_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  62         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  63         cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  64         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  65         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  66         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  67         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  68
  69         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  70         // funding satoshis
  71         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  72         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  73         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  74
  75         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  76         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  77
  78         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  79         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  82         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  83         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  84                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  85                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  86                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  87                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  88                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  89                         match action {
  90                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  91                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  92                                 },
  93                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  94                         }
  95                 } else { assert!(false); }
  96         };
  97
  98         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  99
 100         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 101         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 102         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 117 }
 118
 119 #[test]
 120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 121         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 122         // them.
 123         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 128         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 129
 130         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 131                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 132                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 133                 },
 134                 _ => panic!()
 135         }
 136 }
 137
 138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 139         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 140         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 141         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 142         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 146         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 147
 148         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 149         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 150         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 151         let opt_anchors = false;
 152         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 153         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 154
 155         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 156         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 157         if !send_from_initiator {
 158                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 159                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 160         }
 161         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 162
 163         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 164         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if send_from_initiator {
 166                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 170         {
 171                 let mut lock;
 172                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 173                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176
 177         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 178         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 179         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 180
 181         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 182         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 183         if send_from_initiator {
 184                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 185                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 186                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 187                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 188                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 189         } else {
 190                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 191         }
 192 }
 193
 194 #[test]
 195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 196         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 197         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 198 }
 199
 200 #[test]
 201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 205         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 207
 208         // balancing
 209         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 210
 211         // A                                        B
 212         // update_fee                            ->
 213         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 214         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 215         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 216         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 217         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 218         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 219         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 220         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 221         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 222         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 223         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 224         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 225         //                                       <- RAA
 226         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 227
 228         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 229         {
 230                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 231                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 232         }
 233         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 235
 236         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 237         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 238         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 239                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 240                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 241                 },
 242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 243         };
 244
 245         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 246
 247         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 248         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 249         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 251
 252         let payment_event = {
 253                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 254                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 255                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 256         };
 257         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 258         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 259
 260         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 261         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 262         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 263         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 264         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 266
 267         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 268         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 269         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 270         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 274         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 276         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 277         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 278         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 279         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 281
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 283         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 284         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 285         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 286         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 287         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 288         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 290
 291         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 292         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 293         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 295
 296         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 297         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 299
 300         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 304         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 305         match events_2[0] {
 306                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 308         }
 309
 310         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 312 }
 313
 314 #[test]
 315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 316         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 317         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 322         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 323
 324         // balancing
 325         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 326
 327         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 328         {
 329                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 330                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 331         }
 332         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 334
 335         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 336         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 337         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 338                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 339                         update_fee.as_ref()
 340                 },
 341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 342         };
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 345
 346         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 347         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 348         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 350
 351         let payment_event = {
 352                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 353                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 354                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 355         };
 356         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 357         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 358
 359         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 360         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 361         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 362         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 363         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 365
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 368
 369         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 370 }
 371
 372 #[test]
 373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 377         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 379
 380         // A                                        B
 381         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 382         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 383         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 384         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 385         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 386         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 387         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 388         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 389         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 390         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 391         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 392         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 393         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 394         //                                          B should send no response here
 395         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 396         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 397         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 398
 399         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 400         let initial_feerate;
 401         {
 402                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 403                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 404                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 405         }
 406         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 408
 409         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 410         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 411         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 412                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 413                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 414                 },
 415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 416         };
 417
 418         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 421         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 423
 424         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 425         // transaction:
 426         {
 427                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 428                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 429         }
 430         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 431         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 432         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 433
 434         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 435         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 436                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 437                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 438         };
 439
 440         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 441
 442         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 443         // Deliver (3)
 444         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 445
 446         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 447         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 448         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 450         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 451         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 452         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 453         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 454         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 455         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 456         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 457
 458         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 460         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 463
 464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 465         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 467
 468         // Delever (4)
 469         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 470         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 472
 473         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 474         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 476
 477         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 478         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 479         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 481
 482         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 483         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 485 }
 486
 487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 488         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 489         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 490         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 491         // Node objects.
 492
 493         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 497
 498         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 499                 let block = Block {
 500                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 501                         txdata: vec![],
 502                 };
 503                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 504                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 505         }
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 508         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 509         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 510
 511         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 512         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 513         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 514
 515         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 516         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 517
 518         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 523         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 526         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 527         {
 528                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 529                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 530                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 531                 added_monitors.clear();
 532         }
 533         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 534
 535         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 536         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 537         {
 538                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 541                 added_monitors.clear();
 542         }
 543
 544         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 545         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 546
 547         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 548         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 549
 550         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 551         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 552         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 553         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 558         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 559         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 560         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 561         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 562         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 563         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 564         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 576 }
 577
 578 #[test]
 579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 584         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 585
 586         {
 587                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 588                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 589         }
 590         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 592
 593         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 594         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 595         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 596                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 597                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 598                 },
 599                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 600         };
 601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 602
 603         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 604         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 606
 607         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 608         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 610
 611         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 612         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 617         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619 }
 620
 621 #[test]
 622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 627         let channel_value = 5000;
 628         let push_sats = 700;
 629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 630         let channel_id = chan.2;
 631         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 632         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 633
 634         let opt_anchors = false;
 635
 636         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 637         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 638         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 639         // remote limit.
 640         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 641         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 642         {
 643                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 644                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 645         }
 646         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 648         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 649
 650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 651
 652         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 653
 654         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 655         {
 656                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 657
 658                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 659                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 660                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 661                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 662                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 663                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 664         }
 665
 666         {
 667                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 668                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 669                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 670         }
 671         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 672         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 674
 675         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 676
 677         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 678         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 679         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 680                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 684                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 685                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 686         };
 687         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 688                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 689                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 690                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 691                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 692                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 693                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696
 697         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 698         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 699                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 700
 701         let res = {
 702                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 706                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 707                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 708                         push_sats,
 709                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 710                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 711                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 712                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 713                         &mut htlcs,
 714                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 715                 );
 716                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 717         };
 718
 719         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 720                 channel_id: chan.2,
 721                 signature: res.0,
 722                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 723         };
 724
 725         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 726                 channel_id: chan.2,
 727                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 728         };
 729
 730         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 731
 732         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 733         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 734         //Should produce and error.
 735         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 736         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 740 }
 741
 742 #[test]
 743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 747         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 748         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 749
 750         // balancing
 751         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 752
 753         {
 754                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 755                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 756         }
 757         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 759
 760         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 761         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 762         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 763                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 764                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 765                 },
 766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 767         };
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 769         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 770         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 772
 773         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 774
 775         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 776         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 777         {
 778                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 779                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 780                 added_monitors.clear();
 781         }
 782         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 783         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 784         // node[1] has nothing to do
 785
 786         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 787         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 789
 790         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 791         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 792         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 794         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 796         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 797
 798         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 799         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 800         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 801         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 802         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 803         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 804
 805         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 809
 810         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 812         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 813
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 817         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 824
 825         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 826         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 827         match events[0] {
 828                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 830         };
 831
 832         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 833
 834         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 835         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 836         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 837         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 838         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 839 }
 840
 841 #[test]
 842 fn test_update_fee() {
 843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 847         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 848         let channel_id = chan.2;
 849
 850         // A                                        B
 851         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 852         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 853         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 854         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 855         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 856         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 857         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 858         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 859         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 860         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 861         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 862         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 863
 864         // Create and deliver (1)...
 865         let feerate;
 866         {
 867                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 868                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 869                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 870         }
 871         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 873
 874         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 875         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 876         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 877                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 878                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 879                 },
 880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 881         };
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 883
 884         // Generate (2) and (3):
 885         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 886         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 888
 889         // Deliver (2):
 890         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 891         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         // Create and deliver (4)...
 895         {
 896                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 897                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 898         }
 899         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 901         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 902         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 903         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 904                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 905                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 906                 },
 907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 908         };
 909
 910         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 913         // ... creating (5)
 914         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 915         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 916
 917         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 918         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 920         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 921         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 922
 923         // Deliver (5):
 924         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 925         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 927
 928         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 930         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 931         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 932         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 933         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 934         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 935         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 937
 938         // Deliver (7)
 939         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 943
 944         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 947
 948         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 949         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 950         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 951         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 952         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 953 }
 954
 955 #[test]
 956 fn fake_network_test() {
 957         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 958         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 962         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 963
 964         // Create some initial channels
 965         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 966         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 967         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 968
 969         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 970         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 973         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 974
 975         // Send some more payments
 976         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 977         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 978         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 979
 980         // Test failure packets
 981         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 982         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 983
 984         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 985         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 986
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 988         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 996         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 997         hops.push(RouteHop {
 998                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 999                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1002                 fee_msat: 0,
1003                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1004         });
1005         hops.push(RouteHop {
1006                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010                 fee_msat: 0,
1011                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012         });
1013         hops.push(RouteHop {
1014                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1018                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1019                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1020         });
1021         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1024
1025         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026         hops.push(RouteHop {
1027                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031                 fee_msat: 0,
1032                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033         });
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1047                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1049         });
1050         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1053
1054         // Claim the rebalances...
1055         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1057
1058         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1060
1061         // Send some payments across both channels
1062         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1065
1066
1067         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1071
1072         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1073
1074         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 }
1095
1096 #[test]
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100         // commitment dance rounds.
1101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1113         }
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1115
1116         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1123         // another HTLC.
1124         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1130         }
1131
1132         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1134         {
1135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1137         }
1138
1139         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1143
1144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151
1152         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1155
1156         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1157
1158         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162
1163         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1167
1168         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1174         }
1175         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1180
1181         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1189
1190         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1191
1192         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1195                 match event {
1196                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1198                         },
1199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1200                 };
1201         }
1202
1203         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1205         }
1206
1207         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1208 }
1209
1210 #[test]
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1218
1219         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225
1226         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1227
1228         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1237 }
1238
1239 #[test]
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1248
1249         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1250
1251         // balancing
1252         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1255
1256         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1259
1260         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1263
1264         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1265         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1266
1267         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1268         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1269         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1270                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1271                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1273                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1274                 }
1275         }
1276         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1277
1278         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1281         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1282
1283         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1284         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1285         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1287         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1288         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1289         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1291
1292         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1293         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1297         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1298         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1299         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1302         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1303         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1304
1305         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1306         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1307         for e in events {
1308                 match e {
1309                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1310                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1311                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1312                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1313                         },
1314                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1315                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1316                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1317                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1318                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1319                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1320                         },
1321                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1322                 }
1323         }
1324 }
1325
1326 #[test]
1327 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1331         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1332         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1333
1334         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1335         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1336
1337         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1338         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1339         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1340         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1341         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1342         match err {
1343                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1344                         match &fails[0] {
1345                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1346                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1347                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348                         }
1349                 },
1350                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1351         }
1352         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1353         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1354
1355         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1365
1366         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1367         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1368         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1369         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1370
1371         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1372
1373         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1374         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1375         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1376         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1377                 channel_id: chan.2,
1378                 htlc_id: 0,
1379                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1380                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1381                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1382                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1383         };
1384
1385         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1386
1387         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1388         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1389         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1390
1391         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1392
1393         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1394
1395         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1396         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1397         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1398                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1403
1404                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1409         };
1410         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1413                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1414                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1415                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1416                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1417                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418         };
1419
1420         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1421         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1422                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1423
1424         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1425         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1426         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1427
1428         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1429                 offered: false,
1430                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1431                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1432                 payment_hash,
1433                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434         };
1435
1436         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437
1438         let res = {
1439                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1441                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1442                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1443                         commitment_number,
1444                         95000,
1445                         local_chan_balance,
1446                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1447                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448                         feerate_per_kw,
1449                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1450                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451                 );
1452                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1453         };
1454
1455         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1456                 channel_id: chan.2,
1457                 signature: res.0,
1458                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1459         };
1460
1461         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1462         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1463         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464
1465         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1466         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467                 channel_id: chan.2,
1468                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1469                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470         };
1471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472
1473         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1474         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1475         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476         match events[0] {
1477                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1478                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1479                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480                 },
1481                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482         };
1483         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1484                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485
1486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1487 }
1488
1489 #[test]
1490 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1491         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1492         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1493         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1494         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495         // this situation.
1496         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1499         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1500
1501         let opt_anchors = false;
1502
1503         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1504         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1506
1507         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1508
1509         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1512         }
1513
1514         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1520 }
1521
1522 #[test]
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529
1530         let opt_anchors = false;
1531
1532         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1538         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1539
1540         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1543         }
1544
1545         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1554                 channel_id: chan.2,
1555                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1560         };
1561
1562         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1570 }
1571
1572 #[test]
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1578
1579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582
1583         let opt_anchors = false;
1584
1585         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1592
1593         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597         // commitment transaction fee.
1598         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1599
1600         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1603         }
1604
1605         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1609 }
1610
1611 #[test]
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620
1621         let opt_anchors = false;
1622
1623         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1624         // HTLC.
1625         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1629
1630         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1633         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1637
1638         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640         match msg_events[0] {
1641                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1643                 },
1644                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1645         }
1646 }
1647
1648 #[test]
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1657
1658         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664
1665         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671
1672         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 }
1677
1678 #[test]
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1685         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1686
1687         let feemsat = 239;
1688         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1690         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1692
1693         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1697
1698         // Add a pending HTLC.
1699         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700         let payment_event_1 = {
1701                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1702                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1703
1704                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1707         };
1708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1709
1710         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1715
1716         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1724                 channel_id: chan.2,
1725                 htlc_id: 1,
1726                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1730         };
1731
1732         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1740 }
1741
1742 #[test]
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1752         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1753
1754         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1755         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757
1758         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 }
1761
1762 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1763         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1764 }
1765
1766 #[test]
1767 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1768         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1770         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1771         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1772         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1773         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1775         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1776         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1777         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1778
1779         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1780         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781
1782         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1783         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784
1785         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1786                 ($node: expr) => {{
1787                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1788                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1789                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1790                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1791                         payment_event
1792                 }}
1793         }
1794
1795         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1796         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1797         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1798         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1799
1800         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1801
1802         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1803         {
1804                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1805                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1806                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1807                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1808                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1809                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1810                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811         }
1812
1813         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1814         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1815         loop {
1816                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1817                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1818                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1819                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1820                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1821                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1822                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1823                         break;
1824                 }
1825                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1826
1827                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1829                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1832                 );
1833
1834                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1839         }
1840
1841         // adding pending output.
1842         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1851         // policy.
1852         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1855
1856         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857         let payment_event_1 = {
1858                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1860
1861                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1864         };
1865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1866
1867         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1869         {
1870                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1874         }
1875
1876         // split the rest to test holding cell
1877         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1881         {
1882                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1884         }
1885
1886         // now see if they go through on both sides
1887         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1893
1894         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1895         {
1896                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1901         }
1902
1903         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909
1910         // flush the pending htlc
1911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1914
1915         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1919
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1924
1925         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1930
1931         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1934
1935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1937
1938         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944
1945         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1949
1950         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1952
1953         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1955         match events[0] {
1956                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1957                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1959                         match &purpose {
1960                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1961                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1962                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1963                                 },
1964                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1965                         }
1966                 },
1967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1968         }
1969         match events[1] {
1970                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1971                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1972                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1973                         match &purpose {
1974                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1975                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1976                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1977                                 },
1978                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1979                         }
1980                 },
1981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1982         }
1983
1984         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1985         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1987
1988         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1989         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1993         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1994         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1995         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1996         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1997
1998         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2000 }
2001
2002 #[test]
2003 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2004         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2005         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2006         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2007         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2008         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2009         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2010         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2011         // To test this we:
2012         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2013         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2014         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2015         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2016         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2017         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2018         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2019         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2020         //    claim,
2021         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2022         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2023         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2024         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2025         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2029         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2030         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2031
2032         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2033         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2034         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2035         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2036
2037         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2038         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2039         let send_1 = {
2040                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2044                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2045         };
2046
2047         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2048         // initial fulfill/CS.
2049         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2054         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2055         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2058
2059         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2060         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2062         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2063         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2064
2065         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2066         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2069         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2077         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2084         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2085         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2086         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2087         // on-chain as necessary).
2088         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2089         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2091         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2092         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2093
2094         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2097
2098         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2099         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2100
2101         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2102         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2103         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2105         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2106         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2107
2108         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2109         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2110         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2111         let send_2 = {
2112                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2113                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2115                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2116                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2117         };
2118
2119         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2123
2124         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2125
2126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132
2133         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2135         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2136         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2137
2138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2144
2145         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2146         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2147
2148         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2149         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2150 }
2151
2152 #[test]
2153 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2154         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2155         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2159         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2160
2161         // Create some initial channels
2162         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2163         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2164         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2165         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2166
2167         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2168         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2170         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2171         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2173
2174         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2175         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2176         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2177         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2178         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2179
2180         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2181         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap();
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2184         {
2185                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2186                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2189                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190         }
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2192         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2195         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2196
2197         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2198         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2199
2200         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2201         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2202         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2).unwrap();
2203         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2205         {
2206                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2208                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2209                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2211                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212         }
2213         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2214         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2215         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2216         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2217         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2218
2219         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2220                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2221                         {
2222                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2223                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2224
2225                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2226                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2227                                 match events[0] {
2228                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2229                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2230                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2231                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2232                                         },
2233                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2234                                 };
2235                         }
2236                 }
2237         }
2238
2239         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2240         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2241         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2).unwrap();
2242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2244         let node2_commitment_txid;
2245         {
2246                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2248                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2249                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2250
2251                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2252                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2253                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2255                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2256         }
2257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2258         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2259         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2260         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2261         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2262
2263         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2264         // confusing us in the following tests.
2265         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2266
2267         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2268         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2269         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2270         // buffer space).
2271
2272         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2273                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2275                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2276                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2277                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2278                                 msg.clone()
2279                         },
2280                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2281                 };
2282                 match events[1] {
2283                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2284                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2285                         },
2286                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287                 }
2288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2289
2290                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2291                 {
2292                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2293                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2294                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2295                                         false
2296                                 } else { true }
2297                         });
2298                 }
2299
2300                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2301
2302                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2303                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2304
2305                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2306                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2307                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2308                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2309                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2310                                 msg.clone()
2311                         },
2312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2313                 };
2314                 match events[1] {
2315                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2316                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2317                         },
2318                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319                 }
2320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2321                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2322
2323                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2324                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2325                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2326         };
2327         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2328         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2329         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2330         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2331
2332         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2333         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2334         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2335 }
2336
2337 #[test]
2338 fn test_justice_tx() {
2339         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2340         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2341         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2342         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2343         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2344         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2345         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2348         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2349         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2350         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2352         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2354         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2355         // Create some new channels:
2356         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2357
2358         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2361         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2363         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2365         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2366         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2369         // Revoke the old state
2370         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2371
2372         {
2373                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2374                 {
2375                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2376                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2377                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2378
2379                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2380                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2381                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2382                 }
2383                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2384                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2386
2387                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2389                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2390                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2391                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2392                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2394                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2395                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2396         }
2397         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2398
2399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2400         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2401
2402         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2403         // Create some new channels:
2404         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2405         {
2406                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2407                 node_txn.clear();
2408         }
2409
2410         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2411         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2412         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2413         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2417         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2418         // Revoke the old state
2419         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2420         {
2421                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2422                 {
2423                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2426
2427                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2429                 }
2430                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2431                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2432
2433                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2435                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2437                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2438                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2440         }
2441         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2442         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2443         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2444 }
2445
2446 #[test]
2447 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2448         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2449         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2455         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2456         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2457         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2458         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2459         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2460         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2461         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2462
2463         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2464         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2466         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2468         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2469
2470         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2472
2473         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2474         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2477         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2478 }
2479
2480 #[test]
2481 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2482         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2483         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2484         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2485         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2487         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2488
2489         // Create some new channel:
2490         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491
2492         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2493         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2494         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2495         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2496         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2497
2498         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2499         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2500         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2501         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2502         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2503         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2506         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2507
2508         //Revoke the old state
2509         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2510
2511         {
2512                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2514                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2517                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2518                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2519                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2520
2521                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2522                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2523
2524                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2525                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526
2527                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2528                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2529                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2530                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2531                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2532                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2533                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2534                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2535
2536                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2537                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2539         }
2540         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2541         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2542         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2543 }
2544
2545 #[test]
2546 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2547         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2548         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2549         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2552         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2553
2554         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2555
2556         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2557         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2558         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2559         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2560         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2561         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2562
2563         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2564         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2565
2566         //Revoke the old state
2567         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2568
2569         {
2570                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2571                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2572                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2573                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2574                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2575                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2577                 match events[1] {
2578                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2579                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2580                 }
2581
2582                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2583                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2584
2585                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2587                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2588                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2589                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2590                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2591
2592                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2593                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2594                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2596                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2597                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2598                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2599
2600                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2602                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2604
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2606                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2608
2609                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2610                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2611                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2612                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2613                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2614                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2615                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2616                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2617         }
2618         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2619         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2620         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2621 }
2622
2623 #[test]
2624 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2625         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2626         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2627         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2628         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2629         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2630         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2631         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2632         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2633         // towards B.
2634         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2635         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2636         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2637         // PaymentSent event).
2638
2639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2642         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2643
2644         // Create some initial channels
2645         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2646         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2647
2648         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2649         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2650         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2651         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2652         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2653
2654         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2655         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2656         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2657
2658         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2659         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2660
2661         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2662         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2663         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2664         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2665         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2666         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2667         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2669         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2670         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2671         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2672         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2673         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2674
2675         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2676         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2678         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2679         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2680         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2681         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2682         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2683         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2684         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2685         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2686         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2688         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2689         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2691         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2692
2693         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2694         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2695         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2696         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2697         {
2698                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2699                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2700                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2701                 added_monitors.clear();
2702         }
2703         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2704         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2705         match forwarded_events[0] {
2706                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2708         }
2709         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2710         match forwarded_events[1] {
2711                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
2712                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2713                         assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
2714                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2715                 },
2716                 _ => panic!()
2717         }
2718         match forwarded_events[2] {
2719                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
2720                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2721                         assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
2722                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2723                 },
2724                 _ => panic!()
2725         }
2726         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2727         {
2728                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2729                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2730                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2731                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2732                 added_monitors.clear();
2733         }
2734         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2735         match events[0] {
2736                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2737                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2738         }
2739         match events[1] {
2740                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2741                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2742         }
2743
2744         match events[2] {
2745                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2746                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2747                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2748                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2749                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2750                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2751                 },
2752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2753         };
2754         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2755                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2756                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2757                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2758                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2759                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2760                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2761                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2762                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2763                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2764                         if $htlc_offered {
2765                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2766                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2767                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2768                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2769                         } else {
2770                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2772                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2773                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2774                         }
2775                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2776                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2777                         node_txn.clear();
2778                 } }
2779         }
2780         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2781         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2782         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2783         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2784
2785         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2786         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2787         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2788         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2789         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2790         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2792         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2793         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2794         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2795         let commitment_spend =
2796                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2797                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2798                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2799                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2800                         &node_txn[0]
2801                 } else {
2802                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2803                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2804                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2805                         &node_txn[2]
2806                 };
2807
2808         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2809         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2810         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2811         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2812         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2813         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2814         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2815         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2816         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2817         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2818         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2819         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2820
2821         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2822         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2823         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2824         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2825         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2827         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2828         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2829         let mut first_claimed = false;
2830         for event in events {
2831                 match event {
2832                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2833                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2834                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2835                                         first_claimed = true;
2836                                 } else {
2837                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2838                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2839                                 }
2840                         },
2841                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2842                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2843                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2844                 }
2845         }
2846         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2847 }
2848
2849 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2850         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2851         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2852         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2853         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2854         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2855         //            \                                  \
2856         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2857
2858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2861         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2862         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2863         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2864         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2865
2866         // Create some intial channels
2867         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2868         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2869
2870         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2871         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2873
2874         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2875
2876         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2877         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2878         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2879         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2881         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2883
2884         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2885         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2886         match events[0] {
2887                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2888                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2889                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2890                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2891                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2892                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2893                 },
2894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2895         };
2896         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2897         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2899         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2900         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2901         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2902         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2903         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2904
2905         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2906         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2907         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2908         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2909         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2910         let timeout_tx;
2911         {
2912                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2913                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2915                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2916
2917                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2918                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2919
2920                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2921                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2922                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2923                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2924
2925                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2926                 node_txn.clear();
2927         }
2928
2929         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2930         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2931         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2932         {
2933                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2934                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2935                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2936                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2937         }
2938
2939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2940         {
2941                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2942                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2943                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2944                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2945                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2946                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2947                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2948                 } else {
2949                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2950                 }
2951         }
2952
2953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2957         match events[0] {
2958                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2959                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2961                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2964                 },
2965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2966         };
2967
2968         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2969         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2970         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2971
2972         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2973         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2974
2975         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2976         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2977         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2978         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2979         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2980         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2981         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2982         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2983         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2984 }
2985
2986 #[test]
2987 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2988         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2989         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2990         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2991 }
2992
2993 #[test]
2994 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2995         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2996         // and fail backward accordingly.
2997
2998         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3001         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3002
3003         // Create some initial channels
3004         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3005         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3006
3007         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3008         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3009         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3010         // Revoke the old state
3011         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3012
3013         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3014
3015         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3016         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3017         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3019         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3020
3021         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3023         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3024         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3025         match events[0] {
3026                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3027                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3028                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3029                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3030                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3031                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3032
3033                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3034                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3035                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3036                 },
3037                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3038         }
3039 }
3040
3041 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3042         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3043         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3044         // commitment transaction anymore.
3045         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3046         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3047         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3048         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3049         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3050         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3051         // transactions:
3052         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3053         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3054         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3055         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3056         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3057         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3060         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3061
3062         // Create some initial channels
3063         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3064         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3065
3066         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3067         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3068         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3069         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3070         // Revoke the old state
3071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3072
3073         let value = if use_dust {
3074                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3075                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3076                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3077         } else { 3000000 };
3078
3079         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3080         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3081         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3082
3083         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3084         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3086         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3087         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3088         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3089         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3090         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3091         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3092         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3093         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3094         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3095
3096         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3097         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3099         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3100         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3101         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3102         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3103         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3104         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3105         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3106         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3108         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3109         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3110         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3112
3113         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3114         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3116         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3117         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3118         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3119         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3120         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3121         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3122         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3123         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3124         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3125         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3127         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3128         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3129         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3131
3132         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3133         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3134         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3135         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3136         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3137         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3139
3140         if deliver_bs_raa {
3141                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3142                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3143                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3144                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3145                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3146                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3147                 match events[0] {
3148                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3149                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3150                 };
3151                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3152                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3153         }
3154
3155         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3156         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3157
3158         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3161         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3162
3163         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3164         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3165         match events[0] {
3166                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3167                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3168         }
3169         match events[1] {
3170                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3171                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3172                 },
3173                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174         }
3175         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3176                 match events[2] {
3177                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3178                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3179                         },
3180                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3181                 }
3182                 match events[3] {
3183                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185                 };
3186         }
3187         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3189
3190         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3191         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3192         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3193                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3194                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3195         }
3196         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3197                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3198                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3199                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3200                 },
3201                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3202         }
3203         if deliver_bs_raa {
3204                 match events[0] {
3205                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3206                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3207                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3208                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3209                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3210                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3211                         },
3212                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213                 }
3214         }
3215         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3216                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3217                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3218                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3219                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3220                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3221                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3222
3223                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3224                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3225                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3226
3227                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3228
3229                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3230                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3231                         match events[0] {
3232                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3233                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3234                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3235                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3236                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3237                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3238                                         }
3239                                 },
3240                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241                         }
3242                         match events[1] {
3243                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3244                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3245                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3246                                 },
3247                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3248                         }
3249                         match events[2] {
3250                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3251                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3252                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3253                                 },
3254                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255                         }
3256                 },
3257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3258         }
3259
3260         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3261         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3262         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3263 }
3264
3265 #[test]
3266 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3267         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3268         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3269         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3270         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3271 }
3272
3273 #[test]
3274 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3275         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3276         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3277         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3278         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3279 }
3280
3281 #[test]
3282 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3283         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3286         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3287         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3288
3289         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3290         {
3291                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3292                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3293                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3294
3295                 let payment_event = {
3296                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3297                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3298                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3299                 };
3300                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3301                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3302         }
3303
3304         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3305         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3306         {
3307                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3309
3310                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3311         }
3312
3313         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3314         {
3315                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3316
3317                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3318                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3319                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3320                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3321                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3322                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3323
3324                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3325                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3326                         channel_id: chan.2,
3327                         htlc_id: 0,
3328                         amount_msat: 0,
3329                         payment_hash,
3330                         cltv_expiry,
3331                         onion_routing_packet,
3332                 };
3333                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3334         }
3335         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3336         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3337         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3338         match events[0] {
3339                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3340                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3341                 },
3342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3343         }
3344         match events[1] {
3345                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3346                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3347                 },
3348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3349         }
3350         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3352 }
3353
3354 #[test]
3355 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3356         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3357         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3358         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3359         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3360         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3361         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3362         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3363
3364         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3365         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3366         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3367         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3369         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3370
3371         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3372         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3373         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3374
3375         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3376         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3377         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3379         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3380
3381         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3382         // registering new transactions
3383         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3384         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3385 }
3386
3387 #[test]
3388 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3389         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3390         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3391         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3392         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3393         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3395         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3396
3397         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3398
3399         let mut payment_event = {
3400                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3401                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3402
3403                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3404                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3405                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3406         };
3407
3408         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3409         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3410
3411         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3412
3413         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3414         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3415         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3416         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3417
3418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3419         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3423
3424         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3425         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3426         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3427
3428         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3432         let tx = {
3433                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3434                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3435                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3436                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3437                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3438                 node_txn.remove(0)
3439         };
3440
3441         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3442
3443         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3444         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3447
3448         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3449         {
3450                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3451                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3452         }
3453         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3454         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3455         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3456         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3457         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3458         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3459         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3460
3461         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3462 }
3463
3464 #[test]
3465 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3466         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3467         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3468         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3469         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3470
3471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3475         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3476
3477         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3478
3479         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3481         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3482         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3483         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3484
3485         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3486         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487
3488         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3489         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3490 }
3491
3492 #[test]
3493 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3494         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3495         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3500
3501         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3502         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3503         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3504         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3505         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3506         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3507         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3508
3509         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
3510         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3511
3512         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
3513
3514         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3515         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3516
3517         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3518         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3519         // broadcasted.
3520         {
3521                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3522         }
3523
3524         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3525         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3526         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3527         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3528
3529         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3530         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3531 }
3532
3533 #[test]
3534 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3535         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3539         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3540         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3541         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3542
3543         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3545         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3546
3547         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3548         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3549         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3550         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3551
3552         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3553         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3555
3556         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3557         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3558         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3559         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3560
3561         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3562         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3563
3564         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3565         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3566
3567         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3568         {
3569                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3571                 match events[0] {
3572                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3573                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3574                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3575                         },
3576                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577                 }
3578                 match events[1] {
3579                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3580                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3581                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3582                         },
3583                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3584                 }
3585                 match events[2] {
3586                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3587                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3588                 }
3589         }
3590
3591         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3592         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3593 }
3594
3595 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3596         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3600         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3601
3602         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3603         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3604                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3605                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3606                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3607                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3608                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3609         } else {
3610                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3611         }
3612
3613         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3614
3615         let payment_event = {
3616                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3617                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3618
3619                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3620                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3621                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3622         };
3623         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3624
3625         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3626                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3627         } else {
3628                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3629                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3630                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3631                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3632                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3633
3634                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3635                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3636                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3637                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3638
3639                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3640                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3641                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3642                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3643                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3644
3645                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3646                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3647                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3648                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649                                         }
3650                                 }
3651                         }
3652                 }
3653         }
3654
3655         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3656         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3657         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3658                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3659                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3660                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3661                         //
3662                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3663                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3664                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3665                         //
3666                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3667                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3668                 }
3669                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3670                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3671                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3673                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3674                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3675         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3676                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3677                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3678         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3679                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3680                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3681         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3682                 // Everything was delivered...
3683                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3684         }
3685
3686         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3687         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3688         match events_1[0] {
3689                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3690                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691         };
3692
3693         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3694         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3695         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3696
3697         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3698
3699         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3700         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3701         match events_2[0] {
3702                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3703                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3704                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3705                         match &purpose {
3706                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3707                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3708                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3709                                 },
3710                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3711                         }
3712                 },
3713                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3714         }
3715
3716         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3718
3719         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3720         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3721         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3722                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3723                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3724                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3725                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3726                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3727                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3728                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3729                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3730                 },
3731                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3732         };
3733
3734         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3735                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3736
3737                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3738                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3739                 match events_4[0] {
3740                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3741                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3742                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3743                         },
3744                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3745                 }
3746
3747                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3748                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3749                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3750                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3751
3752                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3753                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3754                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3755                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3756
3757                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3758                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3759                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3760                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3761                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3762
3763                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3764                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3765                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3766                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3767                                         }
3768                                 }
3769                         }
3770                 }
3771         }
3772
3773         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3774         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3775         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3776                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3777                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3778                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3779                 } else {
3780                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3781                 }
3782         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3783                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3784                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3785         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3786                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3787                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3789                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3790                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3791         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3792                 // Everything was delivered...
3793                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794         }
3795
3796         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3797                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3798         }
3799
3800         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3803
3804         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3805                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3806         }
3807
3808         // Channel should still work fine...
3809         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3810         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3811         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3812 }
3813
3814 #[test]
3815 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3816         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3817         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3818         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3819         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3820 }
3821
3822 #[test]
3823 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3824         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3825         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3826         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3827         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3828 }
3829
3830 #[test]
3831 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3832         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3833         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3834         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3835         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3836         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3837         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3838         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3839         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3840         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3841
3842         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3843         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3844
3845         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3846         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3847         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3848
3849         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3850
3851         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3852         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3853
3854         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3855         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3856         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3857
3858         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3859         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3860         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3861         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3862
3863         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3864         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3865         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3866         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3867         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3868                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3869                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3870                         msg.clone()
3871                 },
3872                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3873         };
3874
3875         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3876         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3877         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3878         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3880         let chan_id;
3881         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3882                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3883                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3884                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3885                         msg.clone()
3886                 },
3887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3888         };
3889         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3890                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3891                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3892                         msg.clone()
3893                 },
3894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3895         };
3896         match events_4[2] {
3897                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3898                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3899                 },
3900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3901         }
3902
3903         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3904         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3905         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3906         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3908         match events_5[0] {
3909                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3910                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3911                 },
3912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3913         };
3914
3915         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3916         // announcement_signatures.
3917         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3918         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3919         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3920         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3921                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3922                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3923                         msg.clone()
3924                 },
3925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3926         };
3927
3928         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3929         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3930         // channel_update.
3931         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3932         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3933         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3934         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3935                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3936                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3937                 },
3938                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3939         };
3940
3941         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3942         // same channel_announcement.
3943         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3944         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3946         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3947                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3948                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3949                         update_msg.clone()
3950                 },
3951                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3952         };
3953
3954         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3955         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3956         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3957         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3958
3959         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3960         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3961         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3962
3963         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3964         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3965         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3966
3967         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3968         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3969         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3970
3971         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3972         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3973         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3974         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3975         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3976         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3977                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3978         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3979
3980         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3981         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3982                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3983                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3984                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3985                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3986                         keys_manager,
3987                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3988                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3989                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3990                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3991                         channel_monitors,
3992                 }).unwrap()
3993         };
3994         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3995         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3996
3997         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3998         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4000
4001         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4002
4003         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4004         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4005         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006         let mut found_announcement = false;
4007         for event in msgs.iter() {
4008                 match event {
4009                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4010                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4011                         },
4012                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4013                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4014                 }
4015         }
4016         assert!(found_announcement);
4017 }
4018
4019 #[test]
4020 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
4021         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4022         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4023         // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4024         // funding_locked immediately instead.
4025         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4026         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4027         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4028         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4029         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4030
4031         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4032
4033         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4034         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4035         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4036         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4037         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4038         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4039
4040         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
4041         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4042         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
4043 }
4044
4045 #[test]
4046 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4047         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4048         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4049         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4050         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4051         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4052         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4053         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4054
4055         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4056
4057         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4058         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4059         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4061
4062         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4063         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4064         match events_1[0] {
4065                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4066                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4067         }
4068
4069         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4071
4072         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4073         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4074         match events_2[0] {
4075                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4076                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4079                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4082
4083                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4084                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4085                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4086                         match events_3[0] {
4087                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4088                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4089                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4090                                 },
4091                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4092                         }
4093
4094                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4095                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4096                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4097                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4098                 },
4099                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4100         }
4101
4102         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4103         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4104
4105         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4106         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4107         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4108         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4109         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4110         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4111
4112         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4113         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4114         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4115         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4116
4117         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4118         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4119
4120         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4121         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4122
4123         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4124
4125         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4126         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4127         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4128         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4129         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4131         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4132         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4133         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4135
4136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4137         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4138         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4139         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4140         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4141         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4142         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4144
4145         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4146         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4147         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4148         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4149         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4150         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4151         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4153
4154         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4155         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4156         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158
4159         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4160         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4161         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163
4164         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4165         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4167
4168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4169
4170         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4171         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4172         match events_5[0] {
4173                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4174                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4175                         match &purpose {
4176                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4177                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4178                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4179                                 },
4180                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4181                         }
4182                 },
4183                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4184         }
4185
4186         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4187         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4189
4190         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4191         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4192 }
4193
4194 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4195         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4196         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4200         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4201
4202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4203
4204         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4205                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4206                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4207                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4208                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4209                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4210                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4213                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4214                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4215                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4216                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4217                 our_payment_hash
4218         } else {
4219                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4220         };
4221
4222         let mut block = Block {
4223                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4224                 txdata: vec![],
4225         };
4226         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4227         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4228         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4229         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4230                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4231                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4232                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4233         }
4234
4235         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4236
4237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4238         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4239         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4240         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4241         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4242         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4243
4244         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4245         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4246         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4247         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4248         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4249         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4250 }
4251
4252 #[test]
4253 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4254         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4255         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4256 }
4257
4258 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4259         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4260         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4263         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4264         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4265         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4266
4267         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4268         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4269         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4270         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4271
4272         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4273         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4274         {
4275                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4276         }
4277         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4279
4280         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4281         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4282         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4283         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4284         if forwarded_htlc {
4285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4286                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4287                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4288                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4289                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4290         }
4291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4292
4293         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4294         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4295         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4296         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4297
4298         if forwarded_htlc {
4299                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4300                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4301                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4302                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4303                 match fail_commit[0] {
4304                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4305                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4306                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4307                         },
4308                         _ => unreachable!(),
4309                 }
4310                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4311         } else {
4312                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4313                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4314                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4315                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4316                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4317                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4318                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4319                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4320         }
4321 }
4322
4323 #[test]
4324 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4325         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4326         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4327 }
4328
4329 #[test]
4330 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4331         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4335         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4336         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4337         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4338         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4339         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4340
4341         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4342
4343         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4344
4345         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4346         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4347         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4348                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4349
4350         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4351         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4352         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4353         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4354         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4355         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4356         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4357         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4358                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4359         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4360
4361         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4362         let config = UserConfig::default();
4363         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4364                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4365                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4366                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4367                         default_config: config,
4368                         keys_manager,
4369                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4370                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4371                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4372                         logger: &logger,
4373                         channel_monitors,
4374                 }).unwrap()
4375         };
4376         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4377         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4378
4379         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4380         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4381         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4383
4384         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4385         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4386         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4387         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4388
4389         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4390         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4391         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4392         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4393
4394         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4395         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4396         for node in nodes.iter() {
4397                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4398                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4399                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4400         }
4401
4402         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4403 }
4404
4405 #[test]
4406 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4407         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4408         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4409         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4411         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4412         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4413         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4414         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4415         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4416         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4417
4418         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4419         let channel_value = 100000;
4420         let push_msat = 10001;
4421         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4422         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4423         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4424         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4425         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4426         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4427         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4428
4429         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4430
4431         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4432         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4433
4434         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4435         {
4436                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4437                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4438                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4439                 added_monitors.clear();
4440         }
4441
4442         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4443         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4444         {
4445                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4446                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4447                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4448                 added_monitors.clear();
4449         }
4450         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4451
4452         nodes.push(node_a);
4453         nodes.push(node_b);
4454
4455         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4456         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4457         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4458         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4459
4460         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4461         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4462         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4463         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4464         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4465         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4466         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4467         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4468                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4469         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4470
4471         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4472         let config = UserConfig::default();
4473         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4474                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4475                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4476                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4477                         default_config: config,
4478                         keys_manager,
4479                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4480                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4481                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4482                         logger: &logger,
4483                         channel_monitors,
4484                 }).unwrap()
4485         };
4486         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4487         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4488
4489         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4490
4491         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4492         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4493
4494         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4495         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4496         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4497         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4498         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4499
4500         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4501         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4503
4504         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4505         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4506         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4507         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4508
4509         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4510         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4511         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4512         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4513
4514         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4515         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4516         for node in nodes.iter() {
4517                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4518                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4519                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4520         }
4521
4522         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4523 }
4524
4525 #[test]
4526 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4530         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4531         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4532         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4533         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4534         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4537
4538         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4539         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4540
4541         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4542
4543         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4544         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4545         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4546
4547         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4548         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4549         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4550         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4551         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4552         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4553         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4554         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4555                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4556         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4557
4558         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4559         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4560                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4561                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4562                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4563                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4564                         keys_manager,
4565                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4566                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4567                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4568                         logger: &logger,
4569                         channel_monitors,
4570                 }).unwrap()
4571         };
4572         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4573         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4574
4575         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4576         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4578
4579         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4580
4581         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4582         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4583 }
4584
4585 #[test]
4586 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4587         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4591         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4592         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4593         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4594         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4595         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4596         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4597         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4598         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4599         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4600
4601         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4602         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4603                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4604                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4605                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4606         }
4607
4608         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4609
4610         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4611         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4612
4613         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4614         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4615         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4616         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4617
4618         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4619         // nodes[3])
4620         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4621         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4622                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4623                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4624                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4625         }
4626
4627         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4628         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4629         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4630         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4631         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4632         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4633
4634
4635         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4636         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4637                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4638                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4639                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4640                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4641         }
4642
4643         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4644         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4645                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4646                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4647                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4648                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4649         }
4650
4651         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4652         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4653                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4654                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4655                 keys_manager,
4656                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4657                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4658                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4659                 logger: &logger,
4660                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4661         }) { } else {
4662                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4663         };
4664
4665         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4666         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4667                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4668                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4669                 keys_manager,
4670                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4671                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4672                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4673                 logger: &logger,
4674                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4675         }).unwrap();
4676         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4677         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4678
4679         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4680                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4681                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4682                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4683                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4684         }
4685
4686         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4687                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4689         }
4690         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4691         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4692
4693         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4694         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4695         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4696         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4697         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4698
4699         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4700         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4701         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4702         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4703         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4704         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4705         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4706                 match action {
4707                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4708                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4709                         },
4710                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4711                 }
4712         }
4713 }
4714
4715 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4716         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4717                 {
4718                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4719                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4720                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4721                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4722                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4723                                 match event {
4724                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4725                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4726                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4727                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4728                                                 }
4729                                         },
4730                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4731                                 };
4732                         }
4733                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4734                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4735                                         txn.push(tx);
4736                                 }
4737                         }
4738                         txn
4739                 }
4740         }
4741 }
4742
4743 #[test]
4744 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4745         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4749         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4750
4751         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4752         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4753         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4756         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4757         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4758         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4759         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4760
4761         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4762         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4763
4764         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4765         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4766         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4767         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4768         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4769 }
4770
4771 #[test]
4772 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4773         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4774         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4775         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4779
4780         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4781         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4782         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4783         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4784         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4785
4786         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4787         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4788         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4789         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4790
4791         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4792         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4794         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4795         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4796
4797         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4798         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4799         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4800 }
4801
4802 #[test]
4803 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4804         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4805         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4806
4807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4810         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4811
4812         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4813         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4814         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4815         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4817
4818         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4819         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4823
4824         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4825         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4826         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4827
4828         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4829         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4830         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4831         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4832         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4833 }
4834
4835 #[test]
4836 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4837         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4838         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4839         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4840         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4841
4842         // Create some initial channels
4843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4844
4845         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4846
4847         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4848         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4849         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4850
4851         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4852         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4855         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4857         match events[0] {
4858                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4860         }
4861         match events[1] {
4862                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4863                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4864         }
4865
4866         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4867         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4868         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4869         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4870         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4871         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4872         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4873
4874         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4877
4878         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4879         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4880         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4881 }
4882
4883 #[test]
4884 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4885         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4888         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4889
4890         // Create some initial channels
4891         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4892
4893         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4895
4896         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4897
4898         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4899         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4900         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4901
4902         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4903         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4905         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4906         match events[0] {
4907                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4909         }
4910         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4911
4912         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4913         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4914         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4915         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4916         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4917         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4918
4919         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4920         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4921         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4922         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4923
4924         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4925         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4926         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4927         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4928         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4929 }
4930
4931 #[test]
4932 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4936         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4937
4938         // Create some initial channels
4939         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4940
4941         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4942         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4943         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4944         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4945
4946         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4947
4948         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4949         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4951         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4952
4953         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4954         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4955         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4956         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4957
4958         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4959         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4960
4961         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4962         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4963         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4964 }
4965
4966 #[test]
4967 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4968         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4969         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4971         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4972         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4973
4974         // Create some initial channels
4975         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4976
4977         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4978         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4979         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4980         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4981
4982         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4983
4984         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4985         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4986         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4989         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4990
4991         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4992         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4993         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4994         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4995         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4996         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4997         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4998
4999         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5000         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5001         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5002         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5004         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5005
5006         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5007         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5008         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5009         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5010         // transactions next...
5011         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5012         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5013
5014         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5015         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5016         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5017                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5018         } else {
5019                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5020                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5021         }
5022
5023         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5024         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5025
5026         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5027         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5028
5029         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5030         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5031         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5032         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5033         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5034 }
5035
5036 #[test]
5037 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5038         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5039         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5043
5044         // Create some initial channels
5045         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5046
5047         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5048         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5049         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5050         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5051
5052         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5053         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5054
5055         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5056
5057         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5058         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5059         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5062         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5063
5064         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5065         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5066         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5067         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5068
5069         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5070         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5071         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5072
5073         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5074         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5075         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5076         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5078         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5079
5080         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5082
5083         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5084         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5085         // transactions next...
5086         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5087         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5088         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5089                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5090         } else {
5091                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5092                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5093         }
5094
5095         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5096         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5097
5098         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5099
5100         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5101         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5102
5103         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5104         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5105
5106         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5107         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5108         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5109         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5110         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5111         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5112         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5113         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5114 }
5115
5116 #[test]
5117 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5118         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5119         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5120         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5121         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5122         // channel.
5123         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5124         // gets broadcast.
5125
5126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5129         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5130
5131         // Create some initial channels
5132         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5133         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5134
5135         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5136         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5137         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5138         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5139         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5140
5141         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5142         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5143         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5144
5145         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5146         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5147         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5148         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5150         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5151         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5152         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5153         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5154         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5155
5156         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5157         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5159         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5160
5161         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5162         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5163         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5164         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5165         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5166         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5167         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5168         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5169         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5170         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5171
5172         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5173         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5174         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5176         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5177         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5178         match events[0] {
5179                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5180                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5181         }
5182         match events[1] {
5183                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5184                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5185                         assert_eq!(source_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5186                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5187                 },
5188                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5189         }
5190         {
5191                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5192                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5193                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5194                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5195                 b_txn.clear();
5196         }
5197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5198         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5199         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5200         match msg_events[0] {
5201                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5202                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5203         }
5204         match msg_events[1] {
5205                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207         }
5208         match msg_events[2] {
5209                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5210                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5211                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5212                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5213                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5214                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5215                 },
5216                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5217         };
5218         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5219         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5220         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5221         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5222         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5223         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5224         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5225         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5226         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5227         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5228         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5229         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5230         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5231
5232         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5234 }
5235
5236 #[test]
5237 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5238         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5239         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5240         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5241         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5244         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5245         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5246         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5247         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5249                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5250         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5251
5252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5253         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5254         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5255
5256         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5257         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5258         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5259         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5260         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5261
5262         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5263
5264         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5265         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5266         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5267         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5268         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5269                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5270         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5271         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5272
5273         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5274         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5275         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5276
5277         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5278         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5280         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5281         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5282
5283         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5284         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5285                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5286                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5287                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5288                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5289
5290                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5291                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5292                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5293                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5294                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5295                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5296                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5297
5298                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5299                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5300                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5302         }
5303
5304         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5305         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5307         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5308         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5309         match events[0] {
5310                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5311                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5312         }
5313         match events[1] {
5314                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5315                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5316         }
5317         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5318         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5319         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5320         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5321         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5322         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5323         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5324         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5325         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5326         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5327         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5328         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5329         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5330
5331         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5332         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5333         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5334         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5335         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5336         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5337         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5338         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5339         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5341
5342         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5343         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5344         {
5345                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5346         }
5347         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5348
5349         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5350         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5351         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5352         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5353         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(196*2), true);
5354         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5355         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5356         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5357         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5358         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5359         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5361
5362         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5363         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5364
5365         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5366         match events[0] {
5367                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5368                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5369                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5370                 }
5371                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5372         }
5373 }
5374
5375 #[test]
5376 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5380         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5381
5382         // Create some initial channels
5383         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5384
5385         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5386         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5387         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5388         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5389         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5390
5391         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5392         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5394         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5396         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5397         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5398         match events[0] {
5399                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5400                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5401         }
5402         match events[1] {
5403                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5404                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5405         }
5406         let node_tx = {
5407                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5408                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5409                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5410                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5411                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5412                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5413                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5414                 node_txn[0].clone()
5415         };
5416
5417         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5418         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5419
5420         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5421         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5422         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5423         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5424         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5425         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5426 }
5427
5428 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5429         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5430         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5431         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5432         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5433         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5434         // use the same payment hashes.
5435         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5436         //
5437         // A \         / E
5438         //    - C - D -
5439         // B /         \ F
5440         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5441         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5442         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5443         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5444         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5445         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5446         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5447         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5448                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5449         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5450
5451         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5452         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5453         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5454         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5455         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5456
5457         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5458         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5459         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5460         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5461
5462         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5463         // 0th HTLC:
5464         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5465         // 1st HTLC:
5466         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5467         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5468         // 2nd HTLC:
5469         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5470         // 3rd HTLC:
5471         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5472         // 4th HTLC:
5473         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5474         // 5th HTLC:
5475         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5476         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5477         // 6th HTLC:
5478         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5479         // 7th HTLC:
5480         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5481
5482         // 8th HTLC:
5483         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5484         // 9th HTLC:
5485         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5486         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5487
5488         // 10th HTLC:
5489         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5490         // 11th HTLC:
5491         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5492         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5493
5494         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5495         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5496         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5497         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5498         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5499
5500         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5501         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5502         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5503         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5504         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5505         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5507         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5508         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5509
5510         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5511         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5512         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5513         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5514         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5515         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5516
5517         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5518         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5519         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5521         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5523
5524         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5525         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5526         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5527         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5528
5529         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5530
5531         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5533         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5534         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5535         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5536         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5537         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5538         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5539         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5540         if deliver_last_raa {
5541                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5542         } else {
5543                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5544         }
5545
5546         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5547         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5548         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5549         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5550         //
5551         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5552         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5553         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5554         //
5555         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5556         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5557         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5558
5559         if announce_latest {
5560                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5561         } else {
5562                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5563         }
5564         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5565         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5566                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5567                 events[1].clone()
5568         } else {
5569                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5570                 events[0].clone()
5571         };
5572         match close_event {
5573                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5574                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5575         }
5576
5577         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5578         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5579         if deliver_last_raa {
5580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5581         } else {
5582                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5583         }
5584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5585
5586         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5587         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5588         let mut a_done = false;
5589         for msg in cs_msgs {
5590                 match msg {
5591                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5592                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5593                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5594                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5595                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5596                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5597                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5598                                         }
5599                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5600                                         assert!(!a_done);
5601                                         a_done = true;
5602                                         &nodes[0]
5603                                 } else {
5604                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5605                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5606                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5607                                         }
5608                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5609                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5610                                         &nodes[1]
5611                                 };
5612                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5613                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5614                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5615                                 if announce_latest {
5616                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5617                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5618                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5619                                         }
5620                                 }
5621                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5622                         },
5623                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5624                 }
5625         }
5626
5627         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5628         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5629         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5630         let mut as_updates = 0;
5631         for event in as_events.iter() {
5632                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5633                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5634                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5635                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5636                         } else {
5637                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5638                         }
5639                         if network_update.is_some() {
5640                                 as_updates += 1;
5641                         }
5642                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5643         }
5644         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5645         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5646         if announce_latest {
5647                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5648                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5649         }
5650         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5651
5652         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5653         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5654         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5655         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5656         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5657                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5658                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5659                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5660                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5661                         } else {
5662                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5663                         }
5664                         if network_update.is_some() {
5665                                 bs_updates += 1;
5666                         }
5667                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5668         }
5669         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5670         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5671         if announce_latest {
5672                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5673         }
5674         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5675
5676         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5677         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5678         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5679         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5680         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5681         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5682 }
5683
5684 #[test]
5685 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5686         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5687 }
5688
5689 #[test]
5690 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5691         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5692 }
5693
5694 #[test]
5695 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5696         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5697         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5698         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5699 }
5700
5701 #[test]
5702 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5703         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5704         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5705         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5706         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5707
5708         // Create some initial channels
5709         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5710
5711         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5712         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5713         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5714         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5715
5716         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5717         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5718         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5720         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5721         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5722
5723         let htlc_timeout = {
5724                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5725                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5726                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5727                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5728                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5729                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5730                 node_txn[1].clone()
5731         };
5732
5733         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5734         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5735         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5736
5737         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5738         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5739         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5740         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5741         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5742         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5743         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5744         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5745         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5746         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5747                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5748 }
5749
5750 #[test]
5751 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5752         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5753         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5754         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5755
5756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5757
5758         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5759         let seed = [42; 32];
5760         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5761         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5762         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5763         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5764         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5765         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5766
5767         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5768         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5769
5770         // Create some initial channels
5771         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5772         // for node 0
5773         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5774         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5775         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5776
5777         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5778         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5779         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5780         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5781         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5782
5783         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5784         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5785         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5786         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5787         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5788
5789         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5790         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5791         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5792         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5793             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5794             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5795             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5796                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5797         }
5798
5799         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5800         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5801         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5802         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5805
5806         let htlc_timeout = {
5807                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5808                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5809                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5810                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5811                 node_txn[1].clone()
5812         };
5813
5814         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5815         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5816         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5817
5818         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5819         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5820         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5821         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5822         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5823         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5824         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5825         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5826         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5827         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5828         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5829                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5830 }
5831
5832 #[test]
5833 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5834         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5837         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5838
5839         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5840
5841         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5842         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5843
5844         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5845         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5847
5848         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5849         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5850         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5851
5852         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5853         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5854         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5855
5856         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5857         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5858         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5859 }
5860
5861 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5865         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5866         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5867
5868         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5869
5870         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5871         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5872         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5874
5875         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5876         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5877         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5878
5879         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5881         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5882         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5884
5885         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5886         let mut block = Block {
5887                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5888                 txdata: vec![],
5889         };
5890         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5891                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5892                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5893         }
5894         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5895         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5897         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5898 }
5899
5900 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5904         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5905         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5906
5907         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5910
5911         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5912
5913         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5914         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5915         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5916
5917         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5918         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5919
5920         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5921                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5922                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5923         }
5924         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5925         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5927         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5928 }
5929
5930 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5931         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5932         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5933         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5934         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5935         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5936
5937         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5938         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5939         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5940         // actually revoked.
5941         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5942         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5943         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5946
5947         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5948         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5949         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5952         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5954         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5957
5958         if check_revoke_no_close {
5959                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5960                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961         }
5962
5963         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5964         let mut block = Block {
5965                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5966                 txdata: vec![],
5967         };
5968         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5969                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5970                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5971         }
5972         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5973                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5974                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5975                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5976                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5977         } else {
5978                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5979                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5980                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5981                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5982                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5983                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5984                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5985                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5986         }
5987 }
5988
5989 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5990 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5991 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5992 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5993 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5994 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5995 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5996 // non-dust HTLCs.
5997 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5998 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5999 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6000 #[test]
6001 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6002         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6003         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6004
6005         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6006         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6007 }
6008
6009 #[test]
6010 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6011         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6012         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6013         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6014         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6015 }
6016
6017 #[test]
6018 #[should_panic]
6019 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6023         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6024         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6025         for node in nodes.iter() {
6026                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6027         }
6028
6029         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6030         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6031         let push_msat=10001;
6032         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6033         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6034         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6035         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6036
6037         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6038         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6039         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6040 }
6041
6042 #[test]
6043 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6047         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6048
6049         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6050         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6051         let push_msat=10001;
6052         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6053
6054         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6055         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6056         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6057         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6058         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6059
6060         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6061         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6062         let push_msat=10001;
6063         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6064         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6065         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6066
6067         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6068         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6069         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6070
6071         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6072         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6073         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6074
6075         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6076         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6077         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6078
6079         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6080         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6081         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6082         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6083         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6084         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6085 }
6086
6087 #[test]
6088 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6089         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6090         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6091         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6092         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6093
6094         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6095         let push_msat=10001;
6096         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6097         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6098         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6099         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6100
6101         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6102         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6103         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6104                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6105                         msg.clone()
6106                 },
6107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6108         };
6109         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6110 }
6111
6112 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6113 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6114 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6115 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6116 #[test]
6117 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6121         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6122         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6123
6124         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6125         // pending_update_fee.
6126         {
6127                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6128                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6129         }
6130         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6132
6133         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6134         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6135         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6136                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6137                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6138                 },
6139                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6140         };
6141
6142         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6143
6144         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6145         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6146         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6147         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6148
6149         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6150         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6151         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6152
6153         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6154         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6155         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6156         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6157
6158         // Flush the pending fee update.
6159         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6160         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6162         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6164
6165         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6166         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6167         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6168         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6169         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6170         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6171         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6172                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6173         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6174
6175         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6176         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6177         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6178         match &events[0] {
6179                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6180                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6181                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6182                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6183                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6184                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6185                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6186                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6187                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6188                 },
6189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6190         }
6191 }
6192
6193 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6194 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6195 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6196 #[test]
6197 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6201         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6202         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6203
6204         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6205         // pending_update_fee.
6206         {
6207                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6208                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6209         }
6210         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6212
6213         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6214         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6215         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6216                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6217                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6218                 },
6219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6220         };
6221
6222         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6223
6224         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6225         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6226         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6227         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6228
6229         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6230         let amt_1 = 20000;
6231         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6232         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6233         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6234
6235         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6236         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6237         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6238         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6239         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6240         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6241         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6242
6243         // Flush the pending fee update.
6244         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6245         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6248         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6250
6251         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6252         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6253         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6254         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6255         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6256         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6257         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6258                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6259         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6260
6261         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6262         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6263         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6264         match &events[0] {
6265                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6266                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6267                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6268                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6269                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6270                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6271                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6272                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6273                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6274                 },
6275                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6276         }
6277
6278         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6279         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6280                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6281                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6282                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6283         };
6284         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6285                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6286                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6287         };
6288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6290         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6291         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6292         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6293         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6294         match events[0] {
6295                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6296                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6297         }
6298         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6299         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6300         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6301         match events[0] {
6302                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6303                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6304         }
6305         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6307         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6308         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6309         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6310         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6311 }
6312
6313 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6314 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6315 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6316 // once it's freed.
6317 #[test]
6318 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6321         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6322         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6323         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6324         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6326         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6329
6330         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6331         // pending_update_fee.
6332         {
6333                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6334                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6335         }
6336         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6338
6339         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6340         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6341         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6342                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6343                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6344                 },
6345                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6346         };
6347
6348         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6349
6350         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6351         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6352         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6353         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6354
6355         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6356         let feemsat = 239;
6357         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6358         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6359         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6360         let payment_event = {
6361                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6362                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6363
6364                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6365                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6366
6367                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6368         };
6369         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6371         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6372         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6373
6374         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6375         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6376
6377         // Flush the pending fee update.
6378         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6379         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6381         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6382         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6384
6385         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6386         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6388
6389         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6390                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6391                         msg.clone()
6392                 },
6393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6394         };
6395
6396         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6398         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6399
6400         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6401         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6402         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6403         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6404                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6405                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6406         }
6407
6408         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6409         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6411
6412         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6413         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6415         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6416                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6417                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6418                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6419                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6420                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6421                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6422                 },
6423                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6424         };
6425
6426         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6427         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6428         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6429
6430         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6431         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6433         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6434         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6436         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6437         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6438         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6439                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6440                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6441         };
6442         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6443         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6445 }
6446
6447 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6448 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6449 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6450
6451 #[test]
6452 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6453         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6458         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6459
6460         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6461         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6462
6463         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6464                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6465         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6466         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6467 }
6468
6469 #[test]
6470 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6471         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6475         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6477
6478         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6479         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6480         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6481                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6482
6483         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6484         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6485 }
6486
6487 #[test]
6488 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6489         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6490         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6494         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495
6496         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6497         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6500         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6501
6502         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6503         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6504         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6505         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6507 }
6508
6509 #[test]
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6511         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6512         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518
6519         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6520                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6521         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6522         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6523         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6524                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6525 }
6526
6527 #[test]
6528 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6529         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6530         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6531         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6532         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6535         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6536         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6537         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6538
6539         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6540                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6541                 let payment_event = {
6542                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6543                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6544
6545                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6546                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6547                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6548                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6549                         } else {
6550                                 assert!(false);
6551                         }
6552                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6553                 };
6554                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6555                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6556                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6557
6558                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6559                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6560         }
6561         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6562         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6563                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6564
6565         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6566         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6567 }
6568
6569 #[test]
6570 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6571         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6572         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6573         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6574         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6576         let channel_value = 100000;
6577         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6578         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6579
6580         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6581
6582         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6583         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6584         // limits us to.
6585         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6586         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6587                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6588
6589         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6590         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6591
6592         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6593 }
6594
6595 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6596 #[test]
6597 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6598         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6604         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6605         {
6606                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6607                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6608                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6609         }
6610
6611         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6612         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6614         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6615         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6616         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6617         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6618         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6619         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6621         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6622 }
6623
6624 #[test]
6625 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6626         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6627         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6628         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6629         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6630         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6631         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6632
6633         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6634         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6635         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6636         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6637         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6638         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6639
6640         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6641         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6642         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6644         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6645
6646         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6647         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6648         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6649         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6651
6652         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6653         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6654         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6657 }
6658
6659 #[test]
6660 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6661         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6662         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6668
6669         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6670         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6671         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6672         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6673         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6674         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6675
6676         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6677                 channel_id: chan.2,
6678                 htlc_id: 0,
6679                 amount_msat: 1000,
6680                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6681                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6682                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6683         };
6684
6685         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6686                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6687                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6688         }
6689         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6690         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6691
6692         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6693         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6694         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6696         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6697 }
6698
6699 #[test]
6700 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6701         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6702         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6703         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6704         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6705         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6706         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6707
6708         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6709         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6711         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6712         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6713         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6714
6715         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6716         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6717         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6719         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6720 }
6721
6722 #[test]
6723 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6724         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6725         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6726         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6728         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6729
6730         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6731         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6736         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6737
6738         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6739         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6740         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6743 }
6744
6745 #[test]
6746 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6747         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6748         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6749         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6750         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6751         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6753         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6754
6755         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6756         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6757         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6759         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6761
6762         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6763         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6764         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6765         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6766         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6767         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6768         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6769         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6770         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6771         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6772         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6773         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6774         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6775
6776         //Resend HTLC
6777         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6778         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6779         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6781         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6782
6783         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6784
6785         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6786         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6787         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6789         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6790 }
6791
6792 #[test]
6793 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6794         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6795
6796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6799         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6801         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6802         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6803
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6807
6808         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6809                 channel_id: chan.2,
6810                 htlc_id: 0,
6811                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6812         };
6813
6814         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6815
6816         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6817         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6818         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6821 }
6822
6823 #[test]
6824 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6825         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6826
6827         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6828         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6829         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6830         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6831         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6832
6833         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6834         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6836         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6837         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6838
6839         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6840                 channel_id: chan.2,
6841                 htlc_id: 0,
6842                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6843         };
6844
6845         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6846
6847         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6848         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6849         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6852 }
6853
6854 #[test]
6855 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6856         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6857
6858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6861         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6862         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6863
6864         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6865         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6867         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6869         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6870                 channel_id: chan.2,
6871                 htlc_id: 0,
6872                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6873                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6874         };
6875
6876         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6877
6878         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6879         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6880         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6883 }
6884
6885 #[test]
6886 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6887         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6888
6889         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6890         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6891         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6892         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6893         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6894
6895         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6896
6897         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6899
6900         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6901         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6902         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6903                 match events[0] {
6904                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6905                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6906                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6907                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6908                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6909                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6910                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6911                         },
6912                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6913                 }
6914         };
6915
6916         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6917
6918         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6919
6920         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6921         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6922         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6925 }
6926
6927 #[test]
6928 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6929         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6930
6931         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6932         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6933         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6934         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6935         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6936
6937         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6938
6939         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6941
6942         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6943         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6944         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6945                 match events[0] {
6946                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6947                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6948                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6949                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6950                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6951                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6952                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6953                         },
6954                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6955                 }
6956         };
6957
6958         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6959
6960         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6961
6962         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6963         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6964         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6967 }
6968
6969 #[test]
6970 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6971         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6972
6973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6976         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6977         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6978
6979         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6980         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982
6983         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6984         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6985
6986         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6988         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6989
6990         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6991
6992         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6993                 match events[0] {
6994                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6995                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6996                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6997                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6998                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6999                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7000                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7001                         },
7002                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7003                 }
7004         };
7005         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7006         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7007
7008         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7009         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7010         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7012         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7013 }
7014
7015 #[test]
7016 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7017         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7018         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7019
7020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7023         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7024         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7025         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7026
7027         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7028
7029         //First hop
7030         let mut payment_event = {
7031                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7033                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7035                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7036         };
7037         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7039         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7040         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7041         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7042         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7044         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7045         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7046
7047         //Second Hop
7048         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7049         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7052
7053         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7054         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7055         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7056                 match events_3[0] {
7057                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7058                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7059                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7060                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7061                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7062                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7063                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7064                         },
7065                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7066                 }
7067         };
7068
7069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7070
7071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7072         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7073         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7074         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7075         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7076
7077         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7078         match events_4[0] {
7079                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7080                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7081                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7082                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7083                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7084                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7085                 },
7086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7087         };
7088
7089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7090 }
7091
7092 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7093         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7094         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7095         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7096
7097         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7098         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7101         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7102         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7103
7104         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7105
7106         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7107         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7108         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7109         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7110
7111         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7112         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7113
7114         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7115         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7117         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7119
7120         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7121         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7122         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7124
7125         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7126         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7127
7128         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129         match events[0] {
7130                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7131                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7132                 },
7133                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7134         }
7135         match events[1] {
7136                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7137                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7138                 },
7139                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7140         }
7141
7142         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7143         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7144         if announce_latest {
7145                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7146         } else {
7147                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7148         }
7149
7150         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7153
7154         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7155         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7156         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7157         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7158         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7159         let mut first_failed = false;
7160         for event in events {
7161                 match event {
7162                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7163                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7164                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7165                                         first_failed = true;
7166                                 } else {
7167                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7168                                 }
7169                         }
7170                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7171                 }
7172         }
7173 }
7174
7175 #[test]
7176 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7177         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7178         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7179 }
7180
7181 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7182         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7183         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7184         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7185         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7186         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7187         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7188
7189         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7190         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7191         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7192         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7193         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7194
7195         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7196
7197         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7198         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7199
7200         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7201         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7202
7203         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7204         if revoked {
7205                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7206                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7207         }
7208
7209         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7210         if local {
7211                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7212                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7213                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7214                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7215                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7216
7217                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7218                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7220                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7221                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7222                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7223                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7224                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7225                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7226                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7227                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7228         } else {
7229                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7230                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7231                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7233                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7234                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7235                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7236                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7237                 if !revoked {
7238                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7239                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7240                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7241                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7242                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7243                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7244                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7245                 } else {
7246                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7247                         // commitment tx
7248                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7249                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7250                         let first;
7251                         match events[0] {
7252                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7253                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7254                                         else { first = false; }
7255                                 },
7256                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7257                         }
7258                         match events[1] {
7259                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7260                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7261                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7262                                 },
7263                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7264                         }
7265                 }
7266         }
7267 }
7268
7269 #[test]
7270 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7271         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7272         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7273         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7274 }
7275
7276 #[test]
7277 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7278         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7279
7280         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7281         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7282         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7283         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7284         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7285         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7286         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7287         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7288         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7289
7290         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7291         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7292                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7293                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7294         {
7295                 match error {
7296                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7297                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7298                 }
7299         } else { assert!(false) }
7300
7301         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7302         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7303         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7304         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7305         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7306                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7307                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7308         {
7309                 match error {
7310                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7311                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7312                 }
7313         } else { assert!(false); }
7314
7315         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7316         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7317         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7318         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7319         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7320         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7321         let reason_msg;
7322         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7323                 match action {
7324                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7325                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7326                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7327                         },
7328                         _ => { panic!(); }
7329                 }
7330         } else { panic!(); }
7331         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7332
7333         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7334         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7335         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7336         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7337         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7338                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7339                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7340         {
7341                 match error {
7342                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7343                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7344                 }
7345         } else { assert!(false); }
7346 }
7347
7348 #[test]
7349 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7350         // We want to be sure that :
7351         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7352         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7353         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7354         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7355         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7356         let persister;
7357         let logger;
7358         let fee_estimator;
7359         let tx_broadcaster;
7360         let chain_source;
7361         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7362         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7363         // during signing due to revoked tx
7364         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7365         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7366         let monitor;
7367         let node_state_0;
7368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7370         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7371
7372         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7373
7374         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7375         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7376         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7377         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7378
7379         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7380         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7381
7382         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7383         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7384
7385         // Restore node A from previous state
7386         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7387         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7388         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7389         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7390         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7391         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7392         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7393         node_state_0 = {
7394                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7395                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7396                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7397                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7398                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7399                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7400                         logger: &logger,
7401                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7402                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7403                         channel_monitors,
7404                 }).unwrap().1
7405         };
7406         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7407         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7408         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7409         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7410
7411         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7412
7413         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7414         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7415
7416         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7417
7418         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7419         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7421
7422         {
7423                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7424                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7425         }
7426
7427         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7428         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7429                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7430                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7431                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7432                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7433                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7434                         match action {
7435                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7436                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7437                                 },
7438                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7439                         }
7440                 } else {
7441                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7442                 }
7443         }
7444
7445         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7446         // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7447         // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7448         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7449         let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7450         assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7451
7452         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7453         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7454         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7455         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7456         // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7457         let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7458         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7459
7460         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7461         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7462         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7463         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7464         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7465         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7466
7467         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7468         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7469         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7470                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7471                         match action {
7472                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7473                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7474                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7475                                 },
7476                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7477                         }
7478                 } else {
7479                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7480                 }
7481         }
7482         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7483         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7484         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7486         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7487         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7488 }
7489
7490 #[test]
7491 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7492         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7493         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7494         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7495
7496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7499         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7500
7501         // Create some initial channels
7502         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7503
7504         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7505         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7506         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7507         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7508         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7509         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7510         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7512
7513         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7514         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7515         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7516         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7517         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7518
7519         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7520         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7521         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7522         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7523
7524         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7525         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7526         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7527
7528         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7529         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7530         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7531                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7532                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7533                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7534                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7535                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7536                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7537                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7538                 },
7539                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7540         };
7541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7542
7543         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7544         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7545
7546         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7547         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7548         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7549         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7550 }
7551
7552 #[test]
7553 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7554         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7555         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7556
7557         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7558         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7559         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7560         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7561
7562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7563         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7564         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7565
7566         // Disconnect peers
7567         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7568         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7569
7570         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7571         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7572         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7573         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7574         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7575         for e in msg_events {
7576                 match e {
7577                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7578                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7579                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7580                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7581                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7582                                 }
7583                         },
7584                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7585                 }
7586         }
7587         // Reconnect peers
7588         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7589         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7590         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7591         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7592         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7593         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7594
7595         // Reestablish chan_1
7596         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7597         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7598         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7599         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7600         // Reestablish chan_2
7601         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7602         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7603         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7604         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7605         // Reestablish chan_3
7606         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7607         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7608         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7609         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7610
7611         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7612         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7614         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7615         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7616         for e in msg_events {
7617                 match e {
7618                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7619                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7620                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7621                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7622                                         // the old one.
7623                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7624                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7625                                 }
7626                         },
7627                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7628                 }
7629         }
7630         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7631         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7632 }
7633
7634 #[test]
7635 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7636         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7637         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7638
7639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7643
7644         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7645
7646         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7647         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7648                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7649         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7650         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7651
7652         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7653         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7654         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7655         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7656         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7657         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7658
7659         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7660         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7661                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7662                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7663                 }
7664         }
7665
7666         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7667         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7668
7669         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7670         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7671         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7672         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7674
7675         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7676         let penalty_1;
7677         let feerate_1;
7678         {
7679                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7680                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7681                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7682                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7683                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7684                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7685                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7686                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7687                 node_txn.clear();
7688         };
7689
7690         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7691         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7692         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7693         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7694         {
7695                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7696                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7697                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7698                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7699                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7700                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7701                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7702                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7703                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7704                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7705                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7706                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7707                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7708                         node_txn.clear();
7709                 }
7710         }
7711         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7712
7713         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7714         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7715         let penalty_3;
7716         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7717         {
7718                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7719                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7720                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7721                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7722                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7723                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7724                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7725                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7726                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7727                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7728                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7729                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7730                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7731                         node_txn.clear();
7732                 }
7733         }
7734         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7735
7736         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7737         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7738 }
7739
7740 #[test]
7741 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7742         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7743         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7744
7745         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7749         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7750
7751         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7752         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7753         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7754         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7755         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7756         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7757                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7758         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7759         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7760         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7761                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7762         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7763
7764         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7765         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7766         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7767
7768         // Revoke local commitment tx
7769         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7770
7771         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7772         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7773         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7774         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7776         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7777         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7778
7779         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7780         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7781         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7782
7783         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7784         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7785         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7786
7787         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7788         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7789         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7790         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7791
7792         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7793         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7794         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7795         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7796         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7797         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7798         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7799         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7800         match events[1] {
7801                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7803         }
7804         let first;
7805         let feerate_1;
7806         let penalty_txn;
7807         {
7808                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7809                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7810                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7811
7812                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7813                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7814                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7815                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7816                 // future).
7817                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7818                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7819                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7820                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7821                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7822                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7823
7824                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7825                 // available, which we check here:
7826                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7827                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7828                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7829
7830                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7831                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7832
7833                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7834                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7835                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7836                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7837
7838                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7839                 // output, checked above).
7840                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7841                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7842                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7843
7844                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7845                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7846                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7847                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7848                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7849                 node_txn.clear();
7850         }
7851
7852         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7853         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7854         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7855         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7856         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7857         {
7858                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7860
7861                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7862                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7864                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7865                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7866                 } else {
7867                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7868                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7869                 }
7870
7871                 node_txn.clear();
7872         };
7873
7874         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7875         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7876         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7877         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7878         let node_txn = {
7879                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7880                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7881
7882                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7883                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7884                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7885                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7886                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7887                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7888                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7889                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7890                 node_txn.clear();
7891                 txn
7892         };
7893         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7894         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7895         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7896         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7897         {
7898                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7899                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7900                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7901                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7902                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7903                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7904                 // up bumped justice generation.
7905                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7906                 node_txn.clear();
7907         }
7908         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7910 }
7911
7912 #[test]
7913 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7914         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7915         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7916
7917         // Create 2 HTLCs
7918         // Provide preimage for one
7919         // Check aggregation
7920
7921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7924         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7925
7926         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7927         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7928         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7929
7930         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7931         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7932         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7933         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7934         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7935
7936         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7937         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7938         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7940         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7941
7942         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7943         let timeout;
7944         let preimage;
7945         let preimage_bump;
7946         let feerate_timeout;
7947         let feerate_preimage;
7948         {
7949                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950                 // 9 transactions including:
7951                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7952                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7953                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7954                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7955                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7957                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7958                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7959                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7960                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7961                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7962
7963                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7964                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7965                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7966                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7967
7968                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7969                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7970                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7971                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
7972
7973                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7974                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7975                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7976                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7977
7978                 node_txn.clear();
7979         };
7980         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7981         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7982
7983         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7984         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7985         {
7986                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7987                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7988                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7989                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7990                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7991                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7992
7993                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7994                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7995                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7996                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7997                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7998
7999                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8000                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8001                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8002                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8003                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8004
8005                 node_txn.clear();
8006         }
8007
8008         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8009         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8010 }
8011
8012 #[test]
8013 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8014         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8015         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8016         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8017         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8018         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8019         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8020         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8021         // implement that).
8022         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8023         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8024         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8025         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8026         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8027
8028         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8029         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8030
8031         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8032
8033         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8034         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8035         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8036
8037         // Must revoke without gaps
8038         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8039         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8040
8041         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8042         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8043                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8044
8045         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8046                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8047         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8048         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8050 }
8051
8052 #[test]
8053 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8054         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8055         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8056
8057         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8060         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8061
8062         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8063         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8064         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8065         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8066
8067         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8068         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8069         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8070
8071         // Revoke local commitment tx
8072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8073
8074         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8075         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8076         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8077         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8078
8079         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8080         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8083         let penalty_txn = {
8084                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8085                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8086                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8087                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8088                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8089                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8090                 node_txn.clear();
8091                 penalty_txn
8092         };
8093         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8094         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8095         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8096         {
8097                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8098                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8099                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8100         }
8101 }
8102
8103 #[test]
8104 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8105         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8106         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8110         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8112
8113         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8114         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8116         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8117
8118         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8119         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8120         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8122         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8123
8124         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8125         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8126         // can get our balance.
8127
8128         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8129         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8130         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8131         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8132         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8133         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8134         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8135         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8136
8137         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8138 }
8139
8140 #[test]
8141 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8142         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8143         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8144         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8145         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8146         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8147         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8148
8149         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8150
8151         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8152         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8153         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8154         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8155         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8156
8157         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8158         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8160         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8161
8162         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8164         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8165         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8167         match close_ev[0] {
8168                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8169                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8170                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8171                 },
8172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8173         }
8174 }
8175
8176 #[test]
8177 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8182
8183         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8184         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8185         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8186
8187         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8188
8189         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8190         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8191         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8192         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8193 }
8194
8195 #[test]
8196 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8197         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8198         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8202         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8203
8204         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8205         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8206         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8207
8208         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8209         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8210         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8211 }
8212
8213 #[test]
8214 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8215         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8216         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8217         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8218         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8219         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8220
8221         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8222         config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8223         config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8224         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8225         config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8226         config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8227         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8228         config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8229         config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8230         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8231         config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8232         config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8233
8234         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8235         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8236         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8237         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8238
8239         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8240         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8241         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8242         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8243         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8244
8245         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8246         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8247
8248         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8249         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8250         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8251         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8252         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8253         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8254
8255         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8256         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8257         // `channel_value`.
8258         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8259         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8260         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8261         // `channel_value`.
8262         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8263 }
8264
8265 #[test]
8266 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8267         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8268         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8269         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8270         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8271         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8272         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8273
8274         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8275         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8276
8277         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8278
8279         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8280         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8281         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8282
8283         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8284         match events[0] {
8285                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8286                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8287                 }
8288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8289         }
8290
8291         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8292         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8293
8294         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8295                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8296                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8297                 }
8298                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8299         }
8300
8301         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8302
8303         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8304         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8305
8306         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8307         match events[0] {
8308                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8309                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8310                 }
8311                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8312         }
8313 }
8314
8315 #[test]
8316 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8317         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8318         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8322         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323
8324         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8325         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8326
8327         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8328
8329         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8330         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8331         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8332
8333         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8334         match events[0] {
8335                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8336                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8337                 }
8338                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8339         }
8340
8341         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8342         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8343
8344         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8345                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8346                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8347                 }
8348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8349         }
8350         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8351 }
8352
8353 #[test]
8354 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8355         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8356         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8357         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8358         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8359         // and the channel should be closed.
8360         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8361         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8362         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8363         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8364         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8365         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8366
8367         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8368         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8369         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8370
8371         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8372
8373         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8374         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8375
8376         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8377         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8378
8379         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8380         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8381         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8382         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8383         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8384         {
8385                 let mut lock;
8386                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8387                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8388                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8389         }
8390
8391         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8392
8393         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8394         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8395
8396         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8397         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8398
8399         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8400         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8401
8402         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8403         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8404                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8405                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8406                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8407                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8408                 }
8409                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8410         }
8411
8412         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8413 }
8414
8415 #[test]
8416 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8417         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8418         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8423
8424         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8425         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8426
8427         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8428
8429         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8430         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8431         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8432
8433         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8434         match events[0] {
8435                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8436                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8437                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8438                         match api_res {
8439                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8440                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8441                                 },
8442                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8443                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8444                         }
8445                 }
8446                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8447         }
8448
8449         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8450         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8451         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8452
8453         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8454                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8455                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8456                 }
8457                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8458         }
8459 }
8460
8461 #[test]
8462 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8463         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8464         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8465         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8466         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8467
8468         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8469         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8470         match api_res {
8471                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8472                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8473                 },
8474                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8475                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8476         }
8477 }
8478
8479 #[test]
8480 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8481         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8485         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8486
8487         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8488         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8489         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8490         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8491
8492         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8493         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8494         route.paths.push(path);
8495         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8496         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8497         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8498         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8499         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8500         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8501         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8502         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8503 }
8504
8505 #[test]
8506 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8507         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8511         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8512
8513         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8514
8515         {
8516                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8517                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8518                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8519                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8520                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8521                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8522                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8523                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8524         }
8525         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8526         // values from previous calls.
8527         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8528         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8529         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8530         match events[0] {
8531                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8532                         match &purpose {
8533                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8534                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8535                                 },
8536                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8537                         }
8538                 },
8539                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8540         }
8541 }
8542
8543 #[test]
8544 #[allow(deprecated)]
8545 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8546         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8547         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8551         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8552
8553         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8554
8555         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8556
8557         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8558         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8559         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8560                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8561         } else { panic!(); }
8562         let mut block = {
8563                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8564                 Block {
8565                         header: BlockHeader {
8566                                 version: 0x2000000,
8567                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8568                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8569                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8570                         txdata: vec![],
8571                 }
8572         };
8573         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8574         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8575                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8576         } else { panic!(); }
8577
8578         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8579         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8580         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8581         block.header.time += 1;
8582         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8583         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8584         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8585
8586         {
8587                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8588                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8589                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8590                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8592                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8593                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8594         }
8595         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8596         // values from previous calls.
8597         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8598         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8599         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8600         match events[0] {
8601                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8602                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8603                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8604                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8605                 },
8606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8607         }
8608 }
8609
8610 #[test]
8611 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8612         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8613         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8614         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8615         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8616         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8617
8618         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8619
8620         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8621         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8622         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8623         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8624
8625         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8626         // resulting events.
8627         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8628                 () => {
8629                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8630                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8631                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8632                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8633                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8634
8635                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8636                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8637                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8638                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8639                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8640
8641                         // We should fail the payment back
8642                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8643                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8644                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8645                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8646                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8647                                 },
8648                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8649                         }
8650                 }
8651         }
8652
8653         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8654         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8655         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8656
8657         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8658         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8659         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8660         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8661
8662         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8663         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8664         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8665         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8666
8667         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8668         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8669         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8670         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8671 }
8672
8673 #[test]
8674 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8675         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8676         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8677         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8678         //
8679         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8680         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8681         // commitment at same time.
8682
8683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8686         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8687
8688         // Create some initial channel
8689         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8690         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8691
8692         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8693         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8694
8695         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8696         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8697
8698         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8699         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8700         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8701         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8702         let watchtower = {
8703                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8704                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8705                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8706                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8707                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8708                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8709                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8710                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8711                 watchtower
8712         };
8713         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8714         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8715         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8716         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8717         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8718         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8719
8720         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8721         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8722         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8723         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8724         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8725         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8726         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8727                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8728                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8729                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8730                 } else { assert!(false); }
8731         } else { assert!(false); };
8732         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8734         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8735         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8736 }
8737
8738 #[test]
8739 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8740         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8741         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8742         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8743         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8744
8745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8748         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749
8750         // Create some initial channel
8751         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8752         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8753
8754         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8755         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8756
8757         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8758         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8759
8760         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8761         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8762         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8763         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8764         let watchtower_alice = {
8765                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8766                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8767                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8768                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8769                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8770                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8771                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8772                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8773                 watchtower
8774         };
8775         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8776         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8777         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8778         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8779         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8780         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8781
8782         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8783         {
8784                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8785                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8786                 txn.clear();
8787         }
8788
8789         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8790         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8791         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8792         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8793         let watchtower_bob = {
8794                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8795                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8796                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8797                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8798                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8799                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8800                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8801                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8802                 watchtower
8803         };
8804         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8805         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8806
8807         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8808         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8809         {
8810                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8811         }
8812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8813
8814         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8815         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8816         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8817         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8818                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8819                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8820                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8821                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8822                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8823                 } else { assert!(false); }
8824         } else { assert!(false); };
8825         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8827
8828         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8829         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8830         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8831
8832         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8833         let bob_state_y;
8834         {
8835                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8836                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8837                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8838                 txn.clear();
8839         };
8840
8841         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8842         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8843         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8844         {
8845                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8846                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8847                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8848                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8849                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8850                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8851         }
8852 }
8853
8854 #[test]
8855 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8856         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8857         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8858         // message).
8859         //
8860         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8861         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8862         //
8863         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8864         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8865         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8866         // before receiving funding_signed.
8867         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8870         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8871
8872         // Create an initial channel
8873         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8874         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8875         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8876         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8877         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8878
8879         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8880         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8881
8882         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8884
8885         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8886         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8887         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8888         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8889         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8890 }
8891
8892 #[test]
8893 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8894         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8895         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8896         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8897         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8898         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8899         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8900
8901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8904         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8905
8906         // Create some initial channels
8907         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8908
8909         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8910         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8911         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8912         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8913         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8914         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8915
8916         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8917         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8918         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8919         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8920         // this test before #653 fix.
8921         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8922         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8924         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8925         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8926
8927         let htlc_timeout = {
8928                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8929                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8930                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8931                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8932                 node_txn[1].clone()
8933         };
8934
8935         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8936         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8937         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8938         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8939 }
8940
8941 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8942         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8943         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8944         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8945         //
8946         // Steps of the test:
8947         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8948         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8949         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8950         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8951         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8952         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8953         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8954         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8955         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8956         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8957         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8958         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8959
8960         // Create some initial channels
8961         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8962         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8963
8964         // Steps (1) and (2):
8965         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8966         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8967
8968         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8969         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8970         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8971         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8972         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8973         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8974         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8975
8976         // Steps (3) and (4):
8977         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8978         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8979         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8980         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8981         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8982         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8984         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8985         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8986                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8987                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8988                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8989                 };
8990                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8991                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8992                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8993                 if broadcast_alice {
8994                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8995                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8996                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8997                 }
8998                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8999                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9000         }
9001
9002         // Step (5):
9003         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9004         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9005         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9007         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9008         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9009         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9010         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9011         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9012         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9013
9014         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9015         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
9016         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9017         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9018                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9019                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9020                 match events[0] {
9021                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9022                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9023                         },
9024                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9025                 };
9026         }
9027         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9028         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9029         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9031
9032         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9033         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9034         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9035                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9036                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9037                         (*msg).clone()
9038                 },
9039                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9040         };
9041         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9042                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9043                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9044                         (*updates).clone()
9045                 },
9046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9047         };
9048
9049         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9051         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9053
9054         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9055         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9056         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9057                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9058                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9059                         (*msg).clone()
9060                 },
9061                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9062         };
9063         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9065
9066         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9067         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9068         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9069         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9070         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9071                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9072                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9073                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9074                 if broadcast_alice {
9075                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9076                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9077                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9078                 }
9079                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9080                 if broadcast_alice {
9081                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9082                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9083                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9084                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9085                         // broadcasted.
9086                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9087                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9088                 } else {
9089                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9090                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9091                 }
9092         }
9093
9094         // Step (6):
9095         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9096         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9097         {
9098                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9099                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9100                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9101                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9102                 }
9103                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9104                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9105                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9106                 };
9107                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9108                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9109                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9110                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9111                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9112                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9113                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9114                 } else {
9115                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9116                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9117                 }
9118         }
9119 }
9120
9121 #[test]
9122 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9123         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9124         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9125         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9126         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9127 }
9128
9129 #[test]
9130 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9131         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9132         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9133         //
9134         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9135         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9136         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9137         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9138         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9139         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9140         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9141         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9142
9143         // Create an initial channel
9144         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9145         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9146         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9148
9149         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9150         // that it is rejected.
9151         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9152         {
9153                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9154                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9155                 match events[0] {
9156                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9157                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9158                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9159                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9160                                 // move forward with it.
9161                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9162                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9163                         },
9164                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9165                 }
9166         }
9167
9168         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9169         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9170
9171         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9173
9174         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9175         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9176         {
9177                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9178                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9179                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9180                 added_monitors.clear();
9181         }
9182         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9183
9184         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9185         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9186
9187         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9188         // temporary one).
9189
9190         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9191         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9192         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9193         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9194         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9195         {
9196                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9197                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9198                 match events[0] {
9199                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9200                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9201                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9202                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9203                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9204                         },
9205                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9206                 }
9207         }
9208
9209         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9210         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9211         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9212         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9213         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9214         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9215
9216         let funding_created = {
9217                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9218                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9219                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9220                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9221         };
9222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9223         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9224         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9225         // still needs to be cleared here.
9226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9227
9228         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9229         {
9230                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9231                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9232                 match events[0] {
9233                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9234                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9235                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9236                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9237                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9238                         },
9239                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9240                 }
9241         }
9242
9243         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9244         // everything is functional.
9245         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9246         {
9247                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9248                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9249                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9250                 added_monitors.clear();
9251         }
9252
9253         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9254         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9255         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9256         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9257
9258         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9259         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9260         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9261         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9262 }
9263
9264 #[test]
9265 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9266         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9267         //
9268         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9269         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9270         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9274         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9275
9276         // Create some initial channels
9277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9278         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9279         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9280
9281         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9282         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9283         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9284
9285         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9286         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9287         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9288
9289         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9290         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9293         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9294         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9295         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9296         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9297         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9298
9299         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9300         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9301         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9303         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9304         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9305         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9306         match events[0] {
9307                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9308                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9309                 },
9310                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9311         }
9312         match events[1] {
9313                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9314                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9315                 },
9316                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9317         }
9318         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9319         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9320         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9321         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9322         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9323         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9324
9325         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9326         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9327         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9328 }
9329
9330 #[test]
9331 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9332         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9333         //
9334         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9335         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9336         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9337         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9341         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9342
9343         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9344         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9345         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9346
9347         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9348         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9349                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9350                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9351         }
9352
9353         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9354         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9356
9357         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9359
9360         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9361         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9362
9363         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9364         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9365         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9366
9367         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9368         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9369         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9371         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9372         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9373         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9374                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9375                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9376                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9377                 } else { panic!(); }
9378         } else { panic!(); }
9379         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9380 }
9381
9382 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9383         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9384         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9385         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9386         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9387         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9388         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9389         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9390         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9391         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9392         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9393         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9394         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9395         // until we learned about an additional block.
9396         //
9397         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9398         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9402         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9403         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9404
9405         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9406         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9407         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9408         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9409         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9410
9411         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9412         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9413         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9415         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9416         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9417
9418         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9419         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9420                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9421         }
9422         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9423                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9424         if test_height_before_timelock {
9425                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9426                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9427                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9428                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9429         } else {
9430                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9431                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9432                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9433                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9434                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9435                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9436                 // timelock is up).
9437                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9438                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9439
9440                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9441                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9442                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9443                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9444                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9445                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9447
9448                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9449                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9450                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9451                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9452                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9453                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9454                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9455                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9456                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9457         }
9458 }
9459
9460 #[test]
9461 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9462         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9463         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9464 }
9465
9466 #[test]
9467 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9468         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9469         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9470         // HTLCs.
9471         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9472
9473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9476         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9477         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9478         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9479         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9481         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9482
9483         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9484         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9485         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9487
9488         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9489         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9490         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9491         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9492         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9493
9494         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9495
9496         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9497         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9498         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9500
9501         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9502         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9503         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9504         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9505         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9506
9507         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9508         // generated
9509         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9510
9511         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9512         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9513         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9514
9515         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9516         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9517         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9518         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9519         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9520
9521         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9522         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9523         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9524         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9525
9526         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9527         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9528                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9529         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9530         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9531         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9532                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9533         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9534
9535         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9536         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9537                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9538                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9539                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9540                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9541                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9542                         keys_manager,
9543                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9544                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9545                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9546                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9547                         channel_monitors,
9548                 }).unwrap()
9549         };
9550         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9551         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9552
9553         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9554         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9555         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9557
9558         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9559         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9560         // the commitment state.
9561         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9562
9563         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9564
9565         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9566         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9568
9569         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9570         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9571         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9572         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9573         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9574         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9575         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9576
9577         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9578         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9579 }
9580
9581 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9585         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9586
9587         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9588
9589         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9590                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9591         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9592
9593         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9594
9595         {
9596                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9598                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9599                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9600                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9601                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9602                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9603         }
9604         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9605         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9606
9607         {
9608                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9609                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9610                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9611                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9612                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9613                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9614                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9615                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9616                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9617                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9618                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9619         }
9620
9621         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9622         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9623
9624         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9625                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9626                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9627
9628                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9629                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9630
9631                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9632                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9633                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9634
9635                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9636                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9637                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9638
9639                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9640                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9641                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9642                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9643         } else {
9644                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9645                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9646                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9647
9648                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9649                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9650                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9651                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9652
9653                 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9654
9655                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9656         }
9657 }
9658
9659 #[test]
9660 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9661         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9662         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9663         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9664         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9665         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9666 }
9667
9668 #[test]
9669 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9670         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9671         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9672         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9673 }
9674
9675 #[test]
9676 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9677         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9678         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9680         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9681         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9682         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9683
9684         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9685         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9686         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9687         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9688
9689         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9690                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9691         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9692         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9693         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9694                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9695                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9696                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9697         });
9698         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9699
9700         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9701
9702         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9703         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9704         {
9705                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9706                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9707
9708                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9709                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9710                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9711         }
9712         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9713
9714         {
9715                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9716                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9717
9718                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9719                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9720                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9721
9722                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9723                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9724
9725                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9726                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9727
9728                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9729                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9730                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9731
9732                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9733                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9734                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9735
9736                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9737                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9738                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9739         }
9740         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9741         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9742         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9743         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9744
9745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9746
9747         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9748         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9749         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9750
9751         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9753
9754         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9755         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9756         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9757
9758         expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9759
9760         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9761         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9762
9763         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9764         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9765         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9766
9767         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9768 }
9769
9770 #[test]
9771 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9772         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9773         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9775         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9776
9777         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9778         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9779         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9780         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9781         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9782                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9783                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9784                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9785         };
9786         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9787         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9788         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9789
9790         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9791         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9793         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9794         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9795         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9796         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9797         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9798         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9799 }
9800
9801 #[test]
9802 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9803         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9804         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9805         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9806         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9807
9808         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9809         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9810         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9811         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9812
9813         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9814         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9815                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9816                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9817                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9818         };
9819         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9820         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9821         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9822         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9823         let route = find_route(
9824                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9825                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9826         ).unwrap();
9827
9828         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9829         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9831         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9832         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9833         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9834         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9835         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9836         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9837 }
9838
9839 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9840 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9841 enum ExposureEvent {
9842         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9843         AtHTLCForward,
9844         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9845         AtHTLCReception,
9846         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9847         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9848 }
9849
9850 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9851         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9852         // policy.
9853         //
9854         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9855         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9856         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9857         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9858         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9859         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9860         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9861         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9862
9863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9864         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9865         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9868         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9869
9870         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9871         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9872         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9873         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9874         if on_holder_tx {
9875                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9876         }
9877         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9878         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9879         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9880
9881         let opt_anchors = false;
9882
9883         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9884
9885         if on_holder_tx {
9886                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9887                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9888                 }
9889         }
9890
9891         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9892         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9894
9895         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9897
9898         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9899         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9900         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9901
9902         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9903                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9904                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9905                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9906         };
9907         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9908         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9909
9910         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9911         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9912
9913         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9914         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9915
9916         if on_holder_tx {
9917                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9918                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9919                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9920                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9921                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9922                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9923                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9924                         }
9925                 } else {
9926                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9927                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9928                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9929                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9930                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9931                         }
9932                 }
9933         } else {
9934                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9935                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9936                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9937                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9938                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9939                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9940                         }
9941                 } else {
9942                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9943                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9944                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9945                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9946                         }
9947                 }
9948         }
9949
9950         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9951         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9952                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9953                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9954                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9955                 if on_holder_tx {
9956                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9957                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9958                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9959                 } else {
9960                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9961                 }
9962         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9963                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9964                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9965                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9966                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9967                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9968                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9969                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9970                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9971                 if on_holder_tx {
9972                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9973                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9974                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9975                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9976                 } else {
9977                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9978                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9979                 }
9980         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9981                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9982                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9983                 {
9984                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9985                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9986                 }
9987                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9988                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9989                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9990         }
9991
9992         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9993         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9994         added_monitors.clear();
9995 }
9996
9997 #[test]
9998 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9999         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10000         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10001         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10002         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10003         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10004         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10005         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10006         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10007         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10008         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10009         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10010         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10011 }