1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
586 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
600 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
601 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
602 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
603 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
604 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
611 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
614 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
619 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
620 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
623 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
629 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
634 let channel_value = 5000;
636 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
637 let channel_id = chan.2;
638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
639 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
640 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
642 let opt_anchors = false;
644 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
645 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
646 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
648 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
649 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
651 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
652 *feerate_lock = feerate;
654 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
656 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
662 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
664 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
666 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
667 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
668 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
669 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
670 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
671 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
675 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
676 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
679 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
680 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
683 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
685 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
686 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
687 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
695 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
696 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
698 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
699 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
700 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
701 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
705 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
706 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
707 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
710 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
712 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
713 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
714 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
715 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
717 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
718 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
719 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
720 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
722 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
724 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
727 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
730 htlc_signatures: res.1
733 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
735 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
738 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
740 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
741 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
742 //Should produce and error.
743 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
744 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
746 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
747 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
751 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
756 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
762 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
765 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
768 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
769 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
770 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
772 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
777 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
778 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
781 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
783 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
784 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
786 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
787 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
788 added_monitors.clear();
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 // node[1] has nothing to do
794 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
798 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
799 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
800 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
802 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
804 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
806 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
813 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
816 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
822 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
825 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
827 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
833 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
836 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
840 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
842 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
843 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
844 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
845 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 fn test_update_fee() {
851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
855 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
856 let channel_id = chan.2;
859 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
860 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
861 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
862 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
863 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
864 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
865 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
866 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
867 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
868 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
869 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
872 // Create and deliver (1)...
875 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
876 feerate = *feerate_lock;
877 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
879 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
882 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
883 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
884 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
885 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
886 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
892 // Generate (2) and (3):
893 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
894 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
902 // Create and deliver (4)...
904 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
905 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
907 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
910 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
911 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
913 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
922 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
923 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
925 // Handle (3), creating (6):
926 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
933 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
936 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
937 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
938 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
947 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
949 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
950 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
956 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
964 fn fake_network_test() {
965 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
966 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
970 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
972 // Create some initial channels
973 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
974 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
977 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
983 // Send some more payments
984 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
988 // Test failure packets
989 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
990 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
992 // Add a new channel that skips 3
993 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
995 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1004 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021 hops.push(RouteHop {
1022 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1024 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050 hops.push(RouteHop {
1051 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1053 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062 // Claim the rebalances...
1063 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1064 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066 // Close down the channels...
1067 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1068 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1071 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1074 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1083 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1084 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1085 // commitment dance rounds.
1086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1089 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1091 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1094 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1095 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1096 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1097 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1103 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1104 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1107 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1112 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1114 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1117 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1118 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1127 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1131 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1132 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1144 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1158 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1164 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1178 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1179 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1182 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1188 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1189 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1196 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1197 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1198 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1202 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1217 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1220 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1225 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1226 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1227 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1228 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1242 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1243 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1246 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1247 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1251 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1254 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1255 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1256 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1257 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1258 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1259 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1262 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1266 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1267 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1270 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1278 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1279 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1280 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1285 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1290 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1294 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1295 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1301 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1302 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1303 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1304 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1307 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1308 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1310 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1319 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1323 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1324 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1327 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1330 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1331 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1332 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1333 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1335 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1337 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1338 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1339 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1342 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1345 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1351 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1359 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1361 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1366 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1367 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1368 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1371 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1372 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1373 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1374 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1380 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1381 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1388 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1389 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1390 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1391 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1392 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1393 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1394 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1397 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1398 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1399 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1400 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1403 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1404 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1405 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1406 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1407 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1408 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1409 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1412 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1413 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1414 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1417 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1418 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422 amount_msat: 3460001,
1423 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1428 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1431 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1433 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1434 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1438 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1439 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1442 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1447 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1450 htlc_signatures: res.1
1453 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1454 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1455 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1458 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1461 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1467 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1470 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1471 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1476 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1482 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1484 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1485 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1486 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1491 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1492 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1493 let opt_anchors = false;
1495 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1496 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1503 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1504 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1507 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1508 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1509 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1510 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1511 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1512 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1517 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1518 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1521 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1522 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1523 let opt_anchors = false;
1525 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1526 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1527 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1528 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1529 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1530 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1534 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1535 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1538 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1539 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1541 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1542 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1543 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1544 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1545 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1546 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1549 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1550 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1551 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1552 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1556 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1557 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1559 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1560 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1566 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1567 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1568 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1569 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1570 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1575 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1576 let opt_anchors = false;
1578 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1579 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1580 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1581 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1582 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1583 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1587 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1588 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1589 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1590 // commitment transaction fee.
1591 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1594 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1595 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1598 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1599 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1600 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1601 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1605 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1606 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1607 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1608 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1609 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614 let opt_anchors = false;
1616 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1619 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1621 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1624 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1625 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1627 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1628 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1632 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1633 match msg_events[0] {
1634 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1635 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1642 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1643 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1644 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1652 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1653 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1659 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1666 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1667 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1676 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1678 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1681 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1682 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1683 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1687 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1688 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1689 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691 // Add a pending HTLC.
1692 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1693 let payment_event_1 = {
1694 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1699 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1704 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1705 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1706 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1707 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1710 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1711 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1712 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1713 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1714 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1715 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1716 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1719 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1720 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1721 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1722 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1726 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1727 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1728 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1729 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1730 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1736 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1742 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1743 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1744 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1745 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1746 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1749 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1750 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1757 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1761 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1764 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1765 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1766 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1767 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1769 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1771 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1774 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1777 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1783 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1784 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1789 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1790 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1791 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1792 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1799 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1800 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1801 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1802 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1805 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1807 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1810 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1811 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1814 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1815 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1816 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1817 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1818 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1819 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1823 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1824 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1825 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1826 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1827 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1830 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1837 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1839 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843 // adding pending output.
1844 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1845 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1846 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1847 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1848 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1849 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1850 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1851 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1852 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1855 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1856 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1859 let payment_event_1 = {
1860 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1865 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1870 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1873 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1874 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1875 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878 // split the rest to test holding cell
1879 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1880 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1881 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1882 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1885 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888 // now see if they go through on both sides
1889 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1890 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1891 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1899 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1900 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1901 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1902 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1906 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912 // flush the pending htlc
1913 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1914 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1920 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1923 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1928 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1934 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1938 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1941 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1945 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1948 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1959 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1960 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1977 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1978 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1991 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1992 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1995 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1996 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1997 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1998 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2001 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2005 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2006 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2007 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2008 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2009 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2010 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2011 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2012 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2015 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2016 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2017 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2018 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2019 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2020 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2021 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2024 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2025 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2026 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2027 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2031 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2032 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2035 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2036 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2037 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2038 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2041 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2045 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2047 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2050 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2051 // initial fulfill/CS.
2052 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2053 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2060 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2074 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2082 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2089 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2090 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2091 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2092 // on-chain as necessary).
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2101 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2104 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2107 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2111 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2114 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2115 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2121 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2141 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2151 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2154 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2158 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2159 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2160 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2164 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166 // Create some initial channels
2167 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2168 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2186 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2192 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2194 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2199 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2203 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2206 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2207 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2213 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2214 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2216 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2220 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2222 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2225 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2228 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2229 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2235 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2236 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2245 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2246 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2247 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2249 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2250 let node2_commitment_txid;
2252 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2253 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2254 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2255 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2258 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2259 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2261 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2264 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2266 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2270 // confusing us in the following tests.
2271 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2274 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2275 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2278 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2279 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2280 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2282 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2283 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2289 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2290 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2299 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2300 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2306 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2309 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2312 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2314 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2315 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2322 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2327 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2330 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2331 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2334 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2335 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2340 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2345 fn test_justice_tx() {
2346 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2347 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2348 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2349 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2350 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2351 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2352 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2353 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2354 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2355 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2356 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2357 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2361 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2362 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2363 // Create some new channels:
2364 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2367 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2368 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2369 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2377 // Revoke the old state
2378 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2381 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2384 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2389 node_txn.truncate(1);
2391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2392 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2396 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2397 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2398 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2400 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2401 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2402 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2403 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2408 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2411 // Create some new channels:
2412 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2418 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2419 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2420 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2421 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2422 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2426 // Revoke the old state
2427 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2439 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2446 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2447 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2450 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2455 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2456 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2457 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2462 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2463 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2464 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2466 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2468 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2469 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2474 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2475 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2476 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2485 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2489 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2490 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2491 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2492 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497 // Create some new channel:
2498 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2501 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2502 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2503 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2504 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2507 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2514 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516 //Revoke the old state
2517 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2520 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2522 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2525 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2527 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2530 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2533 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2536 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2540 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2542 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2545 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2546 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2549 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2550 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2551 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2552 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2556 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2560 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2561 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2562 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2563 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2571 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2572 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2573 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2575 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2578 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580 //Revoke the old state
2581 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2584 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2588 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2589 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2591 match events.last().unwrap() {
2592 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2597 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2600 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2606 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2607 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2608 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2611 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2620 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2621 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2624 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2625 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2626 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2629 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2630 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2633 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2634 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2637 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2638 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2642 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2643 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2644 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2645 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2646 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2647 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2648 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2649 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2650 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2653 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2654 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2655 // PaymentSent event).
2657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2660 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662 // Create some initial channels
2663 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2664 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2667 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2668 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2670 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2677 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2680 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2681 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2682 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2683 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2684 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2685 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2686 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2687 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2689 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2690 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2691 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2692 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2698 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2699 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2704 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2705 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2709 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2714 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2715 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2719 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2721 added_monitors.clear();
2723 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2724 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2725 match forwarded_events[0] {
2726 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2730 match forwarded_events[1] {
2731 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2732 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2733 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2734 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2735 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2739 match forwarded_events[2] {
2740 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2741 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2742 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2743 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2744 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2748 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2751 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754 added_monitors.clear();
2756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2762 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2767 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2768 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2769 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2770 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2771 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2777 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2778 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2780 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2781 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2784 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2785 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2790 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2795 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2802 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2803 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2804 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2805 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2808 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2809 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2810 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2811 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2812 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2814 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2815 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2816 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2817 let commitment_spend =
2818 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2821 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2825 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2826 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2830 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2835 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2836 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2837 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2840 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2841 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2844 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2845 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2851 let mut first_claimed = false;
2852 for event in events {
2854 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2855 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2856 assert!(!first_claimed);
2857 first_claimed = true;
2859 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2860 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2863 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2864 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2868 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2871 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2872 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2873 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2874 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2875 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2876 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2878 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2883 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2884 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2885 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888 // Create some intial channels
2889 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2890 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2899 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2900 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2901 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2910 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2919 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2921 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2922 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2928 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2929 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2930 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2931 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2934 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2939 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2943 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2944 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2951 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2953 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2956 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2957 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2958 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2963 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2964 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2965 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2966 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2967 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2968 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2969 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2971 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2980 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2981 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2982 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2983 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2984 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2985 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2990 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2991 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2992 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2994 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2995 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2997 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2999 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3000 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3001 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3003 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3004 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3005 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3010 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3011 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3012 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3016 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3017 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3018 // and fail backward accordingly.
3020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3023 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3025 // Create some initial channels
3026 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3027 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3029 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3030 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3031 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3032 // Revoke the old state
3033 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3035 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3037 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3039 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3041 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3048 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3049 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3051 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3055 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3056 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3057 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3063 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3064 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3065 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3066 // commitment transaction anymore.
3067 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3068 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3069 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3070 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3071 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3072 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3074 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3075 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3076 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3077 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3078 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3082 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3084 // Create some initial channels
3085 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3086 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3088 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3089 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3090 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3091 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3092 // Revoke the old state
3093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3095 let value = if use_dust {
3096 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3097 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3098 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3101 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3102 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3103 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3105 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3109 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3112 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3113 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3115 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3116 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3118 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3130 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3131 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3132 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3135 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3139 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3141 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3142 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3143 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3145 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3146 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3149 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3150 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3151 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3154 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3155 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3156 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3157 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3159 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3163 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3164 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3165 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3170 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3177 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3178 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3181 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3182 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3184 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3186 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3187 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3189 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3192 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3193 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3196 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3203 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3204 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3216 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3217 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3218 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3219 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3223 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3224 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3225 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3232 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3233 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3234 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3243 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3244 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3245 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3246 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3253 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3255 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3258 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3259 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3260 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3261 // that we should update our routing table for.
3262 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3263 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3270 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3271 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3277 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3278 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3287 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3288 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3292 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3293 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3300 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3301 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3308 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3312 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3313 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3315 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3317 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3318 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3321 let payment_event = {
3322 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3324 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3326 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3327 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3330 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3331 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3333 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3339 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3341 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3344 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3345 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3346 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3347 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3348 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3350 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3351 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3357 onion_routing_packet,
3359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3361 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3363 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3365 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3366 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3368 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3371 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3372 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3376 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3381 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3382 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3383 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3390 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3391 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3392 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3393 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3398 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3399 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3401 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3402 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3403 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3405 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3407 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3408 // registering new transactions
3409 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3423 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425 let mut payment_event = {
3426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3551 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3632 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3640 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3642 let payment_event = {
3643 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3648 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3650 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3652 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3653 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3656 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3657 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3661 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3662 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3663 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3666 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3667 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3668 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3669 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3672 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3673 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3674 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3685 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3686 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3687 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3689 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3690 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3691 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3693 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3694 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3696 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3697 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3698 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3699 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3700 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3701 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3702 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3703 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3704 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3705 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3706 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3707 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3708 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3709 // Everything was delivered...
3710 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3713 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3714 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3716 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3724 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3726 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3727 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3729 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3730 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3731 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3733 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3734 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3735 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3737 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3745 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3747 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3749 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3751 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3752 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3754 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3755 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3756 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3757 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3763 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3765 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3766 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3768 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3769 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3770 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3776 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3778 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3780 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3781 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3782 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3785 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3787 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3788 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3791 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3792 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3793 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3801 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3804 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3806 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3810 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3811 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3812 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3813 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3814 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3816 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3817 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3818 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3819 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3820 // Everything was delivered...
3821 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3824 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3825 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3828 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3832 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3833 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3836 // Channel should still work fine...
3837 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3838 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3843 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3845 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3846 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3847 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3851 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3853 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3854 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3855 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3859 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3860 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3865 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3866 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3867 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3868 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3870 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3873 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3874 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3875 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3877 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3879 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3880 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3882 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3883 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3886 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3887 let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3888 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3889 let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3891 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3892 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3893 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3894 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3895 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3896 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3897 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3903 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3904 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3905 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3906 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3909 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3910 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3911 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3912 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3917 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3918 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3919 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3925 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3926 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3931 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3932 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3933 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3934 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3937 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3938 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3943 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3944 // announcement_signatures.
3945 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3946 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3947 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3948 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3949 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3950 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3956 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3957 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3959 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3960 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3961 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3962 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3964 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3969 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3970 // same channel_announcement.
3971 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3972 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3973 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3974 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3975 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3976 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3982 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3983 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3984 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3985 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3987 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3988 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3991 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3992 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3993 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3995 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3996 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3997 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3999 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4000 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4001 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4002 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4003 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4004 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4005 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4006 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4008 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4009 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4010 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4011 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4012 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4013 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4015 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4016 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4017 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4018 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4022 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4023 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4026 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4027 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4034 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4035 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4036 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4037 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4038 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4043 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4045 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4047 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4048 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4049 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4050 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4051 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4052 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4054 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4055 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4060 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4061 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4062 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4066 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4069 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4071 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4072 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4073 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4076 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4077 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4079 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4083 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4084 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4087 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4088 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4090 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4091 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4092 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4093 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4094 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4095 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4096 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4098 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4099 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4100 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4102 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4103 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4104 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4109 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4110 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4111 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4117 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4118 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4120 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4121 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4122 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4124 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4125 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4127 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4128 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4129 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4130 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4132 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4133 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4135 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4136 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4138 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4140 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4141 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4143 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4147 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4148 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4151 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4152 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4153 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4156 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4157 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4160 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4161 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4162 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4163 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4164 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4165 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4166 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4169 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4170 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4171 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4174 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4175 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4176 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4180 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4185 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4186 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4188 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4189 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4191 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4192 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4193 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4195 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4201 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4202 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4209 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4210 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4211 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4219 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4220 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4221 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4222 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4223 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4224 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4225 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4227 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4228 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4229 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4230 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4231 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4234 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4237 let mut block = Block {
4238 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4241 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4242 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4243 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4244 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4245 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4246 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4247 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4250 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4253 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4254 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4255 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4256 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4257 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4259 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4260 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4261 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4262 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4263 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4264 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4268 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4269 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4270 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4273 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4274 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4278 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4279 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4280 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4282 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4283 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4284 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4287 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4288 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4290 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4292 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4295 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4296 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4297 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4298 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4301 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4303 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4304 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4308 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4309 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4310 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4317 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4318 match fail_commit[0] {
4319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4321 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4323 _ => unreachable!(),
4325 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4327 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4329 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4330 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4331 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4332 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4333 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4334 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4339 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4340 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4341 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4345 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4350 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4351 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4352 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4353 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4354 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4356 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4358 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4360 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4361 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4362 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4363 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4365 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4366 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4367 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4368 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4369 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4370 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4371 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4372 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4373 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4374 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4376 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4377 let config = UserConfig::default();
4378 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4379 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4380 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4381 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4382 default_config: config,
4384 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4385 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4386 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4391 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4392 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4394 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4395 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4396 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4397 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4400 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4401 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4402 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4403 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4405 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4406 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4407 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4408 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4410 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4411 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4412 for node in nodes.iter() {
4413 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4414 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4415 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4418 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4422 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4423 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4427 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4428 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4429 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4430 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4431 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4432 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4434 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4435 let channel_value = 100000;
4436 let push_msat = 10001;
4437 let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4438 let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4439 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4440 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4441 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4442 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4443 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4445 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4447 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4448 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4450 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4452 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4453 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4454 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4455 added_monitors.clear();
4458 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4459 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4461 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4462 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4463 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4464 added_monitors.clear();
4466 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4471 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4472 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4473 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4474 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4476 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4477 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4478 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4479 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4480 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4481 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4482 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4483 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4484 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4485 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4487 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4488 let config = UserConfig::default();
4489 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4490 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4491 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4492 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4493 default_config: config,
4495 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4496 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4497 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4502 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4503 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4507 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4508 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4509 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4511 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4512 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4513 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4514 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4517 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4518 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4521 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4522 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4524 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4526 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4527 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4528 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4529 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4531 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4532 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4533 for node in nodes.iter() {
4534 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4535 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4536 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4539 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4543 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4547 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4548 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4549 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4550 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4551 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4552 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4553 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4555 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4556 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4558 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4560 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4561 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4562 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4564 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4565 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4566 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4567 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4568 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4569 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4570 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4571 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4572 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4573 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4575 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4576 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4577 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4578 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4579 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4580 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4582 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4583 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4584 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4589 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4590 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4592 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4593 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4594 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4597 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4599 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4600 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4604 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4605 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4609 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4610 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4611 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4612 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4613 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4614 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4615 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4616 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4617 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4619 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4620 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4621 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4622 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4623 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4626 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4628 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4629 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4631 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4632 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4633 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4634 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4636 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4638 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4639 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4640 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4641 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4642 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4645 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4646 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4647 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4648 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4649 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4650 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4653 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4654 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4655 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4656 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4657 assert!(read.is_empty());
4658 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4661 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4662 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4663 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4664 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4665 assert!(read.is_empty());
4666 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4669 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4670 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4671 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4672 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4674 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4675 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4676 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4678 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4680 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4683 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4684 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4685 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4686 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4688 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4689 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4690 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4692 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4694 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4695 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4697 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4698 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4699 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4700 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4701 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4704 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4706 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4709 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4710 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4712 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4713 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4715 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4716 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4718 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4719 let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4720 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4721 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4722 let mut found_err = false;
4723 for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4724 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4726 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4727 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4728 assert!(!found_err);
4731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4738 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4739 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4741 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4742 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4743 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4744 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4745 for event in events.drain(..) {
4747 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4748 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4749 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4750 all_outputs.push(outp);
4753 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4756 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4757 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4767 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4768 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4772 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4774 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4775 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4776 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4778 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4779 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4780 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4781 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4782 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4784 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4785 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4787 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4788 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4789 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4790 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4791 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4795 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4796 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4797 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4803 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4804 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4805 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4807 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4809 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4810 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4811 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4812 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4814 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4815 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4817 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4818 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4820 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4821 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4822 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4826 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4827 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4828 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4833 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4835 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4836 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4837 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4838 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4841 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4843 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4847 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4848 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4849 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4851 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4852 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4853 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4854 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4855 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4859 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4865 // Create some initial channels
4866 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4868 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4870 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4871 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4872 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4874 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4875 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4876 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4878 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4880 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4882 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4886 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4887 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4890 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4891 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4895 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4898 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4899 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4900 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4902 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4903 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4904 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4908 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4914 // Create some initial channels
4915 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4917 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4918 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4920 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4922 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4923 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4924 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4926 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4927 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4931 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4934 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4936 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4937 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4938 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4939 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4940 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4941 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4943 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4944 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4945 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4946 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4948 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4949 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4950 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4951 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4952 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4956 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4960 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4962 // Create some initial channels
4963 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4965 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4966 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4967 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4968 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4970 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4972 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4975 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4977 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4978 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4979 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4980 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4982 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4983 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4985 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4986 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4987 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4991 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4992 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4993 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4998 // Create some initial channels
4999 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5001 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5002 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5003 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5006 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5008 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5009 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5013 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5015 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5016 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5017 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5018 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5019 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5020 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5021 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5023 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5024 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5025 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5028 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5031 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5032 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5033 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5034 // transactions next...
5035 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5036 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5038 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5039 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5040 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5041 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5043 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5044 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5048 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5050 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5051 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5053 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5054 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5055 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5056 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5057 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5061 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5062 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5063 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5066 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5068 // Create some initial channels
5069 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5071 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5072 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5073 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5076 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5077 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5079 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5081 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5082 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5083 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5086 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5088 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5089 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5090 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5091 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5093 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5094 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5095 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5097 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5098 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5099 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5100 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5102 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5104 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5105 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5107 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5108 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5109 // transactions next...
5110 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5111 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5112 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5113 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5115 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5116 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5119 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5120 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5122 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5124 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5125 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5127 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5128 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5130 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5131 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5132 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5133 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5134 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5135 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5136 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5137 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5141 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5142 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5143 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5144 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5145 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5147 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5153 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5155 // Create some initial channels
5156 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5157 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5159 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5160 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5161 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5162 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5163 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5165 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5166 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5167 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5169 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5170 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5171 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5172 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5173 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5175 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5176 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5177 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5178 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5179 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5181 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5182 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5184 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5186 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5187 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5188 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5189 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5190 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5191 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5192 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5193 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5194 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5195 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5197 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5198 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5199 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5204 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5208 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5209 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5210 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5211 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5212 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5217 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5218 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5219 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5220 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5224 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5225 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5226 match msg_events[0] {
5227 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5230 match msg_events[1] {
5231 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5234 match msg_events[2] {
5235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5237 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5238 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5239 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5240 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5244 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5245 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5246 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5247 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5248 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5249 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5250 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5251 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5252 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5253 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5254 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5255 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5256 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5258 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5263 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5264 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5265 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5266 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5267 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5270 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5271 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5272 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5273 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5274 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5275 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5276 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5278 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5279 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5280 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5282 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5283 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5284 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5285 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5286 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5288 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5290 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5291 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5292 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5293 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5294 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5295 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5296 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5297 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5299 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5300 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5301 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5303 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5306 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5309 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5310 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5311 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5312 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5313 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5314 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5316 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5317 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5319 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5320 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5321 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5322 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5324 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5325 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5327 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5328 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5331 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5332 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5333 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5334 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5336 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5339 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5340 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5342 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5344 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5345 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5347 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5351 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5352 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5354 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5355 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5356 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5357 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5358 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5359 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5360 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5361 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5362 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5363 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5364 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5365 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5366 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5368 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5369 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5370 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5371 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5372 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5373 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5374 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5375 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5376 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5380 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5382 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5384 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5386 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5387 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5388 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5389 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5390 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5391 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5392 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5393 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5395 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5396 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5399 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5400 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5402 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5404 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5405 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5406 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5413 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5417 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5419 // Create some initial channels
5420 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5422 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5423 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5424 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5425 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5426 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5428 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5429 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5430 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5433 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5435 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5436 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5438 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5443 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5446 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5447 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5448 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5449 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5450 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5451 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5452 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5456 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5457 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5459 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5460 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5461 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5462 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5464 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5467 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5468 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5469 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5470 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5471 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5472 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5473 // use the same payment hashes.
5474 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5479 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5482 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5483 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5484 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5485 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5487 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5488 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5490 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5491 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5492 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5493 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5494 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5496 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5498 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5499 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5501 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5503 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5505 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5508 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5510 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5512 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5514 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5515 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5517 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5519 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5522 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5524 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5525 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5528 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5530 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5531 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5533 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5534 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5535 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5536 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5537 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5539 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5540 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5541 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5542 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5543 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5544 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5547 let failed_destinations = vec![
5548 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5549 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5550 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5551 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5553 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5556 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5557 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5558 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5559 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5560 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5561 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5563 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5564 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5565 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5568 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5569 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5570 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5572 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5575 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5576 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5577 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5578 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5580 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5582 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5583 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5584 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5585 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5586 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5587 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5588 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5589 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5591 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5593 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5594 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5595 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5596 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5597 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5598 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5599 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5600 if deliver_last_raa {
5601 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5603 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5606 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5607 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5608 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5609 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5611 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5612 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5613 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5615 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5616 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5617 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5619 if announce_latest {
5620 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5622 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5624 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5625 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5627 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5629 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5630 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5633 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5637 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5638 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5639 if deliver_last_raa {
5640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5642 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5643 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5645 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5646 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5648 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5655 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5656 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5657 let mut a_done = false;
5658 for msg in cs_msgs {
5660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5661 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5662 // should be failed-backwards here.
5663 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5664 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5665 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5666 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5668 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5673 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5674 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5675 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5677 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5678 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5681 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5682 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5683 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5684 if announce_latest {
5685 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5686 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5687 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5690 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5696 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5697 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5698 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5699 let mut as_updates = 0;
5700 for event in as_events.iter() {
5701 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5702 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5703 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5704 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5706 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5708 if network_update.is_some() {
5711 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5713 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5714 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5715 if announce_latest {
5716 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5717 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5719 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5721 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5722 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5723 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5724 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5725 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5726 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5727 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5728 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5729 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5731 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5733 if network_update.is_some() {
5736 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5738 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5739 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5740 if announce_latest {
5741 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5743 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5745 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5746 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5747 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5748 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5749 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5750 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5754 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5755 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5759 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5760 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5764 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5765 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5766 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5767 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5771 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5777 // Create some initial channels
5778 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5780 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5781 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5782 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5783 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5785 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5786 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5787 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5790 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5792 let htlc_timeout = {
5793 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5795 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5796 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5798 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5802 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5803 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5804 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5806 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5807 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5808 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5809 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5810 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5811 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5812 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5813 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5814 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5815 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5816 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5820 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5821 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5822 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5823 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5827 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5828 let seed = [42; 32];
5829 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5830 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5831 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5832 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5833 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5835 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5838 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5840 // Create some initial channels
5841 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5843 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5844 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5845 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5847 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5848 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5849 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5850 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5851 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5853 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5854 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5855 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5856 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5857 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5859 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5860 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5861 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5862 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5863 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5864 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5865 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5866 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5869 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5870 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5871 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5872 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5874 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5876 let htlc_timeout = {
5877 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5880 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5884 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5885 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5886 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5888 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5889 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5890 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5891 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5892 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5893 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5894 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5895 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5896 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5897 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5898 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5899 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5903 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5909 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5911 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5912 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5914 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5915 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5916 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5918 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5919 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5920 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5922 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5923 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5926 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5927 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5928 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5931 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5935 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5936 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5938 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5940 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5941 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5942 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5946 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5947 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5948 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5950 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5952 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5957 let mut block = Block {
5958 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5961 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5962 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5963 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5965 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5968 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5971 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5975 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5976 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5978 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5979 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5982 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5984 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5985 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5986 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5988 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5989 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5991 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5992 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5993 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5995 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5996 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6001 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6005 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6006 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6008 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6009 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6010 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6011 // actually revoked.
6012 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6013 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6014 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6018 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6019 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6020 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6022 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6023 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6025 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6027 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6029 if check_revoke_no_close {
6030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6034 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6035 let mut block = Block {
6036 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6039 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6040 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6041 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6043 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6044 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6047 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6049 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6051 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6052 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6053 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6054 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6055 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6056 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6060 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6061 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6062 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6063 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6064 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6065 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6066 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6068 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6069 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6070 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6072 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6073 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6074 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6076 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6077 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6081 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6082 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6083 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6084 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6085 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6090 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6094 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6096 for node in nodes.iter() {
6097 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6100 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6101 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6102 let push_msat=10001;
6103 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6104 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6106 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6108 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6109 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6110 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6114 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6118 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6120 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6121 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6122 let push_msat=10001;
6123 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6125 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6126 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6127 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6128 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6129 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6131 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6132 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6133 let push_msat=10001;
6134 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6135 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6136 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6138 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6139 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6140 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6142 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6143 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6144 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6146 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6147 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6148 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6150 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6151 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6152 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6154 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6155 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6159 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6165 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6166 let push_msat=10001;
6167 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6168 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6169 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6170 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6172 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6173 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6174 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6175 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6180 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6183 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6184 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6185 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6186 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6188 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6193 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6195 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6196 // pending_update_fee.
6198 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6199 *feerate_lock += 20;
6201 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6206 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6207 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6208 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6215 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6216 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6217 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6218 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6220 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6221 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6222 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6224 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6225 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6226 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6227 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6229 // Flush the pending fee update.
6230 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6231 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6237 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6238 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6239 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6240 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6241 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6242 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6243 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6244 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6246 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6247 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6250 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6251 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6252 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6253 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6254 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6255 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6256 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6262 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6263 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6264 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6266 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6270 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6271 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6273 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6274 // pending_update_fee.
6276 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6277 *feerate_lock += 200;
6279 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6282 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6283 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6284 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6286 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6291 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6293 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6294 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6295 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6296 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6298 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6300 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6301 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6302 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6304 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6305 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6306 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6307 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6308 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6309 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6310 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6312 // Flush the pending fee update.
6313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6314 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6316 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6317 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6320 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6321 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6322 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6323 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6324 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6325 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6326 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6327 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6328 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6330 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6331 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6334 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6335 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6336 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6337 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6338 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6339 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6340 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6345 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6346 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6347 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6348 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6349 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6351 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6352 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6355 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6359 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6360 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6362 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6365 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6366 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6369 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6372 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6374 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6376 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6377 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6378 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6379 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6382 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6383 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6384 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6387 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6390 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6391 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6392 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6393 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6395 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6397 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6399 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6400 // pending_update_fee.
6402 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6403 *feerate_lock += 20;
6405 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6408 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6410 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6411 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6412 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6417 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6419 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6420 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6421 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6422 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6424 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6426 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6427 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6428 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6429 let payment_event = {
6430 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6433 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6436 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6438 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6440 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6441 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6443 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6444 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6446 // Flush the pending fee update.
6447 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6448 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6450 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6451 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6454 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6455 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6458 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6459 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6465 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6467 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6469 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6470 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6471 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6472 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6473 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6477 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6478 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6481 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6482 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6483 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6484 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6485 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6486 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6487 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6488 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6489 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6490 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6492 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6495 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6496 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6497 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6499 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6500 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6502 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6503 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6505 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6506 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6507 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6508 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6511 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6512 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6516 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6517 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6518 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6521 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6522 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6526 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6527 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6529 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6530 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6532 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6533 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6534 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6535 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6539 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6540 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6544 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6545 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6547 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6548 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6549 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6550 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6552 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6553 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6557 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6558 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6565 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6566 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6568 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6569 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6572 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6573 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6575 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6579 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6580 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6581 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6585 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6586 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6588 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6589 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6590 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6591 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6592 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6593 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6597 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6598 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6599 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6600 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6604 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6605 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6606 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6608 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6609 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6610 let payment_event = {
6611 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6614 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6615 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6616 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6617 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6621 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6625 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6627 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6628 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6630 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6631 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6632 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6634 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6635 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6639 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6640 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6644 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6645 let channel_value = 100000;
6646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6647 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6651 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6652 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6654 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6655 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6656 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6658 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6659 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6661 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6664 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6666 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6667 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6671 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6672 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6673 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6675 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6676 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6677 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6680 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6681 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6683 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6684 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6685 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6686 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6687 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6688 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6690 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6694 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6695 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6699 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6700 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6702 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6703 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6704 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6705 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6706 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6707 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6709 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6710 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6711 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6715 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6716 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6717 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6718 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6719 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6721 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6722 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6723 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6725 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6729 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6730 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6731 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6735 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6736 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6738 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6739 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6740 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6741 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6742 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6743 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6745 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6749 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6750 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6751 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6754 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6755 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6758 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6759 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6761 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6762 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6763 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6765 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6769 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6770 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6777 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6778 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6781 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6784 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6785 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6786 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6788 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6792 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6793 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6797 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6799 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6800 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6801 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6804 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6805 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6807 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6808 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6809 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6811 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6815 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6816 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6817 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6818 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6822 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6824 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6825 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6826 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6828 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6829 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6831 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6832 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6833 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6834 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6835 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6836 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6837 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6838 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6839 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6840 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6841 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6842 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6843 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6846 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6847 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6850 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6852 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6854 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6855 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6856 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6858 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6862 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6863 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6868 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6869 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6870 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6871 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6874 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6875 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6877 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6880 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6883 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6885 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6886 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6887 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6889 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6893 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6894 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6899 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6900 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6902 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6903 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6905 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6906 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6908 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6911 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6914 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6916 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6917 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6918 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6920 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6924 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6925 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6930 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6931 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6933 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6934 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6936 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6937 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6938 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6941 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6942 failure_code: 0x8000,
6945 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6947 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6948 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6949 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6955 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6956 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6962 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6964 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6966 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6968 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6970 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6972 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6974 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6975 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6976 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6977 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6978 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6979 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6980 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6986 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6988 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6990 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6991 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6992 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6994 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6998 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6999 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7001 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7002 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7003 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7004 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7005 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7007 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7009 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7011 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7013 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7014 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7015 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7018 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7019 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7020 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7021 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7022 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7023 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7025 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7029 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7031 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7033 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7034 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7035 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7037 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7041 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7042 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7047 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7050 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7051 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7054 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7059 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7061 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7063 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7065 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7066 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7067 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7068 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7069 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7070 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7071 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7076 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7079 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7080 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7081 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7083 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7087 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7088 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7089 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7093 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7094 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7095 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7096 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7098 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7101 let mut payment_event = {
7102 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7104 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7106 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7108 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7112 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7113 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7115 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7116 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7119 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7120 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7124 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7125 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7126 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7128 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7129 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7130 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7131 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7132 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7133 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7134 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7143 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7145 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7146 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7148 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7150 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7151 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7152 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7153 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7154 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7155 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7164 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7168 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7169 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7170 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7172 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7175 let mut payment_event = {
7176 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7178 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7181 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7185 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7186 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7189 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7190 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7194 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7195 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7197 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7198 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7199 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7200 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7202 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7203 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7209 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7210 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7211 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7212 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7216 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7217 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7218 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7223 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7224 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7226 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7227 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7229 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7230 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7232 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7233 assert!(is_permanent);
7234 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7239 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7242 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7243 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7244 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7245 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7247 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7248 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7252 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7254 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7256 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7257 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7258 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7259 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7261 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7262 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7264 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7265 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7270 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7275 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7276 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7278 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7280 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7281 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7287 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7292 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7293 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7294 if announce_latest {
7295 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7297 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7300 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7302 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7305 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7306 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7307 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7309 let mut first_failed = false;
7310 for event in events {
7312 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7313 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7314 assert!(!first_failed);
7315 first_failed = true;
7317 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7326 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7327 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7328 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7331 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7332 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7333 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7334 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7335 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7336 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7337 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7342 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7343 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7345 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7347 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7348 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7350 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7351 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7353 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7355 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7356 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7359 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7361 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7362 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7363 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7364 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7365 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7367 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7368 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7370 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7371 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7372 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7373 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7374 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7375 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7376 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7377 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7379 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7380 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7381 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7383 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7386 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7387 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7388 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7389 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7390 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7391 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7392 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7395 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7397 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7399 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7400 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7401 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7402 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7408 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7409 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7410 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7411 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7415 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7416 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7418 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7419 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7420 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7421 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7422 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7428 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7429 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7430 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7431 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7434 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7437 } else { assert!(false) }
7439 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7440 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7441 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7442 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7443 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7444 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7445 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7448 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7451 } else { assert!(false); }
7453 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7454 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7456 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7457 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7458 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7460 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7462 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7463 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7464 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7468 } else { panic!(); }
7469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7471 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7472 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7473 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7474 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7475 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7476 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7477 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7480 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7483 } else { assert!(false); }
7486 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7487 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7488 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7489 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7490 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7496 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7497 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7498 // during signing due to revoked tx
7499 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7500 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7505 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7507 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7509 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7510 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7511 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7512 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7514 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7515 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7517 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7518 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7520 // Restore node A from previous state
7521 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7522 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7523 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7524 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7525 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7526 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7527 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7529 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7530 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7531 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7532 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7533 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7534 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7536 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7537 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7541 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7542 assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7543 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7544 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7545 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7549 if reconnect_panicing {
7550 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7551 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7553 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7555 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7556 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7557 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7558 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7559 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7560 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7563 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7564 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7565 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7568 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7569 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7570 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7571 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7574 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7578 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7579 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7582 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7583 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7584 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7586 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7587 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7589 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7592 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7596 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7597 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7598 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7599 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7600 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7601 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7603 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7604 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7605 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7606 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7608 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7609 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7610 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7615 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7618 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7619 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7620 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7622 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7623 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7628 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7629 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7633 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7634 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7638 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7639 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7640 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7641 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7648 // Create some initial channels
7649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7651 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7652 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7653 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7654 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7655 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7656 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7657 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7660 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7661 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7662 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7666 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7667 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7668 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7669 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7671 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7672 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7673 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7675 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7677 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7678 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7679 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7680 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7681 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7682 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7683 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7684 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7690 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7691 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7693 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7694 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7695 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7696 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7700 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7701 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7702 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7707 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7709 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7710 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7714 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7715 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7717 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7718 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7719 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7720 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7721 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7722 for e in msg_events {
7724 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7725 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7726 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7727 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7728 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7735 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7736 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7737 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7738 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7739 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7740 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7742 // Reestablish chan_1
7743 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7744 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7745 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7746 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7747 // Reestablish chan_2
7748 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7749 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7750 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7751 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7752 // Reestablish chan_3
7753 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7754 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7755 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7756 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7758 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7759 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7760 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7761 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7762 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7763 for e in msg_events {
7765 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7766 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7767 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7768 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7770 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7771 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7777 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7778 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7782 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7783 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7784 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7786 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7787 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7788 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7789 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7791 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7793 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7794 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7795 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7796 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7797 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7799 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7800 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7801 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7802 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7803 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7804 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7806 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7807 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7808 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7809 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7813 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7814 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7816 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7817 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7818 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7822 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7826 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7827 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7829 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7830 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7831 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7832 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7833 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7837 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7838 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7839 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7840 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7842 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7844 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7845 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7846 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7847 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7848 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7849 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7850 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7851 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7852 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7853 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7854 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7858 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7860 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7861 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7863 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7865 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7867 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7869 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7870 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7871 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7872 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7873 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7874 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7875 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7876 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7877 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7881 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7883 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7884 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7888 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7889 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7890 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7892 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7894 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7895 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7896 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7898 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7899 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7900 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7901 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7902 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7903 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7904 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7905 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7906 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7907 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7908 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7909 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7911 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7912 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7913 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7915 // Revoke local commitment tx
7916 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7918 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7919 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7920 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7921 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7923 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7926 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7927 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7928 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7930 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7931 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7932 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7934 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7935 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7936 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7937 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7939 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7940 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7941 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7942 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7943 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7944 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7945 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7947 match events.last().unwrap() {
7948 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7955 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7957 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7959 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7960 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7961 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7962 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7964 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7965 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7966 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7967 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7968 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7969 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7971 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7972 // available, which we check here:
7973 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7974 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7975 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7977 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7978 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7980 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7981 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7982 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7983 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7985 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7986 // output, checked above).
7987 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7988 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7989 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7991 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7992 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7993 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7994 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7995 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7999 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
8000 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8001 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8002 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8003 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
8005 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8006 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
8008 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8009 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8010 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
8011 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8012 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8014 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8015 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
8021 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8023 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8024 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8026 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8027 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8030 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8031 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8032 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8033 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8034 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8035 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8036 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8040 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8041 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8042 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8043 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8045 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8046 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8047 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8048 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8049 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8050 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8051 // up bumped justice generation.
8052 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8060 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8061 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8062 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8065 // Provide preimage for one
8066 // Check aggregation
8068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8073 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8074 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8075 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8077 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8078 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8079 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8080 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8081 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8083 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8084 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8085 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8086 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8088 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8090 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8094 let feerate_timeout;
8095 let feerate_preimage;
8097 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8098 // 5 transactions including:
8099 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
8100 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8101 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8102 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8103 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8104 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8105 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8106 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8107 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8109 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8110 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8112 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8113 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8114 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8115 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8117 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8118 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8120 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8123 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8124 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8125 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8127 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8128 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8129 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8130 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8134 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8135 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8137 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8138 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8140 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8141 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8142 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8143 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8144 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8145 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8147 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8148 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8149 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8150 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8151 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8153 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8154 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8155 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8156 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8157 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8162 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8163 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8167 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8168 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8169 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8170 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8171 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8172 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8173 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8174 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8182 let per_commitment_secret;
8183 let next_per_commitment_point;
8185 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8186 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8188 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8190 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8191 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8192 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8194 // Must revoke without gaps
8195 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8196 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8198 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8199 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8200 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8203 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8204 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8205 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8207 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8211 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8212 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8213 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8220 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8221 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8222 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8223 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8225 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8226 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8227 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8229 // Revoke local commitment tx
8230 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8232 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8233 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8235 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8237 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8238 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8240 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8242 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8243 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8244 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8245 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8246 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8247 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8251 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8252 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8253 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8255 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8256 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8257 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8262 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8263 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8264 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8269 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8271 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8272 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8273 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8275 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8278 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8279 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8281 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8284 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8285 // can get our balance.
8287 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8288 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8289 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8290 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8291 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8292 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8293 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8294 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8296 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8300 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8301 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8302 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8308 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8310 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8311 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8312 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8313 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8314 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8316 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8317 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8319 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8321 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8323 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8324 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8325 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8327 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8328 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8329 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8336 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8337 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8338 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8340 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8342 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8343 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8344 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8346 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8348 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8349 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8350 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8351 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8355 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8356 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8357 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8363 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8364 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8365 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8367 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8368 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8369 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8373 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8374 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8375 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8376 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8377 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8378 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8380 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8381 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8382 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8383 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8384 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8385 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8386 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8387 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8388 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8389 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8390 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8391 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8396 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8398 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8399 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8400 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8401 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8402 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8404 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8405 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8407 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8408 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8409 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8410 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8411 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8412 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8414 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8415 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8417 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8418 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8419 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8421 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8425 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8426 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8427 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8431 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8433 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8434 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8436 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8438 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8439 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8440 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8442 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8444 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8445 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8450 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8451 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8453 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8454 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8455 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8460 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8462 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8463 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8467 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8468 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8475 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8476 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8477 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8483 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8484 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8488 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8489 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8492 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8494 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8495 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8500 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8501 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8503 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8504 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8505 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8509 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8513 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8514 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8515 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8516 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8517 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8518 // and the channel should be closed.
8519 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8520 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8526 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8527 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8528 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8530 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8532 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8533 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8535 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8536 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8538 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8539 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8540 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8541 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8542 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8543 let accept_chan_msg = {
8545 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8546 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8548 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8550 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8552 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8553 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8555 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8556 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8558 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8559 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8561 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8562 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8563 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8564 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8565 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8566 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8568 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8571 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8575 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8576 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8577 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8578 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8581 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8583 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8584 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8586 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8588 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8589 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8590 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8592 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8594 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8595 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8596 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8598 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8599 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8601 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8602 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8608 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8609 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8610 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8612 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8613 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8614 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8622 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8623 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8624 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8625 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8627 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8628 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8630 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8631 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8633 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8634 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8639 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8640 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8644 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8646 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8647 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8648 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8649 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8651 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8652 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8653 route.paths.push(path);
8654 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8655 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8656 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8657 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8658 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8659 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8660 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8661 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8665 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8666 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8672 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8675 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8676 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8677 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8679 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8680 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8681 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8682 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8684 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8685 // values from previous calls.
8686 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8687 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8690 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8692 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8693 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8695 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8703 #[allow(deprecated)]
8704 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8705 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8706 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8710 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8712 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8714 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8716 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8717 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8718 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8719 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8720 } else { panic!(); }
8722 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8724 header: BlockHeader {
8726 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8727 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8728 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8732 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8733 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8734 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8735 } else { panic!(); }
8737 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8738 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8739 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8740 block.header.time += 1;
8741 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8742 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8743 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8746 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8747 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8750 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8752 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8754 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8755 // values from previous calls.
8756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8757 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8760 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8761 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8762 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8763 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8770 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8771 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8777 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8779 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8780 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8781 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8782 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8784 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8785 // resulting events.
8786 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8787 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8789 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8790 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8791 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8792 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8794 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8795 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8797 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8800 // We should fail the payment back
8801 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8802 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8804 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8805 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8807 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8812 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8813 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8814 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8816 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8817 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8818 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8819 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8821 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8822 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8823 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8824 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8826 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8827 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8828 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8829 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8833 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8834 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8835 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8836 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8839 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8840 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8841 // commitment at same time.
8843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8846 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8848 // Create some initial channel
8849 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8850 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8852 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8853 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8855 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8856 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8858 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8859 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8861 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8863 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8864 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8865 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8866 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8867 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8868 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8869 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8870 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8873 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8874 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8875 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8876 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8877 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8878 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8880 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8881 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8883 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8885 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8886 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8887 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8888 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8889 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8890 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8891 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8892 } else { assert!(false); }
8893 } else { assert!(false); };
8894 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8896 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8901 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8902 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8903 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8904 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8905 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8910 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8912 // Create some initial channel
8913 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8914 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8916 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8917 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8919 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8920 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8922 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8923 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8924 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8925 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8926 let watchtower_alice = {
8927 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8928 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8929 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8930 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8931 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8932 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8933 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8934 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8937 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8938 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8939 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8940 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8941 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8942 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8944 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8946 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8947 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8951 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8952 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8953 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8954 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8955 let watchtower_bob = {
8956 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8957 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8958 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8959 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8960 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8961 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8962 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8963 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8966 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8967 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8969 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8970 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8972 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8976 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8977 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8978 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8979 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8980 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8981 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8982 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8983 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8984 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8985 } else { assert!(false); }
8986 } else { assert!(false); };
8987 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8990 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8991 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8992 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8994 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8997 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8998 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8999 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
9003 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
9004 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9005 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
9007 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9008 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
9009 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
9014 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
9015 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
9016 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
9019 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9020 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9022 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9023 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9024 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9025 // before receiving funding_signed.
9026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9029 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9031 // Create an initial channel
9032 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9033 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9035 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9036 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9038 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9039 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9041 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9044 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9045 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9046 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9047 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9048 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9052 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9053 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9054 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9055 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9056 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9057 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9058 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9063 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9065 // Create some initial channels
9066 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9068 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9069 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9070 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9071 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9072 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9073 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9075 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9076 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9077 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9078 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9079 // this test before #653 fix.
9080 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9081 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9083 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9084 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9086 let htlc_timeout = {
9087 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9088 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9089 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9090 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9094 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9095 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9096 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9097 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9100 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9101 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9102 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9103 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9105 // Steps of the test:
9106 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9107 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9108 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9109 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9110 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9111 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9112 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9113 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9117 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9119 // Create some initial channels
9120 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9123 // Steps (1) and (2):
9124 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9125 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9127 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9128 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9129 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9130 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9131 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9132 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9133 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9135 // Steps (3) and (4):
9136 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9137 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9138 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9139 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9142 if !broadcast_alice {
9143 force_closing_node = 1;
9144 counterparty_node = 0;
9146 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9147 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9149 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9150 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9151 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9152 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9153 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9155 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9156 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9157 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9158 if broadcast_alice {
9159 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9161 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9163 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9164 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9168 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9169 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9170 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9172 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9174 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9176 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9177 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9178 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9179 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9181 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9182 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9183 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9184 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9185 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9186 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9188 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9189 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9195 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9196 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9199 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9201 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9202 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9203 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9208 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9210 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9216 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9218 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9221 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9223 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9224 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9225 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9230 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9233 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9234 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9235 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9236 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9237 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9238 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9239 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9240 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9241 if broadcast_alice {
9242 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9244 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9246 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9247 if broadcast_alice {
9248 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9249 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9250 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9251 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9253 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9254 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9256 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9257 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9262 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9263 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9265 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9266 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9267 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9268 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9270 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9271 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9272 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9274 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9275 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9276 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9277 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9278 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9279 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9280 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9282 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9283 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9289 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9290 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9291 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9292 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9293 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9297 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9298 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9299 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9301 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9302 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9303 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9304 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9310 // Create an initial channel
9311 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9312 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9314 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9316 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9317 // that it is rejected.
9318 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9320 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9323 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9324 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9325 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9326 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9327 // move forward with it.
9328 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9329 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9335 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9336 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9338 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9341 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9342 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9344 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9345 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9346 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9347 added_monitors.clear();
9349 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9351 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9352 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9354 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9357 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9358 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9359 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9360 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9361 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9363 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9366 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9367 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9368 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9369 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9370 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9376 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9377 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9378 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9379 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9380 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9381 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9383 let funding_created = {
9384 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9385 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9386 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9387 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9388 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9389 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9390 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9391 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9394 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9395 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9396 // still needs to be cleared here.
9397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9399 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9401 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9402 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9404 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9405 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9406 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9407 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9408 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9414 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9415 // everything is functional.
9416 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9418 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9419 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9420 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9421 added_monitors.clear();
9424 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9425 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9426 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9427 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9429 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9430 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9431 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9432 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9436 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9437 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9439 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9440 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9441 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9445 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9447 // Create some initial channels
9448 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9449 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9450 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9452 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9453 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9454 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9456 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9457 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9458 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9460 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9461 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9463 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9464 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9466 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9467 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9468 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9470 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9471 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9472 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9474 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9475 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9478 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9479 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9484 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9485 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9487 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9489 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9490 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9491 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9492 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9493 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9494 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9496 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9497 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9498 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9502 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9503 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9505 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9506 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9507 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9508 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9510 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9511 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9512 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9520 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9522 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9524 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9525 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9526 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9528 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9529 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9530 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9531 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9532 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9535 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9539 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9542 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9543 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9545 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9546 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9547 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9549 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9550 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9551 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9553 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9554 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9555 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9556 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9557 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9558 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9559 } else { panic!(); }
9560 } else { panic!(); }
9561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9563 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9564 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9565 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9566 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9567 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9568 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9569 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9573 script_sig: Script::new(),
9574 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9575 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9577 output: vec![TxOut {
9579 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9582 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9583 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9586 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9587 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9588 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9589 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9590 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9591 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9592 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9593 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9594 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9595 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9596 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9597 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9598 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9599 // until we learned about an additional block.
9601 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9602 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9606 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9607 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9609 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9610 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9611 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9612 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9613 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9615 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9616 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9617 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9619 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9620 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9622 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9623 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9624 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9626 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9627 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9628 if test_height_before_timelock {
9629 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9630 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9631 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9632 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9634 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9635 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9636 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9637 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9638 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9639 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9641 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9642 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9644 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9645 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9646 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9647 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9648 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9649 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9652 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9653 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9654 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9655 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9656 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9657 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9658 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9660 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9665 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9666 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9667 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9671 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9672 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9673 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9675 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9680 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9681 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9682 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9684 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9685 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9687 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9688 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9689 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9692 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9694 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9695 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9696 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9698 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9700 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9701 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9702 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9707 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9709 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9711 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9713 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9715 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9716 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9717 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9719 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9720 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9721 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9722 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9723 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9725 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9726 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9727 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9728 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9730 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9731 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9732 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9733 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9734 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9735 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9736 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9737 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9739 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9740 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9741 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9742 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9743 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9744 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9745 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9747 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9748 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9749 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9750 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9754 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9755 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9757 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9758 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9760 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9761 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9764 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9765 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9766 // the commitment state.
9767 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9769 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9771 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9772 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9775 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9777 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9778 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9779 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9781 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9783 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9784 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9787 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9793 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9795 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9796 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9797 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9799 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9802 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9804 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9806 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9808 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9810 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9811 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9814 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9816 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9818 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9819 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9820 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9821 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9822 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9823 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9824 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9828 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9830 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9831 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9832 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9834 let expected_destinations = vec![
9835 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9836 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9839 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9842 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9843 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9845 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9846 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9847 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9849 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9850 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9851 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9852 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9854 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9855 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9856 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9859 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9860 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9861 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9863 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9865 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9870 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9871 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9872 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9873 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9874 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9875 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9879 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9880 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9881 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9882 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9886 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9887 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9888 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9892 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9894 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9895 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9896 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9897 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9899 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9900 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9901 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9902 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9903 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9904 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9905 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9906 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9908 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9910 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9912 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9915 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9918 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9922 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9925 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9928 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9930 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9932 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9933 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9938 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9940 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9942 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9946 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9947 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9948 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9951 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9953 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9957 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9958 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9964 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9965 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9966 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9968 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9970 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9973 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9975 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9977 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9981 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9985 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9987 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9988 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9989 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9990 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9991 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9992 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9993 final_value_msat: 10000,
9994 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9996 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9997 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9998 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
10000 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10001 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10003 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10005 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10006 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10007 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10012 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
10013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10016 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10018 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10019 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10020 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10021 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10023 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10024 let route_params = RouteParameters {
10025 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10026 final_value_msat: 10000,
10027 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10029 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10030 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10031 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10032 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10033 let route = find_route(
10034 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10035 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10038 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10039 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10041 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10043 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10044 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10045 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10050 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10051 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10052 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10053 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10058 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10060 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10062 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10065 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10066 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10067 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10068 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10069 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10070 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10073 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10074 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10075 // amount of time to respond to.
10077 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10078 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10079 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10081 let failed_destinations = vec![
10082 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10083 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10085 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10087 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10089 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10095 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10097 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10098 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10099 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10101 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10104 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10105 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10106 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10107 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10108 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10109 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10110 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10112 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10113 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10114 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10116 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10117 // definitely claimed.
10118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10122 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10123 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10124 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10126 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10130 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10131 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10133 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10134 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10135 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10136 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10137 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10138 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10139 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10142 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10145 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10146 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10147 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10148 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10149 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10151 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10152 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10153 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10154 if !persist_both_monitors {
10155 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10156 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10157 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10158 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10163 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10164 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10166 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10168 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10170 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10172 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10173 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10174 // with the old ChannelManager.
10175 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10176 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10177 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10178 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10179 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10182 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10183 if persist_both_monitors {
10184 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10185 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10186 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10187 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10192 // Now restart nodes[3].
10193 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10194 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10195 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10196 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10197 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10198 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10199 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10200 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10203 let config = UserConfig::default();
10204 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10205 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10206 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10207 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10209 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10210 default_config: config,
10212 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10213 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10214 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10215 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10219 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10221 for monitor in monitors {
10222 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10223 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10224 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10225 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10229 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10230 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10232 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10233 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10234 // never finished processing.
10235 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10236 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10237 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10238 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10239 if persist_both_monitors {
10240 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10243 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10244 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10245 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10246 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10248 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10249 } else { panic!(); }
10251 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10252 if !persist_both_monitors {
10253 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10255 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10256 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10257 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10258 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10260 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10261 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10262 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10264 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10266 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10267 // claim should fly.
10268 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10270 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10271 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10273 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10274 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10275 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10277 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10278 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10279 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10285 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10286 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10287 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10292 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10293 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10294 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10297 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10298 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10299 enum ExposureEvent {
10300 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10302 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10304 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10305 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10308 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10309 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10312 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10313 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10314 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10315 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10316 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10317 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10318 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10319 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10322 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10323 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10328 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10329 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10330 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10331 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10333 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10336 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10337 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10339 let opt_anchors = false;
10341 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10344 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10345 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10349 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10350 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10353 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10356 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10357 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10358 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10360 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10361 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10362 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10363 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10365 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10366 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10368 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10369 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10371 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10372 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10375 if dust_outbound_balance {
10376 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10377 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10378 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10379 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10380 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10381 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10384 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10385 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10386 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10387 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10388 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10392 if dust_outbound_balance {
10393 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10394 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10395 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10396 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10397 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10400 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10401 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10402 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10403 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10408 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10409 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10410 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10411 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10412 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10414 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10415 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10416 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10418 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10420 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10421 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10422 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10424 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10426 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10427 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10428 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10430 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10431 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10432 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10433 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10435 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10436 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10438 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10439 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10440 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10442 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10443 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10445 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10447 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10450 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10451 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10452 added_monitors.clear();
10456 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10457 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10458 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10459 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10460 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10461 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10462 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10463 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10464 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10465 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10466 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10467 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10468 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10472 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10478 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10479 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10480 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10481 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10482 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10484 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10486 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10487 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10488 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10490 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10491 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10492 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10493 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10494 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10499 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10500 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10501 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10502 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10507 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10508 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10509 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10510 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());