_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 #[test]
  66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  67         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  68         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  69         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  70         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  71         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  72         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  73         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  74         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  75
  76         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  77         // funding satoshis
  78         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  79         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  80         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  81
  82         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  83         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  84
  85         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  86         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  87
  88         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  89         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  90         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  91                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  92                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  93                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  94                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  95                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  96                         match action {
  97                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  98                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  99                                 },
 100                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 101                         }
 102                 } else { assert!(false); }
 103         };
 104
 105         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 106
 107         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 109         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 124 }
 125
 126 #[test]
 127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 128         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 129         // them.
 130         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 132         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 133         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 136
 137         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 138                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 139                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 140                 },
 141                 _ => panic!()
 142         }
 143 }
 144
 145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 146         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 147         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 148         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 149         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 153         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 154         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 155
 156         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 157         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 158         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 159         let opt_anchors = false;
 160         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 161         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 162
 163         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 164         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if !send_from_initiator {
 166                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 170
 171         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 172         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 173         if send_from_initiator {
 174                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 175                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 176         }
 177         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 178         {
 179                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 180                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 181                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 182                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 183                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 184                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 185                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 186         }
 187
 188         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 189         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 190         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 191
 192         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 193         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 194         if send_from_initiator {
 195                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 196                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 197                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 198                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 199                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 200         } else {
 201                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 #[test]
 206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 208         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 209 }
 210
 211 #[test]
 212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 218
 219         // balancing
 220         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 221
 222         // A                                        B
 223         // update_fee                            ->
 224         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 225         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 226         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 227         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 228         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 229         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 230         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 231         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 232         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 233         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 234         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 235         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 236         //                                       <- RAA
 237         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 238
 239         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 240         {
 241                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 242                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 243         }
 244         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 246
 247         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 248         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 249         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 251                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 252                 },
 253                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 254         };
 255
 256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 257
 258         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 259         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 260         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 261                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 263
 264         let payment_event = {
 265                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 266                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 267                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 268         };
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 270         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 271
 272         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 274         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 275         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 278
 279         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 281         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 284
 285         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 286         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 291         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 295         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 300         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 304         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 307
 308         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 309         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 314
 315         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 316         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 317         match events_2[0] {
 318                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         }
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 324 }
 325
 326 #[test]
 327 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 328         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 329         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 330         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 331         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 332         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 333         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 334         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 335
 336         // balancing
 337         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 338
 339         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 340         {
 341                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 342                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 343         }
 344         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 346
 347         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 348         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 349         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 350                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 351                         update_fee.as_ref()
 352                 },
 353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 354         };
 355
 356         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 357
 358         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 359         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 360         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 361                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 363
 364         let payment_event = {
 365                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 366                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 367                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 368         };
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 371
 372         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 374         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 375         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 376         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 378
 379         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 381
 382         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 383 }
 384
 385 #[test]
 386 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 390         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 391         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 392
 393         // A                                        B
 394         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 395         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 396         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 397         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 398         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 399         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 400         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 401         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 402         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 403         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 404         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 405         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 406         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 407         //                                          B should send no response here
 408         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 409         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 410         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 411
 412         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 413         let initial_feerate;
 414         {
 415                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 416                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 417                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 418         }
 419         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 421
 422         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 423         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 424         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 425                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 426                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 427                 },
 428                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 429         };
 430
 431         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 433         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 434         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 436
 437         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 438         // transaction:
 439         {
 440                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 441                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 442         }
 443         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 445         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 446
 447         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 448         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 449                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 450                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 451         };
 452
 453         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 454
 455         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 456         // Deliver (3)
 457         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 458
 459         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 460         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 461         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 467         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 469         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 470
 471         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 472         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 473         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 475         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 476
 477         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 478         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 480
 481         // Delever (4)
 482         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 483         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 485
 486         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 487         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 489
 490         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 491         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 492         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 498 }
 499
 500 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 501         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 502         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 503         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 504         // Node objects.
 505
 506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 510
 511         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 512                 let block = Block {
 513                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 514                         txdata: vec![],
 515                 };
 516                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 517                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 518         }
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 522         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 525         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 526         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 529         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 530
 531         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 532
 533         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 534         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 536         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 537
 538         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 539         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 540         {
 541                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 542                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 543                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 544                 added_monitors.clear();
 545         }
 546         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 547
 548         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 549
 550         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 551         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 552         {
 553                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 554                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 555                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 556                 added_monitors.clear();
 557         }
 558
 559         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 560         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 561         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 567         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 569         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 570         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 571 }
 572
 573 #[test]
 574 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 593 }
 594
 595 #[test]
 596 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 601         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 602
 603         {
 604                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 605                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 606         }
 607         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 609
 610         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 611         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 612         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 613                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 614                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 615                 },
 616                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 617         };
 618         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 619
 620         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 621         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 627
 628         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 629         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 630         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 632
 633         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 634         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 636 }
 637
 638 #[test]
 639 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 644         let channel_value = 5000;
 645         let push_sats = 700;
 646         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 647         let channel_id = chan.2;
 648         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 649         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 650         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 651
 652         let opt_anchors = false;
 653
 654         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 655         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 656         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 657         // remote limit.
 658         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 659         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 660         {
 661                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 662                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 663         }
 664         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 666         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 667
 668         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 669
 670         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 671
 672         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 673         {
 674                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 675
 676                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 677                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 678                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 679                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 680                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 681                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 682         }
 683
 684         {
 685                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 686                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 687                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 688         }
 689         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 690         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 692
 693         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 694
 695         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 696         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 697         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 698                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 699                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 700                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 701                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 702                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 703                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 704                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 705         };
 706         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 707                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 708                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 709                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 710                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 711                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 712                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 713                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 714                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 715         };
 716
 717         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 718         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 719                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 720
 721         let res = {
 722                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 723                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 724                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 725                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 726                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 727                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 728                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 729                         push_sats,
 730                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 731                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 732                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 733                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 734                         &mut htlcs,
 735                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 736                 );
 737                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 738         };
 739
 740         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 741                 channel_id: chan.2,
 742                 signature: res.0,
 743                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 744                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 745                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 746         };
 747
 748         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 749                 channel_id: chan.2,
 750                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 751         };
 752
 753         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 754
 755         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 756         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 757         //Should produce and error.
 758         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 759         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 761         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 762         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 763 }
 764
 765 #[test]
 766 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 770         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 771         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 772
 773         // balancing
 774         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 775
 776         {
 777                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 778                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 779         }
 780         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 782
 783         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 784         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 785         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 786                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 787                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 788                 },
 789                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 790         };
 791         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 792         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 793         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 795
 796         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 797
 798         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 799         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 800                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 801         {
 802                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 803                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 804                 added_monitors.clear();
 805         }
 806         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 808         // node[1] has nothing to do
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 811         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 813
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 815         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 816         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 818         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 820         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 821
 822         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 824         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 825         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 826         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 827         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 828
 829         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 830         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 832         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 833
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 836         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 837
 838         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 840         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 841         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 842
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 846
 847         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 848
 849         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 850         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 851         match events[0] {
 852                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 853                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 854         };
 855
 856         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 857
 858         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 859         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 860         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 861         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 862         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 863 }
 864
 865 #[test]
 866 fn test_update_fee() {
 867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 870         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 871         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 872         let channel_id = chan.2;
 873
 874         // A                                        B
 875         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 876         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 877         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 878         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 879         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 880         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 881         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 882         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 883         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 884         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 885         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 886         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 887
 888         // Create and deliver (1)...
 889         let feerate;
 890         {
 891                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 892                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 893                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 894         }
 895         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 897
 898         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 899         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 900         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 901                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 902                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 903                 },
 904                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 905         };
 906         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 907
 908         // Generate (2) and (3):
 909         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 910         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 912
 913         // Deliver (2):
 914         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 915         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 917
 918         // Create and deliver (4)...
 919         {
 920                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 921                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 922         }
 923         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 925         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 926         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 927         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 928                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 929                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 930                 },
 931                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 932         };
 933
 934         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 935         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 937         // ... creating (5)
 938         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 939         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 940
 941         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 942         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 944         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 945         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 946
 947         // Deliver (5):
 948         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 949         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 951
 952         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 953         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 954         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 956         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 957         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 958         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 959         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 961
 962         // Deliver (7)
 963         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 965         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 966         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 967
 968         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 970         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 971
 972         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 973         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 974         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 975         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 976         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 977 }
 978
 979 #[test]
 980 fn fake_network_test() {
 981         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 982         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 983         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 984         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 985         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 986         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 987
 988         // Create some initial channels
 989         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 990         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 991         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 992
 993         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 995         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 996         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 998
 999         // Send some more payments
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1003
1004         // Test failure packets
1005         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1006         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1007
1008         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1009         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1010
1011         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1016         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1017         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1018
1019         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1020         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1021         hops.push(RouteHop {
1022                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1024                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026                 fee_msat: 0,
1027                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028         });
1029         hops.push(RouteHop {
1030                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1031                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1032                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1033                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1034                 fee_msat: 0,
1035                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1036         });
1037         hops.push(RouteHop {
1038                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1039                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1040                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1041                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1042                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1043                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1044         });
1045         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1046         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1047         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1048
1049         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1050         hops.push(RouteHop {
1051                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1053                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055                 fee_msat: 0,
1056                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057         });
1058         hops.push(RouteHop {
1059                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1060                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1061                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1062                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1063                 fee_msat: 0,
1064                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1065         });
1066         hops.push(RouteHop {
1067                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1068                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1069                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1070                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1071                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1072                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1073         });
1074         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1075         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1076         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1077
1078         // Claim the rebalances...
1079         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1080         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1081
1082         // Close down the channels...
1083         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 }
1096
1097 #[test]
1098 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1099         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1100         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1101         // commitment dance rounds.
1102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1105         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1106         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1107         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1108
1109         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1110         for _ in 0..50 {
1111                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1113                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1114                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1115         }
1116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1117
1118         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1119         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1120         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1121         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1122
1123         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1124         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1125         // another HTLC.
1126         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1127         {
1128                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1129                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1130                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1131                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1132                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1133                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1134         }
1135
1136         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1137         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1138         {
1139                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1140                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1141                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1142         }
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1150         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1151         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1152         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1153         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1154         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156
1157         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1158         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1160
1161         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1162
1163         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1164         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1165         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167
1168         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1176
1177         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1178                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1179         }
1180         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1184         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1185
1186         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1190         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1191
1192         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194
1195         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1196
1197         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1198         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1199         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1200                 match event {
1201                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1202                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1203                         },
1204                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1205                 };
1206         }
1207
1208         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1209                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1210         }
1211
1212         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1213 }
1214
1215 #[test]
1216 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1217         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1218         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1219         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1220         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1221         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1222         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1223
1224         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1227         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1228         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1229         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1230
1231         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1232
1233         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1234         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1235
1236         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1237         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1238
1239         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1240         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1241         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1242 }
1243
1244 #[test]
1245 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1246         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1247         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1248         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1249         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1250         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1251         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1252         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1253
1254         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1255
1256         // balancing
1257         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1258
1259         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1260
1261         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1262         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1263         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1264
1265         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1266         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1267         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1268         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1269
1270         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1271         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1272
1273         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1274         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1275         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1276                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1277                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1278                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1279                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1280                 }
1281         }
1282         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1283
1284         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1286         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1287         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1288
1289         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1290         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1291
1292         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1293         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1294         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1295         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1296         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1297                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1298         } else {
1299                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1300         };
1301
1302         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1303         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1304
1305         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1306         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1307         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1308
1309         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1310         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1311         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1312         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1313
1314         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1315         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1316         for e in events {
1317                 match e {
1318                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1319                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1320                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1321                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1322                         },
1323                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1324                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1325                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1326                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1327                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1328                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1329                         },
1330                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1331                 }
1332         }
1333 }
1334
1335 #[test]
1336 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1337         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1338         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1339         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1340         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1341         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1342
1343         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1344         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1345
1346         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1347         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1348         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1349         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1350         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1351                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1352         match err {
1353                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1354                         match &fails[0] {
1355                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1356                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1357                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1358                         }
1359                 },
1360                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1361         }
1362         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1363         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1364
1365         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1366 }
1367
1368 #[test]
1369 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1373         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1374         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1375
1376         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1377         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1378         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1379         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1380
1381         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1382
1383         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1384         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1385                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1386         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1387         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1388                 channel_id: chan.2,
1389                 htlc_id: 0,
1390                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1391                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1392                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1393                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1394         };
1395
1396         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1397
1398         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1399         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1400         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1401
1402         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1403
1404         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1405
1406         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1407         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1408         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1409                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1410                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1411                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1412                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1413                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1414                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1415
1416                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1417                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1418                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1419                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1420                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1421         };
1422         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1423                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1424                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1425                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1426                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1427                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1428                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1429                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1430                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1431         };
1432
1433         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1434         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1435                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1436
1437         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1438         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1439         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1440
1441         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1442                 offered: false,
1443                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1444                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1445                 payment_hash,
1446                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1447         };
1448
1449         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1450
1451         let res = {
1452                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1453                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1454                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1457                         commitment_number,
1458                         95000,
1459                         local_chan_balance,
1460                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1461                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1462                         feerate_per_kw,
1463                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1465                 );
1466                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1467         };
1468
1469         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1470                 channel_id: chan.2,
1471                 signature: res.0,
1472                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1473                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1474                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1475         };
1476
1477         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1478         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1479         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1480
1481         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1482         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1483                 channel_id: chan.2,
1484                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1485                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1486                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1487                 next_local_nonce: None,
1488         };
1489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1490
1491         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1492         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1493         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1494         match events[0] {
1495                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1496                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1497                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1498                 },
1499                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1500         };
1501         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1502                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1503
1504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1505 }
1506
1507 #[test]
1508 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1509         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1510         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1511         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1512         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1513         // this situation.
1514         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1517         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1518         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1519         let opt_anchors = false;
1520
1521         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1522         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1523
1524         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1525
1526         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1527
1528         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1529         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1530                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1531         }
1532
1533         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1534         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1535         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1536                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1537                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1538                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1539         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1540         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1541 }
1542
1543 #[test]
1544 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1545         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1546         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1549         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1550         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1551         let opt_anchors = false;
1552
1553         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1554         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1555         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1556         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1557         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1558         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1559         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1560
1561         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1562         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564         }
1565
1566         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1567         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1568         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1569         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1570         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1571         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1572         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1573                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1574         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1575         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1576                 channel_id: chan.2,
1577                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1578                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1579                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1580                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1581                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1582         };
1583
1584         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1585         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1586         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1587         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1588         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1589         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1591         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1592 }
1593
1594 #[test]
1595 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1596         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1597         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1598         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1599         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1600
1601         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1602         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1603         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1604         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1605         let opt_anchors = false;
1606
1607         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1608         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1609         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1610         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1611         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1612         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1613         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1614
1615         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1616                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1617         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1618         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1619         // commitment transaction fee.
1620         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1621
1622         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1623         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1624                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1625         }
1626
1627         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1628         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1629         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1630                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1631                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1632                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1633 }
1634
1635 #[test]
1636 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1637         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1638         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1639         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1640         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1643         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1644         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1645         let opt_anchors = false;
1646
1647         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1648         // HTLC.
1649         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1650         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1651         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1652                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1653
1654         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1655         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1656         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1657         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1658         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1659         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1660         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1661
1662         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1663         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1664         match msg_events[0] {
1665                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1666                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1667                 },
1668                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1669         }
1670 }
1671
1672 #[test]
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1674         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1675         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1681
1682         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1683         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1684         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688
1689         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1690         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1692         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695
1696         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1697         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1698         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1699         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1700 }
1701
1702 #[test]
1703 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1704         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1705         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1706         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1707         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1708         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1709         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1710
1711         let feemsat = 239;
1712         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1713         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1714         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1715         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1716
1717         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1718         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1719         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1720         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1721
1722         // Add a pending HTLC.
1723         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1724         let payment_event_1 = {
1725                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1726                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1728
1729                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1730                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1731                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1732         };
1733         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1734
1735         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1736         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1737         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1738         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1739         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1740
1741         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1742         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1743         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1744         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1745         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1746         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1747                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1748         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1749         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1750                 channel_id: chan.2,
1751                 htlc_id: 1,
1752                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1753                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1754                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1755                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1756         };
1757
1758         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1759         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1760         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1761         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1762         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1763         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1765         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1766 }
1767
1768 #[test]
1769 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1774         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1775         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1776         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1777         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1778         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1779         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1780
1781         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1782         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1783         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1784
1785         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1786         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1787 }
1788
1789 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1790         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1791 }
1792
1793 #[test]
1794 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1795         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1796         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1797         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1798         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1799         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1800         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1802         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1803         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1804         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1805
1806         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1807         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1808
1809         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1810         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1811
1812         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1813                 ($node: expr) => {{
1814                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1815                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1816                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1817                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1818                         payment_event
1819                 }}
1820         }
1821
1822         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1823         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1824         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1825         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1826
1827         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1828
1829         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1830         {
1831                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1832                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1833                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1834                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1835                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1836
1837                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1838                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1839                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1840                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1841                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1842                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1843         }
1844
1845         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1846         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1847         loop {
1848                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1849                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1850                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1851                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1852                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1854                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1855                         break;
1856                 }
1857
1858                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1859                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1860                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1861                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1862                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1863
1864                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1865                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1866                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1867                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1868                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1869                 );
1870
1871                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1872                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1873                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1874                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1875                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1876         }
1877
1878         // adding pending output.
1879         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1880         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1881         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1882         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1883         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1884         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1885         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1886         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1887         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1888         // policy.
1889         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1890         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1891         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1892
1893         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1894         let payment_event_1 = {
1895                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1896                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1897                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1898
1899                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1900                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1901                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1902         };
1903         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1904
1905         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1906         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1907         {
1908                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1909                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1910                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1911                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1912                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1913                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1914         }
1915
1916         // split the rest to test holding cell
1917         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1918         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1919         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1920         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1921         {
1922                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1923                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1924         }
1925
1926         // now see if they go through on both sides
1927         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1928         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1929         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1930                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1932         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1933         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1934
1935         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1936         {
1937                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1938                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1939                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1940                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1941                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1942                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1943                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1944         }
1945
1946         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1947         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1948         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1949                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1951         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1952         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1953
1954         // flush the pending htlc
1955         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1956         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1958
1959         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1960         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1962         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1963
1964         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1965         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1966         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1968
1969         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1970         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972
1973         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1974
1975         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1976         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1977         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1978
1979         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1980         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1981
1982         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1983         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1984         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1985         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1986         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1987         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1988
1989         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1990         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1991         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1992         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1993
1994         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1995         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1996
1997         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1998         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1999         match events[0] {
2000                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2001                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2002                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2003                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2004                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2005                         match &purpose {
2006                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2007                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2008                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2009                                 },
2010                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2011                         }
2012                 },
2013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2014         }
2015         match events[1] {
2016                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2017                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2018                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2019                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2020                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2021                         match &purpose {
2022                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2023                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2024                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2025                                 },
2026                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2027                         }
2028                 },
2029                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2030         }
2031
2032         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2033         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2034         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2035
2036         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2037         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2038         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2039
2040         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2041         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2042         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2043         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2044         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2045
2046         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2047         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2048 }
2049
2050 #[test]
2051 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2052         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2053         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2054         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2055         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2056         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2057         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2058         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2059         // To test this we:
2060         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2061         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2062         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2063         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2064         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2065         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2066         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2067         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2068         //    claim,
2069         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2070         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2071         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2072         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2073         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2074         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2075         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2076         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2077         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2078         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2079
2080         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2081         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2082         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2083         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2084         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2085
2086         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2087         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2088         let send_1 = {
2089                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2090                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2092                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2093                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2094                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2095         };
2096
2097         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2098         // initial fulfill/CS.
2099         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2100         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2103
2104         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2105         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2106         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2107         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2109         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2110
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2112         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2114         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2116
2117         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2118         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2119         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2120         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2121         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2122
2123         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2125         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2126
2127         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2129         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134
2135         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2136         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2137         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2138         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2139         // on-chain as necessary).
2140         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2141         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2143         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2144         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2145
2146         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2149
2150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2151         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2152
2153         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2154         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2155         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2157         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2158         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2159
2160         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2161         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2162         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2163         let send_2 = {
2164                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2165                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2166                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2167                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2168                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2169                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2170         };
2171
2172         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2173         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2175         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2176
2177         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2178
2179         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2181         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2182
2183         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2185
2186         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2188         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2189         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2190
2191         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2193         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2194
2195         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2197
2198         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2199         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2200
2201         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2202         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2203 }
2204
2205 #[test]
2206 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2207         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2208         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2212         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2213
2214         // Create some initial channels
2215         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2216         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2217         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2218         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2219
2220         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2221         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2222         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2223         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2224         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2225         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2226
2227         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2228         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2230         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2231         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2232
2233         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2234         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2236         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2237         {
2238                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2239                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2240                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2241                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2242                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2243         }
2244         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2245         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2246         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2247         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2248         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2249
2250         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2251         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2252
2253         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2254         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2255         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2256         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2258         {
2259                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2260                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2261                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2262                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2263                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2264                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2265         }
2266         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2267         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2268         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2269         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2270         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2271
2272         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2273                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2274                         {
2275                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2276                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2277                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2278
2279                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2280                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2281                                 match events[0] {
2282                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2283                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2284                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2285                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2286                                         },
2287                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288                                 };
2289                         }
2290                 }
2291         }
2292
2293         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2294         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2295         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2297         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2298         let node2_commitment_txid;
2299         {
2300                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2301                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2302                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2303                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2304
2305                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2306                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2307                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2309                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2310         }
2311         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2313         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2314         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2315         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2316
2317         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2318         // confusing us in the following tests.
2319         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2320
2321         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2322         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2323         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2324         // buffer space).
2325
2326         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2327                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2328                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2329                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2330                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2331                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2332                                 msg.clone()
2333                         },
2334                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2335                 };
2336                 match events[1] {
2337                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2338                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2339                         },
2340                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2341                 }
2342                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2343
2344                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2345                 {
2346                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2347                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2348                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2349                                         false
2350                                 } else { true }
2351                         });
2352                 }
2353
2354                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2355
2356                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2357                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2358
2359                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2360                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2361                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2362                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2363                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2364                                 msg.clone()
2365                         },
2366                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2367                 };
2368                 match events[1] {
2369                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2370                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2371                         },
2372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2373                 }
2374                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2375                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2376
2377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2378                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2379                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2380         };
2381         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2382         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2383         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2384         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2385
2386         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2387                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2388         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2390 }
2391
2392 #[test]
2393 fn test_justice_tx() {
2394         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2395         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2396         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2397         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2398         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2399         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2400         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2401         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2402         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2403         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2404         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2405         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2406         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2409         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2410         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2411         // Create some new channels:
2412         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2413
2414         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2417         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2422         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2423         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2424         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2425         // Revoke the old state
2426         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2427
2428         {
2429                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430                 {
2431                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2433                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2434
2435                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2437                 }
2438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2439                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2440                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2441
2442                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2444                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2445                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2447                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2448                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2449                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2450                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2451         }
2452         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2453
2454         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2455         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2456
2457         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2458         // Create some new channels:
2459         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460         {
2461                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2462                 node_txn.clear();
2463         }
2464
2465         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2466         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2467         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2468         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2469         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2470         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2471         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2472         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2473         // Revoke the old state
2474         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2475         {
2476                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2477                 {
2478                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2479                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2480                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2481
2482                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2484                 }
2485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2486                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2487
2488                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2490                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2492                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2493                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2494                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2495         }
2496         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2497         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2498         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2499 }
2500
2501 #[test]
2502 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2503         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2504         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2509         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2510         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2511         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2513         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2514         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2515         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2516         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2517
2518         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2519         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2523         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2524
2525         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526
2527         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2528         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2529         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 }
2533
2534 #[test]
2535 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2536         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2537         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2538         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2541         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2542
2543         // Create some new channel:
2544         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545
2546         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2547         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2548         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2549         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2550         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2551
2552         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2553         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2554         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2555         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2556         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2557         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2558         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2559         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2560         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2561
2562         //Revoke the old state
2563         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2564
2565         {
2566                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2568                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2569                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2570                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2571                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2572                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2573                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2574
2575                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2576                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2577
2578                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2579                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2580
2581                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2582                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2583                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2584                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2585                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2586                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2587                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2588                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2589
2590                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2591                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2592                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2593                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2594                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2595         }
2596         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2598         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2599 }
2600
2601 #[test]
2602 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2603         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2604         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2605         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2608         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2609
2610         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2611
2612         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2613         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2614         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2615         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2616         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2617         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2618
2619         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2620         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2621
2622         //Revoke the old state
2623         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2624
2625         {
2626                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2627                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2628                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2629                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2630                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2631                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2632                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2633                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2634                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2635                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2636                 }
2637
2638                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2640
2641                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2642                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2643
2644                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2645                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2646                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2648                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2649                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2650                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2651
2652                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2653                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2654                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2655                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2656
2657                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2658                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2659                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2660
2661                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2662                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2663                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2664                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2665                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2666                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2667                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2668                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2669
2670                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2671                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2672                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2673                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2674                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2675                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2676                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2677         }
2678         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2679         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2680         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2681 }
2682
2683 #[test]
2684 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2685         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2686         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2687         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2688         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2689         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2690         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2691         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2692         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2693         // towards B.
2694         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2695         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2696         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2697         // PaymentSent event).
2698
2699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2702         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2703
2704         // Create some initial channels
2705         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2706         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2707
2708         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2709         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2710         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2711         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2712         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2713
2714         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2715         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2716         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2717
2718         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2719         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2720
2721         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2722         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2723         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2724         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2725         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2726         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2727         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2728         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2729         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2731         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2732         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2733         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2734         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2735         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2736
2737         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2740         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2741         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2742         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2743         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2744         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2745         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2746         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2747         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2748         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2749         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2750         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2751
2752         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2753         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2754         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2755         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2756         {
2757                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2758                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2759                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2760                 added_monitors.clear();
2761         }
2762         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2763         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2764         match forwarded_events[0] {
2765                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2767         }
2768         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2769         match forwarded_events[1] {
2770                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2771                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2772                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2773                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2774                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2775                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2776                 },
2777                 _ => panic!()
2778         }
2779         match forwarded_events[2] {
2780                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2781                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2782                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2783                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2784                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2785                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2786                 },
2787                 _ => panic!()
2788         }
2789         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2790         {
2791                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2792                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2793                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2794                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2795                 added_monitors.clear();
2796         }
2797         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2798
2799         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2800         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2801
2802         match nodes_2_event {
2803                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2804                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2805         }
2806
2807         match nodes_0_event {
2808                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2809                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2810                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2811                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2812                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2813                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2814                 },
2815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2816         };
2817
2818         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2819         match events[0] {
2820                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2822         }
2823
2824         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2825                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2826                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2827                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2828                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2829                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2830                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2831                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2832                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2833                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2834                         if $htlc_offered {
2835                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2836                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2837                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2838                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2839                         } else {
2840                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2841                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2842                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2843                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2844                         }
2845                         node_txn.clear();
2846                 } }
2847         }
2848         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2849         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2850
2851         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2852         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2853         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2854         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2855         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2856         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2859         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2860         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2861         let commitment_spend =
2862                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2863                         &node_txn[0]
2864                 } else {
2865                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2866                         // FullBlockViaListen
2867                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2868                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2869                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2870                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2871                                 &node_txn[0]
2872                         } else {
2873                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2874                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2875                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2876                                 &node_txn[2]
2877                         }
2878                 };
2879
2880         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2881         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2882         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2883         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2884         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2885         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2886         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2887         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2888
2889         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2890         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2891         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2892         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2893         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2897         let mut first_claimed = false;
2898         for event in events {
2899                 match event {
2900                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2901                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2902                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2903                                         first_claimed = true;
2904                                 } else {
2905                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2906                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2907                                 }
2908                         },
2909                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2910                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2912                 }
2913         }
2914         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2915 }
2916
2917 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2918         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2919         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2920         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2921         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2922         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2923         //            \                                  \
2924         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2925
2926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2929         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2930         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2931         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2932         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2933
2934         // Create some intial channels
2935         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2936         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2937
2938         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2939         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2940         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2941
2942         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2943
2944         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2945         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2946         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2947         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2949         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2951
2952         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2953         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2954         match events[0] {
2955                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2956                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2957                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2958                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2959                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2960                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2961                 },
2962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2963         };
2964         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2965         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2967         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2968         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2969         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2970
2971         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2972         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2973         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2974         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2975         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2976         let timeout_tx;
2977         {
2978                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2979                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2980
2981                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2982                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2983
2984                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2985                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2986                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2988
2989                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2990                 node_txn.clear();
2991         }
2992
2993         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2995         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2996
2997         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2998
2999         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3001         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3002         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3003         match events[0] {
3004                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3005                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3006                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3007                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3008                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3009                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3010                 },
3011                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3012         };
3013
3014         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3015         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3016         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3017
3018         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3019         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3020
3021         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3023         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3024         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3025         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3026         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3027         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3028 }
3029
3030 #[test]
3031 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3032         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3033         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3034         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3035 }
3036
3037 #[test]
3038 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3039         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3040         // and fail backward accordingly.
3041
3042         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3043         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3044         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3045         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3046
3047         // Create some initial channels
3048         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3049         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3050
3051         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3052         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3053         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3054         // Revoke the old state
3055         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3056
3057         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3058
3059         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3060         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3061         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3062         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3063         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3064
3065         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3067         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3068         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3069         match events[0] {
3070                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3071                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3072                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3073                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3074                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3075                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3076
3077                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3078                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3079                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3080                 },
3081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082         }
3083 }
3084
3085 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3086         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3087         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3088         // commitment transaction anymore.
3089         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3090         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3091         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3092         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3093         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3094         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3095         // transactions:
3096         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3097         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3098         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3099         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3100         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3104         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3105
3106         // Create some initial channels
3107         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3108         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3109
3110         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3111         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3112         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3113         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3114         // Revoke the old state
3115         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3116
3117         let value = if use_dust {
3118                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3119                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3120                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3121                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3122         } else { 3000000 };
3123
3124         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3125         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3126         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3127
3128         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3129         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3132         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3133         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3135         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3136         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3137         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3138         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3139         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3140
3141         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3142         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3144         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3145         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3146         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3147         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3148         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3149         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3150         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3151         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3153         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3154         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3155         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3157
3158         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3159         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3161         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3162         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3163         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3164         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3165         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3166         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3168         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3169         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3172         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3174         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3176
3177         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3178         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3179         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3180         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3181                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3182         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3183         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3185
3186         if deliver_bs_raa {
3187                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3188                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3189                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3190                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3191                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3192                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3193                 match events[0] {
3194                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3195                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3196                 };
3197                 match events[1] {
3198                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200                 }
3201                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3202                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3203         }
3204
3205         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3206         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3207
3208         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3210         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3211
3212         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3213         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3214         match events[0] {
3215                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3216                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3217         }
3218         match events[1] {
3219                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3220                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3221                 },
3222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223         }
3224         match events[2] {
3225                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3226                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3227                 },
3228                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3229         }
3230
3231         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3233
3234         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3235         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3236
3237         if deliver_bs_raa {
3238                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3239                 match nodes_2_event {
3240                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3241                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3242                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3243                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3244                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3245                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                         },
3247                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248                 }
3249         }
3250
3251         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3252         match nodes_2_event {
3253                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3254                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3255                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3256                 },
3257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258         }
3259
3260         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3261         match nodes_0_event {
3262                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3263                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3264                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3265                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3266                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3267                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3268
3269                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3270                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3271                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3272
3273                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3274
3275                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3276                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3277                         match events[0] {
3278                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3279                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3280                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3281                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3282                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3283                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3284                                         }
3285                                 },
3286                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3287                         }
3288                         match events[1] {
3289                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3290                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3291                                 },
3292                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3293                         }
3294                         match events[2] {
3295                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3296                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3297                                 },
3298                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299                         }
3300                         match events[3] {
3301                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3302                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3303                                 },
3304                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305                         }
3306                         match events[4] {
3307                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3308                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3309                                 },
3310                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311                         }
3312                         match events[5] {
3313                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3314                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3315                                 },
3316                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                         }
3318                 },
3319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3320         }
3321
3322         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3323         match events[0] {
3324                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3325                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3326         }
3327
3328         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3329         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3330         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3331 }
3332
3333 #[test]
3334 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3335         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3336         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3337         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3338         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3339 }
3340
3341 #[test]
3342 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3343         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3344         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3345         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3346         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3347 }
3348
3349 #[test]
3350 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3351         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3352         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3354         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3355         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3356
3357         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3358         {
3359                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3360                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3361                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3362                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3363
3364                 let payment_event = {
3365                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3366                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3367                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3368                 };
3369                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3370                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3371         }
3372
3373         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3374         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3375         {
3376                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3377                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3378                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3379
3380                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3381         }
3382
3383         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3384         {
3385                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3386
3387                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3388                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3389                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3390                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3391                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3392                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3393                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3394
3395                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3396                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3397                         channel_id: chan.2,
3398                         htlc_id: 0,
3399                         amount_msat: 0,
3400                         payment_hash,
3401                         cltv_expiry,
3402                         onion_routing_packet,
3403                 };
3404                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3405         }
3406         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3407         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3408         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3409         match events[0] {
3410                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3411                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3412                 },
3413                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414         }
3415         match events[1] {
3416                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3417                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3418                 },
3419                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3420         }
3421         match events[2] {
3422                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3423                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3424                 },
3425                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3426         }
3427         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 }
3430
3431 #[test]
3432 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3433         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3434         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3435         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3436         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3437         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3438         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3439         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3440                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3441                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3442                 // connect_style.
3443                 return;
3444         }
3445         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3446
3447         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3448         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3449         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3450         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3452         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3453
3454         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3455         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3456         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3457
3458         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3459         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3460         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3462         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3463
3464         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3465         // registering new transactions
3466         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3467 }
3468
3469 #[test]
3470 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3471         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3475         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3476         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3477         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3478
3479         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3480
3481         let mut payment_event = {
3482                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3483                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3484                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3485
3486                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3487                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3488                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3489         };
3490
3491         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3492         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3493
3494         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3495
3496         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3497         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3498         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3499         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3500
3501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3502         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3503         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3504         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3505         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3506
3507         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3508         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3509         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3510
3511         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3512         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3514         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3515         let tx = {
3516                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3517                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3518                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3519                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3520                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3521                 node_txn.remove(0)
3522         };
3523
3524         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3525
3526         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3527         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3529         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3530
3531         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3532         {
3533                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3534                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3535         }
3536         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3537         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3538         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3539         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3540         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3541         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3542         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3543
3544         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3545 }
3546
3547 #[test]
3548 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3549         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3550         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3551         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3552         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3553
3554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3558         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3559
3560         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3561
3562         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3563         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3565         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3566         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3567         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3568
3569         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3570         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3571
3572         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3574 }
3575
3576 #[test]
3577 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3578         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3579         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3584
3585         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3586         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3587         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3588         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3589         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3590         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3591         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3592
3593         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3594         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3595
3596         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3597
3598         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3599         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3600
3601         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3602         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3603         // broadcasted.
3604         {
3605                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3606         }
3607
3608         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3609         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3610         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3611         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3612
3613         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3614         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3615 }
3616
3617 #[test]
3618 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3619         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3623         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3624         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3625         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3626
3627         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3628         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3629         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3630
3631         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3632         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3633         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3634         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3635
3636         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3637         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3638         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3639
3640         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3641         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3642         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3643         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3644
3645         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3646         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647
3648         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3649         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3650
3651         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3652         {
3653                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3654                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3655                 match events[0] {
3656                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3657                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3658                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3659                         },
3660                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3661                 }
3662                 match events[1] {
3663                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3664                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3665                 }
3666                 match events[2] {
3667                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3668                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3669                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3670                         },
3671                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3672                 }
3673                 match events[3] {
3674                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3675                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3676                         },
3677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3678                 }
3679         }
3680
3681         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3682         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3683 }
3684
3685 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3686         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3687         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3688         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3689         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3690         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3691
3692         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3693         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3694                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3695                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3696                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3697                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3698                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3699                 chan_id
3700         } else {
3701                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3702         };
3703
3704         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3705
3706         let payment_event = {
3707                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3708                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3709                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3710
3711                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3712                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3713                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3714         };
3715         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3716
3717         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3718                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3719         } else {
3720                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3721                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3722                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3723                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3724                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3725
3726                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3727                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3728                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3729                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3730
3731                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3732                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3733                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3734                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3735                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3736
3737                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3738                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3739                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3740                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3741                                         }
3742                                 }
3743                         }
3744                 }
3745         }
3746
3747         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3748         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3749         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3750                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3751                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3752                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3753                         //
3754                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3755                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3756                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3757                         //
3758                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3759                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3760                 }
3761                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3762                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3763                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3764         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3765                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3766                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3767         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3768                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3769                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3770         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3771                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3772                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3773         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3774                 // Everything was delivered...
3775                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3776         }
3777
3778         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3779         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3780                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3781                 match events_1[0] {
3782                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3783                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784                 };
3785                 match events_1[1] {
3786                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3787                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788                 };
3789         } else {
3790                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3791                 match events_1[0] {
3792                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3793                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3794                 };
3795         }
3796
3797         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3798         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3799         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3800
3801         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3802
3803         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3804         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3805         match events_2[0] {
3806                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3807                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3808                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3809                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3810                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3811                         match &purpose {
3812                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3813                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3814                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3815                                 },
3816                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3817                         }
3818                 },
3819                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3820         }
3821
3822         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3824         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3825
3826         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3827         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3828         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3829                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3830                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3831                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3832                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3834                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3835                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3836                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3837                 },
3838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3839         };
3840
3841         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3842                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3843
3844                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3845                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3846                 match events_4[0] {
3847                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3848                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3849                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3850                         },
3851                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3852                 }
3853
3854                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3855                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3856                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3857                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3858
3859                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3860                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3861                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3862                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3863
3864                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3865                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3866                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3867                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3868                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3869
3870                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3871                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3872                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3873                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3874                                         }
3875                                 }
3876                         }
3877                 }
3878         }
3879
3880         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3881         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3882         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3883                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3884                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3885                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3886                 } else {
3887                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3888                 }
3889         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3890                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3891                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3892         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3893                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3894                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3895         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3896                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3897                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3898         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3899                 // Everything was delivered...
3900                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3901         }
3902
3903         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3904                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3905         }
3906         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3907                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3908                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3909         }
3910         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3911
3912         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3913                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3914         }
3915
3916         // Channel should still work fine...
3917         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3918         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3919         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3920 }
3921
3922 #[test]
3923 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3924         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3925         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3926         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3927         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3928 }
3929
3930 #[test]
3931 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3932         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3933         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3934         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3935         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3936 }
3937
3938 #[test]
3939 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3940         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3941         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3942         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3943         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3944         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3947         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3948         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3949
3950         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3951
3952         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3953         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3954         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3955         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3956         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3957         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3958
3959         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3960         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3961         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3962 }
3963
3964 #[test]
3965 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3966         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3967         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3968         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3969         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3970         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3971         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3972         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3973
3974         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3975
3976         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3977         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3978         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3979                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3981
3982         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3983         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3984         match events_1[0] {
3985                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3987         }
3988
3989         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3990         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992
3993         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3994         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3995         match events_2[0] {
3996                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3997                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3998                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3999                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4000                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4001                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4002                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4003
4004                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4005                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4006                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4007                         match events_3[0] {
4008                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4009                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4010                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4011                                 },
4012                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4013                         }
4014
4015                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4016                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4017                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4018                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4019                 },
4020                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4021         }
4022
4023         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4024         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4025
4026         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
4027         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4028         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4029         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
4030         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4031         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4032
4033         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4034         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4035         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4036         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4037
4038         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4039         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4040
4041         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4042         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4043
4044         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4045
4046         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4047         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4048         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4049         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4050         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4051         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4052         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4053         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4054         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4056
4057         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4058         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4059         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4060         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4061         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4062         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4063         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4065
4066         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4067         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4068         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4069         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4070         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4071         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4072         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4074
4075         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4076         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4077         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4079
4080         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4081         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4082         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4084
4085         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4086         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4088
4089         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4090
4091         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4092         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4093         match events_5[0] {
4094                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4095                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4096                         match &purpose {
4097                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4098                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4099                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4100                                 },
4101                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4102                         }
4103                 },
4104                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4105         }
4106
4107         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4108         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4110
4111         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4112         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4113 }
4114
4115 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4116         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4117         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4121         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4122
4123         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4124
4125         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4126                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4127                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4128                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4129                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4130                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4131                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4132                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4133                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4134                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4135                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4137                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4138                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4139                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4140                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4141                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4142                 our_payment_hash
4143         } else {
4144                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4145         };
4146
4147         let mut block = Block {
4148                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4149                 txdata: vec![],
4150         };
4151         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4152         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4153         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4154         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4155                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4156                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4157                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4158         }
4159
4160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4161
4162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4164         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4165         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4166         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4167         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4168
4169         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4170         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4171         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4172         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4173         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4174         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4175 }
4176
4177 #[test]
4178 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4179         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4180         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4181 }
4182
4183 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4184         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4188         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4189         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4190         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4191
4192         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4193         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4195         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4196
4197         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4198         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4199         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4200                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4201         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203
4204         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4205         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4206         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4207         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4208                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4209         if forwarded_htlc {
4210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4211                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4212                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4213                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4214                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4215         }
4216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4217
4218         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4220         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4222
4223         if forwarded_htlc {
4224                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4225                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4226                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4227                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4228                 match fail_commit[0] {
4229                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4230                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4231                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4232                         },
4233                         _ => unreachable!(),
4234                 }
4235                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4236         } else {
4237                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4238         }
4239 }
4240
4241 #[test]
4242 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4243         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4244         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4245 }
4246
4247 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4248         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4249                 {
4250                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4251                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4252                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4253                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4254                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4255                                 match event {
4256                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4257                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4258                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4259                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4260                                                 }
4261                                         },
4262                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4263                                 };
4264                         }
4265                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4266                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4267                                         txn.push(tx);
4268                                 }
4269                         }
4270                         txn
4271                 }
4272         }
4273 }
4274
4275 #[test]
4276 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4277         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4278         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4279         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4280         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4281         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4282
4283         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4284         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4285         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4287         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4288         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4289         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4290         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4291         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4292
4293         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4294         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4295
4296         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4297         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4298         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4299         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4300         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4301 }
4302
4303 #[test]
4304 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4305         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4306         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4307         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4308         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4309         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4310         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4311
4312         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4313         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4314         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4316         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4317
4318         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4319         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4320         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4321         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4322
4323         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4324         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4326         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4327         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4328
4329         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4330         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4331         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4332 }
4333
4334 #[test]
4335 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4336         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4337         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4338
4339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4342         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4343
4344         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4345         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4346         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4347         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4348         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4349
4350         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4351         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4352         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4354         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4355
4356         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4357         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4358         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4359
4360         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4361         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4362         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4363         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4364         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4365 }
4366
4367 #[test]
4368 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4372         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4373
4374         // Create some initial channels
4375         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4376
4377         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4378
4379         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4380         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4381         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4382
4383         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4384         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4385         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4387         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4389         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4390         match events[0] {
4391                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4392                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4393         }
4394         match events[1] {
4395                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4396                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4397         }
4398
4399         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4400         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4401         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4402         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4403         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4404
4405         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4406         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4407         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4408
4409         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4410         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4411         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4412 }
4413
4414 #[test]
4415 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4416         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4417         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4418         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4419         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4420
4421         // Create some initial channels
4422         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4423
4424         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4425         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4426
4427         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4428
4429         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4430         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4431         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4432
4433         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4434         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4436         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4437         match events[0] {
4438                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4440         }
4441         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4442
4443         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4444         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4445         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4446         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4447         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4448
4449         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4450         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4451         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4452         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4453
4454         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4455         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4456         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4457         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4458         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4459 }
4460
4461 #[test]
4462 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4463         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4464         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4465         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4466         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4467
4468         // Create some initial channels
4469         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4470
4471         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4472         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4473         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4474         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4475
4476         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4477
4478         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4479         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4481         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4482
4483         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4484         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4485         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4486         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4487
4488         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4489         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4490
4491         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4492         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4493         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4494 }
4495
4496 #[test]
4497 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4498         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4499         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4502         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4503
4504         // Create some initial channels
4505         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4506
4507         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4508         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4510         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4511
4512         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4513
4514         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4515         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4516         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4518         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4519         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4520
4521         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4522         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4523         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4524         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4525         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4526         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4527
4528         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4529         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4530         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4531         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4533         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4534
4535         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4536         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4537         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4538         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4539         // transactions next...
4540         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4541         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4542
4543         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4544         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4545         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4546                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4547         } else {
4548                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4549                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4550         }
4551
4552         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4553         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4554
4555         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4556         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4557         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4558         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4559         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4560 }
4561
4562 #[test]
4563 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4564         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4565         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4566         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4567         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4568         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4569
4570         // Create some initial channels
4571         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4572
4573         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4574         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4575         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4576         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4577
4578         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4579         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4580
4581         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4582
4583         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4584         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4585         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4587         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4588         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4589
4590         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4591         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4592         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4593         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4594
4595         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4596         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4597         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4598
4599         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4600         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4601         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4602         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4604         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4605
4606         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4607         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4608
4609         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4610         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4611         // transactions next...
4612         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4613         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4614         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4615                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4616         } else {
4617                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4619         }
4620
4621         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4622         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4623
4624         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4625         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4626
4627         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4628         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4629
4630         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4631         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4632         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4633         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4634         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4635         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4636         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4637         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4638 }
4639
4640 #[test]
4641 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4642         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4643         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4644         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4645         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4646         // channel.
4647         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4648         // gets broadcast.
4649
4650         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4651         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4652         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4653         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4654
4655         // Create some initial channels
4656         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4657         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4658
4659         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4660         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4661         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4662         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4663         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4664
4665         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4666         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4667         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4668
4669         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4670         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4671         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4672         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4673         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4675         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4676         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4677         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4678         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4679         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4680
4681         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4682         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4684         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4685
4686         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4687         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4688         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4689         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4690         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4691         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4692
4693         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4694         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4695         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4697         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4698         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4699         match events[0] {
4700                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4702         }
4703         match events[1] {
4704                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4705                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4706                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4707                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4708                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4709                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4710                 },
4711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712         }
4713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4715         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4716         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4717         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4718
4719         match nodes_2_event {
4720                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4722         }
4723
4724         match nodes_0_event {
4725                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4726                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4727                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4728                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4729                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4730                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4731                 },
4732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4733         };
4734
4735         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4736         match msg_events[0] {
4737                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4739         }
4740
4741         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4742         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4743         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4745         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4746         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4747         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4748         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4750         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4751         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4752
4753         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 }
4756
4757 #[test]
4758 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4759         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4760         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4761         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4762         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4770                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4771         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4772
4773         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4774         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4775         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4776
4777         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4778         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4780         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4781         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4782
4783         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4784
4785         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4786         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4787         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4788         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4789         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4790                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4791         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4792         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4793
4794         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4795         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4796         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4797
4798         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4802         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4803
4804         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4805         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4806                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4807                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4808                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4809
4810                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4813
4814                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4815                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4816                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4817                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4818                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4819
4820                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4821                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4822                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4823                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4824                 } else {
4825                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4826                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4827                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4828                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4829                 }
4830
4831                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4832                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4833                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4834                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4835                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4836                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4837                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4838                 } else {
4839                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4840                 }
4841         }
4842
4843         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4844         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4845
4846         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4848         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4849         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4850         match events[0] {
4851                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4852                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4853         }
4854         match events[1] {
4855                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4856                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4857         }
4858         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4859         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4860         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4861         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4862         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4863         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4864         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4865         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4866         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4867         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4868
4869         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4870         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4871         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4872         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4873         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4874         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4875         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4876         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4877         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4879
4880         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4881         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4882         {
4883                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4884         }
4885         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4886
4887         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4888         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4889         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4890         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4891         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4892         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4893         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4894         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4895         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897
4898         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4899         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4900         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4901 }
4902
4903 #[test]
4904 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4905         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4906         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4907         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4908         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4909
4910         // Create some initial channels
4911         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4912
4913         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4914         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4915         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4916         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4917         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4918
4919         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4920         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4921         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923
4924         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4927         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4928         match events[0] {
4929                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4931         }
4932         match events[1] {
4933                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4934                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4935         }
4936         let node_tx = {
4937                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4938                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4939                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4940                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4941                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4942                 node_txn[0].clone()
4943         };
4944
4945         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4946         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4947
4948         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4949         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4950         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4951         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4952         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4953         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4954 }
4955
4956 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4957         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4958         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4959         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4960         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4961         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4962         // use the same payment hashes.
4963         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4964         //
4965         // A \         / E
4966         //    - C - D -
4967         // B /         \ F
4968         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4971         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4972         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4973         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4974         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4976                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4977         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4978
4979         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4980         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4981         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4982         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4983         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4984
4985         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4987         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4988         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4989
4990         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4991                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4992         // 0th HTLC:
4993         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4994         // 1st HTLC:
4995         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4996         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4997         // 2nd HTLC:
4998         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4999         // 3rd HTLC:
5000         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5001         // 4th HTLC:
5002         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5003         // 5th HTLC:
5004         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5005         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5006         // 6th HTLC:
5007         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5008         // 7th HTLC:
5009         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5010
5011         // 8th HTLC:
5012         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5013         // 9th HTLC:
5014         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5015         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5016
5017         // 10th HTLC:
5018         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5019         // 11th HTLC:
5020         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5021         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5022
5023         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5024         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5025         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5026         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5027         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5028
5029         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5030         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5031         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5032         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5033         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5034         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5036
5037         let failed_destinations = vec![
5038                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5039                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5040                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5041                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5042         ];
5043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5045
5046         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5047         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5048         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5049         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5050         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5052
5053         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5054         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5055         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5057
5058         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5059                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5060                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5061         ];
5062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5064
5065         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5066         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5067         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5068         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5069
5070         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5071
5072         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5073         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5074                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5075                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5076                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5077                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5078                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5079                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5080         ];
5081         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5083         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5084         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5085         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5086         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5087         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5088         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5089         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5090         if deliver_last_raa {
5091                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5092         } else {
5093                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5094         }
5095
5096         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5097         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5098         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5099         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5100         //
5101         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5102         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5103         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5104         //
5105         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5106         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5107         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5108
5109         if announce_latest {
5110                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5111         } else {
5112                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5113         }
5114         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5115         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5116                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5117                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5118         } else {
5119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5120                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5121         };
5122         match close_event {
5123                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5124                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5125         }
5126
5127         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5128         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5129         if deliver_last_raa {
5130                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5131
5132                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5133                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5134         } else {
5135                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5136                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5137                 } else {
5138                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5139                 };
5140
5141                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5142         }
5143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5144
5145         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5146         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5147         let mut a_done = false;
5148         for msg in cs_msgs {
5149                 match msg {
5150                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5151                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5152                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5153                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5154                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5155                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5156                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5157                                         }
5158                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5159                                         assert!(!a_done);
5160                                         a_done = true;
5161                                         &nodes[0]
5162                                 } else {
5163                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5164                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5165                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5166                                         }
5167                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5168                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5169                                         &nodes[1]
5170                                 };
5171                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5172                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5173                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5174                                 if announce_latest {
5175                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5176                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5177                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5178                                         }
5179                                 }
5180                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5181                         },
5182                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5183                 }
5184         }
5185
5186         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5187         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5188         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5189         let mut as_updates = 0;
5190         for event in as_events.iter() {
5191                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5192                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5193                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5194                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5195                         } else {
5196                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5197                         }
5198                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5199                                 as_updates += 1;
5200                         }
5201                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5202                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5203         }
5204         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5205         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5206         if announce_latest {
5207                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5208                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5209         }
5210         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5211
5212         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5213         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5214         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5215         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5216         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5217                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5218                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5219                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5220                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5221                         } else {
5222                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5223                         }
5224                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5225                                 bs_updates += 1;
5226                         }
5227                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5228                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5229         }
5230         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5231         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5232         if announce_latest {
5233                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5234         }
5235         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5236
5237         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5238         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5239         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5240         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5241         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5242         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5243 }
5244
5245 #[test]
5246 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5247         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5248 }
5249
5250 #[test]
5251 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5252         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5253 }
5254
5255 #[test]
5256 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5257         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5258         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5259         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5260 }
5261
5262 #[test]
5263 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5267         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5268
5269         // Create some initial channels
5270         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5271
5272         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5273         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5274         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5275         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5276
5277         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5278         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5279         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5281         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5282         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5283
5284         let htlc_timeout = {
5285                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5286                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5287                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5288                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5289                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5290                 node_txn[0].clone()
5291         };
5292
5293         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5295         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5296
5297         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5298         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5299         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5300         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5301         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5302         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5304         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5305         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5306         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5307                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5308 }
5309
5310 #[test]
5311 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5312         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5313         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5314         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5315         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5316
5317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5318
5319         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5320         let seed = [42; 32];
5321         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5322         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5323         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5324         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5325         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5326         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5327         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5328         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5329         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5330
5331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5332         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5333
5334         // Create some initial channels
5335         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5336         // for node 0
5337         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5338         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5339         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5340
5341         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5342         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5343         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5344         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5345         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5346
5347         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5348         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5349         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5350         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5351         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5352
5353         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5354         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5355         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5356         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5357             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5358             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5359             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5360                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5361         }
5362
5363         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5364         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5365         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5366         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5368         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5369
5370         let htlc_timeout = {
5371                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5372                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5373                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5374                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5375                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5376                 node_txn[0].clone()
5377         };
5378
5379         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5380         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5381         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5382
5383         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5384         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5385         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5386         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5387         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5388         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5389         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5391         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5392         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5393         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5394                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5395 }
5396
5397 #[test]
5398 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5402         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5403
5404         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5405
5406         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5407         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5408
5409         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5410         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5411         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5412
5413         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5414         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5415         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5416
5417         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5418         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5419         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5420
5421         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5422         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5423         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5424 }
5425
5426 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5427         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5428         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5429         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5430         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5431         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5432
5433         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5434
5435         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5436         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5437         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5439         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5440
5441         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5442         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5443         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5444
5445         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5447         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5448         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5450
5451         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5452         let mut block = Block {
5453                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5454                 txdata: vec![],
5455         };
5456         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5457                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5458                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5459         }
5460         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5461         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5463         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5464 }
5465
5466 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5470         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5471         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5472
5473         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5474         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5475                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5477
5478         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5479
5480         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5481         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5482         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5483
5484         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5485         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5486
5487         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5488                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5489                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5490         }
5491         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5494         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5495 }
5496
5497 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5501         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5502         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5503
5504         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5505         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5506         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5507         // actually revoked.
5508         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5509         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5510         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5511         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5513
5514         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5515         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5516         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5518         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5519         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5521         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5523         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5524
5525         if check_revoke_no_close {
5526                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5527                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5528         }
5529
5530         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5531         let mut block = Block {
5532                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5533                 txdata: vec![],
5534         };
5535         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5536                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5537                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5538         }
5539         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5540                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5541                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5542                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5543                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5544         } else {
5545                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5546         }
5547 }
5548
5549 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5550 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5551 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5552 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5553 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5554 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5555 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5556 // non-dust HTLCs.
5557 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5558 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5559 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5560 #[test]
5561 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5562         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5563         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5564
5565         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5566         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5567 }
5568
5569 #[test]
5570 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5571         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5572         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5573         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5574         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5575 }
5576
5577 #[test]
5578 #[should_panic]
5579 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5584         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5585         for node in nodes.iter() {
5586                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5587         }
5588
5589         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5590         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5591         let push_msat=10001;
5592         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5593         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5594         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5595         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5596
5597         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5598         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5599         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5600 }
5601
5602 #[test]
5603 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5608
5609         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5610         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5611         let push_msat=10001;
5612         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5613
5614         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5615         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5616         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5617         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5618         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5619
5620         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5621         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5622         let push_msat=10001;
5623         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5624         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5625         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5626
5627         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5628         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5629         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5630
5631         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5632         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5633         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5634
5635         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5636         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5637         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5638
5639         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5640         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5641         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5642         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5643         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5644         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5645 }
5646
5647 #[test]
5648 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5649         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5650         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5651         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5652         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5653
5654         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5655         let push_msat=10001;
5656         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5657         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5658         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5659         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5660
5661         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5662         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5663         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5664                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5665                         msg.clone()
5666                 },
5667                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5668         };
5669         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5670 }
5671
5672 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5673 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5674 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5675 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5676 #[test]
5677 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5678         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5679         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5680         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5681         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5682         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5683
5684         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5685         // pending_update_fee.
5686         {
5687                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5688                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5689         }
5690         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5692
5693         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5694         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5695         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5696                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5697                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5698                 },
5699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5700         };
5701
5702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5703
5704         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5705         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5706         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5707         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5708
5709         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5710         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5711         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5712
5713         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5714         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5715                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5716         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5717         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5718
5719         // Flush the pending fee update.
5720         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5721         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5723         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5725
5726         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5727         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5728         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5729         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5730         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5731         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5732         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5733                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5734         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5735
5736         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5737         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5738         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5739         match &events[0] {
5740                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5741                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5742                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5743                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5744                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5745                 },
5746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5747         }
5748         match &events[1] {
5749                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5750                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5751                 },
5752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5753         }
5754 }
5755
5756 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5757 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5758 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5759 #[test]
5760 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5764         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5765         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5766
5767         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5768         // pending_update_fee.
5769         {
5770                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5771                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5772         }
5773         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5775
5776         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5777         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5778         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5779                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5780                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5781                 },
5782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5783         };
5784
5785         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5786
5787         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5788         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5789         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5790         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5791
5792         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5793         let amt_1 = 20000;
5794         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5795         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5796         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5797
5798         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5799         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5800                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5801         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5802         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5803         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5804         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5805                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5806         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5807         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5808
5809         // Flush the pending fee update.
5810         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5811         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5813         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5816
5817         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5818         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5819         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5820         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5821         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5822         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5823         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5824                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5825         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5826
5827         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5828         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5829         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5830         match &events[0] {
5831                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5832                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5833                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5834                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5835                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5836                 },
5837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5838         }
5839         match &events[1] {
5840                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5841                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5842                 },
5843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5844         }
5845
5846         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5847         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5848                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5849                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5850                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5851         };
5852         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5853                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5854                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5855         };
5856         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5858         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5859         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5860         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5861         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5862         match events[0] {
5863                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5864                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5865         }
5866         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5867         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5868         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5869         match events[0] {
5870                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5872         }
5873         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5876
5877         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5878         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5879         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5880         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5881 }
5882
5883 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5884 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5885 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5886 // once it's freed.
5887 #[test]
5888 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5889         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5890         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5891         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5892         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5893         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5894         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5896         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5897         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5898         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5899
5900         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5901         // pending_update_fee.
5902         {
5903                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5904                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5905         }
5906         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5908
5909         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5910         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5911         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5912                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5913                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5914                 },
5915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5916         };
5917
5918         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5919
5920         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5921         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5922         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5923         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5924
5925         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5926         let feemsat = 239;
5927         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5928         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5929         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5930         let payment_event = {
5931                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5932                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5933                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5934
5935                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5936                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5937
5938                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5939         };
5940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5944
5945         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5946         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5947
5948         // Flush the pending fee update.
5949         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5950         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5952         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5953         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5955
5956         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5957         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5958         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5959
5960         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5961                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5962                         msg.clone()
5963                 },
5964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5965         };
5966
5967         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5969         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5970
5971         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5972         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5973         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5974         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5975                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5976                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5977         }
5978
5979         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5980         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5982
5983         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5984         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5985         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5986         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5987                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5988                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5989                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5990                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5991                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5992                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5993                 },
5994                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5995         };
5996
5997         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5998         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5999         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6000
6001         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6002         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6004         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6005         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6007         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6008         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6009         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6010                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6011                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6012         };
6013         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6014         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6016 }
6017
6018 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6019 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6020 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6021
6022 #[test]
6023 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6024         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6025         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6026         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6027         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6028         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6029         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6030
6031         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6032         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6033
6034         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6035                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6036                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6037                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6038         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6039         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6040 }
6041
6042 #[test]
6043 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6044         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6045         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6046         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6047         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6048         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6049         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6050
6051         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6052         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6053         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6054                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6055                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6056                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6057
6058         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6059         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6060 }
6061
6062 #[test]
6063 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6064         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6065         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6066         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6067         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6068         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6069         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6070
6071         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6072         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6073                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6075         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6076         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6077
6078         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6079         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6080         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6082         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6083 }
6084
6085 #[test]
6086 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6087         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6088         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6089         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6090         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6091         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6092         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6093         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6094
6095         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6096                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6097         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6098         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6099         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6100                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6101                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6102                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6103 }
6104
6105 #[test]
6106 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6107         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6108         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6109         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6114         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6115         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6116                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6117
6118         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6119                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6120                 let payment_event = {
6121                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6122                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6123                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6124
6125                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6126                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6127                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6128                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6129                         } else {
6130                                 assert!(false);
6131                         }
6132                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6133                 };
6134                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6136                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6137
6138                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6139                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6140         }
6141         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6142         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6143                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6144                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6145                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6146
6147         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6148         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6149 }
6150
6151 #[test]
6152 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6153         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6154         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6155         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6156         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6157         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6158         let channel_value = 100000;
6159         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6160         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6161
6162         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6163
6164         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6165         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6166         // limits us to.
6167         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6168         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6169                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6170                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6171                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6172
6173         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6174         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6175
6176         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6177 }
6178
6179 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6180 #[test]
6181 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6182         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6184         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6185         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6186         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6187         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6188         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6189         {
6190                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6191                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6192                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6193                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6194         }
6195
6196         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6197         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6198                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6201         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6202         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6203         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6204         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6205         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6207         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6208 }
6209
6210 #[test]
6211 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6212         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6217         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6218
6219         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6220         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6221         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6222         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6223         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6224         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6225
6226         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6227         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6228         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6229                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6231         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6232
6233         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6234         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6235         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6236         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6237         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6238
6239         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6240         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6241         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6243         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6244 }
6245
6246 #[test]
6247 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6248         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6249         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6250         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6251         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6252         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6253         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6254         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6255
6256         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6257         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6258         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6259         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6260         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6261                 &route.paths[0], 3999999, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6262         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6263
6264         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6265                 channel_id: chan.2,
6266                 htlc_id: 0,
6267                 amount_msat: 1000,
6268                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6269                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6270                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6271         };
6272
6273         for i in 0..50 {
6274                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6275                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6276         }
6277         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6278         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6279
6280         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6281         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6282         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6284         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6285 }
6286
6287 #[test]
6288 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6289         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6290         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6291         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6292         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6293         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6294         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6295
6296         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6297         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6298                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6301         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6302         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6303
6304         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6305         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6306         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6308         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6309 }
6310
6311 #[test]
6312 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6313         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6314         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6315         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6316         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6317         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6318
6319         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6320         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6321         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6322                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6324         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6325         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6326         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6327
6328         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6329         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6330         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6332         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6333 }
6334
6335 #[test]
6336 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6337         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6338         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6339         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6343         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6344
6345         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6346         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6347         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6348                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6352
6353         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6354         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6355         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6356         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6357         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6358         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6359         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6360         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6361         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6362         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6363         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6364         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6365         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6366
6367         //Resend HTLC
6368         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6369         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6370         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6372         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6373
6374         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6375
6376         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6377         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6378         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6380         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6381 }
6382
6383 #[test]
6384 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6385         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6386
6387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6390         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6391         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6392         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6393         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6394                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6395
6396         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6397         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6398         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6399
6400         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6401                 channel_id: chan.2,
6402                 htlc_id: 0,
6403                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6404         };
6405
6406         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6407
6408         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6410         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6412         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6413 }
6414
6415 #[test]
6416 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6417         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6418
6419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6424
6425         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6426         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6427                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6429         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6431
6432         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6433                 channel_id: chan.2,
6434                 htlc_id: 0,
6435                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6436         };
6437
6438         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6439
6440         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6441         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6442         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6444         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6445 }
6446
6447 #[test]
6448 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6449         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6450
6451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6455         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6456
6457         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6458         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6459                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6461         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6463         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6464                 channel_id: chan.2,
6465                 htlc_id: 0,
6466                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6467                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6468         };
6469
6470         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6471
6472         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6473         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6474         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6476         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6477 }
6478
6479 #[test]
6480 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6481         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6482
6483         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6484         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6485         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6486         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6487         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6488
6489         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6490
6491         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6493         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6494
6495         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6496         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6497         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6498                 match events[0] {
6499                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6500                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6501                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6502                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6503                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6504                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6505                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6506                         },
6507                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6508                 }
6509         };
6510
6511         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6512
6513         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6514
6515         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6516         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6517         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6520 }
6521
6522 #[test]
6523 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6524         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6525
6526         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6527         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6528         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6529         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6530         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6531
6532         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6533
6534         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6536         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6537
6538         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6539         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6540         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6541                 match events[0] {
6542                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6543                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6544                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6545                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6546                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6547                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6548                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6549                         },
6550                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6551                 }
6552         };
6553
6554         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6555
6556         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6557
6558         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6559         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6560         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6562         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6563 }
6564
6565 #[test]
6566 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6567         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6568
6569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6574
6575         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6576         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6577                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6579
6580         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6581         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6582
6583         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6585         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6586
6587         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6588
6589         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6590                 match events[0] {
6591                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6592                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6593                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6594                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6595                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6596                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6597                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6598                         },
6599                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6600                 }
6601         };
6602         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6603         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6604
6605         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6606         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6607         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6609         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6610 }
6611
6612 #[test]
6613 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6614         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6615         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6616
6617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6620         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6621         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6622         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6623
6624         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6625
6626         //First hop
6627         let mut payment_event = {
6628                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6629                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6630                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6631                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6632                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6633                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6634         };
6635         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6637         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6638         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6639         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6640         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6642         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6643         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6644
6645         //Second Hop
6646         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6647         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6649         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6650
6651         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6652         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6653         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6654                 match events_3[0] {
6655                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6656                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6657                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6658                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6659                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6660                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6661                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6662                         },
6663                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6664                 }
6665         };
6666
6667         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6668
6669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6670         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6671         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6672         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6673         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6674
6675         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6676         match events_4[0] {
6677                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6678                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6679                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6680                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6681                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6682                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6683                 },
6684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6685         };
6686
6687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6688 }
6689
6690 #[test]
6691 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6695         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6696         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6697         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6698
6699         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6700
6701         // First hop
6702         let mut payment_event = {
6703                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6704                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6705                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6706                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6707         };
6708
6709         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6710         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6711         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6713         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6714         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6715
6716         // Second Hop
6717         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6718         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6720         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6721
6722         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6723         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6724         match events_3[0] {
6725                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6726                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6727                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6728                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6729
6730                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6731                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6732                 },
6733                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6734         }
6735
6736         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6737                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6738                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6739         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6740         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742
6743         match events_4[0] {
6744                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6745                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6746                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6747                 },
6748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6749         }
6750
6751         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6752         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6753
6754         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6755         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6756         match events_5[0] {
6757                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6758                 } => {
6759                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6760                         assert!(is_permanent);
6761                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6762                 },
6763                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6764         }
6765         match events_5[1] {
6766                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6767                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6768                 },
6769                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6770         }
6771
6772         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6773 }
6774
6775 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6776         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6777         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6778         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6779
6780         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6781         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6782         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6783         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6784         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6785         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6786
6787         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6788                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6789
6790         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6791         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6792         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6793         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6794
6795         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6796         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6797
6798         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6799         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6801         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6803
6804         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6805         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6806         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6808
6809         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6810         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6811
6812         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6813         match events[0] {
6814                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6815                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6816                 },
6817                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6818         }
6819         match events[1] {
6820                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6821                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6822                 },
6823                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6824         }
6825
6826         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6827         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6828         if announce_latest {
6829                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6830         } else {
6831                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6832         }
6833
6834         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6836         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6837
6838         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6839         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6840         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6841         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6842         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6843         let mut first_failed = false;
6844         for event in events {
6845                 match event {
6846                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6847                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6848                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6849                                         first_failed = true;
6850                                 } else {
6851                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6852                                 }
6853                         },
6854                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6855                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6856                 }
6857         }
6858 }
6859
6860 #[test]
6861 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6862         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6863         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6864 }
6865
6866 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6867         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6868         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6869         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6870         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6871         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6872         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6873
6874         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6875         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6876         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6877         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6878         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6879
6880         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6881                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6882
6883         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6884         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6885
6886         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6887         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6888
6889         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6890         if revoked {
6891                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6892                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6893         }
6894
6895         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6896         if local {
6897                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6898                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6899                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6900                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6901                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6902
6903                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6904                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6905                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6907                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6908                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6909                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6910                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6911                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6912                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6913                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6914         } else {
6915                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6916                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6917                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6918                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6919                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6920                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6921
6922                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6923                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6924                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6925                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6926                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6927                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6928                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6929
6930                 if !revoked {
6931                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6932                 } else {
6933                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6934                 }
6935                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6936                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6937                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6938                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6939                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6940         }
6941 }
6942
6943 #[test]
6944 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6945         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6946         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6947         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6948 }
6949
6950 #[test]
6951 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6952         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6953
6954         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6955         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6956         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6957         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6958         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6962         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6963
6964         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6965         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6966                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6967                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6968         {
6969                 match error {
6970                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6971                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6972                 }
6973         } else { assert!(false) }
6974
6975         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6976         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6977         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6978         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6979         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6980                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6981                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6982         {
6983                 match error {
6984                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6985                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6986                 }
6987         } else { assert!(false); }
6988
6989         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6990         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6991         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6992         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6993         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6994         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6995         let reason_msg;
6996         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6997                 match action {
6998                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6999                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7000                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7001                         },
7002                         _ => { panic!(); }
7003                 }
7004         } else { panic!(); }
7005         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7006
7007         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7008         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7009         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7010         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7011         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7012                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7013                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7014         {
7015                 match error {
7016                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7017                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7018                 }
7019         } else { assert!(false); }
7020 }
7021
7022 #[test]
7023 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7024         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7025         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7026         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7027
7028         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7029         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7030         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7031         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7032
7033         // Create some initial channels
7034         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7035
7036         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7037         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7038         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7039         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7040         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7041         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7042         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7043                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7045
7046         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7048         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7049         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7050         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7051
7052         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7053         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7054         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7055         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7056
7057         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7058         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7059         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7060
7061         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7062         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7063         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7064                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7065                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7066                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7067                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7068                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7069                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7070                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7071                 },
7072                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7073         };
7074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7075
7076         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7077         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7078
7079         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7080         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7081         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7082         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7083 }
7084
7085 #[test]
7086 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7087         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7088         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7089
7090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7093         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7094
7095         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7096         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7097         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7098
7099         // Disconnect peers
7100         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7101         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7102
7103         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7104         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7105         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7106         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7107         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7108         for e in msg_events {
7109                 match e {
7110                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7111                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7112                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7113                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7114                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7115                                 }
7116                         },
7117                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7118                 }
7119         }
7120         // Reconnect peers
7121         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7122         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7123         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7124         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7125         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7126         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7127
7128         // Reestablish chan_1
7129         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7130         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7131         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7132         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7133         // Reestablish chan_2
7134         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7135         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7136         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7137         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7138         // Reestablish chan_3
7139         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7140         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7141         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7142         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7143
7144         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7145         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7146         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7147         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7148         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7149         for e in msg_events {
7150                 match e {
7151                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7152                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7153                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7154                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7155                                         // the old one.
7156                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7157                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7158                                 }
7159                         },
7160                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7161                 }
7162         }
7163         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7164         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7165 }
7166
7167 #[test]
7168 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7169         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7170         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7171
7172         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7173         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7174         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7175         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7176
7177         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7178
7179         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7180         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7181                 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7182         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7183         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7184
7185         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7186         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7187         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7188         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7189         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7190         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7191
7192         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7193         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7194                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7195                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7196                 }
7197         }
7198
7199         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7200         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7201
7202         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7203         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7204         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7205         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7207
7208         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7209         let penalty_1;
7210         let feerate_1;
7211         {
7212                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7213                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7214                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7215                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7216                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7217                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7218                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7219                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7220                 node_txn.clear();
7221         };
7222
7223         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7225         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7226         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7227         {
7228                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7229                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7230                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7231                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7232                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7233                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7234                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7235                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7236                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7237                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7238                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7239                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7240                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7241                         node_txn.clear();
7242                 }
7243         }
7244         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7245
7246         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7247         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7248         let penalty_3;
7249         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7250         {
7251                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7252                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7253                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7254                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7255                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7256                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7257                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7258                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7259                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7260                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7261                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7262                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7263                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7264                         node_txn.clear();
7265                 }
7266         }
7267         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7268
7269         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7270         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7271 }
7272
7273 #[test]
7274 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7275         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7276         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7277
7278         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7279         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7282         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7283
7284         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7285         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7286         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7287         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7288         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7289         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7290                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7291         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7292         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7293         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7294                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7295         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7296
7297         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7298         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7299         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7300
7301         // Revoke local commitment tx
7302         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7303
7304         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7305         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7306         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7307         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7309         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7310         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7311
7312         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7313         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7314
7315         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7316         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7317         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7318
7319         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7320         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7321         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7322         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7323
7324         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7325         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7326         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7327         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7328         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7329         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7330         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7331         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7332         match events.last().unwrap() {
7333                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7334                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7335         }
7336         let first;
7337         let feerate_1;
7338         let penalty_txn;
7339         {
7340                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7341                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7342                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7343
7344                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7345                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7346                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7347                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7348                 // future).
7349                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7350                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7351                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7352                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7353                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7354                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7355
7356                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7357                 // available, which we check here:
7358                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7359                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7360                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7361
7362                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7363                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7364
7365                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7366                 // output, checked above).
7367                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7368                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7369                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7370
7371                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7372                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7373                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7374                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7375                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7376                 node_txn.clear();
7377         }
7378
7379         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7380         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7381         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7382         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7383         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7384
7385         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7386         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7387         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7388         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7389         let node_txn = {
7390                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7391                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7392
7393                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7394                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7395                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7396                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7397                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7398                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7399                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7400                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7401                 node_txn.clear();
7402                 txn
7403         };
7404         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7405         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7406         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7407         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7408         {
7409                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7410                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7411                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7412                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7413                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7414                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7415                 // up bumped justice generation.
7416                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7417                 node_txn.clear();
7418         }
7419         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7421 }
7422
7423 #[test]
7424 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7425         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7426         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7427
7428         // Create 2 HTLCs
7429         // Provide preimage for one
7430         // Check aggregation
7431
7432         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7433         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7434         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7435         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7436
7437         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7438         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7439         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7440
7441         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7442         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7443         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7444         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7445         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7446
7447         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7448         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7449         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7452         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7453
7454         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7455         let timeout;
7456         let preimage;
7457         let preimage_bump;
7458         let feerate_timeout;
7459         let feerate_preimage;
7460         {
7461                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7462                 // 3 transactions including:
7463                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7464                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7465                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7466                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7467                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7468                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7469                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7470                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7471
7472                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7473                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7474                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7475                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7476
7477                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7478                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7479                 } else {
7480                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7481                 };
7482
7483                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7484                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7485                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7486
7487                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7488                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7489                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7490                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7491
7492                 node_txn.clear();
7493         };
7494         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7495         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7496
7497         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7498         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7499         {
7500                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7501                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7503                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7504                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7505                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7506
7507                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7508                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7509                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7510                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7511                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7512
7513                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7514                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7515                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7516                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7517                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7518
7519                 node_txn.clear();
7520         }
7521
7522         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7523         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7524 }
7525
7526 #[test]
7527 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7528         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7529         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7530         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7531         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7532         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7533         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7534         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7535         // implement that).
7536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7539         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7540         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7541
7542         let per_commitment_secret;
7543         let next_per_commitment_point;
7544         {
7545                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7546                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7547                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7548
7549                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7550
7551                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7552                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7553                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7554
7555                 // Must revoke without gaps
7556                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7557                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7558
7559                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7560                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7561                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7562         }
7563
7564         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7565                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7566                         channel_id,
7567                         per_commitment_secret,
7568                         next_per_commitment_point,
7569                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7570                         next_local_nonce: None,
7571                 });
7572         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7574         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7575 }
7576
7577 #[test]
7578 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7579         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7580         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7581
7582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7585         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7586
7587         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7588         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7589         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7590         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7591
7592         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7593         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7594         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7595
7596         // Revoke local commitment tx
7597         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7598
7599         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7600         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7601         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7602         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7603
7604         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7605         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7608         let penalty_txn = {
7609                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7610                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7611                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7612                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7613                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7614                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7615                 node_txn.clear();
7616                 penalty_txn
7617         };
7618         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7619         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7620         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7621         {
7622                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7623                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7624                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7625         }
7626 }
7627
7628 #[test]
7629 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7630         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7631         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7635         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7636         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7637
7638         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7639         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7640         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7642         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7643
7644         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7645         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7646         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7648         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7649
7650         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7651         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7652         // can get our balance.
7653
7654         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7655         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7656         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7657         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7658         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7659         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7660         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7661         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
7662                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7663
7664         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7665 }
7666
7667 #[test]
7668 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7669         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7670         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7674         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7675
7676         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7677
7678         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7679         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7680         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7681         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7682         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7683
7684         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7685         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7687         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7688
7689         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7691         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7692         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7693         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7694         match close_ev[0] {
7695                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7696                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7697                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7698                 },
7699                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7700         }
7701 }
7702
7703 #[test]
7704 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7705         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7706         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7708         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7709
7710         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7711         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7712         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7713
7714         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7715
7716         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7717         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7718         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7719         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7720 }
7721
7722 #[test]
7723 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7724         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7725         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7726         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7730
7731         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7732         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7733         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7734
7735         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7736         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7737         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7738 }
7739
7740 #[test]
7741 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7742         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7743         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7744         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7745         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7746         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7747
7748         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7749         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7750         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7751         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7752         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7753         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7754         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7755         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7756         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7757         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7758         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7759         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7760
7761         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7762         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7764         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7765
7766         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7767         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7768         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7769         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7770         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7771
7772         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7773         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7774
7775         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7776         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7777         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7778         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7779         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7780         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7781
7782         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7783         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7784         // `channel_value`.
7785         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7786         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7787         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7788         // `channel_value`.
7789         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7790 }
7791
7792 #[test]
7793 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7794         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7795         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7799         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7800
7801         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7802         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7803
7804         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7805
7806         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7807         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7808         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7809
7810         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7811         match events[0] {
7812                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7813                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7814                 }
7815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7816         }
7817
7818         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7819         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7820
7821         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7822                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7823                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7824                 }
7825                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7826         }
7827
7828         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7829
7830         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7831         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7832
7833         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7834         match events[0] {
7835                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7836                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7837                 }
7838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7839         }
7840 }
7841
7842 #[test]
7843 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7844         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7845         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7846         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7847         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7848         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7849         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7850
7851         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7852         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7853
7854         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7855
7856         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7857         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7858         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7859
7860         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7861         match events[0] {
7862                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7863                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7864                 }
7865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7866         }
7867
7868         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7869         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7870
7871         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7872                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7873                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7874                 }
7875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7876         }
7877         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7878 }
7879
7880 #[test]
7881 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7882         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7883         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7884         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7885         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7886         // and the channel should be closed.
7887         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7888         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7889         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7890         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7891         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7892         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7893
7894         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7895         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7896         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7897
7898         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7899
7900         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7901         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7902
7903         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7904         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7905
7906         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7907         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7908         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7909         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7910         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7911         let accept_chan_msg = {
7912                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7913                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7914                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7915                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7916         };
7917         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7918
7919         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7920
7921         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7922         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7923
7924         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7925         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7926
7927         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7928         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7929
7930         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7931         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7932                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7933                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7934                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7935                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7936                 }
7937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7938         }
7939
7940         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7941 }
7942
7943 #[test]
7944 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7945         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7946         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7950         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7951
7952         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7953         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7954
7955         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7956
7957         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7958         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7959         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7960
7961         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7962         match events[0] {
7963                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7964                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7965                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7966                         match api_res {
7967                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7968                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7969                                 },
7970                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7971                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7972                         }
7973                 }
7974                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7975         }
7976
7977         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7978         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7979         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7980
7981         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7982                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7983                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7984                 }
7985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7986         }
7987 }
7988
7989 #[test]
7990 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7991         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7992         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7993         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7994         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7995
7996         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7997         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7998         match api_res {
7999                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8000                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8001                 },
8002                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8003                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8004         }
8005 }
8006
8007 #[test]
8008 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8009         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8010         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8011         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8012         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8013         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8014         let node_count = 4;
8015         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8016         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8017         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8018         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8019
8020         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8021         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8022         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8023         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8024
8025         let total_msat = 100_000;
8026         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8027         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8028         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8029
8030         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8031         path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8032         path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8033         path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8034         path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8035         path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8036         route.paths.push(path_1);
8037
8038         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8039         path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8040         path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8041         path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8042         path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8043         path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8044         route.paths.push(path_2);
8045
8046         // Send payment
8047         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8048         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8049                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8050         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8051                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8053
8054         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8055         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8056
8057         // First path
8058         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8059         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8060         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8061
8062         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8063                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8064
8065                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8066                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8067                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8068                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8069                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8070                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8071                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8072                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8073                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8074                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8075                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
8076                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8077                 }
8078
8079                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8080                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8081                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8082                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8083
8084                 if idx == 0 {
8085                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8086                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8087                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8088                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8089                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8090                 } else {
8091                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8092                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8093                 }
8094
8095                 prev_node = node;
8096         }
8097
8098         // Second path
8099         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8100         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8101
8102         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8103 }
8104
8105 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8106
8107         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8108         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8109
8110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8113         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114
8115         let src_idx = 0;
8116         let dst_idx = 1;
8117
8118         // Create channels for each amount
8119         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8120         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8121         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8122         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8123                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8124                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8125                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8126                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8127                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8128                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8129                 expected_paths.push(path);
8130         }
8131         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8132
8133         // Create a route for each amount
8134         let example_amount = 100000;
8135         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8136         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8137         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8138                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8139                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8140                 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8141                 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8142                 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8143                 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8144                 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8145                 route.paths.push(path);
8146         }
8147
8148         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8149         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8150         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8151                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8152         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8153                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8155
8156         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8157         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8158         let mut amount_received = 0;
8159         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8160                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8161
8162                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8163                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8164                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8165                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8166         }
8167
8168         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8169 }
8170
8171 #[test]
8172 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8173         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8174         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8175 }
8176
8177 #[test]
8178 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8179         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8183         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8184
8185         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8186         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8187         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8188         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8189
8190         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8191         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8192         route.paths.push(path);
8193         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8194         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8195         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8196         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8197         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8198         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8199         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8200         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8201 }
8202
8203 #[test]
8204 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8205         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8206         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8210
8211         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8212
8213         {
8214                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8215                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8216                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8217                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8218                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8219                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8220                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8221                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8222                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8223         }
8224         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8225         // values from previous calls.
8226         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8227         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8228         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8229         match events[0] {
8230                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8231                         match &purpose {
8232                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8233                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8234                                 },
8235                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8236                         }
8237                 },
8238                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8239         }
8240 }
8241
8242 #[test]
8243 #[allow(deprecated)]
8244 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8245         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8246         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8250         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8251
8252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8253
8254         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8255
8256         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8257         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8258         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8259                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8260         } else { panic!(); }
8261         let mut block = {
8262                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8263                 Block {
8264                         header: BlockHeader {
8265                                 version: 0x2000000,
8266                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8267                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8268                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8269                         txdata: vec![],
8270                 }
8271         };
8272         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8273         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8274                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8275         } else { panic!(); }
8276
8277         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8278         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8279         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8280         block.header.time += 1;
8281         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8282         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8283         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8284
8285         {
8286                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8287                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8288                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8289                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8291                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8292                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8293                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8294         }
8295         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8296         // values from previous calls.
8297         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8298         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8299         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8300         match events[0] {
8301                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8302                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8303                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8304                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8305                 },
8306                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8307         }
8308 }
8309
8310 #[test]
8311 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8312         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8313         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8314         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8315         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8316         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8317
8318         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8319
8320         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8321         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8322         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8323         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8324
8325         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8326         // resulting events.
8327         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8328                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8329                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8330                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8331                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8332                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8333                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8334
8335                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8336                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8337                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8338                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8339                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8340
8341                         // We should fail the payment back
8342                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8343                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8344                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8345                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8346                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8347                                 },
8348                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8349                         }
8350                 }
8351         }
8352
8353         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8354         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8355         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8356
8357         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8358         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8359                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8360         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8361         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8362
8363         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8364         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8365                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8366         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8367         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8368
8369         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8370         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8371                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8372         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8373         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8374 }
8375
8376 #[test]
8377 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8378         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8379         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8380         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8381         // error.
8382         //
8383         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8384         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8385         // commitment at same time.
8386
8387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8390         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8391
8392         // Create some initial channel
8393         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8394         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8395
8396         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8397         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8398
8399         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8400         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8401
8402         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8403         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8404         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8405         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8406         let watchtower = {
8407                 let new_monitor = {
8408                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8409                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8410                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8411                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8412                         new_monitor
8413                 };
8414                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8415                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8416                 watchtower
8417         };
8418         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8419         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8420         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8421         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8422         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8423         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8424
8425         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8426         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8428         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8429
8430         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8431         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8432         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8433         {
8434                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8435                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8436                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8437                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8438                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8439                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8440                 } else { assert!(false); }
8441         }
8442         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8444         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8445         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8446 }
8447
8448 #[test]
8449 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8450         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8451         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8452         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8453         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8454
8455         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8456         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8457         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8458         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8459
8460         // Create some initial channel
8461         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8462         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8463
8464         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8465         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8466
8467         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8468         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8469
8470         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8471         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8472         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8473         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8474         let watchtower_alice = {
8475                 let new_monitor = {
8476                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8477                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8478                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8479                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8480                         new_monitor
8481                 };
8482                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8483                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8484                 watchtower
8485         };
8486         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8487         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8488         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8489         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8490         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8491         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8492
8493         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8494         {
8495                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8496                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8497                 txn.clear();
8498         }
8499
8500         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8501         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8502         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8503         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8504         let watchtower_bob = {
8505                 let new_monitor = {
8506                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8507                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8508                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8509                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8510                         new_monitor
8511                 };
8512                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8513                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8514                 watchtower
8515         };
8516         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8517         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8518
8519         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8520         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8521         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8522                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8524
8525         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8527         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8528         {
8529                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8530                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8531                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8532                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8533                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8534                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8535                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8536                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8537                 } else { assert!(false); }
8538         }
8539         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8541
8542         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8543         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8544         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8545
8546         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8547         let bob_state_y;
8548         {
8549                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8550                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8551                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8552                 txn.clear();
8553         };
8554
8555         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8556         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8557         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8558         {
8559                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8560                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8561                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8562         }
8563 }
8564
8565 #[test]
8566 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8567         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8568         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8569         // message).
8570         //
8571         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8572         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8573         //
8574         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8575         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8576         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8577         // before receiving funding_signed.
8578         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8581         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8582
8583         // Create an initial channel
8584         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8585         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8586         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8587         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8588         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8589
8590         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8591         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8592
8593         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8594         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8595
8596         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8597         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8598         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8599         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8600         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8601 }
8602
8603 #[test]
8604 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8605         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8606         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8607         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8608         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8609         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8610         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8611
8612         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8613         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8614         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8615         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8616
8617         // Create some initial channels
8618         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8619
8620         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8621         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8622         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8623         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8624         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8625         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8626
8627         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8628         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8629         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8630         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8631         // this test before #653 fix.
8632         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8633         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8635         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8636         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8637
8638         let htlc_timeout = {
8639                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8640                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8641                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8642                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8643                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8644                 node_txn[0].clone()
8645         };
8646
8647         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8648         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8649         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8650         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8651 }
8652
8653 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8654         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8655         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8656         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8657         //
8658         // Steps of the test:
8659         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8660         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8661         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8662         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8663         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8664         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8665         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8666         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8667         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8668         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8670         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8671
8672         // Create some initial channels
8673         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8674         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8675
8676         // Steps (1) and (2):
8677         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8678         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8679
8680         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8681         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8682         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8683         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8684         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8685         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8686         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8687
8688         // Steps (3) and (4):
8689         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8690         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8691         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8692         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8693
8694         // Bob force-closes
8695         if !broadcast_alice {
8696                 force_closing_node = 1;
8697                 counterparty_node = 0;
8698         }
8699         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8700         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8702         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8703         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8704                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8705                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8706                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8707                 };
8708                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8709                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8710                 if broadcast_alice {
8711                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8712                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8713                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8714                 }
8715         }
8716
8717         // Step (5):
8718         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8719         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8720         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8722         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8723
8724         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8725         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8726         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8727         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8728         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8729         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8730
8731         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8732         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8733         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8734         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8735                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8736                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8737                 match events[0] {
8738                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8739                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8740                         },
8741                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8742                 };
8743         }
8744         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8745         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8746         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8748
8749         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8750         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8751         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8752                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8753                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8754                         (*msg).clone()
8755                 },
8756                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8757         };
8758         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8759                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8760                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8761                         (*updates).clone()
8762                 },
8763                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8764         };
8765
8766         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8768         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8769         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8770
8771         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8772         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8773         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8774                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8775                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776                         (*msg).clone()
8777                 },
8778                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8779         };
8780         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8782
8783         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8784         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8785         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8786         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8787         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8788                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8789                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8790                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8791                 if broadcast_alice {
8792                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8793                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8794                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8795                 }
8796                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8797                 if broadcast_alice {
8798                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8799                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8800                 } else {
8801                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8802                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8803                 }
8804         }
8805
8806         // Step (6):
8807         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8808         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8809         {
8810                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8811                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8812                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8813                 };
8814                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8815                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8816                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8817                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8818                 if broadcast_alice {
8819                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8820                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8821                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8822                 } else {
8823                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8824                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8825                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8826                 }
8827         }
8828 }
8829
8830 #[test]
8831 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8832         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8833         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8834         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8835         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8836 }
8837
8838 #[test]
8839 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8840         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8841         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8843         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8844         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8845         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8846
8847         // Create an first channel channel
8848         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8849         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850
8851         // Create an second channel
8852         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8853         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8854
8855         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8856         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8857         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8858
8859         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8860         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8861         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8862         {
8863                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8864                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8865                 match &events[0] {
8866                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8867                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8869                         },
8870                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8871                 }
8872         }
8873
8874         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8875         {
8876                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8877                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8878                 match &events[0] {
8879                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8880                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8881                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8882                         },
8883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884                 }
8885         }
8886 }
8887
8888 #[test]
8889 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8890         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8891         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8892         //
8893         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8894         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8895         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8896         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8897         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8898         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8899         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8900         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8901
8902         // Create an initial channel
8903         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8904         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8905         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8906         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8907
8908         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8909         // that it is rejected.
8910         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8911         {
8912                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8913                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8914                 match events[0] {
8915                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8916                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8917                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8918                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8919                                 // move forward with it.
8920                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8921                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922                         },
8923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8924                 }
8925         }
8926
8927         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8928         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8929
8930         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8932
8933         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8934         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8935         {
8936                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8937                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8938                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8939                 added_monitors.clear();
8940         }
8941         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8942
8943         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8944
8945         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8946         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8947
8948         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8949         // temporary one).
8950
8951         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8952         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8953         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8954         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8955         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8956         {
8957                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8958                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8959                 match events[0] {
8960                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8961                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8962                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8963                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8964                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8965                         },
8966                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8967                 }
8968         }
8969
8970         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8971         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8972         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8973         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8974         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8975         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8976
8977         let funding_created = {
8978                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8979                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8980                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8981                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8982                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8983                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8984                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8985                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8986                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8987         };
8988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8989         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8990         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8991         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8993
8994         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8995         {
8996                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8997                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8998                 match events[0] {
8999                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9000                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9001                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9002                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9003                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9004                         },
9005                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9006                 }
9007         }
9008
9009         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9010         // everything is functional.
9011         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9012         {
9013                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9014                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9015                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9016                 added_monitors.clear();
9017         }
9018         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9019
9020         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9021         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9022         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9023         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9024
9025         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9026         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9027         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9028
9029         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9030 }
9031
9032 #[test]
9033 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9034         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9035         //
9036         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9037         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9038         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9042         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9043
9044         // Create some initial channels
9045         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9046         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9047         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9048
9049         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9050         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9051         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9052
9053         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9054         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9055         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9056
9057         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9058         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9060         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9061         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9062         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9063         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9064         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9065         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9066
9067         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9068         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9069         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9071         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9072         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9073         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9074         match events[0] {
9075                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9076                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9077                 },
9078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9079         }
9080         match events[1] {
9081                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9082                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9083                 },
9084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9085         }
9086         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9087         // peer_disconnected.
9088         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9089         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9090
9091         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9092         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9093         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9094 }
9095
9096 #[test]
9097 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9098         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9099         //
9100         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9101         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9102         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9103         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9104         //
9105         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9106         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9107         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9108         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9109         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9110         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9111         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9112
9113         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9114         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9115         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9116
9117         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9118
9119         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9120         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9121         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9122         // its length.
9123         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9124         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9125         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9126                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9127                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9128         }
9129
9130         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9131         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9133         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9134
9135         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9137         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9138
9139         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9140         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9141
9142         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9143         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9144         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9145
9146         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9147         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9148         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9150         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9151         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9152         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9153                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9154                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9155                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9156                 } else { panic!(); }
9157         } else { panic!(); }
9158         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9159
9160         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9161         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9162         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9163         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9164                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9165                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9166                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9167                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9168                                 vout: idx as u32,
9169                         },
9170                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9171                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9172                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9173                 }).collect(),
9174                 output: vec![TxOut {
9175                         value: 1000,
9176                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9177                 }]
9178         };
9179         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9181 }
9182
9183 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9184         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9185         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9186         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9187         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9188         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9189         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9190         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9191         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9192         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9193         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9194         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9195         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9196         // until we learned about an additional block.
9197         //
9198         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9199         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9200         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9201         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9203         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9204         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9205
9206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9207         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9208         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9209         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9210         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9211
9212         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9213         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9214         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9216         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9217         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9218
9219         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9220         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9221                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9222         }
9223         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9224                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9225         if test_height_before_timelock {
9226                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9227                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9228                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9229                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9230         } else {
9231                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9232                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9233                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9234                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9235                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9236                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9237                 // timelock is up).
9238                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9239                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9240
9241                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9242                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9243                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9244                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9245                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9246                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9247                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9248
9249                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9250                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9251                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9252                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9253                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9254                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9255                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9256                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9257                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9258         }
9259 }
9260
9261 #[test]
9262 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9263         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9264         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9265 }
9266
9267 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9268         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9269         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9270         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9271         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9272
9273         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9274
9275         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9276                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9277         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9278
9279         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9280
9281         {
9282                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9283                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9285                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9286                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9287                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9288                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9289                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9290         }
9291         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9292         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9293
9294         {
9295                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9296                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9297                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9298                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9299                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9300                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9301                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9302                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9303                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9304                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9305                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9306                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9307                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9308         }
9309
9310         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9311         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9312
9313         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9314                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9315                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9316
9317                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9318                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9319                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9320                 ];
9321                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9322                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9323
9324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9325                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9326                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9327
9328                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9329                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9330                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9331
9332                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9333                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9334                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9335                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9336                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9337                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9338         } else {
9339                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9340                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9341                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9342
9343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9344                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9345                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9346                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9347
9348                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9349
9350                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9351         }
9352 }
9353
9354 #[test]
9355 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9356         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9357         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9358         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9359         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9360         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9361 }
9362
9363 #[test]
9364 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9365         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9366         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9367         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9368 }
9369
9370 #[test]
9371 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9372         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9373         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9377         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9378
9379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9380         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9382         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9383
9384         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9385                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9386         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9387         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9388         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9389                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9390                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9391                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9392         });
9393
9394         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9395
9396         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9397         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9398
9399         let session_privs = {
9400                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9401                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9402                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9403                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9404                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9405                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9406         };
9407         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9408                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9409                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9411
9412         {
9413                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9414                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9415                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9416         }
9417         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9418
9419         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9420                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9422
9423         {
9424                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9425                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9426                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9427
9428                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9429                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9430
9431                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9432                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9433
9434                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9435                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9436                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9437
9438                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9439                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9440                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9441
9442                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9443                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9444                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9445         }
9446         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9447         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9448         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9449         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9450
9451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9452
9453         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9454         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9455         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9456
9457         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9459
9460         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9461         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9462         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9463
9464         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9465
9466         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9467                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9468                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9470
9471         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9472         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9473         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9474
9475         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9476         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9477 }
9478
9479 #[test]
9480 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9481         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9484         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9485
9486         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9487         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9488         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9489         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9490         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9491                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9492                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9493         };
9494         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9495         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9496         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9497
9498         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9499         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9500                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9502         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9503         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9504         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9505         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9506         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9507         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9508 }
9509
9510 #[test]
9511 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9515         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9516
9517         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9518         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9519
9520         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9521         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9522                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9523                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9524         };
9525         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9526         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9527         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9528         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9529         let route = find_route(
9530                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9531                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9532         ).unwrap();
9533
9534         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9535         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9536                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9538         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9539         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9540         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9541         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9542         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9543         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9544 }
9545
9546 #[test]
9547 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9548         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9549         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9550         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9551         // amount.
9552         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9553         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9554         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9555         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9556
9557         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9558         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9559         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9560         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9561
9562         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9563         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9564         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9565                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9566                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9567                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9568         });
9569
9570         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9571         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9572         // amount of time to respond to.
9573
9574         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9575         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9576         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9577
9578         let failed_destinations = vec![
9579                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9580                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9581         ];
9582         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9583
9584         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9585
9586         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9587         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9588                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9589         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9590
9591         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9592         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9593         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9594         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9595
9596         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9597         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9598         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9600         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9601 }
9602
9603 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9604 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9605 enum ExposureEvent {
9606         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9607         AtHTLCForward,
9608         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9609         AtHTLCReception,
9610         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9611         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9612 }
9613
9614 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9615         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9616         // policy.
9617         //
9618         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9619         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9620         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9621         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9622         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9623         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9624         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9625         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9626
9627         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9628         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9629         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9630         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9631         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9632         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9633
9634         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9635         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9636         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9637         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9638         if on_holder_tx {
9639                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9640         }
9641         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9642         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9643         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9644
9645         let opt_anchors = false;
9646
9647         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9648
9649         if on_holder_tx {
9650                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9651                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9652                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9653                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9654         }
9655
9656         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9657         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9658         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9659         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9660
9661         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9663         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9664
9665         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9666         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9667         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9668
9669         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9670                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9671                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9672                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9673                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9674         };
9675         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9676         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9677
9678         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9679         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9680
9681         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9682         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9683
9684         if on_holder_tx {
9685                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9686                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9687                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9688                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9689                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9690                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9691                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9692                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9693                         }
9694                 } else {
9695                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9696                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9697                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9698                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9699                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9700                         }
9701                 }
9702         } else {
9703                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9704                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9705                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9706                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9707                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9708                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9709                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9710                         }
9711                 } else {
9712                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9713                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9714                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9715                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9716                         }
9717                 }
9718         }
9719
9720         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9721         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9722                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9723                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9724                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9725                 if on_holder_tx {
9726                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9727                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9728                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9729                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9730                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9731                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9732                 } else {
9733                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9734                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9735                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9736                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9737                 }
9738         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9739                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9740                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9741                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9742                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9743                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9744                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9745                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9746                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9747                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9748                 if on_holder_tx {
9749                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9750                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9751                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9752                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9753                 } else {
9754                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9755                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9756                 }
9757         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9758                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9759                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9760                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9761                 {
9762                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9763                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9764                 }
9765                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9766                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9767                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9768         }
9769
9770         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9771         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9772         added_monitors.clear();
9773 }
9774
9775 #[test]
9776 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9777         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9778         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9779         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9780         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9781         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9782         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9783         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9784         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9785         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9786         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9787         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9788         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9789 }
9790
9791 #[test]
9792 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9793         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9794         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9796         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9797
9798         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9799         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9800         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9801         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9802         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9803
9804         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9805
9806         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9807         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9808         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9809         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9810         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9811                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9812                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9813                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9814                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9815                         }]}
9816                 },
9817                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9818         };
9819         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9820         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9821                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9822                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9823                 },
9824                 _ => panic!()
9825         }
9826
9827         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9828         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9829         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9830         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9831 }
9832
9833 #[test]
9834 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9835         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9836         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9837         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9838         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9841         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9842
9843         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9844
9845         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9846         {
9847                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9848                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9849         }
9850
9851         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9852         {
9853                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9854                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9855         }
9856         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9858
9859         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9860         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9861         match events[0] {
9862                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9863                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9864                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9865                 },
9866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9867         };
9868
9869         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9870         // it.
9871         {
9872                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9873                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9874         }
9875         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9877
9878         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9879         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9880         match events[0] {
9881                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9882                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9883                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9884                 },
9885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9886         };
9887
9888         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9889         // channel.
9890         {
9891                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9892                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9893         }
9894         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9896
9897         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9898         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9899         match events[0] {
9900                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9901                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9902                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9903                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9904                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9905                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9906                 },
9907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9908         };
9909 }
9910
9911 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9912         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9915         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9916         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9917         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9918                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9919         let recv_value = 100_000;
9920
9921         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9922
9923         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9924         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9925                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9926                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9927                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9928         } else {
9929                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9930                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9931         };
9932         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9933         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9934                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9936         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9937         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9938         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9939         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9940         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9941         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9942
9943         if valid_delta {
9944                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9945                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9946
9947                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9948         } else {
9949                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9950
9951                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9952
9953                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9954                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9955                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9956
9957                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9958         }
9959 }
9960
9961 #[test]
9962 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9963         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9964         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9965         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9966         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9967 }