1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT;
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route, get_keysend_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
135 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
136 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
137 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
138 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
139 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
140 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
141 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
142 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
143 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
144 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
146 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
148 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
150 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
152 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
158 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
159 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
160 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
162 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
169 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
170 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
171 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
174 let payment_event = {
175 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
176 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
177 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
179 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
182 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
184 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
185 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
186 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
189 // deliver(1), generate (3):
190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
191 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
196 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
205 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
214 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
219 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
225 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
238 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
239 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
259 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
268 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
269 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
270 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
304 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
305 // update_fee (never committed) ->
307 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
308 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
309 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
310 // <- (1) RAA delivered
311 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
312 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
313 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
314 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
316 // B should send no response here
317 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
318 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
321 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
324 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
325 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
326 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
333 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
335 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
340 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
343 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
346 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
349 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
356 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
357 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
358 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
359 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
364 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
370 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
376 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
377 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
380 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
387 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
392 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
400 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
401 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
410 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
411 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
412 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
413 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
414 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
415 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
416 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
417 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
424 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
426 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
428 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
431 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
435 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
436 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
442 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
448 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
449 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
450 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
458 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
463 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
464 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
467 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
468 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
469 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
473 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
478 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
480 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
483 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
488 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
491 added_monitors.clear();
493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
495 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
496 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
501 added_monitors.clear();
504 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
508 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
511 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
513 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
553 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
555 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
557 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
572 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
576 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 let channel_value = 1888;
588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
589 let channel_id = chan.2;
593 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
594 *feerate_lock = feerate;
596 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
598 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
604 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
605 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
607 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
609 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
610 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
611 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
612 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
613 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
614 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
617 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
618 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
620 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
621 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
623 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
626 let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
630 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
631 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
632 //Should produce and error.
633 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed);
634 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
636 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
637 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
641 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
645 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
649 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
658 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
659 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
660 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
662 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
668 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
671 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
673 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
674 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
676 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
677 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
678 added_monitors.clear();
680 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
681 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
682 // node[1] has nothing to do
684 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
688 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
689 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
690 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
692 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
694 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
696 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
697 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
698 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
699 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
700 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
701 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
704 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
706 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
708 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
710 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
712 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
714 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
715 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
717 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
719 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
721 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
723 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
726 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
730 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
732 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
733 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
734 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
735 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
736 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
740 fn test_update_fee() {
741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
746 let channel_id = chan.2;
749 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
750 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
751 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
752 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
753 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
754 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
755 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
756 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
757 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
758 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
759 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
762 // Create and deliver (1)...
765 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 feerate = *feerate_lock;
767 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
769 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
772 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
773 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
774 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
775 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
776 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
780 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
782 // Generate (2) and (3):
783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
784 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
789 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
792 // Create and deliver (4)...
794 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
795 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
797 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
800 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
801 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
802 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
803 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
808 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
809 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
813 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
815 // Handle (3), creating (6):
816 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
818 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
823 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
826 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
828 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
829 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
830 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
831 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
832 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
833 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
837 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
839 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
840 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
842 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
844 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
846 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
847 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
848 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
854 fn fake_network_test() {
855 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
856 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
860 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 // Create some initial channels
863 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
864 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
867 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
868 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
873 // Send some more payments
874 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
875 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
876 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
878 // Test failure packets
879 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
880 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
882 // Add a new channel that skips 3
883 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
885 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
886 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
887 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
888 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
889 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
890 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
891 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
893 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
894 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
896 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
897 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
898 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
899 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
901 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
904 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
905 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
906 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
907 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
909 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
912 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
913 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
914 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
915 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
917 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
919 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
920 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
921 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
923 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
925 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
926 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
927 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
928 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
930 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
933 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
934 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
935 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
936 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
938 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
941 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
942 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
943 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
944 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
946 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
948 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
949 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
950 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops] }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
952 // Claim the rebalances...
953 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
954 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
956 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
957 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
959 // Send some payments across both channels
960 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
961 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
962 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
965 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
966 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
967 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
968 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
970 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
972 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
974 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
976 // Close down the channels...
977 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
978 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
981 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
982 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
983 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
984 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
986 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
987 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
988 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
989 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
990 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
991 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
995 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
996 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
997 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
998 // commitment dance rounds.
999 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1000 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1001 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1002 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1006 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1007 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1008 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1009 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1010 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1014 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1016 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1017 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1019 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1020 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1022 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1024 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1025 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1026 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1027 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1030 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1031 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1033 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1037 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1039 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1040 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1043 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1044 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1045 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1050 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1054 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1056 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1057 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1058 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1061 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1062 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1064 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1070 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1071 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1073 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1075 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1077 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1081 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1083 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1085 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1090 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1091 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1092 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1094 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1095 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1101 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1102 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1109 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1110 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1111 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1115 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1117 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1124 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1126 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1127 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1129 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1130 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1133 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1134 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1138 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1139 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1140 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1141 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1145 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1147 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1150 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1152 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1154 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1155 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1156 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1158 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1159 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1162 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1163 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1165 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1166 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1167 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1168 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1169 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1170 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1171 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1174 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1176 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1178 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1181 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1182 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1183 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1184 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1185 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1186 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1187 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1188 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1190 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1191 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1192 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1194 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1195 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1196 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1197 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1198 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1199 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1200 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1201 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1203 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1207 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1208 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1209 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1210 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1212 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1213 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1214 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1215 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1216 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1217 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1225 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1229 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1230 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1232 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1233 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1235 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1236 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1237 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1238 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1239 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1241 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1243 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1244 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1245 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1248 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1250 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1251 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1253 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1257 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1265 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1266 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1267 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1269 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1271 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1272 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1273 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1274 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1277 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1279 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1280 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1283 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1285 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1286 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1287 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1289 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1291 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1293 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1294 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1295 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1296 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1297 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1298 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1299 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1300 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1302 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1303 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1304 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1305 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1306 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1308 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1309 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1310 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1311 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1312 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1313 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1314 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1315 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1318 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1319 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1320 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1322 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1323 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1324 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1326 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1328 amount_msat: 3460001,
1329 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1331 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1334 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1337 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1339 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1340 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1344 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1345 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1347 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1348 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1350 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1353 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1356 htlc_signatures: res.1
1359 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1360 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1361 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1363 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1364 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1366 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1367 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1369 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1371 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1373 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1376 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1377 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1381 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1382 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1388 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1389 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1391 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1392 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1394 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1395 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1396 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1399 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1401 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1402 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1403 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1405 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1407 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1408 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1410 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1411 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1412 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1413 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1414 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1415 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1419 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1420 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1421 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1422 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1423 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1424 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1425 // the update_add_htlc.
1426 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1427 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1433 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1434 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1436 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1437 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1438 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1439 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1440 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1441 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1444 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1445 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1446 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1450 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1451 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1452 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1454 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1455 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1457 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1461 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1462 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1463 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1464 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1465 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1466 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1467 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1471 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1473 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1474 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1475 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1476 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1477 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1478 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1481 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1482 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1483 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1484 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1485 // commitment transaction fee.
1486 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1488 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1489 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1490 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1491 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1495 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1496 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1497 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1501 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1504 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1505 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1506 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1507 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1508 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1509 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1511 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1512 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1513 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1514 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1515 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1516 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1518 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1519 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1520 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1521 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1525 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1529 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1531 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1534 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1535 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1536 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1538 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1539 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1540 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1541 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1543 // Add a pending HTLC.
1544 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1545 let payment_event_1 = {
1546 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1549 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1550 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1551 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1553 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1555 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1556 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1557 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1558 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1559 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1561 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1562 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1564 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1565 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1566 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1567 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1568 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1571 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1572 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1573 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1574 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1577 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1578 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1579 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1580 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1581 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1582 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1588 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1593 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1594 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1595 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1596 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1597 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1599 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1600 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1601 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1603 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1604 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1607 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1608 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1612 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1615 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1616 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1617 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1618 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1619 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1620 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1622 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1624 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1625 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1627 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1628 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1630 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1632 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1634 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1635 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1640 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1641 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1642 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1644 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1646 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1648 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1649 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1650 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1651 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1652 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1653 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1654 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1657 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1658 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1660 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1661 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1662 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1663 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1664 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1665 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1666 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1669 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1671 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1672 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1673 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1674 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1675 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1678 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1679 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1680 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1681 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1682 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1685 // adding pending output.
1686 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1687 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1688 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1689 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1690 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1691 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1692 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1693 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1694 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1696 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1697 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1698 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1700 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1701 let payment_event_1 = {
1702 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1705 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1706 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1707 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1711 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1712 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1714 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1715 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1716 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1717 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1720 // split the rest to test holding cell
1721 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1722 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1723 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1724 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1726 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1727 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1730 // now see if they go through on both sides
1731 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1732 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1733 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1735 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1736 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1738 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1740 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1741 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1742 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1744 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1747 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1748 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1751 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1754 // flush the pending htlc
1755 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1756 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1759 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1760 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1762 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1764 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1765 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1766 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1770 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1775 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1776 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1777 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1779 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1780 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1782 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1783 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1786 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1787 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1789 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1790 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1791 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1792 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1797 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1798 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1800 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1801 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1802 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1804 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1805 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1806 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1808 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1814 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1815 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1816 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1818 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1819 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1820 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1822 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1829 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1830 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1832 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1833 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1834 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1836 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1837 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1838 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1839 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1840 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1842 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1843 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1847 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1848 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1849 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1850 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1851 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1852 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1853 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1854 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1856 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1857 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1858 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1859 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1860 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1861 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1862 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1863 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1865 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1866 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1867 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1868 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1869 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1873 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1874 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1876 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1877 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1878 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1879 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1881 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1882 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1884 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1888 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1891 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1892 // initial fulfill/CS.
1893 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1895 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1897 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1898 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1899 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1901 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1904 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1906 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1907 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1909 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1910 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1912 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1913 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1925 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1928 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1929 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1930 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1931 // on-chain as necessary).
1932 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1936 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1943 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1945 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
1946 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1947 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1949 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1951 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
1952 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
1953 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
1955 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
1956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1957 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1959 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
1963 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
1964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1965 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1967 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
1969 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1971 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1978 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1980 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1982 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1984 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1987 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
1988 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
1995 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
1996 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1997 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
1998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
1999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2001 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2003 // Create some initial channels
2004 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2006 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2007 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2010 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2012 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2013 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2014 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2016 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2017 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2018 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2019 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2020 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2022 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2023 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2027 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2028 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2031 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2033 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2036 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2037 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2039 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2040 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2042 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2043 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2044 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2045 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2048 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2049 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2050 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2051 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2053 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2055 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2056 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2057 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2059 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2061 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2062 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2064 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2065 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2067 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2070 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2071 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2072 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2073 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2081 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2082 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2083 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2085 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2086 let node2_commitment_txid;
2088 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2089 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2090 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2091 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2093 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2094 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2095 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2097 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2099 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2100 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2101 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2102 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2103 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2105 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2106 // confusing us in the following tests.
2107 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2109 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2110 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2111 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2114 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2115 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2116 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2118 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2119 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2126 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2132 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2134 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2135 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2136 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2142 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2144 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2145 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2147 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2148 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2150 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2151 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2157 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2158 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2160 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2163 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2165 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2166 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2167 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2169 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2170 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2171 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2172 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2174 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2175 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2176 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2180 fn test_justice_tx() {
2181 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2182 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2183 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2184 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2185 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2186 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2187 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2188 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2189 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2190 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2191 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2192 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2193 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2197 // Create some new channels:
2198 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2200 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2201 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2202 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2203 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2204 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2205 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2206 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2207 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2208 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2209 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2210 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2211 // Revoke the old state
2212 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2215 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2217 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2218 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2219 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2221 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2222 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2223 node_txn.truncate(1);
2225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2226 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2231 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2232 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2236 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2237 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2239 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2241 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2242 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2244 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2245 // Create some new channels:
2246 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2248 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2252 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2253 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2254 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2255 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2256 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2257 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2258 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2260 // Revoke the old state
2261 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2263 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2265 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2266 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2269 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2270 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2273 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2277 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2279 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2283 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2284 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2285 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2289 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2290 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2291 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2296 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2297 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2298 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2299 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2300 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2301 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2302 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2305 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2306 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2308 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2309 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2312 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2313 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2315 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2316 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2317 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2323 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2324 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2325 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2326 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2331 // Create some new channel:
2332 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2334 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2336 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2337 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2340 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2341 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2342 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2343 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2344 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2345 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2346 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2347 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2348 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2350 //Revoke the old state
2351 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2354 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2356 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2357 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2360 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2361 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2363 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2364 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2366 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2367 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2369 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2370 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2371 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2372 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2373 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2374 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2375 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2376 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2378 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2379 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2382 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2389 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2390 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2391 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2394 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2396 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2398 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2399 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2400 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2401 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2402 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2403 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2405 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2406 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2408 //Revoke the old state
2409 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2412 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2414 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2418 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2420 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2424 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2425 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2427 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2429 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2430 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2431 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2432 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2434 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2436 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2438 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2439 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2442 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2444 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2445 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2447 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2448 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2452 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2453 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2454 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2455 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2456 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2457 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2458 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2460 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2466 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2467 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2468 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2469 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2470 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2471 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2472 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2473 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2474 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2476 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2477 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2478 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2479 // PaymentSent event).
2481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2484 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2486 // Create some initial channels
2487 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2488 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2490 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2491 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2492 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2493 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2494 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2496 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2500 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2501 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2503 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2504 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2505 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2506 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2507 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2508 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2509 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2511 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2512 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2513 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2514 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2517 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2518 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2520 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2521 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2523 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2525 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2526 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2527 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2528 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2530 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2531 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2535 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2536 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2537 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2538 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2540 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2541 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2543 added_monitors.clear();
2545 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2546 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2547 match forwarded_events[0] {
2548 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2551 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2552 } else { panic!(); }
2553 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2554 } else { panic!(); }
2555 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2560 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2561 added_monitors.clear();
2563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2565 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2569 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2574 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2575 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2576 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2577 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2578 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2583 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2584 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2585 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2587 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2588 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2589 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2590 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2591 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2592 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2594 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2596 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2597 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2601 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2602 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2609 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2610 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2611 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2612 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2614 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2615 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2616 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2617 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2618 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2619 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2621 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2622 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2623 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2624 let commitment_spend =
2625 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2626 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2627 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2628 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2631 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2632 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2633 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2637 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2638 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2639 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2640 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2641 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2642 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2643 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2644 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2646 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2647 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2648 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2650 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2651 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2652 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2653 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2654 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2658 let mut first_claimed = false;
2659 for event in events {
2661 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
2662 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2663 assert!(!first_claimed);
2664 first_claimed = true;
2666 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2667 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2670 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2674 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2677 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2678 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2679 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2680 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2681 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2682 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2684 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2689 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2690 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2691 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2692 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2694 // Create some intial channels
2695 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2696 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2698 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2699 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2702 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2704 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2705 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2706 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2707 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2712 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2715 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2716 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2717 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2718 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2719 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2720 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2724 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2725 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2727 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2728 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2730 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2733 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2734 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2735 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2736 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2745 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2746 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2750 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2753 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2759 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2761 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2762 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2763 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2767 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2769 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2770 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2771 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2772 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2774 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2777 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2784 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2786 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2787 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2788 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2789 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2790 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2791 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2796 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2797 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2798 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2800 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2801 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2803 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2806 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2807 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2811 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2816 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2817 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2818 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2822 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2823 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2824 // and fail backward accordingly.
2826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2827 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2829 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2831 // Create some initial channels
2832 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2833 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2835 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2836 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2837 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2838 // Revoke the old state
2839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2841 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2851 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2854 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2855 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2857 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2858 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2861 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2862 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2863 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2870 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2871 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2872 // commitment transaction anymore.
2873 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2874 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2875 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2876 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2877 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2878 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2880 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2881 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2882 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2883 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2884 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2888 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2890 // Create some initial channels
2891 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2892 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2895 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2896 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2897 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2898 // Revoke the old state
2899 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2901 let value = if use_dust {
2902 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2903 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2904 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2907 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2908 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2909 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2911 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2914 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2915 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2916 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2919 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2920 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2921 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2922 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2924 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2927 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2928 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2929 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2930 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2932 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2933 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2934 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2936 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2937 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2938 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2941 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2944 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2945 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2946 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2948 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2949 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2951 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
2952 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
2953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2956 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2957 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2960 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
2961 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
2962 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
2963 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
2964 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
2969 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2970 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
2971 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
2972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2973 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2974 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2976 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
2977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2979 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
2980 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
2983 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
2984 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2986 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2991 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
2993 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
2994 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
2997 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
2998 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3002 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3004 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3008 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3011 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3012 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3013 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3014 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3017 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3018 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3019 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3020 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3027 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3028 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3029 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3030 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3036 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3037 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3038 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3039 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3040 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3041 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3044 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3045 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3053 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3054 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3055 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3056 // that we should update our routing table for.
3057 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3058 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3064 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3065 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3066 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3072 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3073 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3081 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3082 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3083 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3087 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3088 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3089 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3090 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3091 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3095 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3096 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3097 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3098 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3099 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3103 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3107 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3108 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3110 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3112 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3113 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3116 let payment_event = {
3117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3119 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3121 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3125 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3126 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3128 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3131 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3134 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3136 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3138 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3139 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3140 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3141 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3142 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3143 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3145 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3146 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3152 onion_routing_packet,
3154 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3156 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3158 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3160 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3161 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3166 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3167 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3171 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3177 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3178 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3185 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3186 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3187 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3190 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3192 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3194 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3196 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3197 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3202 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3203 // registering new transactions
3204 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3205 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3209 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3210 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3214 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3218 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3220 let mut payment_event = {
3221 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3226 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3234 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3235 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3236 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3240 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3241 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3243 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3245 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3246 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3247 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3249 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3254 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3255 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3256 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3257 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3258 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3262 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3264 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3267 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3269 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3271 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3272 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3274 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3275 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3276 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3278 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3279 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3280 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3282 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3286 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3287 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3288 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3289 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3290 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3298 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3300 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3302 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3303 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3304 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3306 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3307 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3309 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3310 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3314 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3315 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3316 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3317 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3318 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3319 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3325 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3327 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3328 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3329 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3330 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3332 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3333 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3334 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3336 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3337 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3338 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3339 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3341 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3342 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3344 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3345 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3347 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3352 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
3353 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3354 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3359 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3360 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3361 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3367 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3368 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3371 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3372 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3373 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3374 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3375 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3376 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3379 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3380 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3382 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3383 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3384 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3389 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3391 let payment_event = {
3392 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3397 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3399 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3401 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3402 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3405 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3406 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3408 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3410 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3411 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3415 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3416 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3417 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3418 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3421 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3422 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3431 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3432 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3433 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3434 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3435 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3436 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3438 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3439 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3440 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3442 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3443 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3445 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3446 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3448 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3449 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3450 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3451 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3452 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3453 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3454 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3455 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3456 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3457 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3458 // Everything was delivered...
3459 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3462 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3463 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3465 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3469 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3471 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3473 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3475 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3476 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3478 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3479 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3480 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3482 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3483 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3484 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3486 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3492 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3495 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3496 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3497 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3498 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3499 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3500 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3501 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3502 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3503 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3504 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3505 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3507 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3510 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3511 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3513 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3514 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3516 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3517 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3518 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3526 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3528 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3529 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3534 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3535 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3536 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3540 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3541 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3549 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3550 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3552 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3553 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3557 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3558 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3559 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3564 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3566 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3567 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3568 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3569 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3570 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3573 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3575 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3576 // Everything was delivered...
3577 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3580 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584 // Channel should still work fine...
3585 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3586 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3587 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3591 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3592 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3593 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3594 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3595 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3599 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3600 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3601 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3602 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3603 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3607 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3608 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3612 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3613 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3614 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3615 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3616 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3621 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3622 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3624 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3626 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3627 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3628 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3639 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3641 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3642 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3643 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3648 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3649 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3650 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3658 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3659 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3660 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3661 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3662 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3663 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3664 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3670 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3671 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3676 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3677 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3678 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3679 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3680 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3681 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3687 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3688 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3690 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3691 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3692 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3694 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3695 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3696 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3699 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3700 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3702 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3703 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3704 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3705 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3706 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3707 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3708 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3709 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3711 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3712 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3713 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3714 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3715 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3716 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3718 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3719 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3720 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3721 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3725 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3726 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3728 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3729 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3735 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3736 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3737 let mut found_announcement = false;
3738 for event in msgs.iter() {
3740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3741 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 assert!(found_announcement);
3751 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3752 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3753 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3757 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3758 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3760 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3762 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3763 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3764 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3768 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3777 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3778 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3781 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3782 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3783 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3784 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3785 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3786 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3788 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3789 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3790 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3792 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
3793 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3794 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3800 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3810 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3811 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3812 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3814 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3815 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3817 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3818 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3819 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3820 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3822 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3823 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3825 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3826 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3828 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3830 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3831 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3832 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3833 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3834 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3836 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3837 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3841 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3842 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3843 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3844 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3845 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3846 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3847 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3850 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3851 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3852 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3853 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3854 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3855 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3856 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3860 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3865 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3866 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3869 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3870 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3875 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3876 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3878 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3879 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3881 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3882 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3883 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3885 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3891 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3892 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3895 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3898 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3899 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3900 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3906 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3908 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3910 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3911 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3912 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3913 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3914 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3916 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3918 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3919 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3920 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3923 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3926 let mut block = Block {
3927 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3930 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3931 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3932 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3933 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3934 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3935 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3936 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3942 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3943 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3944 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3945 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3946 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
3948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
3950 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
3951 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
3952 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
3953 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
3957 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
3958 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
3959 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
3962 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
3963 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
3964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3967 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3971 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
3972 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
3973 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3974 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3976 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
3977 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
3979 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3981 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
3982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3984 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
3985 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
3986 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
3987 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
3991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3992 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3997 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
3998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3999 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4000 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4007 match fail_commit[0] {
4008 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4010 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4012 _ => unreachable!(),
4014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4016 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4021 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4022 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4023 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4027 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4031 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4032 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4033 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4034 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4035 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4038 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4040 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4042 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4043 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4044 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4045 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4047 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4048 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4049 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4050 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4051 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4052 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4053 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4054 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4055 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4056 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4058 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4059 let config = UserConfig::default();
4060 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4061 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4062 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4063 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4064 default_config: config,
4066 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4067 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4068 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4073 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4074 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4076 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4077 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4081 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4082 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4083 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4084 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4086 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4087 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4088 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4089 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4091 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4092 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4093 for node in nodes.iter() {
4094 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4095 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4096 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4099 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4102 fn do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload(persist_manager_post_event: bool) {
4103 // When a Channel is closed, any outbound HTLCs which were relayed through it are simply
4104 // dropped when the Channel is. From there, the ChannelManager relies on the ChannelMonitor
4105 // having a copy of the relevant fail-/claim-back data and processes the HTLC fail/claim when
4106 // the ChannelMonitor tells it to.
4108 // If, due to an on-chain event, an HTLC is failed/claimed, we should avoid providing the
4109 // ChannelManager the HTLC event until after the monitor is re-persisted. This should prevent a
4110 // duplicate HTLC fail/claim (e.g. via a PaymentPathFailed event).
4111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4114 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4115 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4116 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4117 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4119 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4121 // Route a payment, but force-close the channel before the HTLC fulfill message arrives at
4123 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
4124 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
4125 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4127 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4129 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4130 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4132 // Connect blocks until the CLTV timeout is up so that we get an HTLC-Timeout transaction
4133 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
4134 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4135 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4136 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4137 check_spends!(node_txn[1], funding_tx);
4138 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4140 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4143 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4144 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()]});
4145 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4147 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4148 let claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4150 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4151 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()]});
4153 // Now connect the HTLC claim transaction with the ChainMonitor-generated ChannelMonitor update
4154 // returning TemporaryFailure. This should cause the claim event to never make its way to the
4156 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap().clear();
4157 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
4159 header.prev_blockhash = nodes[0].best_block_hash();
4160 let claim_block = Block { header, txdata: claim_txn };
4161 connect_block(&nodes[0], &claim_block);
4163 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
4164 let mon_updates: Vec<_> = chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.chain_sync_monitor_persistences.lock().unwrap()
4165 .get_mut(&funding_txo).unwrap().drain().collect();
4166 assert_eq!(mon_updates.len(), 1);
4167 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events().is_empty());
4168 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4170 // If we persist the ChannelManager here, we should get the PaymentSent event after
4172 let mut chan_manager_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4173 if !persist_manager_post_event {
4174 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4177 // Now persist the ChannelMonitor and inform the ChainMonitor that we're done, generating the
4178 // payment sent event.
4179 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(Ok(()));
4180 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4181 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4182 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(funding_txo, mon_updates[0]).unwrap();
4183 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4185 // If we persist the ChannelManager after we get the PaymentSent event, we shouldn't get it
4187 if persist_manager_post_event {
4188 nodes[0].node.write(&mut chan_manager_serialized).unwrap();
4191 // Now reload nodes[0]...
4192 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4193 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4194 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4195 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4196 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4197 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4198 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4199 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4201 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4202 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4203 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4204 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>
4205 ::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(&chan_manager_serialized.0[..]), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4206 default_config: Default::default(),
4208 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4209 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4210 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4211 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4215 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4217 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4219 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4221 if persist_manager_post_event {
4222 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4224 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
4227 // Note that if we re-connect the block which exposed nodes[0] to the payment preimage (but
4228 // which the current ChannelMonitor has not seen), the ChannelManager's de-duplication of
4229 // payment events should kick in, leaving us with no pending events here.
4230 let height = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().len() as u32 - 1;
4231 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&claim_block, height);
4232 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4236 fn test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload() {
4237 do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload(true);
4238 do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload(false);
4242 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4243 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4247 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4248 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4249 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4250 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4251 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4252 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4254 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4255 let channel_value = 100000;
4256 let push_msat = 10001;
4257 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4258 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4259 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4260 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4261 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4262 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4263 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4265 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4267 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4268 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4270 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4272 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4273 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4274 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4275 added_monitors.clear();
4278 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4279 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4281 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4282 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4283 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4284 added_monitors.clear();
4286 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4291 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4292 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4293 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4294 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4296 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4297 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4298 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4299 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4300 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4301 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4302 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4303 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4304 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4305 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4307 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4308 let config = UserConfig::default();
4309 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4310 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4311 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4312 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4313 default_config: config,
4315 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4316 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4317 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4322 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4323 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4325 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4327 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4328 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4330 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4331 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4332 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4333 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4334 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4336 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4337 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4340 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4341 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4342 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4343 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4345 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4346 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4347 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4350 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4351 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4352 for node in nodes.iter() {
4353 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4354 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4355 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4362 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4366 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4367 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4368 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4369 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4370 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4371 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4372 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4374 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4375 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4377 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4379 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4380 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4381 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4383 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4384 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4385 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4386 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4387 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4388 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4389 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4390 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4391 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4392 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4394 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4395 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4396 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4397 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4398 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4399 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4401 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4402 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4403 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4408 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4409 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4411 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4412 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4415 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4417 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4418 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4422 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4423 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4427 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4428 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4429 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4430 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4431 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4432 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4433 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4434 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4435 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4437 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4438 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4439 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4440 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4441 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4444 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4446 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4447 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4449 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4450 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4451 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4452 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4454 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4456 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4457 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4458 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4459 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4460 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4463 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4464 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4465 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4466 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4467 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4468 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4471 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4472 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4473 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4474 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4475 assert!(read.is_empty());
4476 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4479 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4480 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4481 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4482 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4483 assert!(read.is_empty());
4484 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4487 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4488 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4489 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4490 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4492 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4493 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4494 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4496 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4498 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4501 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4502 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4503 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4504 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4506 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4507 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4508 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4510 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4512 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4513 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4515 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4516 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4517 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4518 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4519 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4522 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4523 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4526 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4527 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4529 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4530 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4531 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4532 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4533 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4535 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4536 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4537 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4538 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4539 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4540 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4541 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4543 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4544 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4551 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4552 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4554 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4555 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4556 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4558 for event in events.drain(..) {
4560 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4561 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4562 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4563 all_outputs.push(outp);
4566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4569 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4570 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4580 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4581 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4582 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4583 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4584 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4585 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4587 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4588 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4589 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4592 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4593 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4597 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4598 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4600 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4601 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4602 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4603 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4604 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4608 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4609 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4610 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4616 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4617 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4620 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4622 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4623 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4624 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4627 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4628 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4630 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4631 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4633 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4634 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4635 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4639 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4640 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4641 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4649 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4650 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4651 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4652 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4654 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4656 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4658 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4660 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4661 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4662 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4664 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4665 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4666 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4667 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4668 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4672 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4676 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4678 // Create some initial channels
4679 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4681 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4683 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4684 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4685 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4687 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4688 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4692 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4694 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4698 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4699 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4702 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4703 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4704 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4705 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4708 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4710 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4711 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4712 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4714 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4715 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4716 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4720 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4726 // Create some initial channels
4727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4729 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4730 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4732 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4734 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4735 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4736 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4738 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4739 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4741 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4743 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4746 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4748 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4749 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4750 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4751 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4752 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4755 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4757 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4758 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4760 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4761 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4762 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4763 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4764 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4768 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4772 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4774 // Create some initial channels
4775 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4777 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4778 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4779 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4780 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4782 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4784 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4785 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4787 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4789 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4790 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4791 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4792 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4794 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4795 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4797 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4798 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4799 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4803 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4804 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4805 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4810 // Create some initial channels
4811 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4813 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4814 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4815 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4818 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4820 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4821 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4822 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4824 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4825 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4827 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4828 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4829 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4830 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4831 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4832 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4833 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4835 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4836 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4837 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4838 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4842 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4844 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4845 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4846 // transactions next...
4847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4848 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4850 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4851 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4852 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4853 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4855 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4856 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4859 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4860 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4862 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4863 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4865 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4866 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4867 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4868 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4869 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4873 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4874 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4875 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4880 // Create some initial channels
4881 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4883 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4884 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4885 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4888 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4889 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4891 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4893 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4894 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4895 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4898 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4900 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4901 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4902 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4903 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4905 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4906 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4907 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4909 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4910 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4911 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4912 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4914 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4916 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4917 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4919 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4920 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4921 // transactions next...
4922 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4923 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4924 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4927 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4928 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4931 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4932 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4934 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4936 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4937 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4939 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4940 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4942 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4943 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4944 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4945 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4946 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4947 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4948 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4949 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4953 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4954 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4955 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4956 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4957 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4959 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4965 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4967 // Create some initial channels
4968 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4969 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4971 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4972 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4974 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4975 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4977 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4981 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4982 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4983 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4984 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4986 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4987 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4988 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4989 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4990 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4992 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4993 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4995 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4997 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4998 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4999 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5000 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5001 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5002 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5003 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5004 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5005 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5006 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5008 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5009 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5010 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5012 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5015 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5019 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5020 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5021 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5023 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5026 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5027 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5028 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5029 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5033 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5034 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5035 match msg_events[0] {
5036 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5039 match msg_events[1] {
5040 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5043 match msg_events[2] {
5044 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5045 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5046 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5047 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5048 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5049 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5053 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5054 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5055 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5056 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5057 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5058 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5059 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5060 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5061 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5062 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5063 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5064 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5065 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5067 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5072 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5073 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5074 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5075 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5076 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5079 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5080 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5081 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5082 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5084 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5085 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5087 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5088 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5091 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5092 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5093 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5094 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5095 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5097 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5099 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5100 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5101 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5102 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5103 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5104 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5106 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5107 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5108 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5110 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5111 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5113 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5114 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5116 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5117 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5118 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5119 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5120 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5121 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5123 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5124 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5125 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5126 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5127 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5128 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5129 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5131 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5132 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5133 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5134 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5137 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5138 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5140 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5141 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5143 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5147 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5148 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5150 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5151 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5152 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5153 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5154 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5155 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5156 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5157 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5158 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5159 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5160 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5161 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5162 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5164 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5165 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5167 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5168 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5169 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5170 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5171 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5172 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5175 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5176 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5180 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5182 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5183 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5184 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5185 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5186 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5187 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5188 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5189 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5190 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5191 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5192 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5195 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5196 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5198 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5200 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
5201 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5202 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5209 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5215 // Create some initial channels
5216 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5218 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5219 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5220 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5221 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5222 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5224 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5225 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5227 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5229 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5230 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5232 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5236 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5237 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5240 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5241 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5242 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5243 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5244 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5246 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5250 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5251 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5253 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5254 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5255 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5256 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5257 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5258 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5261 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5262 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5263 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5264 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5265 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5266 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5267 // use the same payment hashes.
5268 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5273 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5276 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5277 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5278 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5279 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5281 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5282 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5286 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5288 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5290 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5291 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5292 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5293 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5295 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5297 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5299 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5300 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5302 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5304 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5306 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5308 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5309 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5311 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5313 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5316 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5318 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5319 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5322 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5324 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5325 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5327 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5328 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5329 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5330 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5331 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5333 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5334 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5335 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5336 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5337 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5338 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5340 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5343 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5344 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5345 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5346 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5347 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5350 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5351 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5352 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5354 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5357 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5358 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5359 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5362 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5366 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5367 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5368 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5369 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5370 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5371 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5372 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5373 if deliver_last_raa {
5374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5376 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5379 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5380 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5381 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5382 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5384 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5385 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5386 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5388 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5389 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5390 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5392 if announce_latest {
5393 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5395 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5397 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5398 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5402 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5406 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5407 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5410 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5411 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5412 if deliver_last_raa {
5413 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5419 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5420 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5421 let mut a_done = false;
5422 for msg in cs_msgs {
5424 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5425 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5426 // should be failed-backwards here.
5427 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5428 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5429 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5430 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5432 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5437 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5438 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5439 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5441 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5442 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5445 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5446 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5447 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5448 if announce_latest {
5449 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5450 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5451 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5454 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5460 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5461 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5462 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5463 let mut as_updates = 0;
5464 for event in as_events.iter() {
5465 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5466 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5467 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5468 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5470 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5472 if network_update.is_some() {
5475 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5477 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5478 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5479 if announce_latest {
5480 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5481 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5483 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5485 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5486 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5487 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5488 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5489 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5490 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5491 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5492 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5493 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5495 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5497 if network_update.is_some() {
5500 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5502 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5503 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5504 if announce_latest {
5505 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5507 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5509 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5510 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5511 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5512 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5513 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5514 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5518 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5519 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5523 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5524 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5528 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5529 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5530 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5531 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5535 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5539 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5541 // Create some initial channels
5542 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5544 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5545 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5546 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5547 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5549 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5550 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5551 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5554 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5556 let htlc_timeout = {
5557 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5558 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5559 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5560 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5561 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5562 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5566 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5567 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5568 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5570 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5571 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5572 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5573 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5575 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5576 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5577 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5578 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5579 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5580 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5584 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5585 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5586 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5587 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5591 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5592 let seed = [42; 32];
5593 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5594 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5595 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5596 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5597 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5598 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5601 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5603 // Create some initial channels
5604 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5606 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5607 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5608 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5610 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5611 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5612 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5613 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5614 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5616 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5617 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5618 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5619 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5620 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5622 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5623 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5624 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5625 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5626 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5627 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5628 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5629 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5632 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5633 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5634 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5635 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5637 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5639 let htlc_timeout = {
5640 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5641 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5642 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5643 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5647 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5648 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5649 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5651 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5652 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5653 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5654 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5655 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5656 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5657 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5658 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5659 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5660 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5661 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5662 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5666 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5675 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5677 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5678 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5679 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5681 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5682 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5683 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5685 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5686 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5687 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5689 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5690 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5691 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5694 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5695 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5696 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5697 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5698 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5699 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5701 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5703 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5704 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5705 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5708 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5710 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5711 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5713 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash } => {
5714 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5715 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5720 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5722 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5723 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5726 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5727 let mut block = Block {
5728 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5731 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5732 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5733 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5735 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5736 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5741 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5745 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5746 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5748 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5752 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5754 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5755 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5756 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5758 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5759 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5761 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5762 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5763 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5765 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5766 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5768 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5771 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5775 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5776 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5778 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5779 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5780 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5781 // actually revoked.
5782 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5783 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5784 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5785 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5788 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5789 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5790 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5792 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5793 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5795 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5797 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5799 if check_revoke_no_close {
5800 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5805 let mut block = Block {
5806 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5809 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5810 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5811 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5813 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5814 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5815 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5817 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5819 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5823 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5824 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5825 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5826 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5827 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5828 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5829 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5831 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5832 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5833 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5835 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5836 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5837 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5839 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5840 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5844 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5845 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5846 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5847 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5848 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5853 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5858 //Force duplicate channel ids
5859 for node in nodes.iter() {
5860 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5863 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5864 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5865 let push_msat=10001;
5866 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5867 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5870 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5871 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5875 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5881 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5882 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5883 let push_msat=10001;
5884 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5886 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5887 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5888 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5889 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5890 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5892 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5893 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5894 let push_msat=10001;
5895 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5896 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5897 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5899 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5900 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5901 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5903 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5904 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5905 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5907 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5908 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5909 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5911 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5912 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5913 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5914 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5915 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5916 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5920 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5924 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5926 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5927 let push_msat=10001;
5928 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5929 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5930 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5931 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5933 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5934 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5935 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5936 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5941 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5944 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5945 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5946 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5947 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5949 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5953 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5954 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5956 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5957 // pending_update_fee.
5959 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5960 *feerate_lock += 20;
5962 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5965 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5967 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5968 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5969 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5974 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5976 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5977 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5978 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5980 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5981 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5982 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5984 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5985 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5986 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5987 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5989 // Flush the pending fee update.
5990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5991 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5993 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5996 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5997 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5998 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5999 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6000 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6001 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6002 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6003 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6004 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6006 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6007 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6008 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6010 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6011 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6012 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6013 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6014 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6015 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6016 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6017 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6023 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6024 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6025 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6027 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6031 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6032 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6034 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6035 // pending_update_fee.
6037 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6038 *feerate_lock += 200;
6040 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6045 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6046 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6047 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6052 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6054 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6055 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6056 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6058 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6060 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6061 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6062 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6064 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6065 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6066 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6067 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6068 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6069 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6070 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6072 // Flush the pending fee update.
6073 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6074 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6076 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6077 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6080 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6081 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6082 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6083 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6084 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6085 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6086 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6087 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6088 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6090 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6091 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6094 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, path: _, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data } => {
6095 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6096 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6097 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6098 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6099 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6100 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6101 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6106 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6107 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6108 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6109 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6110 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6112 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6113 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6116 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6119 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6120 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6123 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6126 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6127 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6130 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6131 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6133 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6135 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6138 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6139 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6141 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash } => {
6142 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6143 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6149 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6150 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6151 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6154 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6157 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6158 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6159 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6160 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6162 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6163 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6164 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6166 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6167 // pending_update_fee.
6169 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6170 *feerate_lock += 20;
6172 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6175 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6177 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6178 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6179 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6184 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6186 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6187 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6188 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6190 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6192 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6193 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6194 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6195 let payment_event = {
6196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6202 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6204 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6209 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6210 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6212 // Flush the pending fee update.
6213 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6214 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6216 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6217 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6220 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6221 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6224 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6225 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6231 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6233 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6235 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6236 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6237 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6238 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6239 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6243 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6244 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6248 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6249 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6250 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6251 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6252 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6253 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6254 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6255 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6256 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6261 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6262 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6263 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6265 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6266 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6268 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6269 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6271 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6272 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6273 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6274 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6277 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6278 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6282 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6283 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6284 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6287 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6288 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6292 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6293 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6295 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6296 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6298 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6299 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6300 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6301 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6305 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6306 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6311 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6313 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6314 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6315 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6316 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6318 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6319 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6323 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6324 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6331 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6334 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6335 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6337 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6338 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6339 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6341 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6345 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6346 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6347 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6348 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6349 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6350 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6351 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6352 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6355 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6356 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6360 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6361 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6362 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6363 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6367 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6368 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6369 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6371 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6372 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6373 let payment_event = {
6374 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6377 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6378 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6379 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6380 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6384 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6386 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6388 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6390 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6391 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6393 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6394 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6395 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6397 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6398 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6402 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6403 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6404 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6405 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6407 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6408 let channel_value = 100000;
6409 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6410 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6412 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6414 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6415 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6417 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6418 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6419 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6421 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6422 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6424 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6427 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6429 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6430 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6431 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6434 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6438 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6439 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6440 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6443 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6444 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6446 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6447 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6449 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6450 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6451 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6453 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6457 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6458 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6462 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6463 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6465 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6466 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6467 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6468 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6469 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6471 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6472 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6473 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6475 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6477 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6478 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6479 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6480 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6481 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6483 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6484 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6485 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6487 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6491 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6492 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6493 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6497 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6498 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6500 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6501 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6502 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6503 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6504 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6505 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6507 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6511 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6512 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6513 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6516 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6517 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6518 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6520 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6521 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6523 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6524 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6525 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6527 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6531 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6532 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6536 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6537 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6539 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6540 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6542 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6543 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6546 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6547 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6548 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6550 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6554 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6555 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6561 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6562 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6563 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6565 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6566 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6567 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6569 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6570 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6571 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6577 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6578 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6579 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6580 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6584 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6586 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6587 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6588 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6590 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6593 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6594 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6596 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6597 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6598 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6599 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6600 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6601 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6602 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6603 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6604 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6605 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6609 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6614 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6616 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6617 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6618 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6620 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6624 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6625 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6630 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6632 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6633 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6636 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6639 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6642 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6645 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6647 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6648 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6649 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6655 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6656 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6664 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6665 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6667 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6670 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6673 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6676 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6678 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6679 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6680 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6682 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6686 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6687 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6692 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6693 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6695 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6696 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6698 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6700 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6703 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6704 failure_code: 0x8000,
6707 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6709 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6710 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6711 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6717 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6718 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6720 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6721 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6722 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6723 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6724 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6726 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6728 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6731 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6732 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6733 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6735 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6736 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6737 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6738 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6739 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6740 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6741 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6747 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6749 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6751 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6752 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6753 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6755 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6759 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6760 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6768 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6770 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6773 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6775 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6777 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6778 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6779 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6780 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6781 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6782 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6783 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6789 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6791 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6793 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6794 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6795 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6801 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6802 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6804 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6805 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6807 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6808 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6810 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6811 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6814 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6815 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6817 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6819 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6821 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6826 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6827 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6828 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6829 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6830 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6831 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6836 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6837 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6839 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6840 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6841 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6843 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6847 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6848 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6849 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6854 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6855 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6856 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6858 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6861 let mut payment_event = {
6862 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6864 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6870 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6871 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6872 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6876 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6879 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6880 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6882 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6884 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6885 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6886 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6888 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6889 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6890 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6891 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6892 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6893 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6894 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6896 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6905 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6906 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6908 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6910 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6911 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6912 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6913 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6914 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6915 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6923 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6924 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6925 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6926 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6928 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6929 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6932 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6933 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6935 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6937 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6938 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6939 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6940 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6942 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6943 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6945 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6946 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6951 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6952 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6953 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6956 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6957 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6959 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6961 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6962 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6967 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6968 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6973 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6974 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6975 if announce_latest {
6976 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6978 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6981 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6985 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6986 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6987 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6988 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6990 let mut first_failed = false;
6991 for event in events {
6993 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6994 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6995 assert!(!first_failed);
6996 first_failed = true;
6998 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7007 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7008 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7009 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7012 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7013 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7014 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7015 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7016 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7017 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7018 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7023 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7024 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7026 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7028 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7029 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7031 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7032 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7034 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7036 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7037 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7040 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7042 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7043 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7044 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7045 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7046 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7048 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7049 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7051 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7052 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7053 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7054 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7056 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7057 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7058 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7060 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7061 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7062 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7064 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7065 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7066 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7067 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7069 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7070 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7071 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7072 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7074 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7075 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7077 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7079 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7083 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7084 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7085 else { first = false; }
7087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7090 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7091 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7092 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7101 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7102 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7103 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7104 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7108 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7109 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7111 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7112 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7113 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7114 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7115 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7121 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7122 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7124 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7127 } else { assert!(false) }
7129 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7130 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7131 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7132 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7133 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
7135 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7136 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7138 } else { assert!(false); }
7140 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7141 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7142 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7143 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7144 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7145 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7147 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7149 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7150 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7151 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7155 } else { panic!(); }
7156 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7158 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7159 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7160 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7161 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7162 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
7164 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7167 } else { assert!(false); }
7171 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7172 // We want to be sure that :
7173 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7174 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7175 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7176 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7177 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7183 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7184 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7185 // during signing due to revoked tx
7186 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7187 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7194 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7196 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7197 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7198 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7199 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7204 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7205 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7207 // Restore node A from previous state
7208 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7209 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7210 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7211 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7212 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7213 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7214 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7216 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7217 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7218 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7219 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7220 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7221 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7223 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7224 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7228 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7229 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7230 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7231 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7235 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7236 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7238 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7240 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7241 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7245 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7249 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7250 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7251 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7252 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7253 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7254 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7255 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7257 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7258 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7263 panic!("Unexpected event")
7267 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7268 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7269 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7270 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7273 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7274 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7275 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7276 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7278 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7279 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7281 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7282 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7283 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7287 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7288 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7289 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7290 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7295 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7297 // Create some initial channels
7298 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7300 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7301 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7302 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7303 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7306 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7308 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7310 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7312 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7313 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7315 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7317 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7318 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7319 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7321 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7323 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7324 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7325 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7326 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7327 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7328 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7329 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7330 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7339 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7340 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7341 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7342 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7346 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7347 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7348 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7350 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7351 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7352 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7353 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7355 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7356 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7357 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7360 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7361 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7363 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7364 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7365 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7366 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7367 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7368 for e in msg_events {
7370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7371 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7372 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7373 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7374 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7381 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7382 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7383 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7384 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7385 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7386 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7388 // Reestablish chan_1
7389 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7390 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7391 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7392 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7393 // Reestablish chan_2
7394 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7395 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7396 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7397 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7398 // Reestablish chan_3
7399 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7400 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7401 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7402 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7404 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7405 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7407 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7408 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7409 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7410 for e in msg_events {
7412 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7413 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7414 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7415 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7416 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7419 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7425 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7426 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7427 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7428 // to forward through that channel.
7429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7431 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7432 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7433 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7435 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7436 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7437 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7438 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7440 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7442 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7443 // not send for private channels.
7444 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7445 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7446 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7447 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7448 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7450 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7451 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7452 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7455 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7456 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7459 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7460 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7461 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7462 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7463 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7464 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7465 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7466 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7467 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7468 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7470 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7471 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7472 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7474 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7476 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7478 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7479 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7480 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7481 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7482 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7483 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7484 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7485 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7486 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7488 let last_hops = vec![&route_hint];
7489 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7491 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7493 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7495 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7497 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7498 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7499 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7500 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7501 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7503 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7504 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7505 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7507 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7508 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7511 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7513 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7514 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7515 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7516 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7517 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7519 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7520 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7521 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7522 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7524 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7525 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7526 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7527 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7528 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7529 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7531 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7533 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7534 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7535 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7536 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7537 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7538 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7539 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7541 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7542 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7543 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7544 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7548 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7549 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7551 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7552 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7554 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7556 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7557 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7558 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7559 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7560 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7561 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7562 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7563 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7565 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7566 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7567 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7568 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7569 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7570 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7571 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7572 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7574 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7576 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7581 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7582 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7583 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7585 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7586 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7587 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7588 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7590 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7592 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7593 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7594 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7596 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7597 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7598 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7599 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7600 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7601 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7603 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7604 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7605 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7606 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7610 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7611 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7613 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7614 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7615 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7616 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7619 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7623 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7624 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7625 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7627 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7628 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7629 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7630 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7634 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7635 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7636 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7637 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7639 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7640 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7641 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7642 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7643 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7644 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7645 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7646 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7647 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7648 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7649 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7650 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7651 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7655 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7657 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7660 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7662 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7663 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7664 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7665 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7666 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7667 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7668 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7669 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7670 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7671 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7672 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7673 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7674 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7678 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7680 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7681 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7685 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7686 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7687 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7689 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7690 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7695 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7696 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7697 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7698 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7699 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7700 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph,
7701 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
7702 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7704 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7705 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7706 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7708 // Revoke local commitment tx
7709 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7711 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7712 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7713 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7714 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7716 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7717 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7719 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7720 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7721 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7723 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7724 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7725 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7727 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7728 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7729 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7730 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7732 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7733 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7734 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7735 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7736 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7737 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7738 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7739 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7741 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7748 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7749 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7750 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7752 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7753 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7754 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7755 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7757 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7758 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7759 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7760 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7761 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7762 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7764 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7765 // available, which we check here:
7766 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7767 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7768 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7771 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7773 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7774 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7775 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7776 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7778 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7779 // output, checked above).
7780 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7781 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7782 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7784 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7785 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7786 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7787 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7788 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7792 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7793 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7794 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7795 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7796 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7798 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7799 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7801 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7802 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7803 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7804 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7805 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7807 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7808 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7814 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7815 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7816 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7817 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7819 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7820 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7823 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7824 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7825 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7826 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7827 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7828 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7829 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7833 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7834 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7835 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7836 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7838 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7839 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7840 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7841 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7842 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7843 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7844 // up bumped justice generation.
7845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7853 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7854 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7855 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7858 // Provide preimage for one
7859 // Check aggregation
7861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7866 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7867 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7868 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7870 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7871 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7872 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7873 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7874 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7876 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7877 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7878 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7880 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7882 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7886 let feerate_timeout;
7887 let feerate_preimage;
7889 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7890 // 9 transactions including:
7891 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7892 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7893 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7896 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7897 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7898 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7899 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7900 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7901 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7903 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7904 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7905 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7906 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7908 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7909 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7910 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7911 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7913 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7914 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7915 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7916 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7920 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7921 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7923 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7924 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7926 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7927 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7929 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7930 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7931 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7933 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7934 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7935 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7936 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7937 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7939 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7940 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7941 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7942 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7943 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7948 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7949 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7953 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7954 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7955 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7956 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7957 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7958 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7959 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7960 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7965 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7966 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7968 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7969 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7971 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7973 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7974 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7975 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7977 // Must revoke without gaps
7978 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7979 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7981 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7982 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7983 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7986 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7987 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7989 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7993 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7994 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7995 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8002 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8003 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8004 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8005 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8007 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8008 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8011 // Revoke local commitment tx
8012 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8014 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8015 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8017 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8019 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8020 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8022 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8024 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8025 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8026 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8027 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8028 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8029 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8033 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8034 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8035 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8037 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8038 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8039 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8044 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8050 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8051 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8052 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8054 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8056 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8057 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8058 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8059 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8063 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8064 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8065 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8071 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8072 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8075 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8076 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8081 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8082 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8086 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8088 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8089 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8091 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8093 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8094 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8095 route.paths.push(path);
8096 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8097 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8098 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8099 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8100 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8101 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8102 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8103 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8107 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8108 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8117 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8118 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8119 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8121 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8122 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8123 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8126 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8127 // values from previous calls.
8128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8129 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8132 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8134 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8135 assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8138 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8146 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8147 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8148 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8149 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8153 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8155 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8157 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8158 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8159 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8160 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8161 } else { panic!(); }
8163 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8165 header: BlockHeader {
8167 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8168 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8169 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8173 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8174 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8175 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8176 } else { panic!(); }
8178 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8179 // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8180 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8181 block.header.time += 1;
8182 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8183 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8184 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8187 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8188 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8191 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8192 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8193 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8195 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8196 // values from previous calls.
8197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8198 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8201 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8202 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8203 assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8204 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8205 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8212 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8213 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8221 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8222 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8223 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8224 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8226 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8227 // resulting events.
8228 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8231 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8232 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8233 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8234 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8236 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8237 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8239 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8242 // We should fail the payment back
8243 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8244 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8246 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8254 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8255 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8256 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8258 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8259 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8260 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8261 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8263 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8264 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8265 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8266 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8268 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8269 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8270 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8271 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8275 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8276 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8277 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8278 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8280 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8281 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8282 // commitment at same time.
8284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8285 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8286 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8287 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8289 // Create some initial channel
8290 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8291 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8293 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8294 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8296 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8297 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8299 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8300 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8301 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8302 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8304 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8305 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8306 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8307 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8308 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8309 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8310 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8311 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8314 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8315 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8316 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8317 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8318 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8320 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8321 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8322 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8323 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8324 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8325 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8326 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8327 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8328 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8329 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8330 } else { assert!(false); }
8331 } else { assert!(false); };
8332 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8334 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8339 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8340 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8341 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8342 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8343 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8350 // Create some initial channel
8351 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8352 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8354 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8355 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8357 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8358 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8360 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8361 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8362 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8363 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8364 let watchtower_alice = {
8365 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8366 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8367 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8368 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8369 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8370 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8371 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8372 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8375 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8376 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8377 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8378 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8379 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8381 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8383 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8384 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8388 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8389 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8390 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8391 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8392 let watchtower_bob = {
8393 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8394 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8395 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8396 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8397 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8398 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8399 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8400 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8403 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8404 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8406 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8407 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8409 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8413 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8414 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8415 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8416 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8417 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8418 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8419 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8420 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8421 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8422 } else { assert!(false); }
8423 } else { assert!(false); };
8424 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8427 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8428 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8429 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8431 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8434 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8435 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8436 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8440 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8441 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8442 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8444 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8445 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8446 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8447 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8448 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8449 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8454 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8455 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8456 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8459 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8460 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8462 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8463 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8464 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8465 // before receiving funding_signed.
8466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8469 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8471 // Create an initial channel
8472 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8473 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8474 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8475 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8478 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8479 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8484 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8485 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8486 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8487 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8488 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8492 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8493 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8494 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8495 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8496 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8497 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8498 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8505 // Create some initial channels
8506 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8508 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8509 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8510 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8511 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8512 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8513 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8515 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8516 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8517 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8518 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8519 // this test before #653 fix.
8520 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8521 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8524 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8526 let htlc_timeout = {
8527 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8528 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8529 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8530 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8534 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8535 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8536 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8537 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8540 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8541 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8542 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8543 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8545 // Steps of the test:
8546 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8547 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8548 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8549 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8550 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8551 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8552 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8553 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8557 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8559 // Create some initial channels
8560 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8561 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8563 // Steps (1) and (2):
8564 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8565 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8567 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8568 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8569 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8570 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8571 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8572 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8573 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8575 // Steps (3) and (4):
8576 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8577 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8578 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8579 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8580 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8581 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8583 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8584 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8585 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8586 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8587 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8589 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8590 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8591 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8592 if broadcast_alice {
8593 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8595 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8597 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8598 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8602 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8603 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8604 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8606 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8607 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8608 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8609 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8610 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8611 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8613 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8614 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8615 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8616 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8617 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8620 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8621 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8626 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8627 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8628 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8631 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8632 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8633 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8634 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8635 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8641 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8642 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8645 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8648 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8650 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8653 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8655 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8656 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8657 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8662 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8665 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8666 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8667 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8668 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8669 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8670 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8671 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8672 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8673 if broadcast_alice {
8674 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8676 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8678 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8679 if broadcast_alice {
8680 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8681 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8682 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8683 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8685 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8686 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8688 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8689 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8694 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8695 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8697 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8698 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8699 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8700 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8702 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8703 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8704 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8706 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8707 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8708 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8709 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8710 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8711 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8712 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8714 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8715 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8721 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8722 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8723 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8724 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8725 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8729 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8730 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8731 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8733 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8734 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8735 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8736 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8742 // Create an initial channel
8743 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8744 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8746 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8748 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8749 // that it is rejected.
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8752 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8755 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8756 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8757 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8758 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8759 // move forward with it.
8760 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8761 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8767 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8768 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8770 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8773 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8774 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8776 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8777 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8778 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8779 added_monitors.clear();
8781 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8783 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8784 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8786 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8789 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8790 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8791 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8792 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8793 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8795 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8796 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8798 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8799 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8800 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8801 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8802 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8808 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8809 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8810 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8811 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8812 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8813 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8815 let funding_created = {
8816 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8817 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8818 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8819 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8822 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8823 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8824 // still needs to be cleared here.
8825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8827 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8829 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8832 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8833 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8834 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8835 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8836 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8842 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8843 // everything is functional.
8844 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8846 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8847 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8848 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8849 added_monitors.clear();
8852 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8853 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8854 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8855 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8857 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8858 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8859 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8860 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8864 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8865 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8867 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8868 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8869 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8873 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8875 // Create some initial channels
8876 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8877 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8878 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8880 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8881 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8882 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8884 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8885 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8886 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8888 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8889 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8891 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8892 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8893 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8895 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8896 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8898 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8899 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8900 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8902 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8903 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8906 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8907 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8912 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8913 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8917 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8918 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8919 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8920 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8921 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8922 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8924 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8926 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8930 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8931 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8933 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8934 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8935 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8936 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8942 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8944 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8946 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8947 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8948 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8949 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8952 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8953 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8956 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8959 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8960 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8964 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8966 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8969 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8970 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8971 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8972 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8973 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8974 assert_eq!(msg.data, "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index");
8975 } else { panic!(); }
8976 } else { panic!(); }
8977 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8980 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8981 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8982 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8983 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8984 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8985 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8986 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8987 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8988 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8989 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8990 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8991 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8992 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8993 // until we learned about an additional block.
8995 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8996 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9000 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9001 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9004 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9005 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9006 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9007 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9009 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9011 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9013 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9014 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9016 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9017 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9018 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9020 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9021 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9022 if test_height_before_timelock {
9023 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9024 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9025 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9026 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9028 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9029 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9030 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9031 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9032 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9033 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9035 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9036 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9038 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9039 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9040 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9041 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9042 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9046 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9047 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9048 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9049 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9050 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9051 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9052 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9054 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9059 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9060 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9061 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9065 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9066 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9067 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9069 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9074 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9075 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9076 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9077 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9078 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9079 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9081 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9082 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9083 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9086 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9088 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9089 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9090 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9092 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9094 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9095 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9096 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9099 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9100 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9101 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9105 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9107 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9109 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9110 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9111 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9113 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9114 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9115 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9116 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9117 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9119 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9120 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9121 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9122 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9124 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9125 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9126 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9127 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9128 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9129 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9130 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9131 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9133 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9134 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9135 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9136 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9137 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9138 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9139 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9141 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9142 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9143 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9144 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9148 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9149 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9151 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9152 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9153 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9156 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9157 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9158 // the commitment state.
9159 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9161 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9164 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9167 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9169 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9170 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9173 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9175 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9176 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9180 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9186 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9187 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9188 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9189 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9190 let route = get_keysend_route(
9191 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, None, &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger
9194 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9195 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9200 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9201 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9202 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9206 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9210 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9212 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9213 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9214 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9215 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9217 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9218 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
9219 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9220 let route = get_keysend_route(
9221 &payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9222 &vec![], 10000, 40, nodes[0].logger
9225 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9226 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9228 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9230 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9231 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9232 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);