn[0].clone()
4894         };
4895
4896         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4897         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4898
4899         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4900         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4901         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4902         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4903         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4904         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4905 }
4906
4907 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4908         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4909         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4910         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4911         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4912         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4913         // use the same payment hashes.
4914         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4915         //
4916         // A \         / E
4917         //    - C - D -
4918         // B /         \ F
4919         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4920         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4921         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4922         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4923         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4924         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4925         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4926         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4927                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4928         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4929
4930         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4931         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4932         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4933         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4934         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4935
4936         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4937         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4938         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4939         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4940
4941         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4942         // 0th HTLC:
4943         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4944         // 1st HTLC:
4945         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4946         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4947         // 2nd HTLC:
4948         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4949         // 3rd HTLC:
4950         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4951         // 4th HTLC:
4952         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4953         // 5th HTLC:
4954         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4955         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4956         // 6th HTLC:
4957         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4958         // 7th HTLC:
4959         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4960
4961         // 8th HTLC:
4962         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4963         // 9th HTLC:
4964         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4965         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4966
4967         // 10th HTLC:
4968         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4969         // 11th HTLC:
4970         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4971         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4972
4973         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4974         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4975         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4976         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4977         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4978
4979         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4980         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4981         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4982         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4983         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4984         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4986
4987         let failed_destinations = vec![
4988                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4989                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4990                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4991                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4992         ];
4993         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4995
4996         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4997         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4998         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4999         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5000         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5001         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5002
5003         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5004         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5005         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5007
5008         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5009                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5010                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5011         ];
5012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5014
5015         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5016         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5017         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5018         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5019
5020         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5021
5022         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5023         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5024                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5025                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5026                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5027                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5028                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5029                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5030         ];
5031         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5033         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5034         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5035         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5036         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5037         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5038         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5039         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5040         if deliver_last_raa {
5041                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5042         } else {
5043                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5044         }
5045
5046         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5047         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5048         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5049         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5050         //
5051         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5052         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5053         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5054         //
5055         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5056         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5057         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5058
5059         if announce_latest {
5060                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5061         } else {
5062                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5063         }
5064         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5065         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5066                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5067                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5068         } else {
5069                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5070                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5071         };
5072         match close_event {
5073                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5075         }
5076
5077         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5078         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5079         if deliver_last_raa {
5080                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5081
5082                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5083                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5084         } else {
5085                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5086                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5087                 } else {
5088                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5089                 };
5090
5091                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5092         }
5093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5094
5095         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5096         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5097         let mut a_done = false;
5098         for msg in cs_msgs {
5099                 match msg {
5100                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5101                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5102                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5103                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5104                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5105                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5106                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5107                                         }
5108                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5109                                         assert!(!a_done);
5110                                         a_done = true;
5111                                         &nodes[0]
5112                                 } else {
5113                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5114                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5115                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5116                                         }
5117                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5118                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5119                                         &nodes[1]
5120                                 };
5121                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5122                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5123                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5124                                 if announce_latest {
5125                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5126                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5127                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5128                                         }
5129                                 }
5130                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5131                         },
5132                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5133                 }
5134         }
5135
5136         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5137         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5138         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5139         let mut as_updates = 0;
5140         for event in as_events.iter() {
5141                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5142                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5143                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5144                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5145                         } else {
5146                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5147                         }
5148                         if network_update.is_some() {
5149                                 as_updates += 1;
5150                         }
5151                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5152         }
5153         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5154         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5155         if announce_latest {
5156                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5157                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5158         }
5159         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5160
5161         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5162         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5163         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5164         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5165         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5166                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5167                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5168                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5169                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5170                         } else {
5171                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5172                         }
5173                         if network_update.is_some() {
5174                                 bs_updates += 1;
5175                         }
5176                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5177         }
5178         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5179         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5180         if announce_latest {
5181                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5182         }
5183         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5184
5185         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5186         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5187         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5188         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5189         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5190         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5191 }
5192
5193 #[test]
5194 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5195         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5196 }
5197
5198 #[test]
5199 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5200         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5201 }
5202
5203 #[test]
5204 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5205         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5206         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5207         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5208 }
5209
5210 #[test]
5211 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5215         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5216
5217         // Create some initial channels
5218         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5219
5220         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5221         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5222         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5223         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5224
5225         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5226         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5227         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5229         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5230         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5231
5232         let htlc_timeout = {
5233                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5234                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5235                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5236                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5237                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5238                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5239                 node_txn[1].clone()
5240         };
5241
5242         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5243         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5244         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5245
5246         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5247         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5248         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5249         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5250         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5251         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5252         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5253         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5254         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5255         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5256                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5257 }
5258
5259 #[test]
5260 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5261         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5262         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5263         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5264
5265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5266
5267         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5268         let seed = [42; 32];
5269         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5270         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5271         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5272         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5273         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5274         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5275         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5276
5277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5278         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5279
5280         // Create some initial channels
5281         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5282         // for node 0
5283         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5284         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5285         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5286
5287         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5288         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5289         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5290         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5291         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5292
5293         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5294         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5295         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5296         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5297         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5298
5299         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5300         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5301         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5302         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5303             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5304             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5305             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5306                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5307         }
5308
5309         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5310         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5311         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5312         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5314         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5315
5316         let htlc_timeout = {
5317                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5318                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5319                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5320                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5321                 node_txn[1].clone()
5322         };
5323
5324         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5325         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5326         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5327
5328         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5329         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5330         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5331         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5332         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5333         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5334         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5335         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5336         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5337         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5338         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5339                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5340 }
5341
5342 #[test]
5343 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5344         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5346         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5347         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5348
5349         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5350
5351         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5352         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5353
5354         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5355         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5356         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5357
5358         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5359         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5360         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5361
5362         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5363         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5364         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5365
5366         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5367         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5368         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5369 }
5370
5371 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5372         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5374         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5375         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5376         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5377
5378         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5379
5380         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5381         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5382         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5384         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5385
5386         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5387         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5388         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5389
5390         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5392         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5393         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5395
5396         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5397         let mut block = Block {
5398                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5399                 txdata: vec![],
5400         };
5401         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5402                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5403                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5404         }
5405         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5406         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5408         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5409 }
5410
5411 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5415         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5416         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5417
5418         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5419         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5421
5422         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5423
5424         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5425         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5426         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5427
5428         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5429         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5430
5431         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5432                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5433                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5434         }
5435         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5436         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5438         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5439 }
5440
5441 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5442         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5443         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5444         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5445         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5446         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5447
5448         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5449         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5450         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5451         // actually revoked.
5452         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5453         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5454         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5455         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5457
5458         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5459         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5460         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5462         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5463         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5465         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5467         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5468
5469         if check_revoke_no_close {
5470                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5472         }
5473
5474         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5475         let mut block = Block {
5476                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5477                 txdata: vec![],
5478         };
5479         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5480                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5481                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5482         }
5483         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5484                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5485                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5487                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5488         } else {
5489                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5490         }
5491 }
5492
5493 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5494 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5495 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5496 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5497 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5498 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5499 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5500 // non-dust HTLCs.
5501 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5502 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5503 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5504 #[test]
5505 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5506         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5507         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5508
5509         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5510         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5511 }
5512
5513 #[test]
5514 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5515         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5516         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5517         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5518         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5519 }
5520
5521 #[test]
5522 #[should_panic]
5523 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5527         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5528         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5529         for node in nodes.iter() {
5530                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5531         }
5532
5533         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5534         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5535         let push_msat=10001;
5536         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5537         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5538         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5539         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5540
5541         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5542         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5543         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5544 }
5545
5546 #[test]
5547 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5551         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5552
5553         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5554         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5555         let push_msat=10001;
5556         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5557
5558         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5559         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5560         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5561         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5562         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5563
5564         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5565         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5566         let push_msat=10001;
5567         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5568         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5569         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5570
5571         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5572         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5573         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5574
5575         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5576         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5577         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5578
5579         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5580         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5581         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5582
5583         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5584         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5585         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5586         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5587         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5588         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5589 }
5590
5591 #[test]
5592 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5597
5598         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5599         let push_msat=10001;
5600         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5601         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5602         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5603         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5604
5605         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5606         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5607         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5608                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5609                         msg.clone()
5610                 },
5611                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5612         };
5613         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5614 }
5615
5616 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5617 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5618 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5619 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5620 #[test]
5621 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5622         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5623         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5624         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5625         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5626         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5627
5628         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5629         // pending_update_fee.
5630         {
5631                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5632                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5633         }
5634         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5636
5637         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5638         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5639         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5640                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5641                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5642                 },
5643                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5644         };
5645
5646         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5647
5648         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5649         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5650         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5651         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5652
5653         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5654         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5655         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5656
5657         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5658         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5659         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5660         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5661
5662         // Flush the pending fee update.
5663         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5664         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5666         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5668
5669         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5670         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5671         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5672         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5673         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5674         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5675         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5676                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5677         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5678
5679         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5680         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5681         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5682         match &events[0] {
5683                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5684                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5685                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5686                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5687                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5688                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5689                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5690                 },
5691                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5692         }
5693 }
5694
5695 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5696 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5697 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5698 #[test]
5699 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5703         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5704         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5705
5706         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5707         // pending_update_fee.
5708         {
5709                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5710                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5711         }
5712         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5714
5715         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5716         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5717         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5718                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5719                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5720                 },
5721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5722         };
5723
5724         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5725
5726         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5727         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5728         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5729         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5730
5731         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5732         let amt_1 = 20000;
5733         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5734         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5735         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5736
5737         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5738         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5739         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5740         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5741         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5742         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5743         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5744         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5745
5746         // Flush the pending fee update.
5747         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5748         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5751         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5753
5754         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5755         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5756         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5757         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5758         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5759         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5760         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5761                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5762         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5763
5764         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5765         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5766         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5767         match &events[0] {
5768                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5769                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5770                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5771                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5772                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5773                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5774                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5775                 },
5776                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5777         }
5778
5779         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5780         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5781                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5782                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5783                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5784         };
5785         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5786                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5788         };
5789         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5792         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5793         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5794         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5795         match events[0] {
5796                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5797                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5798         }
5799         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5800         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5801         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5802         match events[0] {
5803                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5804                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5805         }
5806         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5808         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5809
5810         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5811         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5812         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5813         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5814 }
5815
5816 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5817 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5818 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5819 // once it's freed.
5820 #[test]
5821 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5824         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5825         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5826         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5827         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5828         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5829         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5830         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5831         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5832
5833         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5834         // pending_update_fee.
5835         {
5836                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5837                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5838         }
5839         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5841
5842         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5843         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5844         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5845                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5846                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5847                 },
5848                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5849         };
5850
5851         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5852
5853         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5854         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5855         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5856         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5857
5858         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5859         let feemsat = 239;
5860         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5861         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5862         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5863         let payment_event = {
5864                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5865                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5866
5867                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5868                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5869
5870                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5871         };
5872         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5874         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5875         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5876
5877         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5878         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5879
5880         // Flush the pending fee update.
5881         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5882         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5884         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5885         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5887
5888         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5889         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5890         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5891
5892         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5893                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5894                         msg.clone()
5895                 },
5896                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5897         };
5898
5899         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5901         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5902
5903         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5904         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5905         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5906         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5907                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5909         }
5910
5911         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5912         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5914
5915         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5916         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5917         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5918         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5919                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5920                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5921                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5922                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5923                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5924                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5925                 },
5926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5927         };
5928
5929         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5930         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5931         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5932
5933         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5934         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5936         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5937         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5938         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5939         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5940         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5941         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5942                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5944         };
5945         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5946         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5948 }
5949
5950 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5951 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5952 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5953
5954 #[test]
5955 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5956         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5960         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5961         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5962
5963         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5964         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5965
5966         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5967                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5968         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5969         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5970 }
5971
5972 #[test]
5973 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5974         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5975         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5978         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5979         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5980
5981         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5982         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5983         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5984                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5985
5986         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5987         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5988 }
5989
5990 #[test]
5991 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5992         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5995         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5996         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5997         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5998
5999         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6000         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6002         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6003         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6004
6005         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6006         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6007         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6009         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6010 }
6011
6012 #[test]
6013 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6014         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6015         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6016         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6017         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6018         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6019         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6020         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6021
6022         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6023                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6024         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6025         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6026         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6027                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6028 }
6029
6030 #[test]
6031 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6032         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6033         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6034         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6035         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6036         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6037         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6038         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6039         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6040         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6041
6042         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6043                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6044                 let payment_event = {
6045                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6046                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6047
6048                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6049                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6050                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6051                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6052                         } else {
6053                                 assert!(false);
6054                         }
6055                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6056                 };
6057                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6058                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6059                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6060
6061                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6062                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6063         }
6064         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6065         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6066                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6067
6068         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6069         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6070 }
6071
6072 #[test]
6073 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6074         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6075         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6076         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6077         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6078         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6079         let channel_value = 100000;
6080         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6081         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6082
6083         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6084
6085         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6086         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6087         // limits us to.
6088         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6089         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6090                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6091
6092         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6093         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6094
6095         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6096 }
6097
6098 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6099 #[test]
6100 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6101         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6105         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6106         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6107         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6108         {
6109                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6110                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6111                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6112         }
6113
6114         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6115         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6117         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6118         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6119         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6120         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6121         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6122         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6125 }
6126
6127 #[test]
6128 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6129         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6133         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6134         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6135
6136         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6137         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6138         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6139         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6140         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6141         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6142
6143         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6144         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6145         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6147         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6148
6149         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6150         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6151         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6152         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6153         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6154
6155         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6156         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6157         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6159         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6160 }
6161
6162 #[test]
6163 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6164         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6165         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6169         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6170         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6171
6172         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6173         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6174         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6175         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6176         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6177         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6178
6179         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6180                 channel_id: chan.2,
6181                 htlc_id: 0,
6182                 amount_msat: 1000,
6183                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6184                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6185                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6186         };
6187
6188         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6189                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6190                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6191         }
6192         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6193         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6194
6195         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6196         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6197         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6200 }
6201
6202 #[test]
6203 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6204         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6205         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6206         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6207         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6208         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6209         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6210
6211         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6212         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6214         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6215         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6216         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6217
6218         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6219         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6220         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6222         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6223 }
6224
6225 #[test]
6226 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6227         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6231         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6232
6233         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6234         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6235         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6238         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6239         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6240
6241         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6242         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6243         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6246 }
6247
6248 #[test]
6249 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6250         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6251         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6252         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6253         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6254         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6255         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6256         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6257
6258         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6259         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6260         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6262         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6263         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6264
6265         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6266         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6267         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6268         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6269         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6270         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6271         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6272         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6273         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6274         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6275         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6276         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6277         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6278
6279         //Resend HTLC
6280         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6281         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6282         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6284         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6285
6286         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6287
6288         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6289         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6290         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6292         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6293 }
6294
6295 #[test]
6296 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6297         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6298
6299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6302         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6303         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6304         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6305         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6306
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6310
6311         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6312                 channel_id: chan.2,
6313                 htlc_id: 0,
6314                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6315         };
6316
6317         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6318
6319         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6320         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6321         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6323         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6324 }
6325
6326 #[test]
6327 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6328         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6329
6330         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6331         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6332         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6333         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6334         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6335
6336         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6337         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6339         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6340         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6341
6342         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6343                 channel_id: chan.2,
6344                 htlc_id: 0,
6345                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6346         };
6347
6348         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6349
6350         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6351         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6352         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6355 }
6356
6357 #[test]
6358 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6359         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6360
6361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6364         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6365         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6366
6367         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6368         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6370         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6371         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6372         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6373                 channel_id: chan.2,
6374                 htlc_id: 0,
6375                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6376                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6377         };
6378
6379         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6380
6381         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6382         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6383         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6385         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6386 }
6387
6388 #[test]
6389 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6390         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6391
6392         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6393         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6394         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6395         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6397
6398         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6399
6400         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6402         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6403
6404         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6405         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6406         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6407                 match events[0] {
6408                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6409                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6410                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6411                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6412                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6413                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6414                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6415                         },
6416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6417                 }
6418         };
6419
6420         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6421
6422         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6423
6424         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6425         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6426         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6428         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6429 }
6430
6431 #[test]
6432 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6433         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6434
6435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6438         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6439         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6440
6441         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6442
6443         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6445         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6446
6447         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6448         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6449         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6450                 match events[0] {
6451                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6452                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6453                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6454                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6455                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6456                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6457                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6458                         },
6459                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6460                 }
6461         };
6462
6463         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6464
6465         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6466
6467         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6468         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6469         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6471         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6472 }
6473
6474 #[test]
6475 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6476         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6477
6478         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6481         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6482         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6483
6484         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6485         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6487
6488         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6489         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6490
6491         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6493         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6494
6495         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6496
6497         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6498                 match events[0] {
6499                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6500                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6501                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6502                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6503                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6504                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6505                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6506                         },
6507                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6508                 }
6509         };
6510         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6511         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6512
6513         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6514         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6515         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6517         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6518 }
6519
6520 #[test]
6521 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6522         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6523         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6524
6525         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6528         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6529         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6530         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6531
6532         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6533
6534         //First hop
6535         let mut payment_event = {
6536                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6537                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6538                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6539                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6540                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6541         };
6542         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6544         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6545         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6546         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6547         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6549         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6550         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6551
6552         //Second Hop
6553         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6554         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6555         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6556         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6557
6558         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6559         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6560         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6561                 match events_3[0] {
6562                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6563                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6564                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6565                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6566                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6567                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6568                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6569                         },
6570                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6571                 }
6572         };
6573
6574         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6575
6576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6577         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6578         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6579         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6580         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6581
6582         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6583         match events_4[0] {
6584                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6585                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6586                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6587                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6588                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6589                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6590                 },
6591                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6592         };
6593
6594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6595 }
6596
6597 #[test]
6598 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6602         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6604         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6605
6606         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6607
6608         // First hop
6609         let mut payment_event = {
6610                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6611                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6612                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6613         };
6614
6615         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6616         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6617         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6619         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6620         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6621
6622         // Second Hop
6623         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6624         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6626         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6627
6628         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6629         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6630         match events_3[0] {
6631                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6632                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6633                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6634                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6635
6636                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6637                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6638                 },
6639                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6640         }
6641
6642         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6643                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6644                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6645         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6646         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648
6649         match events_4[0] {
6650                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6651                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6652                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6653                 },
6654                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6655         }
6656
6657         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6658         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6659
6660         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6661         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6662         match events_5[0] {
6663                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6664                         Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6665                 } => {
6666                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6667                         assert!(is_permanent);
6668                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6669                 },
6670                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6671         }
6672
6673         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6674 }
6675
6676 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6677         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6678         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6679         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6680
6681         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6682         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6683         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6684         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6685         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6686         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6687
6688         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6689
6690         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6691         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6692         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6693         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6694
6695         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6696         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6697
6698         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6699         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6701         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6703
6704         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6705         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6706         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708
6709         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6710         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6711
6712         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6713         match events[0] {
6714                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6715                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6716                 },
6717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6718         }
6719         match events[1] {
6720                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6721                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6722                 },
6723                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6724         }
6725
6726         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6727         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6728         if announce_latest {
6729                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6730         } else {
6731                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6732         }
6733
6734         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6736         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6737
6738         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6739         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6740         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6741         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6742         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6743         let mut first_failed = false;
6744         for event in events {
6745                 match event {
6746                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6747                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6748                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6749                                         first_failed = true;
6750                                 } else {
6751                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6752                                 }
6753                         }
6754                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6755                 }
6756         }
6757 }
6758
6759 #[test]
6760 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6761         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6762         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6763 }
6764
6765 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6766         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6767         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6768         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6769         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6770         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6771         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6772
6773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6776         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6778
6779         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6780
6781         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6782         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6783
6784         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6785         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6786
6787         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6788         if revoked {
6789                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6790                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6791         }
6792
6793         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6794         if local {
6795                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6797                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6800
6801                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6802                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6803                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6804                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6805                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6806                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6807                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6808                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6809                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6810                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6811                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6812         } else {
6813                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6814                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6815                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6816                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6818                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6819
6820                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6821                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6822                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6823                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6824                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6825                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6826                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6827
6828                 if !revoked {
6829                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6830                 } else {
6831                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6832                 }
6833                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6834                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6835                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6836                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6837                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6838         }
6839 }
6840
6841 #[test]
6842 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6843         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6844         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6845         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6846 }
6847
6848 #[test]
6849 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6850         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6851
6852         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6853         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6854         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6855         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6856         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6861
6862         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6863         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6864                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6865                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6866         {
6867                 match error {
6868                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6869                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6870                 }
6871         } else { assert!(false) }
6872
6873         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6874         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6875         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6876         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6877         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6878                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6879                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6880         {
6881                 match error {
6882                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6884                 }
6885         } else { assert!(false); }
6886
6887         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6888         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6889         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6890         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6891         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6892         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6893         let reason_msg;
6894         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6895                 match action {
6896                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6897                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6898                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6899                         },
6900                         _ => { panic!(); }
6901                 }
6902         } else { panic!(); }
6903         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6904
6905         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6906         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6907         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6908         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6909         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6910                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6911                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6912         {
6913                 match error {
6914                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6916                 }
6917         } else { assert!(false); }
6918 }
6919
6920 #[test]
6921 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6922         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6923         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6924         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6925
6926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6929         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6930
6931         // Create some initial channels
6932         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6933
6934         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6935         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6936         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6937         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6938         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6939         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6940         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942
6943         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6944         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6945         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6946         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6947         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6948
6949         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6950         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6952         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6953
6954         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6955         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6956         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6957
6958         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6959         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6960         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6961                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6962                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6963                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6964                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6965                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6966                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6967                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6968                 },
6969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6970         };
6971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6972
6973         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6974         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6975
6976         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6977         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6978         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6979         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6980 }
6981
6982 #[test]
6983 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6984         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6985         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6986
6987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6990         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6991
6992         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6993         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6994         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6995
6996         // Disconnect peers
6997         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6998         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6999
7000         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7001         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7002         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7003         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7004         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7005         for e in msg_events {
7006                 match e {
7007                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7008                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7009                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7010                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7011                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7012                                 }
7013                         },
7014                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7015                 }
7016         }
7017         // Reconnect peers
7018         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7019         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7020         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7021         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7022         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7023         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7024
7025         // Reestablish chan_1
7026         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7027         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7028         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7029         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7030         // Reestablish chan_2
7031         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7032         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7033         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7034         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7035         // Reestablish chan_3
7036         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7037         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7038         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7039         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7040
7041         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7042         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7043         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7044         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7045         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7046         for e in msg_events {
7047                 match e {
7048                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7049                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7050                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7051                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7052                                         // the old one.
7053                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7054                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7055                                 }
7056                         },
7057                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7058                 }
7059         }
7060         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7061         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7062 }
7063
7064 #[test]
7065 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7066         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7067         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7068
7069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7072         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7073
7074         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7075
7076         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7077         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7078                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7079         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7080         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7081
7082         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7083         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7084         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7085         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7086         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7087         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7088
7089         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7090         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7091                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7092                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7093                 }
7094         }
7095
7096         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7097         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7098
7099         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7100         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7101         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7102         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7104
7105         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7106         let penalty_1;
7107         let feerate_1;
7108         {
7109                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7110                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7111                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7112                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7113                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7114                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7115                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7116                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7117                 node_txn.clear();
7118         };
7119
7120         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7121         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7122         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7123         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7124         {
7125                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7126                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7127                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7128                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7129                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7130                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7131                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7132                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7133                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7134                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7135                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7136                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7137                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7138                         node_txn.clear();
7139                 }
7140         }
7141         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7142
7143         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7144         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7145         let penalty_3;
7146         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7147         {
7148                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7149                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7150                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7151                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7152                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7153                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7154                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7155                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7156                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7157                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7158                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7159                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7160                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7161                         node_txn.clear();
7162                 }
7163         }
7164         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7165
7166         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7167         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7168 }
7169
7170 #[test]
7171 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7172         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7173         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7174
7175         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7176         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7180
7181         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7182         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7183         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7184         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7185         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7186         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7187                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7188         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7189         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7190         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7191                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7192         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7193
7194         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7195         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7196         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7197
7198         // Revoke local commitment tx
7199         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7200
7201         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7202         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7203         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7204         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7206         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7207         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7208
7209         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7210         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7211         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7212
7213         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7214         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7215         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7216
7217         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7218         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7219         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7220         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7221
7222         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7223         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7224         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7225         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7226         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7227         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7228         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7229         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7230         match events.last().unwrap() {
7231                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7232                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7233         }
7234         let first;
7235         let feerate_1;
7236         let penalty_txn;
7237         {
7238                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7239                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7240                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7241
7242                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7243                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7244                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7245                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7246                 // future).
7247                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7248                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7249                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7250                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7251                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7252                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7253
7254                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7255                 // available, which we check here:
7256                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7257                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7258                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7259
7260                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7261                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7262
7263                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7264                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7265                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7266                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7267
7268                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7269                 // output, checked above).
7270                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7271                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7272                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7273
7274                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7275                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7276                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7277                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7278                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7279                 node_txn.clear();
7280         }
7281
7282         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7283         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7284         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7285         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7286         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7287
7288         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7289         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7290         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7291         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7292         let node_txn = {
7293                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7294                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7295
7296                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7297                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7298                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7299                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7300                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7301                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7302                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7303                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7304                 node_txn.clear();
7305                 txn
7306         };
7307         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7308         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7309         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7311         {
7312                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7313                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7314                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7315                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7316                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7317                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7318                 // up bumped justice generation.
7319                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7320                 node_txn.clear();
7321         }
7322         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7324 }
7325
7326 #[test]
7327 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7328         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7329         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7330
7331         // Create 2 HTLCs
7332         // Provide preimage for one
7333         // Check aggregation
7334
7335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7338         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7339
7340         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7341         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7342         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7343
7344         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7345         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7346         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7347         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7348         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7349
7350         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7351         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7352         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7353         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7355         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7356
7357         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7358         let timeout;
7359         let preimage;
7360         let preimage_bump;
7361         let feerate_timeout;
7362         let feerate_preimage;
7363         {
7364                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7365                 // 5 transactions including:
7366                 //   local commitment + HTLC-Success
7367                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7368                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7369                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7370                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7371                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7372                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7373                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7374                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7375
7376                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7377                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7378
7379                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7380                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7381                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7382                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7383
7384                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7385                         (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7386                 } else {
7387                         (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7388                 };
7389
7390                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7391                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7392                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7393
7394                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7395                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7396                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7397                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7398
7399                 node_txn.clear();
7400         };
7401         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7402         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7403
7404         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7405         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7406         {
7407                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7408                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7409                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7410                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7411                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7412                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7413
7414                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7415                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7416                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7417                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7418                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7419
7420                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7421                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7422                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7423                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7424                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7425
7426                 node_txn.clear();
7427         }
7428
7429         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7430         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7431 }
7432
7433 #[test]
7434 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7435         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7436         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7437         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7438         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7439         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7440         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7441         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7442         // implement that).
7443         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7444         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7445         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7446         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7447         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7448
7449         let per_commitment_secret;
7450         let next_per_commitment_point;
7451         {
7452                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7453                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7454
7455                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7456
7457                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7458                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7459                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7460
7461                 // Must revoke without gaps
7462                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7463                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7464
7465                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7466                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7467                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7468         }
7469
7470         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7471                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7472         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7474         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7475 }
7476
7477 #[test]
7478 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7479         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7480         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7481
7482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7485         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7486
7487         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7488         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7489         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7490         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7491
7492         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7493         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7494         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7495
7496         // Revoke local commitment tx
7497         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7498
7499         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7500         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7501         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7502         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7503
7504         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7505         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7507         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7508         let penalty_txn = {
7509                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7510                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7511                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7512                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7513                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7514                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7515                 node_txn.clear();
7516                 penalty_txn
7517         };
7518         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7519         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7520         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7521         {
7522                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7523                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7524                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7525         }
7526 }
7527
7528 #[test]
7529 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7530         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7531         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7532         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7536         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7537
7538         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7539         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7540         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7542         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7543
7544         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7545         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7546         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7549
7550         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7551         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7552         // can get our balance.
7553
7554         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7555         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7556         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7557         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7558         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7559         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7560         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7561         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7562
7563         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7564 }
7565
7566 #[test]
7567 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7568         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7569         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7570         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7571         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7572         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7573         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7574
7575         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7576
7577         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7578         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7579         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7580         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7581         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7582
7583         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7584         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7586         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7587
7588         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7590         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7591         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7592         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7593         match close_ev[0] {
7594                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7595                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7596                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7597                 },
7598                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7599         }
7600 }
7601
7602 #[test]
7603 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7608
7609         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7610         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7611         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7612
7613         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7614
7615         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7616         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7617         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7618         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7619 }
7620
7621 #[test]
7622 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7623         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7624         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7628         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7629
7630         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7631         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7632         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7633
7634         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7635         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7636         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7637 }
7638
7639 #[test]
7640 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7641         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7642         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7643         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7644         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7645         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7646
7647         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7648         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7649         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7650         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7651         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7652         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7653         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7654         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7655         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7656         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7657         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7658         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7659
7660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7663         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7664
7665         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7666         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7667         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7668         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7669         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7670
7671         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7672         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7673
7674         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7675         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7676         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7677         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7678         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7679         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7680
7681         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7682         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7683         // `channel_value`.
7684         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7685         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7686         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7687         // `channel_value`.
7688         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7689 }
7690
7691 #[test]
7692 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7693         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7694         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7695         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7696         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7697         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7698         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7699
7700         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7701         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7702
7703         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7704
7705         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7706         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7707         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7708
7709         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7710         match events[0] {
7711                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7712                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7713                 }
7714                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7715         }
7716
7717         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7718         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7719
7720         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7721                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7722                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7723                 }
7724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7725         }
7726
7727         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7728
7729         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7730         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7731
7732         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7733         match events[0] {
7734                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7735                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7736                 }
7737                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7738         }
7739 }
7740
7741 #[test]
7742 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7743         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7744         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7748         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7749
7750         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7751         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7752
7753         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7754
7755         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7756         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7757         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7758
7759         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7760         match events[0] {
7761                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7762                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7763                 }
7764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7765         }
7766
7767         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7768         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7769
7770         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7771                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7772                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7773                 }
7774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7775         }
7776         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7777 }
7778
7779 #[test]
7780 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7781         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7782         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7783         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7784         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7785         // and the channel should be closed.
7786         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7787         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7788         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7789         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7790         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7791         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7792
7793         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7794         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7795         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7796
7797         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7798
7799         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7800         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7801
7802         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7803         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7804
7805         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7806         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7807         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7808         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7809         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7810         let accept_chan_msg = {
7811                 let mut lock;
7812                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7813                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7814         };
7815         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7816
7817         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7818
7819         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7820         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7821
7822         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7823         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7824
7825         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7826         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7827
7828         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7829         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7830                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7831                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7832                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7833                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7834                 }
7835                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7836         }
7837
7838         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7839 }
7840
7841 #[test]
7842 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7843         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7844         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7848         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7849
7850         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7851         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7852
7853         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7854
7855         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7856         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7857         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7858
7859         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7860         match events[0] {
7861                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7862                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7863                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7864                         match api_res {
7865                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7866                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7867                                 },
7868                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7869                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7870                         }
7871                 }
7872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7873         }
7874
7875         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7876         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7877         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7878
7879         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7880                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7881                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7882                 }
7883                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7884         }
7885 }
7886
7887 #[test]
7888 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7889         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7891         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7892         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7893
7894         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7895         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7896         match api_res {
7897                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7898                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7899                 },
7900                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7901                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7902         }
7903 }
7904
7905 #[test]
7906 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7907         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7908         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7909         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7910         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7911         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7912
7913         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7914         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7915         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7916         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7917
7918         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7919         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7920         route.paths.push(path);
7921         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7922         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7923         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7924         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7925         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7926         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7927         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7928         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7929 }
7930
7931 #[test]
7932 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7933         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7934         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7935         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7936         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7937         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7938
7939         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7940
7941         {
7942                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7943                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7944                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7945                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7946                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7947                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7948                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7949                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7950         }
7951         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7952         // values from previous calls.
7953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7954         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7955         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7956         match events[0] {
7957                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7958                         match &purpose {
7959                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7960                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7961                                 },
7962                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7963                         }
7964                 },
7965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7966         }
7967 }
7968
7969 #[test]
7970 #[allow(deprecated)]
7971 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7972         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7973         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7977         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7978
7979         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7980
7981         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7982
7983         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7984         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7985         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7986                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7987         } else { panic!(); }
7988         let mut block = {
7989                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7990                 Block {
7991                         header: BlockHeader {
7992                                 version: 0x2000000,
7993                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7994                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7995                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7996                         txdata: vec![],
7997                 }
7998         };
7999         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8000         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8001                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8002         } else { panic!(); }
8003
8004         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8005         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8006         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8007         block.header.time += 1;
8008         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8009         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8010         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8011
8012         {
8013                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8014                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8015                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8017                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8018                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8019                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8020         }
8021         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8022         // values from previous calls.
8023         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8024         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8025         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8026         match events[0] {
8027                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8028                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8029                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8030                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8031                 },
8032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8033         }
8034 }
8035
8036 #[test]
8037 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8038         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8043
8044         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8045
8046         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8047         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8048         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8049         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8050
8051         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8052         // resulting events.
8053         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8054                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8055                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8056                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8057                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8058                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8059                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8060
8061                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8062                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8063                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8064                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8065                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8066
8067                         // We should fail the payment back
8068                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8069                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8070                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8071                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8072                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8073                                 },
8074                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8075                         }
8076                 }
8077         }
8078
8079         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8080         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8081         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8082
8083         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8084         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8085         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8086         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8087
8088         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8089         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8090         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8091         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8092
8093         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8094         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8095         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8096         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8097 }
8098
8099 #[test]
8100 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8101         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8102         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8103         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8104         // error.
8105         //
8106         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8107         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8108         // commitment at same time.
8109
8110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114
8115         // Create some initial channel
8116         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8117         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8118
8119         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8120         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8121
8122         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8123         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8124
8125         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8126         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8127         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8128         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8129         let watchtower = {
8130                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8131                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8132                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8133                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8134                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8135                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8136                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8137                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8138                 watchtower
8139         };
8140         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8141         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8142         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8143         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8144         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8145         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8146
8147         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8148         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8150         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8151
8152         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8153         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8154         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8155         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8156                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8157                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8158                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8159                 } else { assert!(false); }
8160         } else { assert!(false); };
8161         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8163         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8164         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8165 }
8166
8167 #[test]
8168 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8169         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8170         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8171         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8172         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8173
8174         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8175         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8177         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8178
8179         // Create some initial channel
8180         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8181         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8182
8183         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8185
8186         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8187         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8188
8189         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8190         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8191         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8192         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8193         let watchtower_alice = {
8194                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8195                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8196                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8197                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8198                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8199                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8200                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8201                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8202                 watchtower
8203         };
8204         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8205         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8206         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8207         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8208         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8209         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8210
8211         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8212         {
8213                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8214                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8215                 txn.clear();
8216         }
8217
8218         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8219         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8220         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8221         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8222         let watchtower_bob = {
8223                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8224                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8225                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8226                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8227                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8228                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8229                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8230                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8231                 watchtower
8232         };
8233         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8234         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8235
8236         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8237         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8238         {
8239                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8240         }
8241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8242
8243         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8244         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8245         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8246         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8247                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8248                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8249                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8250                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8251                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8252                 } else { assert!(false); }
8253         } else { assert!(false); };
8254         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8256
8257         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8258         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8259         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8260
8261         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8262         let bob_state_y;
8263         {
8264                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8265                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8266                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8267                 txn.clear();
8268         };
8269
8270         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8271         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8272         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8273         {
8274                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8275                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8276                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8277         }
8278 }
8279
8280 #[test]
8281 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8282         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8283         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8284         // message).
8285         //
8286         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8287         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8288         //
8289         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8290         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8291         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8292         // before receiving funding_signed.
8293         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8294         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8295         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8296         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8297
8298         // Create an initial channel
8299         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8300         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8301         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8302         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8303         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8304
8305         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8306         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8307
8308         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8310
8311         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8312         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8313         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8314         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8315         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8316 }
8317
8318 #[test]
8319 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8320         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8321         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8322         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8323         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8324         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8325         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8326
8327         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8328         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8329         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8330         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8331
8332         // Create some initial channels
8333         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8334
8335         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8336         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8337         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8338         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8339         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8340         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8341
8342         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8343         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8344         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8345         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8346         // this test before #653 fix.
8347         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8348         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8350         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8351         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8352
8353         let htlc_timeout = {
8354                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8355                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8356                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8357                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8358                 node_txn[1].clone()
8359         };
8360
8361         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8362         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8363         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8364         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8365 }
8366
8367 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8368         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8369         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8370         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8371         //
8372         // Steps of the test:
8373         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8374         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8375         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8376         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8377         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8378         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8379         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8380         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8384         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8385
8386         // Create some initial channels
8387         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8388         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8389
8390         // Steps (1) and (2):
8391         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8392         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8393
8394         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8395         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8396         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8397         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8398         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8399         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8400         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8401
8402         // Steps (3) and (4):
8403         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8404         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8405         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8406         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8407
8408         // Bob force-closes
8409         if !broadcast_alice {
8410                 force_closing_node = 1;
8411                 counterparty_node = 0;
8412         }
8413         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8414         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8416         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8417         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8418                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8419                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8420                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8421                 };
8422                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8423                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8424                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8425                 if broadcast_alice {
8426                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8427                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8428                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8429                 }
8430                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8431                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8432         }
8433
8434         // Step (5):
8435         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8436         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8437         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8439         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8440
8441         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8443         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8444         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8445         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8446         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8447
8448         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8449         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8450         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8451         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8452                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8453                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8454                 match events[0] {
8455                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8456                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457                         },
8458                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8459                 };
8460         }
8461         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8462         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8463         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8465
8466         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8467         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8468         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8469                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8470                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8471                         (*msg).clone()
8472                 },
8473                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8474         };
8475         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8476                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8477                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8478                         (*updates).clone()
8479                 },
8480                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8481         };
8482
8483         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8485         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8487
8488         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8489         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8490         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8491                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8492                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8493                         (*msg).clone()
8494                 },
8495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8496         };
8497         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8499
8500         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8501         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8502         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8503         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8504         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8505                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8506                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8507                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8508                 if broadcast_alice {
8509                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8510                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8511                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8512                 }
8513                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8514                 if broadcast_alice {
8515                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8516                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8517                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8518                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8519                         // broadcasted.
8520                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8521                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8522                 } else {
8523                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8524                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8525                 }
8526         }
8527
8528         // Step (6):
8529         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8530         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8531         {
8532                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8533                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8534                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8535                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8536                 }
8537                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8538                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8539                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8540                 };
8541                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8542                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8543                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8544                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8545                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8546                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8547                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8548                 } else {
8549                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8550                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8551                 }
8552         }
8553 }
8554
8555 #[test]
8556 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8557         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8558         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8559         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8560         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8561 }
8562
8563 #[test]
8564 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8565         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8566         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8567         //
8568         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8569         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8570         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8571         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8575         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8576
8577         // Create an initial channel
8578         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8579         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8580         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8581         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8582
8583         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8584         // that it is rejected.
8585         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8586         {
8587                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8588                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8589                 match events[0] {
8590                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8591                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8592                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8593                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8594                                 // move forward with it.
8595                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8596                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8597                         },
8598                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8599                 }
8600         }
8601
8602         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8603         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8604
8605         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8607
8608         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8609         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8610         {
8611                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8612                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8613                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8614                 added_monitors.clear();
8615         }
8616         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8617
8618         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8619         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8620
8621         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8622         // temporary one).
8623
8624         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8625         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8626         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8627         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8628         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8629         {
8630                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8631                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8632                 match events[0] {
8633                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8634                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8635                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8636                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8637                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8638                         },
8639                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640                 }
8641         }
8642
8643         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8644         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8645         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8646         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8647         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8648         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8649
8650         let funding_created = {
8651                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8652                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8653                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8654                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8655                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8656                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8657                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8658                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8659         };
8660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8661         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8662         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8663         // still needs to be cleared here.
8664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8665
8666         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8667         {
8668                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8669                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8670                 match events[0] {
8671                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8672                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8673                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8674                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8675                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8676                         },
8677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8678                 }
8679         }
8680
8681         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8682         // everything is functional.
8683         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8684         {
8685                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8686                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8687                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8688                 added_monitors.clear();
8689         }
8690
8691         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8692         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8693         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8694         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8695
8696         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8697         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8698         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8699
8700         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8701 }
8702
8703 #[test]
8704 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8705         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8706         //
8707         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8708         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8709         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8713         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714
8715         // Create some initial channels
8716         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8717         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8718         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8719
8720         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8721         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8722         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8723
8724         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8725         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8726         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8727
8728         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8729         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8732         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8733         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8734         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8735         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8736         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8737
8738         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8739         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8740         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8742         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8743         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8744         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8745         match events[0] {
8746                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8747                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8748                 },
8749                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8750         }
8751         match events[1] {
8752                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8753                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8754                 },
8755                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8756         }
8757         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8758         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8759         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8760         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8761         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8762         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8763
8764         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8765         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8766         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8767 }
8768
8769 #[test]
8770 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8771         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8772         //
8773         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8774         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8775         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8776         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8777         //
8778         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8779         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8780         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8781         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8784         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8785
8786         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8787         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8788         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8789
8790         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8791
8792         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8793         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8794         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8795         // its length.
8796         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8797         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8798         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8799                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8800                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8801         }
8802
8803         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8804         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8806
8807         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8809
8810         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8811         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8812
8813         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8814         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8815         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8816
8817         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8818         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8821         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8822         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8823         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8824                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8825                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8826                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8827                 } else { panic!(); }
8828         } else { panic!(); }
8829         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8830
8831         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8832         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8833         // as its not 32 bytes long.
8834         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8835                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8836                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8837                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8838                                 txid: tx.txid(),
8839                                 vout: idx as u32,
8840                         },
8841                         script_sig: Script::new(),
8842                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8843                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8844                 }).collect(),
8845                 output: vec![TxOut {
8846                         value: 1000,
8847                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8848                 }]
8849         };
8850         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8851         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8852 }
8853
8854 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8855         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8856         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8857         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8858         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8859         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8860         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8861         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8862         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8863         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8864         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8865         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8866         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8867         // until we learned about an additional block.
8868         //
8869         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8870         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8871         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8872         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8873         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8874         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8875         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8876
8877         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8878         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8879         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8880         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8881         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8882
8883         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8884         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8885         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8887         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8888         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8889
8890         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8891         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8892                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8893         }
8894         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8895                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8896         if test_height_before_timelock {
8897                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8898                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8899                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8900                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8901         } else {
8902                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8903                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8904                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8905                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8906                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8907                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8908                 // timelock is up).
8909                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8910                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8911
8912                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8913                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8914                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8915                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8916                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8917                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8918                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8919
8920                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8921                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8922                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8923                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8924                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8925                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8926                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8927                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8928                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8929         }
8930 }
8931
8932 #[test]
8933 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8934         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8935         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8936 }
8937
8938 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8939         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8940         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8941         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8942         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8943
8944         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8945
8946         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8947                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8948         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8949
8950         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8951
8952         {
8953                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8954                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8955                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8956                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8957                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8958                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8959                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8960         }
8961         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8962         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8963
8964         {
8965                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8966                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8967                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8968                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8969                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8970                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8971                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8972                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8973                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8974                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8975                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8976                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8977         }
8978
8979         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8980         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8981
8982         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8983                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8984                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8985
8986                 let expected_destinations = vec![
8987                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8988                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8989                 ];
8990                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
8991                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8992
8993                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8994                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8995                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8996
8997                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8998                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8999                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9000
9001                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9002                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9003                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9004                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9005         } else {
9006                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9007                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9008                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9009
9010                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9011                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9012                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9013                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9014
9015                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9016
9017                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9018         }
9019 }
9020
9021 #[test]
9022 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9023         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9024         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9025         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9026         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9027         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9028 }
9029
9030 #[test]
9031 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9032         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9033         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9034         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9035 }
9036
9037 #[test]
9038 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9039         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9040         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9044         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9045
9046         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9047         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9048         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9049         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9050
9051         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9052                 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9053         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9054         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9055         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9056                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9057                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9058                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9059         });
9060         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9061
9062         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9063
9064         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9065         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9066
9067         let session_privs = {
9068                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9069                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9070                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9071                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9072                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9073         };
9074         {
9075                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9076                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9077
9078                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9079                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9080                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9081         }
9082         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9083
9084         {
9085                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9086                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9087
9088                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9089                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9090                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9091
9092                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9093                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9094
9095                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9096                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9097
9098                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9099                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9100                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9101
9102                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9103                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9104                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9105
9106                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9107                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9108                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9109         }
9110         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9111         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9112         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9113         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9114
9115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9116
9117         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9118         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9119         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9120
9121         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9123
9124         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9125         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9126         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9127
9128         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9129
9130         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9132
9133         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9134         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9135         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9136
9137         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9138 }
9139
9140 #[test]
9141 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9145         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9146
9147         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9148         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9149         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9150         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9151         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9152                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9153                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9154                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9155         };
9156         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9157         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9158         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9159
9160         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9161         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9163         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9165         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9166         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9167         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9168         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9169 }
9170
9171 #[test]
9172 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9176         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9177
9178         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9179         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9180         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9181         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9182
9183         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9184         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9185                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9186                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9187                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9188         };
9189         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9190         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9191         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9192         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9193         let route = find_route(
9194                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9195                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9196         ).unwrap();
9197
9198         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9199         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9201         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9203         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9204         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9205         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9206         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9207 }
9208
9209 #[test]
9210 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9211         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9212         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9213         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9214         // amount.
9215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9218         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9219
9220         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9224
9225         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9226         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9227         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9228                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9229                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9230                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9231         });
9232
9233         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9234         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9235         // amount of time to respond to.
9236
9237         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9238         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9239         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9240
9241         let failed_destinations = vec![
9242                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9243                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9244         ];
9245         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9246
9247         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9248
9249         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9250         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9252
9253         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9254         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9255         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9256
9257         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9258         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9259         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9261         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9262 }
9263
9264 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9265 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9266 enum ExposureEvent {
9267         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9268         AtHTLCForward,
9269         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9270         AtHTLCReception,
9271         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9272         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9273 }
9274
9275 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9276         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9277         // policy.
9278         //
9279         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9280         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9281         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9282         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9283         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9284         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9285         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9286         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9287
9288         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9289         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9290         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9293         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9294
9295         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9296         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9297         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9298         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9299         if on_holder_tx {
9300                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9301         }
9302         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9303         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9305
9306         let opt_anchors = false;
9307
9308         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9309
9310         if on_holder_tx {
9311                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9312                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9313                 }
9314         }
9315
9316         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9317         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9319
9320         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9322
9323         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9324         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9325         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9326
9327         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9328                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9329                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9330                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9331         };
9332         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9333         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9334
9335         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9336         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9337
9338         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9339         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9340
9341         if on_holder_tx {
9342                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9343                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9344                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9345                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9346                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9347                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9348                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9349                         }
9350                 } else {
9351                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9352                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9353                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9354                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9355                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9356                         }
9357                 }
9358         } else {
9359                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9360                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9361                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9362                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9363                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9364                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9365                         }
9366                 } else {
9367                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9368                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9369                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9370                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9371                         }
9372                 }
9373         }
9374
9375         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9376         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9377                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9378                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9379                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9380                 if on_holder_tx {
9381                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9382                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9383                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9384                 } else {
9385                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9386                 }
9387         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9388                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9389                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9390                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9391                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9392                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9393                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9394                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9395                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9396                 if on_holder_tx {
9397                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9398                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9399                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9400                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9401                 } else {
9402                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9403                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9404                 }
9405         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9406                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9407                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9408                 {
9409                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9410                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9411                 }
9412                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9414                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9415         }
9416
9417         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9418         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9419         added_monitors.clear();
9420 }
9421
9422 #[test]
9423 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9424         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9425         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9426         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9427         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9428         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9429         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9430         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9431         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9432         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9433         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9434         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9435         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9436 }
9437
9438 #[test]
9439 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9440         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9441         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9442         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9443         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9444
9445         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9446         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9447         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9448         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9449         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9450
9451         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9452
9453         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9454         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9455         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9456         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9457         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9458                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9459                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9460                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9461                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9462                         }]}
9463                 },
9464                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9465         };
9466         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9467         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9468                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9469                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9470                 },
9471                 _ => panic!()
9472         }
9473
9474         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9475         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9476         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9477         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9478 }
9479
9480 #[test]
9481 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9482         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9483         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9484         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9485         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9489
9490         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9491
9492         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9493         {
9494                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9495                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9496         }
9497
9498         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9499         {
9500                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9501                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9502         }
9503         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9505
9506         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9507         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9508         match events[0] {
9509                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9510                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9511                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9512                 },
9513                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9514         };
9515
9516         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9517         // it.
9518         {
9519                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9520                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9521         }
9522         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9524
9525         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9526         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9527         match events[0] {
9528                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9529                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9530                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9531                 },
9532                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9533         };
9534
9535         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9536         // channel.
9537         {
9538                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9539                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9540         }
9541         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9543
9544         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9545         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9546         match events[0] {
9547                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9548                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9549                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9550                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9551                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9552                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9553                 },
9554                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9555         };
9556 }