1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
28 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
47 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
57 use core::default::Default;
58 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
60 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
61 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
65 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
66 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
67 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
68 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
69 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
71 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
73 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
74 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
75 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
77 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
78 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
80 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
81 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
83 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
84 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
85 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
86 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
87 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
88 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
89 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
90 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
92 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
93 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
95 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
97 } else { assert!(false); }
100 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
101 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
103 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
104 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
124 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
129 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
132 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
136 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
137 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
138 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
139 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
140 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
141 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
142 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
143 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
144 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
145 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
147 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
149 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
151 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
153 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
156 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
159 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
160 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
161 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
162 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
163 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
168 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
170 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
171 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
172 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
175 let payment_event = {
176 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
177 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
178 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
181 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
183 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
184 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
185 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
186 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
187 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
190 // deliver(1), generate (3):
191 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
192 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
193 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
196 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
197 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
198 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
202 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
205 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
206 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
207 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
211 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
215 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
216 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
220 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
223 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
226 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
227 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
229 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
233 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
238 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
239 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
240 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
244 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
248 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
250 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
252 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
255 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
258 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
259 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
260 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
261 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
269 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
270 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
271 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
274 let payment_event = {
275 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
276 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
277 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
282 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
284 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
285 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
286 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
296 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
305 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
306 // update_fee (never committed) ->
308 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
309 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
310 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
311 // <- (1) RAA delivered
312 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
313 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
314 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
315 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
317 // B should send no response here
318 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
319 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
322 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
325 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
326 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
327 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
329 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
332 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
333 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
334 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
335 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
336 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
341 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
343 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
344 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
350 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
353 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
355 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
357 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
358 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
359 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
360 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
365 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
369 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
370 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
371 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
376 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
377 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
379 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
381 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
382 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
383 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
385 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
387 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
388 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
392 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
393 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
396 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
397 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
400 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
401 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
402 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
405 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
406 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
410 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
411 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
412 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
413 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
414 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
415 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
416 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
417 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
418 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
419 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
420 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
425 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
427 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
428 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
429 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
431 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
432 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
433 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
436 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
438 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
442 fn test_1_conf_open() {
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
445 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
448 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
449 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
450 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
451 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
459 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
461 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
464 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
465 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
468 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
469 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
470 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
472 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
473 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
474 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
476 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
477 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
479 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
481 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
482 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
484 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
487 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
489 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
491 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
492 added_monitors.clear();
494 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
496 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
497 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
499 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
501 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
502 added_monitors.clear();
505 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
506 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
508 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
509 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
511 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
512 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
513 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
514 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
518 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
536 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
540 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
545 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
548 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
551 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
554 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
556 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
557 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
558 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
564 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
565 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
568 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
569 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
573 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
574 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
578 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
583 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
587 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
588 let channel_value = 1888;
589 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
590 let channel_id = chan.2;
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595 *feerate_lock = feerate;
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
605 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
606 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
608 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
610 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
611 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
612 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
613 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
614 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
615 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
618 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
619 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
621 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
622 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
624 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
631 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
632 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
633 //Should produce and error.
634 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
635 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
637 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
638 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
642 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
647 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
650 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
653 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
659 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
660 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
661 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
662 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
663 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
668 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
669 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
672 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
674 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
675 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
677 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
678 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
679 added_monitors.clear();
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
682 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
683 // node[1] has nothing to do
685 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
686 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
689 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
690 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
691 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
695 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
697 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
702 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
705 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
707 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
711 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
713 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
715 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
716 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
718 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
720 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
722 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
724 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
727 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
731 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
733 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
735 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
741 fn test_update_fee() {
742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
747 let channel_id = chan.2;
750 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
751 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
752 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
753 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
754 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
755 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
756 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
757 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
758 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
759 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
760 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
763 // Create and deliver (1)...
766 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
767 feerate = *feerate_lock;
768 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
770 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
773 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
774 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
775 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
777 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
781 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
783 // Generate (2) and (3):
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
789 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
793 // Create and deliver (4)...
795 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
796 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
798 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
800 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
801 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
802 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
803 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
804 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
816 // Handle (3), creating (6):
817 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
819 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
823 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
824 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
829 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
834 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
840 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
841 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
843 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
845 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
849 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 fn fake_network_test() {
856 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
857 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
863 // Create some initial channels
864 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
866 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
868 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
874 // Send some more payments
875 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
877 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
879 // Test failure packets
880 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
881 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
883 // Add a new channel that skips 3
884 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
886 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
892 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
894 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
895 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
897 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
898 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
899 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
900 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
902 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
905 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
906 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
907 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
908 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
910 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
913 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
914 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
915 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
916 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
918 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
920 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
922 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
924 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
926 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
927 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
928 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
929 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
931 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
934 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
935 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
936 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
937 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
939 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
942 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
943 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
944 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
945 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
947 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
949 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
951 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
953 // Claim the rebalances...
954 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
955 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
957 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
958 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
960 // Send some payments across both channels
961 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
963 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
966 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
967 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
969 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
971 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
975 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
977 // Close down the channels...
978 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
981 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
984 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
987 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
990 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
992 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
996 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
997 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
998 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
999 // commitment dance rounds.
1000 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1001 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1003 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1007 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1008 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1009 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1010 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1011 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1015 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1017 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1018 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1020 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1021 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1023 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1025 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1026 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1027 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1028 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1031 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1032 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1034 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1040 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1041 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1043 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1045 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1046 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1051 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1052 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1055 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1057 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1059 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1062 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1063 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1065 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1067 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1069 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1071 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1072 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1074 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1076 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1078 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1080 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1084 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1086 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1089 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1091 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1092 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1093 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1095 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1096 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1102 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1103 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1106 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1110 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1111 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1112 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1113 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1114 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1116 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1118 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1127 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1128 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1130 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1131 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1134 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1135 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1139 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1140 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1141 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1142 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1148 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1151 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1153 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1155 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1156 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1157 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1159 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1160 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1163 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1164 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1166 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1167 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1168 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1169 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1170 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1171 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1172 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1175 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1177 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1179 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1180 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1182 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1183 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1186 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1189 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1193 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1196 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1197 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1198 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1200 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1201 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1202 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1204 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1205 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1208 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1209 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1211 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1213 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1214 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1216 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1217 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1226 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1227 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1228 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1229 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1230 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1231 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1233 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1234 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1236 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1237 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1238 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1239 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1240 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1242 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1244 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1245 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1246 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1249 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1251 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1252 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1254 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1258 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1262 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1265 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1266 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1268 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1270 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1272 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1273 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1274 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1275 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1278 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1279 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1280 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1281 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1284 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1286 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1287 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1288 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1290 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1292 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1294 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1295 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1296 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1297 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1298 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1299 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1300 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1301 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1303 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1304 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1305 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1306 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1307 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1309 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1310 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1311 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1312 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1313 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1314 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1315 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1316 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1319 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1320 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1321 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1323 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1324 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1325 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1327 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1329 amount_msat: 3460001,
1330 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1332 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1335 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1338 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1339 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1340 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1341 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1345 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1346 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1348 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1349 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1351 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1354 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1357 htlc_signatures: res.1
1360 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1361 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1362 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1364 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1365 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1367 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1368 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1370 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1372 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1374 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1377 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1378 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1382 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1383 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1389 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1391 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1392 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1393 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1395 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1396 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1400 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1402 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1403 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1404 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1406 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1408 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1409 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1411 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1412 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1413 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1414 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1415 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1416 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1420 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1421 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1423 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1424 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1425 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1426 // the update_add_htlc.
1427 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1432 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1434 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1435 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1436 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1437 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1438 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1439 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1440 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1441 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1442 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1445 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1446 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1447 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1448 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1451 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1452 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1453 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1454 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1455 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1456 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1458 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1462 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1463 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1464 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1465 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1466 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1467 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1468 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1470 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1471 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1472 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1474 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1475 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1476 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1477 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1478 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1479 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1480 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1482 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1483 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1484 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1485 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1486 // commitment transaction fee.
1487 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1489 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1490 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1491 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1492 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1497 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1498 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1505 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1506 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1510 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1512 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1517 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1519 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1520 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1521 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1522 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1526 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1530 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1532 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1535 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1536 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1537 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1539 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1540 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1541 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1542 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1544 // Add a pending HTLC.
1545 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1546 let payment_event_1 = {
1547 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1550 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1552 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1556 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1557 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1558 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1559 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1560 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1562 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1563 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1564 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1565 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1566 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1567 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1568 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1569 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1573 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1574 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1575 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1578 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1579 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1581 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1582 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1583 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1585 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1589 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1590 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1591 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1592 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1594 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1595 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1596 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1597 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1598 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1600 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1602 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1605 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1608 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1609 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1613 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1616 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1617 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1618 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1619 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1621 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1622 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1623 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1625 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1626 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1628 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1629 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1631 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1633 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1635 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1636 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1641 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1642 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1643 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1645 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1647 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1649 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1650 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1651 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1652 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1653 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1654 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1655 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1658 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1659 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1661 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1662 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1663 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1664 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1665 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1666 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1667 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1670 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1672 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1676 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1679 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1681 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1683 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1686 // adding pending output.
1687 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1688 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1689 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1690 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1691 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1692 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1693 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1694 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1695 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1697 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1698 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1699 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1701 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1702 let payment_event_1 = {
1703 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1708 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1712 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1713 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1715 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1716 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1717 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1721 // split the rest to test holding cell
1722 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1723 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1724 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1725 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1727 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1728 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1731 // now see if they go through on both sides
1732 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1733 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1739 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1741 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1742 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1743 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1744 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1745 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1748 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1749 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1750 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1753 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755 // flush the pending htlc
1756 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1760 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1761 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1763 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1765 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1770 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1776 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1777 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1778 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1781 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1783 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1784 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1788 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1790 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1791 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1793 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1796 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1798 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1801 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1802 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1803 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1805 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1806 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1807 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1809 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1812 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1815 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1816 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1817 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1819 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1820 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1821 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1823 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1831 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1833 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1834 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1837 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1838 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1839 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1841 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1843 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1844 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1848 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1849 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1850 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1851 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1852 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1853 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1854 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1855 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1857 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1858 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1859 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1860 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1861 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1862 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1863 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1864 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1866 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1867 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1868 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1869 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1870 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1874 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1877 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1878 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1879 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1880 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1882 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1883 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1885 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1887 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1889 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1892 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1893 // initial fulfill/CS.
1894 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1896 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1898 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1899 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1900 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1902 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1905 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1907 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1908 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1913 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1914 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1926 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1928 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1929 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1930 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1931 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1932 // on-chain as necessary).
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1937 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1939 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1941 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1946 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1947 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1950 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1953 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1954 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1956 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1958 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1959 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1960 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1964 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1966 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1968 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1970 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1977 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1981 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1983 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1989 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1996 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1997 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1998 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2002 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2004 // Create some initial channels
2005 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2008 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2010 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2015 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2017 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2023 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2024 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2028 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2029 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2030 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2032 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2040 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2041 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2043 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2044 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2045 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2046 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2049 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2050 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2051 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2052 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2054 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2056 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2058 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2060 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2062 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2063 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2065 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2066 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2068 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2071 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2072 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2074 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2082 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2083 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2084 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2087 let node2_commitment_txid;
2089 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2090 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2091 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2092 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2094 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2095 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2096 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2098 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2100 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2102 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2106 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2107 // confusing us in the following tests.
2108 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2110 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2111 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2112 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2115 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2117 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2119 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2120 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2126 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2127 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2133 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2135 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2136 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2137 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2143 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2145 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2146 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2148 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2149 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2151 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2158 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2159 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2164 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2166 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2167 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2168 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2170 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2171 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2173 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2175 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2177 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2181 fn test_justice_tx() {
2182 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2183 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2184 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2185 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2186 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2187 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2188 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2189 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2190 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2191 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2192 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2193 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2195 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2197 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2198 // Create some new channels:
2199 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2201 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2202 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2203 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2204 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2211 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2212 // Revoke the old state
2213 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2216 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2218 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2220 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2222 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2223 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2224 node_txn.truncate(1);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2227 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2232 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2233 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2235 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2237 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2238 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2240 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2243 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2245 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2246 // Create some new channels:
2247 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2249 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2253 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2254 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2255 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2256 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2261 // Revoke the old state
2262 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2266 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2268 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2270 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2271 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2274 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2276 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2278 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2280 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2281 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2284 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2286 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2290 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2291 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2292 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2297 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2298 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2299 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2300 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2301 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2302 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2303 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2306 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2307 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2310 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2314 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2316 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2317 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2318 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2320 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2324 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2325 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2326 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2327 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2328 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2329 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2330 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2332 // Create some new channel:
2333 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2336 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2337 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2338 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2339 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2341 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2342 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2348 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2349 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2351 //Revoke the old state
2352 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2355 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2357 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2360 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2361 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2364 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2367 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2368 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2370 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2374 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2377 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2379 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2381 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2383 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2385 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2390 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2391 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2392 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2397 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2399 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2400 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2401 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2402 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2403 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2404 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2406 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2407 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2409 //Revoke the old state
2410 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2413 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2415 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2417 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2418 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2419 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2421 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2425 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2426 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2428 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2430 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2431 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2433 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2435 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2437 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2439 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2440 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2441 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2443 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2446 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2456 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2459 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2461 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2467 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2468 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2469 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2470 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2471 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2472 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2473 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2474 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2475 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2477 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2478 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2479 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2480 // PaymentSent event).
2482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2485 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2487 // Create some initial channels
2488 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2489 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2492 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2495 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2497 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2499 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2502 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2504 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2505 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2506 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2507 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2508 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2510 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2513 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2516 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2518 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2526 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2531 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2536 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2537 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2538 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2539 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2541 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2543 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2544 added_monitors.clear();
2546 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2547 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2548 match forwarded_events[0] {
2549 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2552 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2553 } else { panic!(); }
2554 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2555 } else { panic!(); }
2556 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2558 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2562 added_monitors.clear();
2564 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2566 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2570 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2575 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2576 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2578 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2579 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2580 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2585 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2586 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2587 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2588 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2589 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2591 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2593 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2597 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2598 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2602 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2603 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2610 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2611 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2612 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2613 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2615 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2616 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2617 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2618 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2620 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2622 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2623 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2625 let commitment_spend =
2626 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2629 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2634 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2638 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2642 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2643 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2645 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2647 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2648 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2649 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2651 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2652 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2653 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2654 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2655 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2657 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2659 let mut first_claimed = false;
2660 for event in events {
2662 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
2663 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2664 assert!(!first_claimed);
2665 first_claimed = true;
2667 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2668 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2671 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2672 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2675 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2678 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2679 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2680 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2681 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2682 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2683 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2685 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2690 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2691 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2693 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2695 // Create some intial channels
2696 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2697 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2701 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2703 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2705 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2706 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2707 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2708 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2713 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2714 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2717 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2721 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2726 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2728 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2729 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2730 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2732 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2734 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2735 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2736 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2737 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2738 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2741 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2750 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2754 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2758 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2762 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2763 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2768 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2770 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2771 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2772 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2773 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2774 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2775 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2776 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2784 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2788 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2797 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2798 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2799 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2801 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2802 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2806 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2807 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2810 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2812 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2819 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2823 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2824 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2825 // and fail backward accordingly.
2827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2832 // Create some initial channels
2833 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2834 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2836 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2837 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2838 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2839 // Revoke the old state
2840 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2842 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2844 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2845 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2855 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2856 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2857 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2858 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2860 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2863 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2864 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2870 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2871 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2872 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2873 // commitment transaction anymore.
2874 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2875 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2876 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2877 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2878 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2879 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2881 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2882 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2883 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2884 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2885 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2889 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 // Create some initial channels
2892 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2893 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2895 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2896 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2897 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2898 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2899 // Revoke the old state
2900 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2902 let value = if use_dust {
2903 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2904 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2905 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2908 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2910 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2912 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2921 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2922 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2923 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2925 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2926 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2929 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2932 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2933 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2937 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2938 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2939 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2942 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2945 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2946 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2949 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2950 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2951 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2952 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2953 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2954 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2957 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2958 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2961 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2962 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2963 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2964 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2966 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2971 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2972 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2974 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2977 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2980 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2981 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2984 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2985 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2987 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2989 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2991 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2992 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2994 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2995 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2998 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2999 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3005 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3009 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3013 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3014 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3015 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3018 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3019 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3020 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3021 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3027 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3028 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3029 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3030 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3037 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3038 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3039 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3040 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3041 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3047 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3051 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3054 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3055 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3056 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3057 // that we should update our routing table for.
3058 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3059 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3062 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3065 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3066 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3067 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3072 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3073 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3074 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3084 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3088 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3092 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3096 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3100 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3104 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3108 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3111 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3113 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3114 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3117 let payment_event = {
3118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3126 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3127 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3129 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3132 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3135 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3137 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3140 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3141 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3142 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3143 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3144 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3146 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3147 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3153 onion_routing_packet,
3155 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3159 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3161 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3162 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3168 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3172 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3177 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3178 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3179 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3186 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3187 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3188 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3189 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3191 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3193 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3195 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3197 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3198 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3203 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3204 // registering new transactions
3205 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3206 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3210 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3211 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3215 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3219 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3221 let mut payment_event = {
3222 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3227 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3230 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3235 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3236 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3237 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3238 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3242 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3244 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3246 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3247 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3248 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3250 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3253 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3255 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3256 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3257 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3258 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3259 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3263 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3265 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3268 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3270 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3272 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3273 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3275 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3276 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3277 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3281 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3283 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3287 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3288 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3289 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3290 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3291 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3299 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3301 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3302 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3303 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3304 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3305 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3307 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3308 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3310 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3311 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3315 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3316 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3320 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3324 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3325 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3326 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3328 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3329 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3330 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3331 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3333 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3334 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3335 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3337 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3338 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3339 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3340 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3342 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3343 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3345 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3346 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3348 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3350 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3351 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3353 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
3354 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3355 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3360 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3361 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3362 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3368 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3369 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3372 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3373 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3379 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3380 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3381 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3383 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3384 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3385 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3387 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3390 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3392 let payment_event = {
3393 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3396 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3397 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3398 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3402 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3403 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3405 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3406 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3407 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3409 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3411 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3412 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3416 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3417 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3418 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3419 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3422 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3423 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3424 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3432 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3433 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3434 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3435 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3436 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3437 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3439 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3440 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3441 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3443 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3444 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3446 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3447 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3448 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3449 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3450 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3451 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3452 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3453 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3454 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3455 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3456 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3457 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3458 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3459 // Everything was delivered...
3460 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3463 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3464 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3466 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3470 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3472 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3474 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3476 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3477 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3479 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3480 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3481 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3483 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3484 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3485 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3487 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3493 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3497 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3498 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3499 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3500 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3501 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3502 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3503 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3504 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3505 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3506 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3511 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3512 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3514 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3515 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3517 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3518 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3519 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3525 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3527 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3529 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3531 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3534 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3535 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3536 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3537 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3540 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3541 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3542 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3550 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3553 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3554 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3555 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3556 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3558 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3559 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3560 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3567 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3568 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3569 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3570 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3571 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3574 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3575 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3576 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3577 // Everything was delivered...
3578 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3583 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3585 // Channel should still work fine...
3586 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3587 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3588 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3592 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3593 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3596 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3600 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3601 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3604 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3608 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3609 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3610 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3613 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3614 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3615 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3616 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3617 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3619 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3622 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3623 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3625 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3627 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3628 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3629 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3636 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3639 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3640 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3641 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3642 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3643 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3644 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3649 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3650 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3651 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3657 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3660 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3661 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3662 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3663 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3664 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3665 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3670 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3671 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3672 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3677 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3678 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3679 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3680 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3681 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3682 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3689 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3691 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3692 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3693 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3695 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3696 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3697 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3700 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3701 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3703 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3704 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3705 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3706 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3707 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3708 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3709 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3710 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3712 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3713 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3714 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3715 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3716 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3717 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3719 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3720 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3721 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3722 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3726 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3727 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3729 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3730 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3735 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3736 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3737 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3738 let mut found_announcement = false;
3739 for event in msgs.iter() {
3741 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3742 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3744 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3748 assert!(found_announcement);
3752 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3753 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3754 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3758 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3759 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3761 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3763 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3764 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3765 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3768 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3769 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3778 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3779 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3781 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3782 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3783 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3784 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3785 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3787 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3789 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3790 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3791 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3793 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3795 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3801 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3802 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3808 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3811 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3812 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3813 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3814 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3815 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3816 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3818 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3819 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3820 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3821 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3823 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3824 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3827 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3829 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3831 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3835 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3837 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3838 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3839 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3843 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3848 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3851 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3852 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3857 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3860 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3861 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3862 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3865 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3866 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3867 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3871 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3876 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3877 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3879 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3880 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3882 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3883 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3884 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3886 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3892 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3893 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3896 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3899 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3900 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3901 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3907 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3909 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3910 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3911 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3912 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3913 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3914 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3915 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3917 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3919 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3920 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3921 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3924 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3927 let mut block = Block {
3928 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3931 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3932 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3933 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3934 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3935 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3936 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3937 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3943 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3944 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3945 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3947 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3951 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3952 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3953 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3954 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3958 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3960 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3963 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3964 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3968 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3969 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3970 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3972 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3975 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3977 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3978 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3980 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3982 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3985 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3986 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3987 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3988 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3991 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3998 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4000 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4001 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4006 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4007 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4008 match fail_commit[0] {
4009 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4013 _ => unreachable!(),
4015 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4017 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4022 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4024 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4028 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4032 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4033 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4034 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4035 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4036 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4037 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4039 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4041 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4043 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4044 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4045 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4046 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4048 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4049 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4050 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4051 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4052 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4053 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4054 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4055 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4056 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4057 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4059 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4060 let config = UserConfig::default();
4061 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4062 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4063 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4064 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4065 default_config: config,
4067 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4068 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4069 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4074 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4075 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4077 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4078 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4082 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4083 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4084 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4085 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4087 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4088 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4089 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4090 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4092 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4093 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4094 for node in nodes.iter() {
4095 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4096 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4097 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4100 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4104 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4105 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4109 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4110 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4111 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4112 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4113 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4114 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4116 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4117 let channel_value = 100000;
4118 let push_msat = 10001;
4119 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4120 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4121 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4122 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4123 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4124 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4125 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4127 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4129 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4130 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4132 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4134 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4135 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4136 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4137 added_monitors.clear();
4140 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4141 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4143 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4144 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4145 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4146 added_monitors.clear();
4148 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4153 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4154 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4155 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4156 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4158 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4159 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4160 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4161 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4162 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4163 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4164 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4165 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4166 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4167 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4169 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4170 let config = UserConfig::default();
4171 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4172 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4173 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4174 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4175 default_config: config,
4177 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4178 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4179 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4184 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4185 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4187 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4189 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4190 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4192 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4193 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4194 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4195 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4198 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4202 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4203 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4204 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4205 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4207 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4208 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4209 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4210 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4212 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4213 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4214 for node in nodes.iter() {
4215 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4216 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4217 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4220 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4224 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4228 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4229 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4230 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4231 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4232 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4233 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4234 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4236 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4237 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4239 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4241 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4242 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4243 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4245 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4246 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4247 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4248 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4249 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4250 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4251 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4252 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4253 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4254 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4256 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4257 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4258 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4259 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4260 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4261 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4263 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4264 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4265 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4270 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4271 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4273 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4274 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4277 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4279 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4280 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4284 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4285 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4289 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4290 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4291 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4292 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4293 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4294 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4295 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4296 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4297 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4299 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4300 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4301 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4302 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4303 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4306 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4308 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4309 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4311 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4312 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4313 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4314 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4316 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4318 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4319 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4320 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4321 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4322 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4325 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4326 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4327 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4328 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4329 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4330 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4333 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4334 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4335 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4336 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4337 assert!(read.is_empty());
4338 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4341 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4342 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4343 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4344 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4345 assert!(read.is_empty());
4346 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4349 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4350 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4351 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4352 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4354 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4355 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4356 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4358 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4360 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4363 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4364 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4365 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4366 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4368 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4369 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4370 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4372 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4374 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4375 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4377 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4378 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4379 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4380 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4381 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4384 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4385 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4388 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4389 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4391 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4392 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4393 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4394 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4395 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4397 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4398 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4399 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4400 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4401 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4402 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4403 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4405 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4406 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4413 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4414 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4416 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4417 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4418 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4420 for event in events.drain(..) {
4422 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4423 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4424 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4425 all_outputs.push(outp);
4428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4431 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4432 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4442 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4443 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4449 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4450 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4451 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4454 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4455 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4456 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4457 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4459 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4460 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4462 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4463 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4464 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4465 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4466 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4470 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4471 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4472 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4476 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4478 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4479 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4480 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4482 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4484 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4486 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4487 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4489 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4490 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4492 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4493 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4495 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4496 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4497 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4501 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4502 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4503 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4510 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4511 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4512 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4516 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4517 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4520 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4522 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4524 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4526 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4527 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4528 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4529 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4530 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4534 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4535 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4536 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4537 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4538 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4540 // Create some initial channels
4541 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4543 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4545 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4546 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4547 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4549 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4550 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4552 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4554 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4557 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4560 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4561 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4564 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4565 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4566 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4567 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4568 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4569 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4570 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4572 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4574 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4576 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4577 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4578 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4582 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4588 // Create some initial channels
4589 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4591 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4592 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4594 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4596 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4597 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4598 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4600 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4601 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4605 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4608 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4610 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4611 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4612 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4613 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4614 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4615 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4617 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4618 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4619 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4620 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4622 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4623 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4624 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4625 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4626 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4630 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4636 // Create some initial channels
4637 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4639 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4640 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4641 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4642 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4644 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4646 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4649 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4651 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4652 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4653 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4654 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4656 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4657 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4659 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4660 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4661 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4665 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4666 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4667 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4672 // Create some initial channels
4673 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4675 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4676 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4677 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4680 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4682 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4683 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4684 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4686 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4687 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4689 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4690 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4691 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4692 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4693 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4694 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4695 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4697 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4698 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4699 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4700 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4702 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4704 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4706 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4707 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4708 // transactions next...
4709 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4710 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4712 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4713 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4714 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4715 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4717 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4718 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4721 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4722 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4724 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4725 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4727 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4728 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4729 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4730 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4731 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4735 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4736 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4737 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4742 // Create some initial channels
4743 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4745 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4746 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4747 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4750 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4751 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4755 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4756 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4757 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4759 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4760 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4762 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4763 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4764 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4765 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4767 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4768 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4769 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4771 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4772 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4773 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4774 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4776 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4778 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4779 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4781 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4782 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4783 // transactions next...
4784 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4785 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4786 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4787 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4793 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4794 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4796 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4798 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4799 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4801 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4802 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4804 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4805 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4806 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4807 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4808 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4809 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4810 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4811 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4815 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4816 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4817 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4818 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4819 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4821 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4827 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4829 // Create some initial channels
4830 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4831 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4833 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4834 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4835 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4836 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4837 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4839 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4840 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4841 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4843 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4844 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4845 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4846 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4848 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4849 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4850 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4851 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4852 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4855 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4857 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4859 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4860 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4861 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4862 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4863 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4864 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4865 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4866 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4867 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4868 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4870 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4871 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4872 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4874 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4875 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4877 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4881 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4882 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4883 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4888 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4889 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4890 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4891 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4895 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4896 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4897 match msg_events[0] {
4898 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4901 match msg_events[1] {
4902 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4905 match msg_events[2] {
4906 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4907 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4909 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4910 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4911 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4915 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4916 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4917 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4918 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4919 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4920 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4921 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4922 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4923 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4924 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4925 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4926 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4927 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4929 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4934 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4935 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4936 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4937 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4938 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4941 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4942 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4943 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4944 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4945 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4946 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4947 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4949 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4950 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4951 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4953 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4954 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4955 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4956 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4957 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4959 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
4961 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4962 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4963 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4964 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4965 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4966 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4968 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4969 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4970 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4972 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4975 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4976 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4978 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4979 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4980 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4981 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4982 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
4983 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4985 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4986 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4987 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4989 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4990 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4991 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4993 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4994 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4996 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4999 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5000 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5002 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5003 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5005 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5009 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5010 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5012 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5013 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5014 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5015 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5016 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5017 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5018 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5019 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5020 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5021 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5022 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5023 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5024 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5027 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5028 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5029 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5030 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5031 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5032 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5033 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5034 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5038 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5040 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5042 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5044 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5045 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5046 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5047 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5048 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5049 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5050 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5051 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5052 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5053 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5054 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5058 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5060 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5062 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
5063 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5064 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5071 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5077 // Create some initial channels
5078 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5080 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5081 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5082 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5083 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5084 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5086 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5087 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5089 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5091 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5092 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5094 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5098 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5099 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5102 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5104 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5105 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5108 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5112 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5113 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5115 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5116 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5117 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5118 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5119 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5120 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5123 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5124 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5125 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5126 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5127 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5128 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5129 // use the same payment hashes.
5130 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5135 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5138 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5139 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5140 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5141 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5143 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5144 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5146 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5147 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5148 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5150 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5152 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5153 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5154 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5155 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5157 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5159 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5161 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5162 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5164 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5166 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5168 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5170 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5171 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5173 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5175 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5178 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5180 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5181 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5184 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5186 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5187 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5189 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5190 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5191 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5192 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5193 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5195 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5196 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5197 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5198 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5199 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5200 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5205 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5206 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5207 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5208 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5209 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5210 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5212 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5213 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5214 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5219 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5220 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5221 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5222 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5224 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5226 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5228 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5229 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5230 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5231 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5232 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5233 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5234 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5235 if deliver_last_raa {
5236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5238 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5241 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5242 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5243 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5244 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5246 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5247 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5248 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5250 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5251 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5252 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5254 if announce_latest {
5255 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5257 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5259 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5260 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5268 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5272 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5273 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5274 if deliver_last_raa {
5275 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5277 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5281 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5282 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5283 let mut a_done = false;
5284 for msg in cs_msgs {
5286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5287 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5288 // should be failed-backwards here.
5289 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5290 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5291 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5292 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5294 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5299 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5300 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5301 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5303 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5304 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5307 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5308 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5309 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5310 if announce_latest {
5311 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5312 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5313 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5316 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5322 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5323 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5324 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5325 let mut as_updates = 0;
5326 for event in as_events.iter() {
5327 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5328 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5329 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5330 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5332 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5334 if network_update.is_some() {
5337 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5339 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5340 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5341 if announce_latest {
5342 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5343 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5345 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5347 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5348 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5349 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5350 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5351 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5352 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5353 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5354 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5355 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5357 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5359 if network_update.is_some() {
5362 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5364 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5365 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5366 if announce_latest {
5367 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5369 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5371 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5372 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5373 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5374 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5375 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5376 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5380 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5381 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5385 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5386 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5390 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5391 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5392 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5393 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5397 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5398 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5400 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5401 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5403 // Create some initial channels
5404 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5406 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5407 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5408 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5409 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5411 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5412 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5413 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5415 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5416 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5418 let htlc_timeout = {
5419 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5420 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5421 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5422 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5423 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5424 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5428 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5429 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5430 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5432 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5433 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5434 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5435 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5436 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5437 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5438 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5439 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5440 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5441 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5442 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5446 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5447 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5448 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5449 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5453 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5454 let seed = [42; 32];
5455 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5456 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5457 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5458 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5459 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5460 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5463 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5465 // Create some initial channels
5466 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5468 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5469 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5470 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5472 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5473 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5474 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5475 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5476 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5478 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5479 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5480 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5481 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5482 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5484 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5485 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5486 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5487 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5488 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5489 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5490 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5491 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5494 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5495 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5496 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5497 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5501 let htlc_timeout = {
5502 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5503 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5504 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5505 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5509 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5510 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5511 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5513 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5514 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5515 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5516 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5517 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5518 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5519 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5520 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5521 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5522 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5523 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5524 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5528 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5532 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5534 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5537 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5539 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5540 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5541 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5543 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5544 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5545 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5547 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5548 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5549 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5551 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5552 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5553 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5556 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5561 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5563 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5565 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5566 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5567 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5570 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5571 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5572 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5573 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5575 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
5576 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5577 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5582 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5584 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5588 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5589 let mut block = Block {
5590 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5593 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5594 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5595 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5597 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5598 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5600 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5603 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5608 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5610 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5611 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5614 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5616 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5617 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5618 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5620 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5621 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5623 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5624 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5625 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5627 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5628 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5630 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5633 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5637 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5638 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5640 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5641 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5642 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5643 // actually revoked.
5644 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5645 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5646 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5650 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5651 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5652 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5654 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5655 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5657 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5659 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5661 if check_revoke_no_close {
5662 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5667 let mut block = Block {
5668 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5671 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5672 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5673 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5675 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5676 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5677 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5679 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5681 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5685 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5686 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5687 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5688 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5689 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5690 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5691 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5693 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5694 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5695 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5697 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5698 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5699 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5701 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5702 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5706 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5707 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5708 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5709 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5710 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5715 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5720 //Force duplicate channel ids
5721 for node in nodes.iter() {
5722 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5725 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5726 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5727 let push_msat=10001;
5728 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5729 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5730 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5732 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5733 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5737 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5743 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5744 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5745 let push_msat=10001;
5746 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5748 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5749 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5750 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5751 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5752 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5754 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5755 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5756 let push_msat=10001;
5757 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5758 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5759 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5761 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5762 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5763 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5765 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5766 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5767 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5769 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5770 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5771 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5773 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5774 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5775 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5776 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5777 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5778 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5782 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5786 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5788 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5789 let push_msat=10001;
5790 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5791 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5792 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5793 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5795 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5796 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5797 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5798 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5803 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5806 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5807 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5808 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5809 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5811 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5815 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5816 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5818 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5819 // pending_update_fee.
5821 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5822 *feerate_lock += 20;
5824 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5827 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5828 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5829 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5831 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5838 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5839 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5840 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5842 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5843 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5844 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5846 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5847 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5848 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5849 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5851 // Flush the pending fee update.
5852 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5853 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5855 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5858 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5859 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5860 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5861 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5862 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5863 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5864 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5865 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5866 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5868 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5869 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5872 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, retry: _, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5873 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5874 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5875 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5876 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5877 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5878 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5879 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5885 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5886 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5887 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5889 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5893 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5894 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5896 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5897 // pending_update_fee.
5899 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5900 *feerate_lock += 200;
5902 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5907 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5909 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5914 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5916 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5917 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5918 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5920 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5922 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5923 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5924 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5926 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5927 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5928 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5929 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5930 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5931 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5932 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5934 // Flush the pending fee update.
5935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5936 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5938 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5942 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5943 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5944 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5945 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5946 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5947 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5948 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5949 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5950 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5952 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5953 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5956 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, retry: _, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
5957 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5958 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5959 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5960 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5961 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5962 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5963 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5968 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5969 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5970 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5971 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5972 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5974 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5975 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5978 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5980 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5982 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5985 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5988 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5989 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5992 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5995 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5997 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5998 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5999 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6003 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
6004 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6005 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6011 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6012 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6013 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6016 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6019 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6020 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6021 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6022 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6023 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6024 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6025 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6026 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6028 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6029 // pending_update_fee.
6031 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6032 *feerate_lock += 20;
6034 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6037 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6039 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6040 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6041 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6046 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6048 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6049 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6050 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6052 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6054 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6055 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6056 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6057 let payment_event = {
6058 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6064 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6066 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6071 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6072 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6074 // Flush the pending fee update.
6075 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6076 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6078 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6079 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6082 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6083 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6086 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6087 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6093 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6095 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6097 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6098 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6099 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6100 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6101 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6105 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6106 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6109 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6110 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6111 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6112 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6113 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6114 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6115 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6117 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6118 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6123 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6125 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6127 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6128 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6130 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6133 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6134 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6135 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6136 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6140 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6144 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6145 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6146 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6149 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6150 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6154 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6155 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6157 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6158 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6160 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6161 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6162 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6163 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6167 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6168 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6172 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6173 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6175 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6176 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6177 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6178 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6180 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6181 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6185 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6186 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6187 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6188 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6189 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6190 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6191 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6193 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6194 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6196 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6197 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6199 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6200 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6201 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6203 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6207 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6208 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6209 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6213 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6214 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6216 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6217 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6218 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6222 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6223 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6224 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6225 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6229 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6231 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6233 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6234 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6235 let payment_event = {
6236 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6239 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6242 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6246 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6250 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6252 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6253 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6256 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6257 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6259 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6260 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6264 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6265 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270 let channel_value = 100000;
6271 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6272 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6274 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6276 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6277 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6279 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6280 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6281 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6283 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6284 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6286 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6289 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6291 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6292 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6296 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6297 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6298 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6300 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6301 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6302 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6305 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6306 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6308 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6310 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6311 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6312 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6313 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6319 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6320 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6325 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6327 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6329 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6330 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6331 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6333 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6334 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6335 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6337 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6339 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6340 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6341 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6342 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6343 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6345 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6346 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6347 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6349 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6353 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6354 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6355 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6362 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6363 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6364 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6365 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6366 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6367 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6369 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6373 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6374 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6375 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6378 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6379 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6380 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6382 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6383 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6385 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6386 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6387 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6389 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6393 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6394 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6398 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6399 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6401 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6402 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6404 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6405 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6408 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6409 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6410 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6416 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6417 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6421 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6424 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6425 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6427 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6428 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6431 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6432 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6433 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6435 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6439 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6440 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6441 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6442 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6446 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6448 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6449 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6450 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6452 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6455 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6456 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6457 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6458 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6459 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6460 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6461 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6462 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6463 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6464 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6465 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6466 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6467 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6471 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6472 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6474 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6476 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6478 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6479 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6480 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6482 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6486 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6487 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6494 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6495 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6499 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6501 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6504 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6509 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6510 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6511 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6513 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6517 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6518 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6523 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6524 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6526 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6527 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6529 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6530 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6532 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6535 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6538 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6540 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6541 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6542 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6544 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6548 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6549 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6555 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6562 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6565 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6566 failure_code: 0x8000,
6569 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6571 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6572 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6573 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6575 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6579 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6580 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6586 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6588 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6590 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6593 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6594 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6595 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6597 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6598 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6599 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6600 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6601 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6602 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6603 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6609 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6611 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6613 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6614 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6615 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6621 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6622 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6628 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6630 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6632 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6635 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6636 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6637 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6639 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6640 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6641 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6642 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6643 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6644 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6645 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6647 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6651 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6653 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6655 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6656 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6657 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6659 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6663 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6664 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6666 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6669 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6670 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6672 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6673 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6676 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6677 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6681 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6683 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6685 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6687 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6688 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6689 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6690 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6691 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6692 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6693 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6698 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6699 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6701 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6702 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6703 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6705 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6709 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6710 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6711 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6716 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6717 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6718 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6720 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6723 let mut payment_event = {
6724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6726 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6728 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6732 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6733 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6734 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6735 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6737 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6738 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6741 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6742 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6746 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6748 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6751 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6753 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6754 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6755 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6756 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6765 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6766 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6767 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6768 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6770 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6773 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6774 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6775 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6776 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6777 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6779 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6785 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6786 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6787 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6788 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6790 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6791 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6795 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6797 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6799 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6800 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6801 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6802 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6804 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6805 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6807 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6808 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6810 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6813 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6818 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6819 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6821 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6824 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6829 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6830 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6835 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6836 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6837 if announce_latest {
6838 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6840 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6843 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6847 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6848 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6850 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6851 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6852 let mut first_failed = false;
6853 for event in events {
6855 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6856 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6857 assert!(!first_failed);
6858 first_failed = true;
6860 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6869 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6870 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6871 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6874 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6875 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6876 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6877 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6878 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6879 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6880 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6882 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6883 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6884 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6885 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6886 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6888 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6890 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6891 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6893 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6894 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6896 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6898 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6899 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6902 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6904 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6905 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6906 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6908 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6910 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6911 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6913 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6914 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6915 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6916 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6917 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6918 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6919 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6920 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6922 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6923 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6924 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6926 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6927 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6928 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6929 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6931 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6932 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6933 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6934 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6935 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6936 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6937 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6939 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
6941 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6945 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6946 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
6947 else { first = false; }
6949 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6952 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6953 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
6954 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
6956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6963 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6964 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6965 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6966 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6970 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6971 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6973 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6974 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6975 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6976 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6977 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6983 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6984 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
6986 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989 } else { assert!(false) }
6991 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6992 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6993 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6994 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6995 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
6997 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7000 } else { assert!(false); }
7002 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7003 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7004 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7005 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7006 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7007 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7009 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7011 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7012 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7013 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7017 } else { panic!(); }
7018 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7020 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7021 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7022 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7023 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7024 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7026 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7029 } else { assert!(false); }
7033 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7034 // We want to be sure that :
7035 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7036 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7037 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7038 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7039 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7045 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7046 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7047 // during signing due to revoked tx
7048 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7049 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7054 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7056 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7058 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7059 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7060 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7061 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7063 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7064 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7066 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7067 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7069 // Restore node A from previous state
7070 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7071 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7072 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7073 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7074 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7075 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7076 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7078 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7079 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7080 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7081 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7082 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7083 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7085 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7086 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7090 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7091 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7092 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7093 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7097 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7098 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7100 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7102 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7103 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7107 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7108 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7111 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7112 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7113 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7114 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7115 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7116 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7117 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7119 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7120 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7125 panic!("Unexpected event")
7129 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7130 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7131 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7132 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7135 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7136 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7137 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7138 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7139 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7140 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7141 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7142 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7143 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7144 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7145 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7149 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7150 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7151 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7152 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7157 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7159 // Create some initial channels
7160 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7162 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7163 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7164 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7165 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7166 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7167 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7170 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7172 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7174 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7176 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7177 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7181 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7182 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7183 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7185 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7186 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7187 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7188 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7189 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7190 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7192 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7193 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7194 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7201 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7203 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7204 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7205 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7206 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7210 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7211 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7212 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7219 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7220 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7221 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7224 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7225 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7227 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7228 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7229 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7230 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7231 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7232 for e in msg_events {
7234 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7235 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7236 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7237 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7238 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7245 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7246 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7247 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7248 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7249 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7250 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7252 // Reestablish chan_1
7253 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7254 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7255 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7256 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7257 // Reestablish chan_2
7258 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7259 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7260 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7261 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7262 // Reestablish chan_3
7263 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7264 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7265 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7266 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7268 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7269 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7270 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7271 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7272 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7273 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7274 for e in msg_events {
7276 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7277 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7278 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7279 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7280 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7289 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7290 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7291 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7292 // to forward through that channel.
7293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7295 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7296 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7297 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7299 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7300 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7301 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7302 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7304 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7306 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7307 // not send for private channels.
7308 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7309 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7310 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7311 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7312 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7314 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7315 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7316 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7319 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7320 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7323 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7324 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7325 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7326 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7327 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7328 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7329 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7330 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7332 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7334 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7335 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7336 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7338 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7340 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7342 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7343 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7344 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7345 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7346 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7347 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7348 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7349 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7350 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7352 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7353 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7355 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7357 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7358 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7361 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7362 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7363 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7364 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7365 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7369 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7371 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7372 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7374 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7375 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7377 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7378 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7379 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7380 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7381 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7383 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7384 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7385 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7386 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7388 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7389 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7390 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7391 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7392 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7393 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7395 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7397 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7398 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7399 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7400 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7401 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7402 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7403 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7405 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7406 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7407 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7408 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7412 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7413 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7415 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7416 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7418 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7420 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7421 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7422 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7423 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7424 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7425 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7426 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7427 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7429 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7430 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7431 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7432 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7433 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7434 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7435 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7436 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7440 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7441 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7445 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7446 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7447 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7452 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7454 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7456 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7457 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7458 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7460 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7461 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7462 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7463 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7464 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7465 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7467 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7468 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7469 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7470 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7474 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7475 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7477 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7478 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7479 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7480 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7483 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7487 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7488 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7489 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7490 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7491 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7492 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7493 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7494 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7498 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7499 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7500 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7501 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7503 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7504 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7505 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7508 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7509 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7510 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7511 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7512 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7513 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7514 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7515 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7519 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7521 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7522 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7524 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7526 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7527 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7528 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7529 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7530 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7531 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7532 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7533 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7534 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7535 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7536 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7537 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7538 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7542 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7544 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7545 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7549 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7550 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7551 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7553 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7554 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7559 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7560 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7561 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7562 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
7563 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7564 None, 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7565 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7566 let payee = Payee::new(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7567 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7568 None, 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7569 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7571 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7572 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7573 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7575 // Revoke local commitment tx
7576 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7578 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7579 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7580 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7581 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7583 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7586 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7587 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7588 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7590 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7591 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7592 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7594 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7595 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7596 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7597 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7599 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7600 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7601 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7602 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7603 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7604 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7605 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7606 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7608 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7615 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7616 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7617 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7619 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7620 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7621 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7622 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7625 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7626 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7627 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7628 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7629 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7631 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7632 // available, which we check here:
7633 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7634 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7635 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7637 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7638 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7640 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7641 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7642 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7643 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7645 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7646 // output, checked above).
7647 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7648 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7649 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7651 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7652 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7653 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7654 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7655 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7659 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7660 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7661 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7662 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7663 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7665 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7666 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7668 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7669 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7670 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7671 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7672 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7674 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7675 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7681 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7682 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7683 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7684 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7686 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7687 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7689 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7690 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7691 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7692 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7693 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7694 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7695 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7696 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7700 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7701 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7702 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7703 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7705 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7706 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7707 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7708 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7709 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7710 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7711 // up bumped justice generation.
7712 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7715 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7720 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7721 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7722 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7725 // Provide preimage for one
7726 // Check aggregation
7728 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7729 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7730 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7731 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7733 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7734 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7735 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7737 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7738 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7739 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7740 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7741 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7743 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7744 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7745 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7747 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7749 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7753 let feerate_timeout;
7754 let feerate_preimage;
7756 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7757 // 9 transactions including:
7758 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7759 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7760 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7762 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7763 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7764 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7766 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7768 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7770 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7775 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7776 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7777 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7778 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7780 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7781 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7782 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7783 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7787 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7788 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7790 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7791 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7793 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7795 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7796 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7798 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7800 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7801 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7802 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7803 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7804 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7806 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7807 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7808 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7809 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7810 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7815 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7816 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7820 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7821 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7822 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7823 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7824 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7825 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7826 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7827 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7832 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7833 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7835 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7836 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7838 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7840 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7841 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7842 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7844 // Must revoke without gaps
7845 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7846 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7848 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7849 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7850 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7852 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7853 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7854 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7860 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7861 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7862 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7864 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7865 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7867 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7869 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7870 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7871 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7872 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7874 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7875 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7876 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7878 // Revoke local commitment tx
7879 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7881 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7882 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7883 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7886 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7887 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7889 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7891 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7894 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7895 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7896 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7900 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7901 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7902 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7904 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7905 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7906 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7911 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7917 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7918 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7919 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7921 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7923 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7924 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7925 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7926 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7930 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7931 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7932 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7936 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7938 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7939 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7940 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7942 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
7943 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7944 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7948 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7949 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7953 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7955 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7956 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7957 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7958 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7960 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7961 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7962 route.paths.push(path);
7963 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7964 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7965 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7966 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7967 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7968 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7969 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7970 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7974 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7975 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7979 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7981 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7984 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
7985 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7986 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7988 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7989 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7990 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7991 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7993 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7994 // values from previous calls.
7995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7996 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7997 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7999 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8001 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8002 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8005 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8008 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8013 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8014 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8020 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8022 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8024 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8025 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8026 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8027 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8028 } else { panic!(); }
8030 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8032 header: BlockHeader {
8034 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8035 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8036 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8040 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8041 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8042 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8043 } else { panic!(); }
8045 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8046 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8047 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8048 block.header.time += 1;
8049 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8050 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8051 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8054 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8055 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8058 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8059 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8060 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8062 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8063 // values from previous calls.
8064 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8065 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8068 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8069 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8070 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8071 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8072 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8079 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8080 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8084 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8088 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8089 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8090 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8091 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8093 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8094 // resulting events.
8095 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8098 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8099 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8103 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8104 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8109 // We should fail the payment back
8110 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8111 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8112 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8113 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8114 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8121 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8122 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8123 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8125 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8126 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8127 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8130 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8131 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8132 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8133 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8135 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8136 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8137 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8138 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8142 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8143 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8144 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8145 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8147 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8148 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8149 // commitment at same time.
8151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8154 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8156 // Create some initial channel
8157 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8158 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8160 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8161 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8163 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8164 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8166 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8167 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8168 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8169 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8171 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8172 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8173 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8174 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8175 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8176 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8177 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8178 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8181 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8182 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8183 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8184 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8185 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8187 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8188 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8190 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8191 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8192 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8193 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8194 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8195 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8196 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8197 } else { assert!(false); }
8198 } else { assert!(false); };
8199 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8201 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8206 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8207 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8208 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8209 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8210 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8217 // Create some initial channel
8218 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8219 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8221 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8222 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8224 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8225 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8227 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8228 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8229 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8230 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8231 let watchtower_alice = {
8232 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8233 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8234 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8235 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8236 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8237 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8238 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8239 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8242 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8243 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8244 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8245 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8246 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8248 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8250 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8251 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8255 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8256 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8257 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8258 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8259 let watchtower_bob = {
8260 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8261 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8262 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8263 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8264 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8265 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8266 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8267 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8270 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8271 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8273 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8274 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8276 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8280 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8283 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8284 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8285 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8286 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8287 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8288 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8289 } else { assert!(false); }
8290 } else { assert!(false); };
8291 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8294 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8295 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8296 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8298 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8301 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8302 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8303 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8307 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8308 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8309 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8311 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8312 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8313 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8314 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8315 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8316 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8321 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8322 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8323 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8326 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8327 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8329 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8330 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8331 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8332 // before receiving funding_signed.
8333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8336 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8338 // Create an initial channel
8339 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8340 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8341 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8342 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8343 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8345 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8346 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8348 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8351 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8353 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8354 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8355 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8359 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8360 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8361 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8362 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8363 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8364 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8365 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8372 // Create some initial channels
8373 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8375 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8376 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8377 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8378 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8379 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8380 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8382 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8383 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8384 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8385 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8386 // this test before #653 fix.
8387 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8388 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8390 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8391 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8393 let htlc_timeout = {
8394 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8395 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8396 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8397 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8401 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8402 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8403 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8404 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8407 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8408 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8409 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8410 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8412 // Steps of the test:
8413 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8414 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8415 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8416 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8417 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8418 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8419 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8420 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8424 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8426 // Create some initial channels
8427 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8428 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8430 // Steps (1) and (2):
8431 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8432 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8434 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8435 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8436 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8437 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8438 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8439 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8440 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8442 // Steps (3) and (4):
8443 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8444 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8445 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8446 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8447 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8448 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8450 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8451 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8452 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8453 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8454 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8456 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8457 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8458 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8459 if broadcast_alice {
8460 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8462 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8464 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8465 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8469 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8470 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8471 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8473 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8474 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8475 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8476 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8477 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8478 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8480 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8481 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8482 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8483 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8484 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8485 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8487 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8488 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8494 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8495 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8498 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8499 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8500 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8501 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8502 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8507 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8508 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8509 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8512 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8515 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8517 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8520 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8522 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8523 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8524 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8529 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8532 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8533 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8534 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8535 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8536 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8537 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8538 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8539 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8540 if broadcast_alice {
8541 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8543 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8545 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8546 if broadcast_alice {
8547 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8548 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8549 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8550 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8552 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8553 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8555 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8556 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8561 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8562 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8564 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8565 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8566 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8567 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8569 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8570 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8571 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8573 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8574 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8575 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8576 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8577 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8578 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8579 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8581 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8582 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8588 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8589 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8590 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8591 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8592 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8596 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8597 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8598 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8600 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8601 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8602 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8603 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8609 // Create an initial channel
8610 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8611 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8612 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8613 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8615 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8616 // that it is rejected.
8617 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8619 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8622 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8623 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8624 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8625 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8626 // move forward with it.
8627 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8628 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8634 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8635 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8637 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8640 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8643 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8644 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8645 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8646 added_monitors.clear();
8648 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8650 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8651 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8653 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8656 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8657 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8658 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8659 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8660 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8662 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8665 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8666 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8667 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8668 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8669 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8675 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8676 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8677 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8679 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8680 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8682 let funding_created = {
8683 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8684 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8685 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8686 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8689 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8690 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8691 // still needs to be cleared here.
8692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8694 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8696 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8699 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8700 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8701 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8702 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8703 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8709 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8710 // everything is functional.
8711 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8713 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8714 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8715 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8716 added_monitors.clear();
8719 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8720 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8721 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8722 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8724 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8725 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8726 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8727 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8731 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8732 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8734 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8735 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8736 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8740 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8742 // Create some initial channels
8743 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8744 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8745 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8747 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8748 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8749 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8751 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8752 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8753 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8755 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8756 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8758 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8759 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8760 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8761 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8762 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8763 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8765 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8766 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8767 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8769 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8770 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8773 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8774 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8779 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8780 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8784 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8785 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8786 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8787 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8788 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8789 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8791 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8792 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8793 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8797 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8798 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8800 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8801 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8802 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8803 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8807 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8809 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8810 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8811 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8813 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8814 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8815 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8816 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8819 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8820 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8823 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8826 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8827 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8829 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8830 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8831 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8833 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8834 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8836 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8837 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8838 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8839 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8840 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8841 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8842 } else { panic!(); }
8843 } else { panic!(); }
8844 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8847 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8848 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8849 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8850 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8851 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8852 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8853 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8854 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8855 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8856 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8857 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8858 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8859 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8860 // until we learned about an additional block.
8862 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8863 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8864 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8865 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8867 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8868 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8870 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8871 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8872 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8873 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8874 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8876 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8877 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8878 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8880 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8881 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8883 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8884 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8885 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8887 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8888 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8889 if test_height_before_timelock {
8890 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8891 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8892 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8893 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8895 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8896 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8897 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8898 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8899 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8900 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8902 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8903 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8905 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8906 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8907 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8908 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8909 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8913 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8914 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8915 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8916 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8918 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8919 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8920 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8921 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8926 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8927 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8928 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8932 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
8933 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
8934 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
8936 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
8938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8941 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
8942 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
8943 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
8944 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8945 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8946 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8948 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
8949 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8950 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8953 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8955 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8956 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8957 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8959 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8961 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
8962 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
8963 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8966 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8968 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8972 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
8974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8976 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
8977 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8978 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8980 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
8981 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8982 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8983 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8984 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
8986 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8987 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
8988 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
8989 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
8991 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8992 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8993 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
8994 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
8995 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
8996 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8997 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
8998 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9000 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9001 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9002 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9003 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9004 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9005 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9006 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9008 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9009 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9010 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9011 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9015 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9016 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9018 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9019 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9020 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9023 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9024 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9025 // the commitment state.
9026 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9028 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9031 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9034 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9036 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9037 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9040 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9047 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9051 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9053 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9054 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9055 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9056 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9057 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9058 let route = get_keysend_route(
9059 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None, &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9062 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9063 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9065 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9067 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9068 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9069 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9074 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9078 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9080 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9081 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9082 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9083 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9085 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9086 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9087 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9088 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
9089 let route = get_keysend_route(
9090 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9091 &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9094 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9095 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9097 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9099 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9100 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9101 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9102 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);