1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 let opt_anchors = false;
131 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
132 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
134 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
135 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
136 if !send_from_initiator {
137 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
138 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
142 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
143 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
144 if send_from_initiator {
145 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
146 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
148 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
151 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
152 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
153 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
156 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
157 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
158 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
160 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
161 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
162 if send_from_initiator {
163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
164 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
165 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
166 // well as an additional HTLC.
167 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
169 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
174 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
176 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
180 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
192 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
193 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
194 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
195 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
196 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
197 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
198 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
199 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
200 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
201 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
203 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
205 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
207 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
209 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
212 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
216 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
217 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
219 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
226 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
227 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
228 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
231 let payment_event = {
232 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
233 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
234 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
239 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
241 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
242 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
243 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 // deliver(1), generate (3):
247 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
248 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
249 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
253 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
254 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
258 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
262 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
263 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
267 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
271 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
272 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
276 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
282 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
283 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
285 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
294 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
295 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
296 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
306 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
308 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
311 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
316 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
325 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
326 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
330 let payment_event = {
331 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
333 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
338 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
340 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
341 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
342 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
348 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
352 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
360 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
361 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
362 // update_fee (never committed) ->
364 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
365 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
366 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
367 // <- (1) RAA delivered
368 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
369 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
370 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
371 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
373 // B should send no response here
374 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
375 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
378 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
381 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
382 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
383 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
385 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
389 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
390 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
391 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
392 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
397 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
399 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
400 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
403 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
409 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
411 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
413 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
414 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
415 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
416 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
421 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
425 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
427 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
432 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
433 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
435 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
437 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
438 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
439 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
441 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
443 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
448 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
449 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
456 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
457 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
458 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
466 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
467 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
468 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
469 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
470 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
471 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
472 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
473 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
474 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
475 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
476 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
481 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
483 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
485 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
486 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
488 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
489 let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
490 assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), 2);
491 let as_funding_locked = if let MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = as_msg_events[0] {
492 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
494 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
495 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = as_msg_events[1] {
496 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
497 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
499 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
500 let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
501 assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), 1);
502 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = bs_msg_events[0] {
503 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
504 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
506 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
508 // After 6 confirmations, as required by the spec, we'll send announcement_signatures and
509 // broadcast the channel_announcement (but not before exactly 6 confirmations).
510 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
511 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
513 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
514 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
516 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
517 let bs_announce_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
518 assert_eq!(bs_announce_events.len(), 2);
519 let bs_announcement_sigs = if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } = bs_announce_events[0] {
520 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
523 let (bs_announcement, bs_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = bs_announce_events[1] {
524 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
525 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
527 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
528 let as_announce_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
529 assert_eq!(as_announce_events.len(), 1);
530 let (announcement, as_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = as_announce_events[0] {
531 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
532 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
533 assert_eq!(announcement, bs_announcement);
536 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
537 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
538 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
542 fn test_1_conf_open() {
543 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
544 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
545 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
548 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
549 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
550 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
551 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
559 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
561 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
564 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
565 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
568 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
569 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
570 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
572 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
573 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
574 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
576 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
577 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
579 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
581 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
582 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
584 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
586 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
587 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
589 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
590 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
591 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
592 added_monitors.clear();
594 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
596 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
597 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
599 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
600 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
601 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
602 added_monitors.clear();
605 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
606 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
608 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
609 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
611 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
612 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
613 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
614 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
618 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
619 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
620 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
621 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
622 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
623 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
624 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
625 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
626 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
627 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
628 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
629 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
630 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
631 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
632 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
633 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
634 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
635 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
636 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
640 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
644 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
645 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
648 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
651 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
654 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
655 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
656 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
658 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
664 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
665 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
668 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
672 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
673 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
674 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
677 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
678 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
683 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
688 let channel_value = 5000;
690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
691 let channel_id = chan.2;
692 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
693 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
695 let opt_anchors = false;
697 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
698 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
699 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
701 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
702 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
704 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
705 *feerate_lock = feerate;
707 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
709 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
715 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
717 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
719 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
720 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
721 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
722 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
723 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
724 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
728 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
729 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
732 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
733 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
736 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
738 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
739 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
740 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
741 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
742 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
743 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
744 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
745 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
746 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
748 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
749 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
751 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
752 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
753 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
754 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
755 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
758 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
759 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
760 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
763 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
764 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
765 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
766 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
767 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
768 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
770 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
771 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
772 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
773 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
775 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
777 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
780 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
783 htlc_signatures: res.1
786 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
788 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
791 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
793 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
794 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
795 //Should produce and error.
796 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
797 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
804 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
808 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
809 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
812 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
815 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
818 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
822 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
823 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
824 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
825 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
829 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
830 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
831 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
834 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
836 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
837 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
839 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
840 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
841 added_monitors.clear();
843 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
844 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
845 // node[1] has nothing to do
847 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
848 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
851 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
852 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
853 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
855 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
857 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
859 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
860 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
861 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
862 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
863 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
864 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
866 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
867 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
869 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
871 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
873 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
875 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
877 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
878 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
880 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
889 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
893 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
895 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
896 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
897 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
898 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
899 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
903 fn test_update_fee() {
904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
909 let channel_id = chan.2;
912 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
913 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
914 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
915 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
916 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
917 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
918 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
919 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
920 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
921 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
922 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
925 // Create and deliver (1)...
928 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
929 feerate = *feerate_lock;
930 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
932 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
936 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
937 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
939 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
945 // Generate (2) and (3):
946 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
947 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
951 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
952 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
955 // Create and deliver (4)...
957 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
958 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
960 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
962 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
963 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
964 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
966 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
975 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
976 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
978 // Handle (3), creating (6):
979 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
981 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
982 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
986 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
989 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
990 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
991 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
992 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
993 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
994 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
995 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
996 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1000 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1002 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1003 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1005 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1007 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1009 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1010 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1011 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1013 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1017 fn fake_network_test() {
1018 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1019 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1023 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1025 // Create some initial channels
1026 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1027 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1028 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1030 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1031 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1032 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1033 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1034 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1036 // Send some more payments
1037 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1038 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1039 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1041 // Test failure packets
1042 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1043 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1045 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1046 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1048 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1049 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1050 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1051 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1052 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1053 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1054 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1056 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1057 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1058 hops.push(RouteHop {
1059 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1060 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1061 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1062 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1064 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1066 hops.push(RouteHop {
1067 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1068 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1069 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1070 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1072 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1074 hops.push(RouteHop {
1075 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1077 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1080 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1082 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1083 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1084 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1086 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1087 hops.push(RouteHop {
1088 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1089 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1090 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1091 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1093 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1095 hops.push(RouteHop {
1096 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1097 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1098 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1099 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1101 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1103 hops.push(RouteHop {
1104 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1105 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1106 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1107 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1109 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1111 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1112 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1113 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1115 // Claim the rebalances...
1116 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1117 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1119 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1120 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 // Send some payments across both channels
1123 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1124 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1125 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1128 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1129 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1131 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1133 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1135 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1137 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1139 // Close down the channels...
1140 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1141 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1142 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1143 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1144 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1145 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1146 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1147 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1148 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1149 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1150 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1151 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1152 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1153 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1154 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1158 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1159 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1160 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1161 // commitment dance rounds.
1162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1165 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1166 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1167 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1169 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1170 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1171 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1172 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1173 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1179 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1180 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1183 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1185 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1187 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1188 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1190 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1193 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1194 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1203 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1205 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1207 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1208 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1209 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1214 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1215 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1217 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1219 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1220 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1221 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1224 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1225 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1227 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1229 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1231 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1233 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1234 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1236 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1238 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1240 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1242 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1244 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1246 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1248 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1251 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1253 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1254 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1255 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1257 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1258 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1264 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1265 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1268 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1272 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1273 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1274 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1278 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1280 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1282 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1283 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1287 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1289 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1290 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1292 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1293 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1295 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1296 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1297 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1301 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1302 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1303 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1304 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1313 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1315 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1317 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1318 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1319 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1321 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1322 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1325 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1326 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1328 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1329 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1330 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1331 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1332 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1333 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1334 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1337 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1339 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1341 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1342 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1344 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1345 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1346 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1347 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1348 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1349 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1350 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1351 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1353 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1354 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1355 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1357 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1358 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1359 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1360 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1361 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1362 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1363 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1364 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1371 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1372 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1373 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1376 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1377 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1378 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1379 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1388 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1395 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1396 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1398 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1399 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1400 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1401 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1402 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1404 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1406 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1407 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1408 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1411 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1414 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1416 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1420 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1427 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1428 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1430 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1432 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1434 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1435 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1436 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1437 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1440 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1441 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1442 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1443 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1446 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1448 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1449 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1450 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1452 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1454 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1456 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1457 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1458 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1459 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1461 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1462 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1463 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1465 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1466 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1467 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1468 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1469 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1471 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1472 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1473 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1474 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1475 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1476 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1477 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1478 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1481 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1482 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1483 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1485 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1486 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1487 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1489 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1491 amount_msat: 3460001,
1492 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1494 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1497 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1500 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1501 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1502 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1503 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1507 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1508 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1510 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1511 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1513 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1516 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1519 htlc_signatures: res.1
1522 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1523 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1524 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1526 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1527 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1529 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1530 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1532 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1534 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1536 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1538 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1539 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1540 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1544 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1545 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1552 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1553 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1554 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1555 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1557 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1560 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1562 let opt_anchors = false;
1564 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1565 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1566 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1568 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1570 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1571 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1572 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1575 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1576 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1577 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1578 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1579 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1584 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1585 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1586 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1591 let opt_anchors = false;
1593 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1598 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1601 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1606 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1607 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1609 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1610 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1611 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1612 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1613 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1614 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1616 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1617 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1618 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1619 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1620 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1623 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1624 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1625 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1626 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1627 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1628 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1630 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1634 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1635 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1636 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1637 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1638 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1642 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1644 let opt_anchors = false;
1646 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1647 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1648 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1649 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1650 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1651 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1652 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1654 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1655 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1656 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1657 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1658 // commitment transaction fee.
1659 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1661 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1662 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1666 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1667 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1668 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1669 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1673 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1674 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1675 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1676 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1677 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1680 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1682 let opt_anchors = false;
1684 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1686 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1687 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1688 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1689 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1691 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1692 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1693 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1694 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1695 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1696 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1697 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1699 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1700 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1701 match msg_events[0] {
1702 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1703 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1710 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1711 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1712 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1716 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1717 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1719 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1720 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1721 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1727 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1733 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1734 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1735 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1736 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1740 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1744 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1746 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1750 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1751 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1752 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1754 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1755 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1756 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1757 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1759 // Add a pending HTLC.
1760 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1761 let payment_event_1 = {
1762 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1765 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1771 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1773 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1777 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1779 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1780 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1781 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1782 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1783 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1784 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1788 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1789 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1790 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1794 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1795 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1796 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1797 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1798 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1804 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1809 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1810 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1811 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1812 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1813 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1815 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1816 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1817 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1819 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1824 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1828 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1831 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1832 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1833 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1834 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1836 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1837 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1838 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1840 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1841 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1843 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1844 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1846 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1848 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1850 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1851 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1856 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1857 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1858 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1859 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1863 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1865 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1866 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1867 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1868 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1869 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1870 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1871 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1874 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1875 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1877 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1878 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1879 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1880 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1881 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1882 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1883 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1886 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1888 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1889 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1890 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1891 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1892 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1895 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1896 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1897 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1898 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1899 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1902 // adding pending output.
1903 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1904 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1905 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1906 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1907 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1908 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1909 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1910 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1911 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1913 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1914 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1915 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1917 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1918 let payment_event_1 = {
1919 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1923 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1924 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1928 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1929 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1931 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1932 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1933 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1937 // split the rest to test holding cell
1938 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1939 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1940 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1941 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1943 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1944 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1947 // now see if they go through on both sides
1948 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1949 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1950 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1952 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1955 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1957 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1958 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1959 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1960 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1961 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1964 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1965 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1966 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1969 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1971 // flush the pending htlc
1972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1973 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1977 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1981 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1982 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1983 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1986 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1987 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1992 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1993 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1994 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1997 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1999 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2000 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2001 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2006 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2007 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2008 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2009 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2014 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2017 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2018 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2019 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
2021 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2022 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2023 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2025 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2031 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2032 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2033 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
2035 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2036 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2037 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2039 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2045 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2047 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2049 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2050 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2051 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2053 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2054 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2055 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2056 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2057 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2059 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2060 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2064 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2065 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2066 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2067 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2068 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2069 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2070 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2071 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2073 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2074 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2075 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2076 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2077 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2078 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2079 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2080 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2082 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2083 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2084 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2085 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2086 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2090 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2091 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2093 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2094 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2095 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2096 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2098 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2099 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2101 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2105 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2108 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2109 // initial fulfill/CS.
2110 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2115 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2116 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2121 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2130 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2144 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2145 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2146 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2147 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2148 // on-chain as necessary).
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2153 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2160 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2162 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2163 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2164 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2167 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2170 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2171 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2173 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2175 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2177 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2183 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2185 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2191 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2194 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2199 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2201 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2203 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2207 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2209 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2210 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2214 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2215 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2216 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2220 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2222 // Create some initial channels
2223 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2224 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2225 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2226 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2228 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2232 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2233 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2235 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2236 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2239 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2241 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2242 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2244 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2246 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2248 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2250 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2254 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2255 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2256 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2258 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2259 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2261 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2262 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2263 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2267 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2268 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2269 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2272 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2281 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2283 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2284 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2286 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2287 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2289 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2290 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2291 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2292 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2301 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2302 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2305 let node2_commitment_txid;
2307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2308 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2309 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2310 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2312 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2313 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2314 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2316 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2319 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2320 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2321 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2322 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2324 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2325 // confusing us in the following tests.
2326 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2328 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2329 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2330 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2333 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2334 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2335 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2337 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2338 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2344 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2345 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2351 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2353 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2355 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2361 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2363 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2364 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2366 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2367 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2368 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2369 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2376 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2377 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2382 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2384 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2385 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2386 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2388 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2389 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2390 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2393 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2394 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2395 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2399 fn test_justice_tx() {
2400 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2401 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2402 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2403 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2404 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2405 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2406 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2407 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2408 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2409 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2410 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2411 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2412 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2415 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2416 // Create some new channels:
2417 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2419 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2422 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2429 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2430 // Revoke the old state
2431 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2434 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2442 node_txn.truncate(1);
2444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2448 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2450 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2451 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2453 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2456 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2458 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2464 // Create some new channels:
2465 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2467 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2471 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2472 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2473 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2479 // Revoke the old state
2480 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2494 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2498 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2500 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2502 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2503 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2504 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2508 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2509 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2510 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2515 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2516 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2517 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2519 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2521 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2522 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2524 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2525 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2527 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2528 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2531 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2534 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2535 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2543 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2544 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2545 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2548 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2550 // Create some new channel:
2551 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2553 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2554 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2555 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2556 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2557 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2559 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2560 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2561 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2562 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2563 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2564 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2565 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2566 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2567 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2569 //Revoke the old state
2570 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2573 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2575 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2582 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2583 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2586 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2588 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2589 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2592 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2593 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2594 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2595 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2597 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2598 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2601 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2602 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2603 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2607 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2608 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2610 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2615 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2617 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2618 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2619 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2620 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2621 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2622 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2624 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2625 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2627 //Revoke the old state
2628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2631 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2633 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2635 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2636 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2637 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2639 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2646 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2647 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2648 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2649 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2650 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2651 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2653 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2654 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2655 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2656 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2657 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2658 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2659 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2661 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2662 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2663 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2664 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2666 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2667 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2668 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2670 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2671 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2672 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2673 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2674 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2675 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2676 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2677 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2679 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2685 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2686 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2687 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2688 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2689 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2690 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2691 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2692 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2693 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2695 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2696 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2697 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2698 // PaymentSent event).
2700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2703 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2705 // Create some initial channels
2706 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2707 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2709 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2710 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2712 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2713 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2715 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2716 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2717 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2719 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2720 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2722 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2723 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2724 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2725 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2726 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2727 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2728 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2730 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2731 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2732 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2733 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2734 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2736 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2739 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2744 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2745 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2750 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2755 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2756 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2757 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2759 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2760 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2761 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2762 added_monitors.clear();
2764 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2765 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2766 match forwarded_events[0] {
2767 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2771 } else { panic!(); }
2772 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2773 } else { panic!(); }
2774 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2776 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2777 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2778 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2779 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2780 added_monitors.clear();
2782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2784 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2788 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2793 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2794 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2795 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2796 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2797 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2798 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2802 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2803 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2804 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2805 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2806 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2807 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2810 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2811 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2813 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2816 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2818 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2819 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2820 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2821 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2823 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2824 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2828 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2829 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2830 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2831 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2833 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2834 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2835 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2836 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2837 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2838 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2841 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2842 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2843 let commitment_spend =
2844 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2845 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2846 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2847 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2852 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2856 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2857 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2858 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2861 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2862 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2863 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2864 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2865 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2866 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2867 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2869 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2870 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2871 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2875 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2877 let mut first_claimed = false;
2878 for event in events {
2880 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2881 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2882 assert!(!first_claimed);
2883 first_claimed = true;
2885 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2886 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2889 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2890 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2894 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2897 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2898 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2899 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2900 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2901 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2902 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2904 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2909 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2910 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2911 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2912 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2914 // Create some intial channels
2915 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2916 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2918 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2920 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2922 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2924 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2925 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2926 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2927 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2935 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2936 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2937 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2938 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2939 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2944 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2945 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2947 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2948 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2950 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2953 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2954 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2955 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2956 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2957 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2960 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2961 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2962 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2965 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2966 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2971 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2973 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2977 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2981 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2982 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2984 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2989 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2990 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2991 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2992 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2993 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2994 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2997 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3006 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3007 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3009 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3016 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3017 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3018 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3021 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3023 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3025 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3026 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3027 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3028 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3030 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3031 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3035 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3036 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3037 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3038 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3042 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3043 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3044 // and fail backward accordingly.
3046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3051 // Create some initial channels
3052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3053 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3056 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058 // Revoke the old state
3059 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3061 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3063 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3064 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3065 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3067 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3071 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3074 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3075 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3076 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3077 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3083 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3089 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3090 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3091 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3092 // commitment transaction anymore.
3093 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3094 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3095 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3096 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3097 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3098 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3100 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3101 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3102 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3103 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3104 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3108 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3110 // Create some initial channels
3111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3112 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3114 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3115 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3116 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3117 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3118 // Revoke the old state
3119 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3121 let value = if use_dust {
3122 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3123 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3124 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3127 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3128 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3131 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3142 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3144 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3147 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3148 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3149 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3152 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3156 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3157 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3158 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3161 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3165 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3166 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3167 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3168 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3169 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3171 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3172 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3175 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3176 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3180 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3181 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3182 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3183 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3184 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3185 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3189 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3190 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3191 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3193 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3196 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3200 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3203 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3204 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3206 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3209 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3211 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3214 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3215 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3218 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3219 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3225 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3226 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3238 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3239 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3240 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3241 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3245 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3246 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3247 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3253 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3254 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3255 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3256 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3257 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3258 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3263 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3265 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3266 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3267 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3277 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3278 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3280 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3282 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3283 // that we should update our routing table for.
3284 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3285 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3291 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3292 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3293 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3298 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3299 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3300 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3308 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3309 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3310 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3314 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3315 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3316 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3317 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3318 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3322 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3323 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3324 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3325 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3326 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3330 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3335 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3337 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3339 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3340 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3343 let payment_event = {
3344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3346 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3348 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3349 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3352 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3353 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3355 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3358 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3361 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3363 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3366 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3367 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3368 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3370 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3372 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3373 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3379 onion_routing_packet,
3381 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3385 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3387 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3388 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3393 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3394 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3398 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3403 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3404 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3405 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3409 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3410 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3412 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3413 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3414 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3415 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3417 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3419 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3420 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3421 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3423 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3424 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3425 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3427 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3429 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3430 // registering new transactions
3431 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3432 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3436 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3437 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3441 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3442 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3443 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3445 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3447 let mut payment_event = {
3448 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3451 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3453 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3461 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3462 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3463 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3464 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3467 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3468 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3470 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3472 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3473 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3474 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3476 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3477 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3479 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3481 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3482 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3483 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3484 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3489 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3491 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3492 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3494 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3496 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3498 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3499 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3501 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3502 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3503 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3504 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3513 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3514 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3515 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3516 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3517 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3519 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3522 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3523 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3525 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3527 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3529 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3530 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3531 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3533 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3536 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3537 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3541 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3542 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3546 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3547 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3548 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3550 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3554 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3555 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3556 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3557 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3559 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3560 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3561 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3563 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3564 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3565 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3566 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3572 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3576 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3579 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3580 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3581 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3586 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3587 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3588 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3593 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3599 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3602 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3603 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3609 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3610 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3611 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3612 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3613 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3614 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3615 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3617 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3620 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3622 let payment_event = {
3623 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3626 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3628 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3630 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3632 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3633 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3636 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3637 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3639 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3641 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3642 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3643 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3647 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3648 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3649 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3653 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3654 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3662 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3663 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3664 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3665 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3666 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3667 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3669 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3670 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3671 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3673 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3676 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3677 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3678 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3679 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3680 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3681 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3682 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3683 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3684 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3685 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3686 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3688 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3689 // Everything was delivered...
3690 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3693 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3696 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3700 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3701 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3704 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3706 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3707 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3709 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3710 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3711 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3713 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3714 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3715 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3717 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3726 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3727 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3728 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3729 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3730 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3731 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3732 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3733 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3734 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3735 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3736 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3744 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3745 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3747 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3748 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3749 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3755 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3759 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3760 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3761 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3764 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3765 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3770 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3772 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3780 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3781 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3782 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3783 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3784 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3785 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3789 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3790 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3791 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3792 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3793 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3794 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3795 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3796 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3797 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3798 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3799 // Everything was delivered...
3800 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3803 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3804 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3812 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3815 // Channel should still work fine...
3816 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3817 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3818 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3822 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3823 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3824 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3825 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3826 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3830 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3831 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3832 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3833 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3834 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3838 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3839 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3843 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3844 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3845 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3846 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3847 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3849 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3850 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3852 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3853 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3854 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3856 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3858 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3859 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3861 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3862 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3863 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3865 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3866 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3867 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3868 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3870 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3871 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3872 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3874 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3875 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3876 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3882 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3883 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3884 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3885 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3888 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3889 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3890 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3891 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3896 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3897 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3898 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3904 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3905 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3910 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3911 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3912 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3913 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3914 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3916 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3917 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3922 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3923 // announcement_signatures.
3924 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3925 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3926 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3927 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3928 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3929 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3935 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3936 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3938 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3939 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3941 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3942 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3943 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3948 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3949 // same channel_announcement.
3950 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3951 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3953 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3954 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3955 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3961 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3962 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3963 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3964 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3966 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3967 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3968 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3970 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3971 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3972 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3974 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3975 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3976 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3978 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3979 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3980 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3981 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3982 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3983 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3984 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3985 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3987 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3988 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3989 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3990 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3991 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3992 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3994 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3995 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3996 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3997 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4001 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4002 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4004 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4005 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4008 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4010 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4011 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4012 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4013 let mut found_announcement = false;
4014 for event in msgs.iter() {
4016 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4017 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4019 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4023 assert!(found_announcement);
4027 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4028 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4029 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4034 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4036 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4038 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4039 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4040 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4043 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4044 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4046 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4050 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4053 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4054 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4056 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4057 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4058 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4059 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4060 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4061 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4062 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4065 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4066 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4068 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4069 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4070 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4075 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4076 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4077 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4083 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4084 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4086 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4087 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4088 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4089 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4090 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4091 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4093 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4094 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4095 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4096 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4098 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4099 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4101 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4102 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4104 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4106 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4107 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4109 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4113 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4114 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4118 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4119 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4120 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4121 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4122 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4123 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4126 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4127 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4128 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4129 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4131 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4132 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4135 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4136 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4137 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4141 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4142 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4151 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4152 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4154 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4155 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4157 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4158 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4159 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4161 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4167 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4168 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4171 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4175 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4176 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4177 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4185 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4186 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4187 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4188 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4189 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4190 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4195 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4196 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4197 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4200 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4203 let mut block = Block {
4204 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4207 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4208 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4209 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4210 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4211 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4212 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4213 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4219 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4220 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4221 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4222 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4223 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4227 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4228 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4229 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4230 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4234 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4235 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4236 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4239 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4240 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4244 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4246 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4248 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4249 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4251 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4253 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4254 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4258 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4261 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4262 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4263 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4264 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4274 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4275 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4276 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4277 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4283 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4284 match fail_commit[0] {
4285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4287 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4289 _ => unreachable!(),
4291 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4293 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4295 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4296 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4297 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4298 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4299 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4300 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4305 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4306 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4307 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4311 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4315 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4316 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4317 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4318 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4319 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4320 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4322 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4326 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4327 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4328 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4329 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4331 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4332 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4333 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4334 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4335 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4336 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4337 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4338 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4339 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4340 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4342 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4343 let config = UserConfig::default();
4344 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4345 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4346 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4347 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4348 default_config: config,
4350 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4351 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4352 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4357 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4358 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4360 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4361 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4365 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4366 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4367 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4368 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4370 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4371 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4372 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4373 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4375 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4376 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4377 for node in nodes.iter() {
4378 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4379 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4380 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4387 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4388 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4392 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4393 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4394 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4395 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4396 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4399 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4400 let channel_value = 100000;
4401 let push_msat = 10001;
4402 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4403 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4404 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4405 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4406 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4407 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4408 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4410 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4412 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4413 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4415 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4417 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4418 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4419 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4420 added_monitors.clear();
4423 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4424 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4426 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4427 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4428 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4429 added_monitors.clear();
4431 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4436 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4437 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4438 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4439 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4441 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4442 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4443 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4444 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4445 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4446 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4447 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4448 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4449 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4450 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4452 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4453 let config = UserConfig::default();
4454 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4455 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4456 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4457 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4458 default_config: config,
4460 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4461 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4462 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4467 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4468 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4472 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4473 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4475 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4476 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4477 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4478 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4481 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4485 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4486 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4487 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4488 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4490 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4491 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4492 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4493 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4495 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4496 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4497 for node in nodes.iter() {
4498 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4499 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4500 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4503 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4507 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4511 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4512 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4513 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4514 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4515 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4517 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4519 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4520 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4522 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4524 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4525 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4526 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4528 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4529 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4530 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4531 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4532 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4533 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4534 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4535 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4536 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4537 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4539 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4540 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4541 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4542 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4543 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4544 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4546 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4547 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4548 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4553 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4554 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4556 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4557 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4562 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4563 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4567 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4568 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4572 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4573 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4574 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4575 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4576 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4577 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4578 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4579 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4580 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4582 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4583 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4584 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4585 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4586 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4589 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4591 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4592 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4594 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4596 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4597 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4599 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4601 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4602 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4603 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4604 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4605 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4608 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4609 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4610 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4611 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4612 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4613 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4616 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4617 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4618 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4619 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4620 assert!(read.is_empty());
4621 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4624 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4625 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4626 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4627 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4628 assert!(read.is_empty());
4629 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4632 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4633 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4634 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4635 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4637 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4638 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4639 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4641 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4643 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4646 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4647 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4648 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4649 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4651 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4652 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4653 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4655 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4657 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4658 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4660 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4661 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4662 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4663 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4664 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4667 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4668 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4671 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4672 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4674 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4675 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4676 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4677 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4678 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4680 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4681 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4682 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4683 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4684 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4685 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4686 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4688 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4689 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4696 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4697 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4699 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4700 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4701 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4703 for event in events.drain(..) {
4705 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4706 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4707 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4708 all_outputs.push(outp);
4711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4714 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4715 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4725 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4726 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4732 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4733 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4734 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4736 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4737 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4738 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4739 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4740 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4742 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4745 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4746 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4747 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4749 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4753 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4754 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4755 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4759 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4761 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4762 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4763 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4765 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4767 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4768 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4769 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4772 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4773 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4775 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4776 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4778 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4779 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4780 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4784 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4785 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4786 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4794 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4795 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4796 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4797 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4799 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4800 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4805 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4806 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4807 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4809 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4810 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4811 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4812 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4813 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4817 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4823 // Create some initial channels
4824 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4826 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4828 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4829 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4830 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4832 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4833 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4837 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4839 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4843 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4844 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4847 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4848 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4849 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4852 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4853 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4855 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4859 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4860 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4861 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4865 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4869 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4871 // Create some initial channels
4872 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4874 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4875 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4877 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4879 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4880 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4881 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4883 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4884 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4888 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4891 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4893 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4894 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4897 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4900 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4901 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4902 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4905 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4906 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4907 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4908 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4909 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4913 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4919 // Create some initial channels
4920 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4922 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4923 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4927 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4929 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4930 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4932 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4934 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4939 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4940 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4942 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4943 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4944 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4948 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4949 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4950 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4955 // Create some initial channels
4956 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4958 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4959 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4965 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4966 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4967 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4969 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4972 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4973 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4974 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4975 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4976 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4977 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4978 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4980 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4981 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4982 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4983 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4987 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4989 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4990 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4991 // transactions next...
4992 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4993 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4996 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4997 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4998 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5000 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5001 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5004 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5005 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5007 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5008 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5010 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5011 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5012 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5013 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5014 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5018 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5019 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5020 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5025 // Create some initial channels
5026 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5028 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5029 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5033 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5034 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5038 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5039 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5043 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5045 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5046 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5047 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5050 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5051 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5054 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5055 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5056 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5057 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5059 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5061 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5062 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5064 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5065 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5066 // transactions next...
5067 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5068 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5069 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5070 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5072 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5073 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5076 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5077 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5079 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5081 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5082 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5084 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5085 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5087 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5088 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5089 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5090 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5091 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5092 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5093 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5094 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5098 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5099 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5100 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5101 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5102 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5104 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5110 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5112 // Create some initial channels
5113 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5114 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5116 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5117 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5118 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5119 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5120 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5122 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5124 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5126 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5127 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5128 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5129 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5133 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5134 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5135 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5137 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5138 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5140 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5142 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5143 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5144 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5145 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5146 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5147 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5148 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5149 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5150 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5151 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5153 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5154 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5155 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5160 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5164 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5165 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5166 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5171 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5172 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5173 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5174 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5178 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5179 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5180 match msg_events[0] {
5181 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5184 match msg_events[1] {
5185 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5188 match msg_events[2] {
5189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5190 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5191 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5192 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5193 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5194 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5198 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5199 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5200 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5202 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5203 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5204 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5205 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5206 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5207 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5208 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5209 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5210 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5218 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5219 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5220 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5221 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5224 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5225 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5226 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5227 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5229 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5230 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5233 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5236 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5237 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5239 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5240 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5242 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5244 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5245 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5246 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5247 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5249 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5251 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5252 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5253 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5255 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5256 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5258 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5259 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5261 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5262 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5263 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5264 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5265 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5266 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5268 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5269 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5270 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5271 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5272 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5273 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5274 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5276 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5277 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5278 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5279 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5282 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5283 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5285 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5286 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5292 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5293 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5295 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5296 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5297 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5298 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5299 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5302 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5303 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5304 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5305 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5306 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5307 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5312 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5313 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5314 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5315 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5316 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5317 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5323 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5325 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5327 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5328 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5329 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5330 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5331 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5332 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5333 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5334 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5335 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5336 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5337 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5343 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5345 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5346 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5347 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5354 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5360 // Create some initial channels
5361 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5363 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5364 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5365 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5366 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5367 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5369 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5370 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5372 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5374 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5375 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5382 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5385 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5386 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5388 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5389 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5390 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5391 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5395 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5396 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5398 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5399 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5400 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5401 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5402 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5403 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5406 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5407 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5408 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5409 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5410 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5411 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5412 // use the same payment hashes.
5413 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5418 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5421 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5422 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5423 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5424 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5426 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5427 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5430 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5435 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5436 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5437 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5438 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5440 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5442 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5444 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5445 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5447 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5449 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5451 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5453 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5454 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5456 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5458 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5461 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5463 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5464 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5467 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5469 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5470 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5472 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5473 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5474 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5475 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5476 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5478 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5479 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5480 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5481 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5482 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5483 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5485 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5488 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5489 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5490 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5491 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5492 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5493 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5495 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5496 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5497 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5502 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5503 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5504 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5505 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5507 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5509 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5511 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5512 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5513 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5514 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5515 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5516 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5517 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5518 if deliver_last_raa {
5519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5521 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5524 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5525 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5526 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5527 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5529 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5530 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5531 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5533 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5534 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5535 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5537 if announce_latest {
5538 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5540 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5542 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5543 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5547 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5551 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5555 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5556 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5557 if deliver_last_raa {
5558 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5564 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5565 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5566 let mut a_done = false;
5567 for msg in cs_msgs {
5569 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5570 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5571 // should be failed-backwards here.
5572 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5573 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5574 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5575 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5577 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5582 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5583 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5584 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5586 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5587 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5590 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5591 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5592 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5593 if announce_latest {
5594 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5595 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5596 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5599 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5605 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5606 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5607 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5608 let mut as_updates = 0;
5609 for event in as_events.iter() {
5610 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5611 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5612 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5613 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5615 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5617 if network_update.is_some() {
5620 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5622 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5623 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5624 if announce_latest {
5625 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5626 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5628 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5630 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5631 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5632 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5633 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5634 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5635 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5636 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5637 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5638 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5640 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5642 if network_update.is_some() {
5645 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5647 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5648 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5649 if announce_latest {
5650 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5652 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5654 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5655 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5656 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5657 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5658 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5659 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5663 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5664 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5668 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5669 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5673 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5674 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5675 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5676 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5680 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5683 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5684 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686 // Create some initial channels
5687 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5689 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5690 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5691 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5692 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5694 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5695 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5699 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5701 let htlc_timeout = {
5702 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5704 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5705 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5706 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5711 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5712 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5713 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5715 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5716 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5717 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5718 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5719 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5720 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5721 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5722 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5723 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5724 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5725 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5729 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5730 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5731 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5732 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5734 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5736 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5737 let seed = [42; 32];
5738 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5739 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5740 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5741 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5742 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5743 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5746 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5748 // Create some initial channels
5749 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5751 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5752 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5753 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5755 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5756 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5757 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5758 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5759 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5761 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5762 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5763 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5764 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5765 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5767 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5768 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5769 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5770 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5771 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5772 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5773 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5774 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5777 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5778 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5779 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5784 let htlc_timeout = {
5785 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5786 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5788 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5792 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5793 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5794 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5796 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5797 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5798 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5799 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5800 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5801 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5802 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5803 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5804 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5805 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5806 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5807 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5811 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5815 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5817 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5819 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5820 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5822 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5823 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5824 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5826 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5827 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5828 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5830 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5831 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5832 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5834 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5835 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5836 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5839 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5843 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5844 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5846 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5848 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5849 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5850 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5853 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5854 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5855 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5857 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5859 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5860 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5863 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5864 let mut block = Block {
5865 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5868 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5869 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5870 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5872 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5878 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5882 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5883 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5885 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5886 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5889 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5891 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5892 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5893 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5895 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5896 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5898 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5899 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5900 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5902 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5903 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5908 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5912 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5915 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5916 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5917 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5918 // actually revoked.
5919 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5920 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5921 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5922 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5925 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5926 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5930 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5932 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5934 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5936 if check_revoke_no_close {
5937 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5942 let mut block = Block {
5943 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5946 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5947 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5948 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5950 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5951 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5958 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5959 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5960 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5961 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5962 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5963 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5967 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5968 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5969 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5970 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5971 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5972 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5973 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5975 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5976 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5977 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5979 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5980 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5981 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5983 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5984 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5988 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5989 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5990 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5991 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5992 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5997 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002 //Force duplicate channel ids
6003 for node in nodes.iter() {
6004 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6007 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6008 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6009 let push_msat=10001;
6010 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6011 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6012 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6013 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6015 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
6016 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6020 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6021 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6022 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6024 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6026 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6027 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6028 let push_msat=10001;
6029 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6031 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6032 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6033 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6034 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6035 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6037 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6038 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6039 let push_msat=10001;
6040 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6041 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6042 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6044 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6045 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6046 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6048 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6049 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6050 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6052 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6053 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6054 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6056 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6057 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6058 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6059 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6060 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6061 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6065 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6071 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6072 let push_msat=10001;
6073 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6074 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6075 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6076 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6078 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6079 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6080 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6081 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6086 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6089 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6090 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6091 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6092 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6094 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6098 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6099 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6101 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6102 // pending_update_fee.
6104 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6105 *feerate_lock += 20;
6107 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6110 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6111 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6114 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6119 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6121 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6122 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6123 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6124 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6126 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6127 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6128 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6130 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6131 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6132 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6133 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6135 // Flush the pending fee update.
6136 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6137 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6139 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6142 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6143 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6144 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6145 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6146 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6147 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6148 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6149 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6150 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6152 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6153 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6156 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6157 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6158 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6159 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6160 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6161 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6162 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6163 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6164 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6170 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6171 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6172 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6174 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6178 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6179 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6181 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6182 // pending_update_fee.
6184 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6185 *feerate_lock += 200;
6187 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6190 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6194 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6201 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6204 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6206 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6208 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6209 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6210 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6212 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6213 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6214 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6215 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6216 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6217 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6218 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6220 // Flush the pending fee update.
6221 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6222 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6224 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6225 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6228 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6229 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6230 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6231 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6232 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6233 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6234 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6235 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6236 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6238 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6239 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6243 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6244 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6245 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6246 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6247 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6248 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6249 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6250 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6255 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6256 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6257 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6259 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6261 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6262 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6265 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6269 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6270 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6272 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6275 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6276 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6279 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6282 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6284 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6285 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6286 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6287 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6290 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6291 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6292 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6295 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6298 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6299 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6300 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6301 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6303 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6304 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6305 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6307 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6308 // pending_update_fee.
6310 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6311 *feerate_lock += 20;
6313 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6317 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6318 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6320 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6325 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6327 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6329 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6330 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6332 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6334 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6337 let payment_event = {
6338 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6344 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6346 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6351 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6352 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6354 // Flush the pending fee update.
6355 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6356 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6358 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6359 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6362 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6363 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6366 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6367 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6373 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6375 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6377 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6378 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6379 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6380 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6381 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6385 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6386 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6389 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6390 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6391 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6392 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6393 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6394 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6395 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6396 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6397 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6398 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6403 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6404 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6405 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6407 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6408 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6411 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6413 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6415 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6416 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6419 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6420 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6425 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6426 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6429 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6430 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6431 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6434 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6437 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6438 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6440 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6441 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6443 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6448 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6455 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6456 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6457 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6458 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6460 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6461 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6465 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6466 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6470 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6471 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6473 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6474 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6476 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6477 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6479 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6480 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6481 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6487 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6488 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6489 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6494 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6496 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 0);
6497 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6498 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6499 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6503 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6504 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6505 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6506 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6510 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6511 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6512 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6514 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6516 let payment_event = {
6517 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6522 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6523 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6527 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6529 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6531 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6533 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6534 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6536 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6537 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6538 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6540 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6541 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6545 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6546 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6547 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6548 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6550 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6551 let channel_value = 100000;
6552 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6553 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6555 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6557 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6558 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6560 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6561 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6562 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6565 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6567 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6570 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6572 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6573 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6577 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6578 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6579 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6581 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6582 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6583 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6586 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6587 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6589 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6590 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6593 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6594 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6596 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6600 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6601 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6605 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6606 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6608 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6609 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6610 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6611 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6612 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6613 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6615 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6616 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6617 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6619 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6621 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6622 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6623 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6624 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6627 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6628 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6629 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6631 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6635 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6636 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6637 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6641 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6644 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6645 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6646 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6647 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6648 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6649 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6651 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6655 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6656 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6657 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6660 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6661 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6664 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6667 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6668 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6669 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6671 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6675 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6676 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6680 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6681 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6683 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6684 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6686 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6687 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6688 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6690 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6691 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6692 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6694 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6698 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6699 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6703 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6705 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6706 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6707 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6709 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6710 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6713 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6714 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6715 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6717 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6721 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6722 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6723 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6724 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6728 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6731 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6737 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6738 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6739 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6740 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6741 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6742 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6743 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6744 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6745 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6746 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6747 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6748 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6749 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6752 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6753 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6754 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6756 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6758 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6760 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6761 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6762 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6764 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6768 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6769 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6776 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6777 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6783 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6786 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6789 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6791 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6792 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6793 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6795 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6799 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6800 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6804 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6805 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6806 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6808 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6809 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6811 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6814 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6817 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6822 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6823 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6824 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6826 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6830 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6831 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6836 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6837 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6839 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6840 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6843 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6844 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6847 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6848 failure_code: 0x8000,
6851 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6853 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6854 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6855 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6857 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6861 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6862 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6864 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6865 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6867 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6868 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6870 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6872 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6877 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6879 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6880 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6882 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6883 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6884 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6885 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6891 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6893 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6895 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6896 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6897 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6899 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6903 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6904 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6910 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6912 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6914 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6917 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6919 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6921 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6922 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6923 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6924 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6925 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6926 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6927 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6933 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6935 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6937 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6938 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6939 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6941 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6945 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6946 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6948 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6949 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6950 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6951 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6952 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6954 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6955 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6958 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6959 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6961 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6965 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6969 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6970 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6971 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6972 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6973 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6974 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6975 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6981 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6983 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6984 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6985 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6987 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6991 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6992 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6993 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6998 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7000 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7002 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7005 let mut payment_event = {
7006 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7008 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7010 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7016 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7017 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7019 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7020 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7023 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7024 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7028 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7029 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7030 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7032 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7033 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7035 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7036 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7037 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7038 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7049 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7050 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7052 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7054 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7055 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7056 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7058 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7059 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7067 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7068 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7069 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7070 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7072 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7073 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7075 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7076 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7077 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7079 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7081 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7082 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7083 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7084 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7086 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7087 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7089 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7090 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7095 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7096 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7097 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7101 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7103 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7105 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7106 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7111 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7112 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7117 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7118 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7119 if announce_latest {
7120 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7122 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7125 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7127 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7129 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7130 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7131 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7132 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7134 let mut first_failed = false;
7135 for event in events {
7137 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7138 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7139 assert!(!first_failed);
7140 first_failed = true;
7142 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7151 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7152 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7153 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7156 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7157 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7158 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7159 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7160 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7161 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7162 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7167 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7168 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7170 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7172 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7173 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7175 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7176 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7178 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7180 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7181 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7184 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7186 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7187 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7188 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7189 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7190 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7192 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7193 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7196 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7197 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7198 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7200 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7201 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7202 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7204 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7205 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7206 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7208 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7209 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7210 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7211 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7213 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7214 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7215 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7216 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7217 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7218 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7219 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7221 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7223 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7227 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7228 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7229 else { first = false; }
7231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7234 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7235 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7236 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7245 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7246 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7247 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7248 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7252 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7253 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7255 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7256 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7257 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7258 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7259 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7263 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7265 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7266 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7268 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7271 } else { assert!(false) }
7273 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7274 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7275 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7277 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7279 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7282 } else { assert!(false); }
7284 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7285 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7287 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7288 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7289 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7291 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7293 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7294 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7295 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7299 } else { panic!(); }
7300 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7302 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7303 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7304 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7305 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7306 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7308 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7311 } else { assert!(false); }
7315 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7316 // We want to be sure that :
7317 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7318 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7319 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7320 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7321 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7327 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7328 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7329 // during signing due to revoked tx
7330 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7331 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7336 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7338 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7340 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7341 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7342 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7343 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7345 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7346 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7348 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7349 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7351 // Restore node A from previous state
7352 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7353 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7354 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7355 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7356 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7357 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7358 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7360 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7361 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7362 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7363 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7364 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7365 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7367 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7368 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7372 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7373 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7374 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7375 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7379 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7380 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7382 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7384 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7385 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7389 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7390 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7393 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7394 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7395 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7396 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7397 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7398 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7399 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7401 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7402 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7404 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7407 panic!("Unexpected event")
7411 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7412 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7413 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7414 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7417 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7418 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7420 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7421 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7422 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7423 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7424 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7425 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7426 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7427 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7431 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7432 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7433 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7434 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7439 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7441 // Create some initial channels
7442 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7444 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7445 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7446 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7447 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7448 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7449 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7450 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7453 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7455 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7459 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7460 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7462 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7464 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7465 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7466 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7468 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7470 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7471 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7472 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7473 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7474 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7475 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7476 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7477 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7483 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7484 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7486 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7487 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7488 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7489 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7493 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7494 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7495 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7504 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7507 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7508 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7510 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7511 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7512 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7513 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7514 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7515 for e in msg_events {
7517 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7518 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7519 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7520 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7521 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7528 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7529 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7530 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7531 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7532 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7533 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7535 // Reestablish chan_1
7536 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7537 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7538 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7539 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7540 // Reestablish chan_2
7541 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7542 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7544 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7545 // Reestablish chan_3
7546 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7547 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7548 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7549 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7551 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7552 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7553 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7554 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7555 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7556 for e in msg_events {
7558 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7559 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7560 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7561 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7563 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7564 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7570 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7571 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7575 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7576 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7577 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7578 // to forward through that channel.
7579 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7580 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7581 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7582 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7583 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7585 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7586 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7587 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7588 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7590 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7592 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7593 // not send for private channels.
7594 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7595 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7596 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7597 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7598 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7600 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7601 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7602 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7605 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7606 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7609 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7610 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7611 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7612 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7613 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7614 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7615 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7616 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7617 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7618 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7620 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7621 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7622 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7624 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7626 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7628 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7629 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7630 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7631 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7632 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7633 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7634 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7635 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7636 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7638 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7639 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7641 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7643 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7647 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7648 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7649 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7650 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7651 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7654 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7655 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7657 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7658 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7660 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7661 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7663 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7664 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7665 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7666 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7667 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7669 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7670 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7671 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7672 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7674 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7675 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7676 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7677 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7678 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7679 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7681 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7683 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7684 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7685 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7686 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7687 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7688 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7689 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7691 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7692 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7693 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7694 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7698 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7699 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7701 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7702 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7704 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7706 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7707 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7708 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7709 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7710 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7711 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7712 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7713 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7716 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7717 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7718 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7719 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7720 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7721 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7722 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7726 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7727 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7731 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7732 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7733 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7738 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7740 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7742 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7743 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7744 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7746 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7747 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7748 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7749 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7750 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7751 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7753 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7754 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7755 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7756 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7760 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7761 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7763 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7764 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7765 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7766 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7769 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7773 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7775 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7777 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7778 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7779 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7780 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7784 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7785 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7786 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7787 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7789 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7791 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7795 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7796 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7797 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7798 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7799 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7800 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7801 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7805 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7807 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7808 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7810 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7812 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7813 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7814 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7815 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7816 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7817 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7818 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7819 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7820 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7821 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7822 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7823 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7824 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7828 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7830 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7831 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7835 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7836 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7837 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7839 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7840 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7843 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7845 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7846 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7847 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7848 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7849 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7850 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7851 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7852 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7853 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7854 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7855 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7856 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7858 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7860 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7862 // Revoke local commitment tx
7863 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7865 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7866 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7867 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7868 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7870 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7871 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7873 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7874 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7875 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7877 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7878 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7879 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7881 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7882 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7883 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7884 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7886 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7887 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7888 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7889 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7890 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7891 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7892 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7895 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7902 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7903 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7904 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7906 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7907 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7908 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7909 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7911 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7912 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7913 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7914 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7915 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7916 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7918 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7919 // available, which we check here:
7920 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7921 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7922 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7925 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7927 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7928 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7929 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7930 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7932 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7933 // output, checked above).
7934 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7935 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7936 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7938 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7939 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7940 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7941 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7942 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7946 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7947 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7948 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7949 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7950 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7952 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7955 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7956 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7957 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7958 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7959 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7961 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7962 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7968 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7969 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7970 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7971 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7973 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7974 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7976 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7977 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7978 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7979 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7980 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7981 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7982 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7983 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7987 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7988 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7989 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7990 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7992 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7993 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7994 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7995 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7996 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7997 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7998 // up bumped justice generation.
7999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8002 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8007 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8008 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8009 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8012 // Provide preimage for one
8013 // Check aggregation
8015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8020 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8021 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8022 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8024 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8025 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8026 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8027 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8028 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8030 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8031 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8032 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8034 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8036 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8040 let feerate_timeout;
8041 let feerate_preimage;
8043 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8044 // 9 transactions including:
8045 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8046 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8047 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8049 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8050 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8051 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8052 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8053 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8054 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8055 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8057 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8058 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8059 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8060 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8062 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8063 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8064 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8065 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8067 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8068 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8069 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8070 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8074 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8075 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8077 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8078 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8080 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8081 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8082 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8083 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8084 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8085 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8087 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8088 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8089 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8090 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8091 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8093 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8094 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8095 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8096 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8097 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8102 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8103 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8107 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8108 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8109 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8110 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8111 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8112 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8113 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8114 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8120 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8122 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8123 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8125 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8127 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8128 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8129 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8131 // Must revoke without gaps
8132 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8133 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8135 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8136 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8137 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8140 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8141 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8143 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8147 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8148 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8149 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8156 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8157 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8158 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8159 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8161 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8162 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8163 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8165 // Revoke local commitment tx
8166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8168 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8169 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8171 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8173 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8174 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8176 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8178 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8179 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8180 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8181 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8182 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8183 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8187 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8188 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8189 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8191 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8192 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8193 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8198 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8199 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8200 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8204 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8207 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8208 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8210 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8213 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8214 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8216 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8218 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8219 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8220 // can get our balance.
8222 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8223 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8224 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8225 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8226 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8227 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8228 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8229 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8235 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8236 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8237 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8238 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8239 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8240 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8241 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8243 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8245 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8246 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8247 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8248 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8249 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8251 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8252 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8254 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8256 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8258 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8259 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8260 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8262 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8263 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8264 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8271 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8272 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8273 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8275 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8277 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8278 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8279 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8281 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8283 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8284 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8286 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8290 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8291 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8292 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8298 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8299 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8303 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8304 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8308 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8309 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8310 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8314 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8317 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8319 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8321 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8322 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8323 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8325 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8327 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8328 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8333 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8334 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8336 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8337 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8338 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8345 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8346 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8347 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8351 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8353 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8354 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8356 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8358 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8359 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8360 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8364 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8365 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8370 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8371 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8373 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8374 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8375 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8379 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8383 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8384 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8385 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8386 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8387 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8388 // and the channel should be closed.
8389 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8390 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8396 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8397 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8398 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8400 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8402 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8403 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8405 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8406 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8408 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8409 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8410 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8411 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8412 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8415 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8416 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8417 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8420 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8422 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8423 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8425 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8426 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8428 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8429 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8431 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8432 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8433 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8434 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8435 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8436 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8445 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8446 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8447 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8453 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8454 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8456 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8458 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8459 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8460 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8462 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8464 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8465 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8466 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id);
8468 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8469 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8471 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8472 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8478 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8479 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8480 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8482 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8483 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8484 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8491 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8492 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8493 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8494 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8495 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8497 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8498 let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id);
8500 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8501 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8503 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8504 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8509 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8510 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8516 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8517 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8518 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8519 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8521 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8522 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8523 route.paths.push(path);
8524 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8525 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8526 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8527 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8528 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8529 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8530 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8531 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8535 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8536 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8545 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8546 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8550 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8551 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8552 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8554 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8555 // values from previous calls.
8556 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8557 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8560 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8562 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8563 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8565 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8568 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573 #[allow(deprecated)]
8574 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8575 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8576 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8584 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8586 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8587 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8588 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8589 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8590 } else { panic!(); }
8592 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8594 header: BlockHeader {
8596 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8597 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8598 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8602 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8603 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8604 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8605 } else { panic!(); }
8607 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8608 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8609 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8610 block.header.time += 1;
8611 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8612 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8613 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8616 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8617 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8619 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8620 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8624 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8625 // values from previous calls.
8626 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8627 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8628 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8630 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8631 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8632 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8633 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8641 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8647 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8649 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8650 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8651 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8652 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8654 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8655 // resulting events.
8656 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8659 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8660 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8662 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8664 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8665 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8667 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8670 // We should fail the payment back
8671 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8672 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8673 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8682 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8683 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8684 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8686 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8687 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8688 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8689 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8691 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8692 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8693 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8694 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8696 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8697 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8698 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8699 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8703 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8704 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8705 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8706 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8708 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8709 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8710 // commitment at same time.
8712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8715 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717 // Create some initial channel
8718 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8719 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8721 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8722 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8724 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8725 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8727 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8728 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8729 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8730 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8732 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8733 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8734 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8735 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8736 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8737 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8738 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8739 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8742 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8743 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8744 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8745 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8746 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8748 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8749 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8751 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8752 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8753 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8754 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8755 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8756 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8757 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8758 } else { assert!(false); }
8759 } else { assert!(false); };
8760 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8762 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8767 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8768 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8769 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8770 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8771 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8776 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8778 // Create some initial channel
8779 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8780 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8782 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8783 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8785 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8786 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8788 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8789 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8790 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8791 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8792 let watchtower_alice = {
8793 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8794 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8795 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8796 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8797 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8798 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8799 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8800 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8803 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8804 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8805 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8806 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8807 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8809 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8811 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8812 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8816 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8817 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8818 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8819 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8820 let watchtower_bob = {
8821 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8822 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8823 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8824 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8825 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8826 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8827 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8828 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8831 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8832 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8834 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8835 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8837 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8841 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8842 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8843 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8844 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8845 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8846 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8847 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8848 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8849 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8850 } else { assert!(false); }
8851 } else { assert!(false); };
8852 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8855 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8856 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8857 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8859 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8862 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8863 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8864 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8868 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8869 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8870 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8872 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8873 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8874 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8875 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8876 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8877 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8882 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8883 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8884 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8887 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8888 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8890 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8891 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8892 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8893 // before receiving funding_signed.
8894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8897 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8899 // Create an initial channel
8900 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8901 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8902 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8903 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8904 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8906 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8907 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8909 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8912 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8913 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8914 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8915 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8916 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8920 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8921 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8922 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8923 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8924 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8925 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8926 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8933 // Create some initial channels
8934 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8936 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8937 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8938 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8939 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8940 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8941 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8943 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8944 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8945 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8946 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8947 // this test before #653 fix.
8948 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8949 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8952 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8954 let htlc_timeout = {
8955 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8956 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8957 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8958 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8962 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8963 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8964 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8965 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8968 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8969 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8970 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8971 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8973 // Steps of the test:
8974 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8975 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8976 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8977 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8978 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8979 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8980 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8981 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8985 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8987 // Create some initial channels
8988 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8991 // Steps (1) and (2):
8992 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8993 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8995 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8996 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8997 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8998 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8999 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9000 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9001 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9003 // Steps (3) and (4):
9004 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9005 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9006 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9007 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
9008 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
9009 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9011 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9012 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9013 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9014 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9015 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9017 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9018 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9019 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9020 if broadcast_alice {
9021 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9023 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9025 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9026 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9030 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9031 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9032 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9034 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9035 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9036 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9037 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9038 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9039 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9041 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9042 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
9043 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9044 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9048 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9049 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9054 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9055 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9056 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9059 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9061 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9062 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9063 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9068 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9069 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9070 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9076 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9078 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9081 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9083 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9084 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9085 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9090 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9093 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9094 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9095 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9096 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9097 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9098 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9099 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9100 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9101 if broadcast_alice {
9102 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9106 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9107 if broadcast_alice {
9108 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9109 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9110 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9111 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9113 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9114 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9116 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9117 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9122 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9123 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9125 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9126 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9127 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9128 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9130 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9131 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9132 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9134 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9135 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9136 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9137 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9138 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9139 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9140 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9142 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9143 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9149 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9150 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9151 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9152 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9153 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9157 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9158 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9159 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9161 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9162 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9163 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9164 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9168 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9170 // Create an initial channel
9171 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9172 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9173 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9174 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9176 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9177 // that it is rejected.
9178 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9180 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9181 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9183 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9184 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9185 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9186 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9187 // move forward with it.
9188 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9189 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9195 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9196 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9198 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9201 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9202 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9204 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9205 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9206 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9207 added_monitors.clear();
9209 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9211 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9212 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9214 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9217 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9218 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9219 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9220 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9221 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9223 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9226 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9227 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9228 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9229 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9230 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9236 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9237 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9238 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9239 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9240 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9241 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9243 let funding_created = {
9244 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9245 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9246 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9247 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9250 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9251 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9252 // still needs to be cleared here.
9253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9255 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9257 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9258 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9260 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9261 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9262 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9263 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9264 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9270 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9271 // everything is functional.
9272 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9274 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9275 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9276 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9277 added_monitors.clear();
9280 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9281 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9282 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9283 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9285 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9286 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9287 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9288 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9292 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9293 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9295 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9296 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9297 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9301 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9303 // Create some initial channels
9304 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9305 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9306 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9309 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9310 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9312 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9313 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9314 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9316 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9317 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9320 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9323 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9324 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9326 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9327 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9328 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9330 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9331 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9334 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9335 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9340 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9341 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9345 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9346 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9347 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9348 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9349 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9350 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9352 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9353 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9354 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9358 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9359 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9361 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9362 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9363 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9364 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9368 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9370 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9371 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9372 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9374 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9375 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9376 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9377 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9380 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9381 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9387 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9388 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9390 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9391 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9392 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9394 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9395 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9396 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9398 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9399 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9400 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9401 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9402 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9403 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9404 } else { panic!(); }
9405 } else { panic!(); }
9406 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9409 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9410 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9411 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9412 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9413 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9414 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9415 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9416 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9417 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9418 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9419 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9420 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9421 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9422 // until we learned about an additional block.
9424 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9425 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9426 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9428 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9429 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9430 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9433 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9434 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9435 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9436 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9438 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9439 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9440 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9442 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9443 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9445 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9446 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9447 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9449 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9450 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9451 if test_height_before_timelock {
9452 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9453 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9454 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9455 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9457 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9458 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9459 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9460 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9461 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9462 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9464 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9465 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9467 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9468 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9469 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9470 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9471 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9475 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9476 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9477 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9478 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9479 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9480 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9481 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9482 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9483 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9488 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9489 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9490 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9494 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9495 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9496 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9498 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9503 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9504 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9505 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9506 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9507 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9508 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9510 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9511 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9512 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9515 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9517 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9523 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9524 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9525 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9528 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9530 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9531 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9532 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9534 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9538 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9539 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9540 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9542 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9543 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9544 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9545 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9546 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9548 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9549 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9550 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9551 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9553 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9554 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9555 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9556 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9557 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9558 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9559 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9560 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9562 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9563 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9564 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9565 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9566 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9567 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9568 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9570 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9571 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9572 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9573 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9577 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9578 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9580 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9581 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9582 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9585 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9586 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9587 // the commitment state.
9588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9590 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9593 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9596 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9598 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9599 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9602 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9604 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9605 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9609 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9610 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9611 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9612 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9613 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9619 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9621 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9622 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9623 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9624 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9625 let route = get_route(
9626 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9627 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9628 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9630 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9633 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9635 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9637 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9639 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9642 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9645 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9647 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9648 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9649 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9652 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9653 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9654 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9655 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9658 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9659 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9660 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9661 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9663 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9664 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9667 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9668 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9670 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9671 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9672 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9674 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9675 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9676 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9677 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9681 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9685 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9687 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9688 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9689 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9690 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9691 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9692 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9693 final_value_msat: 10000,
9694 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9696 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9697 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9698 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9700 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9701 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9703 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9704 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9705 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9706 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9707 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9708 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9712 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9716 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9718 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9719 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9720 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9721 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9723 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9724 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9725 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9726 final_value_msat: 10000,
9727 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9729 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9730 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9731 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9732 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9733 let route = find_route(
9734 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9735 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9738 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9739 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9741 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9743 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9744 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9745 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9746 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9749 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9750 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9751 enum ExposureEvent {
9752 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9754 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9756 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9757 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9760 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9761 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9764 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9765 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9766 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9767 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9768 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9769 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9770 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9771 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9774 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9775 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9778 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9780 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9781 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9782 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9783 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9785 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9787 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9788 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9789 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9791 let opt_anchors = false;
9793 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9796 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9797 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9801 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9802 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9805 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9808 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9809 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9810 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9812 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9813 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9814 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9815 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9817 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9818 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9820 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9821 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9823 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9824 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9827 if dust_outbound_balance {
9828 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9829 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9830 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9831 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9832 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9833 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9836 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9837 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9838 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9839 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9840 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9844 if dust_outbound_balance {
9845 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9846 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9847 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9848 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9849 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9852 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9853 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9854 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9855 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9860 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9861 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9862 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9863 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9864 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9866 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9867 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9868 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9870 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9872 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9873 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9874 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9876 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9878 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9880 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9882 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9883 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9884 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9885 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9887 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9888 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9890 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9891 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9892 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9894 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9895 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9897 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9899 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9902 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9903 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9904 added_monitors.clear();
9908 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9909 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9910 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9911 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9912 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9913 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9914 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9915 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9916 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9917 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9918 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9919 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9920 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);