1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
55 use core::iter::repeat;
56 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
57 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
59 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
62 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
183 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
184 match channel_phase {
185 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
186 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
187 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
188 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
194 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
195 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
196 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
198 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
199 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
200 if send_from_initiator {
201 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
202 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
203 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
204 // well as an additional HTLC.
205 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
207 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
212 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
213 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
214 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
218 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
219 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
220 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
221 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
222 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
226 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
230 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
231 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
232 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
233 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
234 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
235 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
236 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
237 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
238 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
239 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
241 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
243 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
245 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
247 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
250 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
253 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
254 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
255 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
256 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
257 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
264 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
265 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
266 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
267 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
270 let payment_event = {
271 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
272 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
273 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
275 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
278 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
280 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
281 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
282 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
285 // deliver(1), generate (3):
286 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
287 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
288 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
292 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
293 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
294 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
295 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
296 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
297 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
301 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
302 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
303 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
304 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
305 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
306 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
309 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
310 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
311 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
315 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
318 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
321 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
322 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
324 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
328 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
333 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
334 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
335 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
339 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
340 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
343 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
345 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
347 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
353 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
354 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
355 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
356 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
364 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
365 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
366 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
367 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
370 let payment_event = {
371 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
372 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
373 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
375 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
376 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
378 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
380 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
381 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
382 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
385 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
388 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
392 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
397 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
400 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
401 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
402 // update_fee (never committed) ->
404 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
405 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
406 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
407 // <- (1) RAA delivered
408 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
409 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
410 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
411 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
413 // B should send no response here
414 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
415 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
418 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
421 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
422 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
423 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
425 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
428 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
429 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
430 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
432 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
437 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
438 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
439 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
440 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
443 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
446 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
447 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
449 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
450 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
453 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
454 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
455 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
456 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
461 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
465 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
466 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
467 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
470 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
472 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
473 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
474 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
475 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
477 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
478 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
479 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
481 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
483 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
484 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
488 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
489 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
492 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
496 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
497 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
498 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
501 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
502 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
506 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
507 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
508 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
509 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
517 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
518 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
519 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
520 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
523 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
524 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
525 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
527 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
528 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
529 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
531 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
532 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
534 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
536 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
537 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
539 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
541 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
542 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
544 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
547 added_monitors.clear();
549 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
551 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
553 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
554 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
556 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
557 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
558 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
559 added_monitors.clear();
562 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
563 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
564 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
566 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
567 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
569 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
570 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
571 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
572 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
573 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
577 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
595 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
599 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
603 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
604 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
607 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
610 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
613 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
614 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
615 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
616 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
617 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
621 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
623 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
624 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
627 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
631 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
632 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
633 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
636 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
637 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
642 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
647 let channel_value = 5000;
649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
650 let channel_id = chan.2;
651 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
652 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
653 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
655 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
657 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
658 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
659 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
661 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
662 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
664 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
665 *feerate_lock = feerate;
667 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
669 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
671 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
673 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
675 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
677 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
679 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
680 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
681 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
682 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
683 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
684 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
688 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
689 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
692 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
693 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
696 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
698 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
699 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
700 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
704 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
705 ).flatten().unwrap();
706 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
707 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
708 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
709 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
712 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
713 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
714 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
715 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
716 ).flatten().unwrap();
717 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
718 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
719 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
720 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
721 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
724 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
725 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
726 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
729 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
730 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
731 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
732 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
733 ).flatten().unwrap();
734 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
735 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
736 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
737 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
739 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
740 local_funding, remote_funding,
741 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
742 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
744 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
746 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
749 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
752 htlc_signatures: res.1,
754 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
757 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
759 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
764 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
765 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
766 //Should produce and error.
767 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
768 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
770 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
771 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
772 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
776 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
780 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
781 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
784 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
787 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
790 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
793 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
794 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
795 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
797 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
801 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
802 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
803 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
806 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
808 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
809 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
810 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
812 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
813 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
814 added_monitors.clear();
816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
817 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
818 // node[1] has nothing to do
820 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
824 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
825 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
826 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
828 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
830 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
832 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
833 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
834 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
835 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
836 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
837 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
839 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
840 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
842 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
844 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
846 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
848 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
850 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
851 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
853 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
855 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
857 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
859 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
862 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
866 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
868 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
869 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
870 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
871 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
872 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
876 fn test_update_fee() {
877 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
878 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
879 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
880 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
881 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
882 let channel_id = chan.2;
885 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
886 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
887 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
888 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
889 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
890 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
891 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
892 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
893 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
894 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
895 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
898 // Create and deliver (1)...
901 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
902 feerate = *feerate_lock;
903 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
905 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
908 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
909 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
910 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
911 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
912 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
916 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
918 // Generate (2) and (3):
919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
920 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 // Create and deliver (4)...
930 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
931 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
933 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
936 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
937 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
939 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
945 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
949 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
951 // Handle (3), creating (6):
952 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
954 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
955 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
958 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
962 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
963 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
964 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
965 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
966 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
967 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
968 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
969 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
973 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
975 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
976 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
978 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
980 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
982 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
983 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
984 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
985 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
986 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
990 fn fake_network_test() {
991 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
992 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
996 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
998 // Create some initial channels
999 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1000 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1001 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1003 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 // Send some more payments
1010 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1011 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1012 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1014 // Test failure packets
1015 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1016 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1018 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1019 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1021 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1022 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1023 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1024 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1025 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1030 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1031 hops.push(RouteHop {
1032 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1033 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1034 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1035 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1037 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1038 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1040 hops.push(RouteHop {
1041 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1046 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1047 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1056 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1058 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1061 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1062 &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1064 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1065 hops.push(RouteHop {
1066 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1067 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1068 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1069 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1071 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1072 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1074 hops.push(RouteHop {
1075 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1077 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1080 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1081 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1083 hops.push(RouteHop {
1084 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1085 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1086 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1087 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1089 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1090 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1092 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1093 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1094 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1095 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1096 &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1098 // Claim the rebalances...
1099 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1100 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1102 // Close down the channels...
1103 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1105 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1106 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1110 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1113 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1119 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1120 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1121 // commitment dance rounds.
1122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1125 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1126 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1127 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1129 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1130 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1132 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1134 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1136 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1137 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1141 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1142 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1143 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1144 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1146 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1147 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1150 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1151 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1152 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1153 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1156 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1157 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1159 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1160 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1164 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1165 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1166 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1167 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1170 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1171 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1172 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1173 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1181 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1183 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1184 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1185 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1188 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1189 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1191 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1193 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1195 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1197 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1198 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1200 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1202 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1204 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1206 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1208 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1210 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1212 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1217 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1218 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1219 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1221 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1222 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1229 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1232 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1237 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1238 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1242 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1244 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1246 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1247 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1248 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1249 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1251 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1253 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1254 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1256 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1259 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1260 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1261 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1266 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1267 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1268 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1274 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1277 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1279 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1281 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1282 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1283 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1285 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1286 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1287 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1290 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1291 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1293 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1294 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1295 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1296 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1297 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1298 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1299 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1302 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1304 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1306 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1309 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1312 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1313 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1314 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1315 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1316 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1317 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1319 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1322 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1323 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1325 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1327 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1329 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1330 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1331 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1332 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1334 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1335 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1338 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1339 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1340 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1341 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1343 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1344 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1345 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1346 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1347 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1348 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1356 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1363 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1364 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1366 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1367 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1368 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1369 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1370 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1371 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1372 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1373 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1375 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1376 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1377 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1379 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1381 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1391 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1392 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1394 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1395 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1396 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1397 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1398 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1399 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1401 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1403 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1404 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1405 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1406 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1407 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1410 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1411 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1412 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1413 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1414 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1415 blinding_point: None,
1418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1420 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1421 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1422 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1424 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1426 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1428 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1429 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1430 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1431 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1432 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1433 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1434 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1435 ).flatten().unwrap();
1436 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1437 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1438 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1440 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1441 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1442 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1443 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1444 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1446 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1447 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1448 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1449 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1450 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1451 ).flatten().unwrap();
1452 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1453 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1454 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1455 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1456 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1459 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1460 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1461 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1463 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1464 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1465 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1467 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1469 amount_msat: 3460001,
1470 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1472 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1475 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1478 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1479 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1480 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1481 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1482 ).flatten().unwrap();
1483 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1484 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1488 local_funding, remote_funding,
1489 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1491 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1492 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1494 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1497 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1500 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1502 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1505 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1506 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1507 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1509 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1510 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1512 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1513 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1515 next_local_nonce: None,
1517 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1519 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1521 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1523 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1524 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1525 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1529 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1530 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1536 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1537 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1538 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1539 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1540 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1542 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1545 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1546 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1547 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1549 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1550 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1552 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1554 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1556 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1558 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1559 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1560 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1563 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1564 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1565 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1566 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1567 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1571 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1572 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1573 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1574 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1575 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1576 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1577 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1578 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1580 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1581 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1582 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1583 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1584 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1585 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1588 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1589 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1590 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1593 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1594 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1595 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1596 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1597 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1598 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1599 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1600 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1601 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1602 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1603 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1604 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1606 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1607 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1608 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1609 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1610 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1611 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1612 blinding_point: None,
1615 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1616 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1617 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1618 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1619 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1620 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1622 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1623 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1628 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1629 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1635 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1636 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1637 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1639 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1640 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1641 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1642 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1643 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1644 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1645 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1647 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1648 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1649 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1650 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1651 // commitment transaction fee.
1652 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1654 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1655 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1656 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1659 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1660 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1661 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1662 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1663 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1664 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1665 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1669 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1670 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1671 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1672 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1673 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1676 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1678 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1680 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1682 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1683 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1684 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1685 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1687 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1688 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1689 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1690 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1691 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1692 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1695 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1696 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1697 match msg_events[0] {
1698 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1699 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1706 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1707 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1708 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1712 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1713 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1715 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1716 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1717 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1718 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1723 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1725 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1730 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1731 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1732 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1736 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1740 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1742 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1745 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1746 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1747 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1748 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1751 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1752 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1753 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1755 // Add a pending HTLC.
1756 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1757 let payment_event_1 = {
1758 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1759 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1762 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1764 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1766 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1768 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1769 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1770 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1771 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1772 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1773 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1775 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1776 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1777 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1778 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1779 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1780 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1781 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1782 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1783 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1786 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1787 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1788 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1789 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1790 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1791 blinding_point: None,
1794 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1795 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1796 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1797 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1798 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1799 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1801 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1802 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1806 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1811 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1812 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1813 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1814 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1815 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1816 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1818 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1819 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1822 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1827 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1831 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1834 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1835 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1836 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1837 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1839 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1840 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1841 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1843 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1844 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1846 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1847 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1849 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1851 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1853 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1854 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1859 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1860 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1861 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1862 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1864 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1866 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1868 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1869 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1870 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1871 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1872 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1874 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1875 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1876 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1877 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1880 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1881 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1883 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1884 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1885 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1886 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1887 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1888 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1889 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1893 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1894 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1895 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1896 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1897 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1899 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1900 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1901 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1902 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1903 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1906 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1907 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1908 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1909 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1910 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1913 // adding pending output.
1914 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1915 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1916 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1917 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1918 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1919 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1920 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1921 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1922 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1924 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1925 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1926 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1928 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1929 let payment_event_1 = {
1930 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1931 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1936 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1938 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1940 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1941 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1943 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1944 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1945 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1946 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1947 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1948 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1949 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1952 // split the rest to test holding cell
1953 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1954 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1955 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1956 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1958 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1959 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1962 // now see if they go through on both sides
1963 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1964 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1965 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1966 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1971 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1973 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1974 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1975 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1976 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1977 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1978 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1979 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1982 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1983 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1984 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1985 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1987 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1988 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1990 // flush the pending htlc
1991 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1992 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1995 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1996 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1998 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2000 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2001 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2005 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2006 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2011 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2012 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2013 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2016 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2018 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2019 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2020 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2021 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2025 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2026 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2027 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2028 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2033 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2036 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2037 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2038 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2039 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2040 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2042 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2043 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2044 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2046 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2052 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2053 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2054 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2055 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2056 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2058 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2059 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2060 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2062 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2068 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2069 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2072 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2073 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2074 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2076 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2077 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2078 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2079 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2080 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2082 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2083 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2087 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2088 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2089 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2090 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2091 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2092 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2093 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2094 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2096 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2097 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2098 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2099 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2100 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2101 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2102 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2103 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2105 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2106 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2107 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2108 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2109 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2113 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2114 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2116 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2117 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2118 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2119 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2120 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2122 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2123 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2125 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2126 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2130 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2133 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2134 // initial fulfill/CS.
2135 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2136 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2141 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2142 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2143 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2147 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2148 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2151 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2157 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2163 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2165 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2167 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2169 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2171 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2172 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2173 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2174 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2175 // on-chain as necessary).
2176 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2177 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2179 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2180 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2182 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2184 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2186 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2187 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2189 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2190 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2191 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2194 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2196 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2197 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2198 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2200 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2203 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2208 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2209 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2211 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2213 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2215 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2217 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2219 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2224 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2225 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2227 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2229 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2231 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2235 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2237 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2238 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2242 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2243 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2244 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2247 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2248 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2250 // Create some initial channels
2251 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2252 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2253 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2254 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2256 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2257 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2258 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2259 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2260 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2261 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2263 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2264 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2265 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2266 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2267 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2270 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2271 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2273 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2274 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2276 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2277 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2278 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2279 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2280 let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2283 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2285 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2287 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2288 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2289 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2290 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2292 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2293 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2295 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2296 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2297 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2298 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2299 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2303 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2304 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2305 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2307 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2309 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2310 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2311 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2312 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2313 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2315 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2316 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2318 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2319 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2320 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2322 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2325 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2326 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2327 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2328 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2330 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2336 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2337 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2338 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
2339 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
2340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342 let node2_commitment_txid;
2344 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2349 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2355 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2361 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362 // confusing us in the following tests.
2363 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2365 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2370 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2375 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2384 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2388 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2390 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2398 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2400 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2403 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2407 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2413 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2422 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2426 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2431 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454 // Create some new channels:
2455 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2457 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468 // Revoke the old state
2469 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2474 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2484 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2494 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517 // Create some new channels:
2518 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2520 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528 // Revoke the old state
2529 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2531 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2537 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2543 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2551 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2573 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2580 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2582 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596 // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597 // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598 // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599 // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601 let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602 let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603 let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2611 if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2616 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617 // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620 let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2622 // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2625 let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626 check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2628 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2640 // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642 let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2644 channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645 _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2648 // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649 let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650 let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651 assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2664 // Create some new channel:
2665 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2667 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2673 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683 //Revoke the old state
2684 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2687 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2696 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2702 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2711 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2717 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2731 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2733 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2740 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2743 //Revoke the old state
2744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2747 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
2754 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2759 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2762 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2764 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2772 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2780 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2784 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2793 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2801 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2817 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820 // PaymentSent event).
2822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2827 // Create some initial channels
2828 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2831 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2837 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2841 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2844 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2860 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2875 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2879 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882 added_monitors.clear();
2884 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886 match forwarded_events[0] {
2887 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2890 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891 match forwarded_events[1] {
2892 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2893 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2895 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2896 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2897 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2898 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2899 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2903 match forwarded_events[2] {
2904 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2905 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2907 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2908 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2909 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2910 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2911 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2915 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2917 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2918 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2919 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2920 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2921 added_monitors.clear();
2923 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2925 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2926 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2928 match nodes_2_event {
2929 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2933 match nodes_0_event {
2934 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2935 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2936 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2937 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2938 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2944 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2946 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2950 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2951 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2952 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2954 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2955 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2956 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2957 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2958 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2959 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2961 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2962 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2964 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2966 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2967 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2969 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2974 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2975 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2977 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2978 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2979 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2980 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2981 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2985 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2986 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2987 let commitment_spend =
2988 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2991 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2992 // FullBlockViaListen
2993 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2994 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2996 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2999 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3000 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3001 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3006 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3007 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3008 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3010 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3011 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3012 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3013 // we already checked the same situation with A.
3015 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3016 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3017 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3018 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3020 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3022 let mut first_claimed = false;
3023 for event in events {
3025 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3026 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3027 assert!(!first_claimed);
3028 first_claimed = true;
3030 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3031 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3034 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3035 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3039 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3042 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3043 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3044 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3045 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3046 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3047 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
3049 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
3051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3055 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3056 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3057 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3059 // Create some intial channels
3060 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3061 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3063 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3064 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3065 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3067 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3069 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3070 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3071 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3072 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3074 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3080 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3081 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3083 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3089 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3090 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3093 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3094 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3096 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3097 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3098 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3099 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3100 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3101 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3103 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3104 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3105 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3107 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3109 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3110 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3114 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3116 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3118 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3122 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3125 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3126 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3128 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3129 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3130 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3135 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3136 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3137 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3139 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3140 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3142 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3144 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3145 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3146 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3147 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3148 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3152 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3153 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3154 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3155 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3159 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3160 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3161 // and fail backward accordingly.
3163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3166 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3168 // Create some initial channels
3169 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3170 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3172 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3173 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3174 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3175 // Revoke the old state
3176 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3178 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3180 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3181 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3182 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3186 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3188 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3191 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3192 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3193 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3194 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3195 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3198 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3199 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3200 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3207 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3208 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3209 // commitment transaction anymore.
3210 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3211 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3212 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3213 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3214 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3215 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3217 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3218 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3219 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3220 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3221 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3225 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3227 // Create some initial channels
3228 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3229 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3231 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3232 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3233 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3234 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3235 // Revoke the old state
3236 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3238 let value = if use_dust {
3239 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3240 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3241 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3242 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3245 let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3246 let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3247 let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3249 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3250 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3252 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3253 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3254 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3255 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3256 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3257 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3258 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3259 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3260 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3262 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3263 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3265 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3267 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3274 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3275 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3276 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3279 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3282 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3283 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3284 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3286 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3287 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3288 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3289 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3290 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3291 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3293 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3294 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3295 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3298 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3299 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3300 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3301 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3302 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3304 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3308 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3309 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3310 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3312 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3315 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3319 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3322 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3323 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3326 let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3327 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3329 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3331 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3333 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3334 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3335 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3337 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3339 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3341 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3343 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3345 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3348 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3351 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3352 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3355 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3356 match nodes_2_event {
3357 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3358 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3359 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3360 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3361 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3362 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3368 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3369 match nodes_2_event {
3370 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3371 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3372 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3377 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3378 match nodes_0_event {
3379 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3380 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3381 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3382 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3383 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3384 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3386 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3388 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3392 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3395 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3396 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3397 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3398 // that we should update our routing table for.
3399 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3400 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3406 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3407 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3413 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3418 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3419 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3424 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3425 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3430 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3431 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3439 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3441 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3445 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3446 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3447 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3451 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3452 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3453 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3454 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3455 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3459 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3460 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3461 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3462 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3463 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3467 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3471 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3472 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3474 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3476 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3477 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3478 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3481 let payment_event = {
3482 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3484 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3486 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3487 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3490 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3491 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3493 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3497 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3500 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3502 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3505 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3506 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3507 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3508 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3509 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3510 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3512 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3513 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3519 onion_routing_packet,
3520 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3521 blinding_point: None,
3523 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3525 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3527 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3529 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3530 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3535 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3536 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3538 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3541 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3542 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3544 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3546 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3551 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3552 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3553 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3558 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3559 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3560 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3564 let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3565 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3566 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3567 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3568 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3569 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3571 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3573 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3574 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3575 check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3576 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3578 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3579 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3580 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3584 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3585 // registering new transactions
3586 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3590 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3591 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3595 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3596 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3597 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3599 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3601 let mut payment_event = {
3602 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3603 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3606 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3608 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3614 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3616 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3617 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3618 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3619 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3622 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3623 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3625 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3627 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3628 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3629 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3630 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
3631 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
3632 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3634 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3635 let commitment_tx = {
3636 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3637 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3638 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3639 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3640 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3644 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3646 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3649 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3651 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3653 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3654 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3656 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3657 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3658 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3659 let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3660 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3661 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3662 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3663 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3665 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3669 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3670 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3671 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3672 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3673 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3681 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3683 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3684 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3688 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3690 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3691 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3693 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3694 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3695 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3696 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3700 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3701 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3702 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3708 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3709 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3710 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3711 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3712 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3713 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3714 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3716 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3717 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3719 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3721 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3724 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3725 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3728 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3731 // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3732 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3733 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3735 // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3736 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3737 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3740 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed`
3741 // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding
3742 // transaction is broadcasted.
3743 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true
3744 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3745 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3746 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3750 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3751 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3755 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3756 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3757 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3759 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3760 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3762 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3763 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3765 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3766 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3767 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3768 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3770 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3771 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3772 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3774 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3775 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3776 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3777 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3779 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3780 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3782 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3783 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3785 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3786 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3787 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3788 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3790 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3793 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3794 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3795 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3801 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3804 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3805 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3806 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3811 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3812 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3817 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3819 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3820 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3823 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3824 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3828 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3830 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3831 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3832 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3833 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3834 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3835 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3836 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3839 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3842 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3844 let payment_event = {
3845 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3849 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3851 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3853 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3855 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3856 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3858 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3859 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3860 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3862 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3864 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3865 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3866 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3869 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3870 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3871 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3872 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3875 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3876 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3877 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3885 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3886 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3887 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3888 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3889 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3890 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3892 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3893 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3894 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3896 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3897 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3899 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3900 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3901 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3902 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3903 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3904 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3905 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3906 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3907 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3908 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3909 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3910 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3911 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3912 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3913 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3914 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3915 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3916 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3917 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3918 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3919 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3920 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3921 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3922 // Everything was delivered...
3923 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3926 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3927 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3928 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3930 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3934 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3938 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3940 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3945 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3946 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3947 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3949 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3951 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3952 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3954 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3955 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3956 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3957 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3958 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3960 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3961 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3962 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3964 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3970 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3972 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3974 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3975 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3976 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3977 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3978 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3979 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3980 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3981 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3982 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3983 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3984 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3989 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3990 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3992 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3993 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3995 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3996 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3997 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4002 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4003 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4007 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4008 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4009 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4012 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4013 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4014 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4018 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4019 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4020 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4028 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4029 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4030 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4031 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4032 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4033 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4034 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4035 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4037 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4039 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4040 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4041 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4042 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4043 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4044 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4045 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4046 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4047 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4048 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4049 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4050 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4051 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4052 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4053 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4054 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4055 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4056 // Everything was delivered...
4057 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4060 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4061 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4063 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4064 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4065 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4067 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4069 if messages_delivered > 2 {
4070 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4073 // Channel should still work fine...
4074 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4075 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4080 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4081 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4082 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4083 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4084 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4088 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4089 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4090 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4091 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4092 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4096 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4097 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4098 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4099 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4100 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4104 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4105 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4107 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4109 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4110 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4111 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4112 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4113 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4114 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4116 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4117 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4118 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4122 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4123 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4124 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4125 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4126 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4128 // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4129 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4130 // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4131 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4132 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4134 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4135 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4137 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4138 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4140 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4141 // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4142 // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4143 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4144 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4145 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4146 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4148 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4149 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4150 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4154 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4158 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4160 // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4161 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4162 // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4163 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4164 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4166 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4167 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4169 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4170 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4172 // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4173 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4175 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4176 // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4177 // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4178 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4179 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4180 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4181 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4183 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4184 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4185 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4189 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4190 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4191 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4192 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4193 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4194 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4195 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4196 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4198 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4200 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4201 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4202 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4206 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4207 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4213 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4214 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4217 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4218 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4220 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4221 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4222 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4223 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4224 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4225 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4226 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4229 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4230 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4232 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4233 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4234 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4239 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4240 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4241 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4247 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4248 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4250 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4251 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4253 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4254 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4255 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4256 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4258 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4259 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4261 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4262 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4263 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4264 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4266 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4267 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4269 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4270 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4272 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4274 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4275 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4276 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4277 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4278 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4279 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4280 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4281 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4282 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4285 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4286 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4287 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4288 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4289 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4290 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4291 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4295 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4296 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4297 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4298 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4299 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4300 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4303 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4304 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4305 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4308 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4309 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4310 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4313 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4314 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4319 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4320 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4322 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4323 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4325 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4326 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4327 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4329 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4335 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4339 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4340 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4343 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4344 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4345 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4351 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4353 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4355 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4356 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4357 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4358 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4359 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4360 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4361 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4362 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4363 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4365 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4367 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4368 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4369 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4372 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4375 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4376 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4377 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4378 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4379 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4380 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4381 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4382 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4385 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4388 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4389 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4390 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4391 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4392 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4394 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4395 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4396 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4397 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4398 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4399 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4403 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4404 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4405 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4408 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4409 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4413 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4414 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4415 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4417 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4418 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4419 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4420 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4422 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4423 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4424 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4425 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4426 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4429 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4430 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4431 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4432 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4433 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4436 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4438 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4439 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4443 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4445 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4446 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4449 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4451 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4452 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4453 match fail_commit[0] {
4454 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4455 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4456 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4458 _ => unreachable!(),
4460 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4462 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4467 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4468 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4469 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4472 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4473 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4475 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4476 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4477 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4478 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4479 for event in events.drain(..) {
4481 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4482 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4483 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4484 all_outputs.push(outp);
4487 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4490 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4491 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4501 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4502 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4508 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4509 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4510 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4511 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4513 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4514 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4515 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4516 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4517 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4519 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4520 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4522 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4523 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4524 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4525 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4526 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4530 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4531 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4532 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4535 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4536 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4537 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
4539 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4540 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
4541 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4543 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4545 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4546 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4547 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4548 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4550 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4551 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4554 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4556 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4557 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4558 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4562 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4563 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4564 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4571 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4572 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4573 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4574 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4575 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4578 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4579 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4581 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4583 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4584 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4585 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4587 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4588 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4589 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4590 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4591 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4595 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4601 // Create some initial channels
4602 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4604 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4606 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4607 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4608 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4610 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4611 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4612 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4614 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4616 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4618 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4619 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4622 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4623 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4626 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4627 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4628 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4629 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4630 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4633 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4634 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4636 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4637 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4638 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4642 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648 // Create some initial channels
4649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4651 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4652 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4654 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4657 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4658 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4660 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4661 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4663 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4670 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4671 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4672 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4673 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4674 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4676 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4677 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4678 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4679 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4681 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4682 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4683 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4684 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4685 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4689 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4695 // Create some initial channels
4696 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4698 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4699 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4700 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4701 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4703 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4705 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4706 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4710 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4711 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4713 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4715 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4718 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4719 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4720 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4724 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4725 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4726 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4729 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4731 // Create some initial channels
4732 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4734 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4735 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4736 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4737 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4739 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4741 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4742 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4743 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4745 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4746 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4748 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4749 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4750 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4751 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4752 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4753 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4755 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4756 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4757 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4759 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4761 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4763 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4764 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4765 // transactions next...
4766 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4767 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4770 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4771 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4772 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4775 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4778 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4779 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4781 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4782 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4783 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4784 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4785 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4789 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4790 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4791 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4796 // Create some initial channels
4797 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4799 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4800 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4802 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4804 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4805 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4807 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4809 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4810 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4814 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4816 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4817 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4818 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4819 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4821 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4822 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4823 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4825 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4826 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4827 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4829 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4831 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4832 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4834 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4835 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4836 // transactions next...
4837 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4838 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4839 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4842 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4843 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4847 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4849 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4850 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4852 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4853 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4855 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4856 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4857 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4858 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4859 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4860 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4861 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4862 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4866 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4867 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4868 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4869 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4870 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4872 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4878 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4880 // Create some initial channels
4881 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4882 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4884 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4885 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4886 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4887 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4888 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4890 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4891 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4892 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4894 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4895 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4896 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4897 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4898 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4900 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4901 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4902 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4903 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4904 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4906 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4907 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4909 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4911 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4912 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4913 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4914 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4915 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4916 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4918 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4919 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4921 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4922 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4924 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4928 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4929 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4931 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4932 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4933 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4934 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4935 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4940 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4941 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4942 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4943 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4945 match nodes_2_event {
4946 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950 match nodes_0_event {
4951 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4952 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4953 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4954 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4955 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4961 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4962 match msg_events[0] {
4963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4967 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4968 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4969 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4970 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4971 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4972 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4973 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4974 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4975 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4976 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4977 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4984 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4985 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4986 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4987 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4988 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4991 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4992 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4993 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4994 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4996 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4997 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5000 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5001 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5003 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5004 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5005 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5006 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5007 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5009 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5011 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5012 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5013 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5014 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5015 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5016 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5017 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5018 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5020 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5021 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5022 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5024 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5027 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5028 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5030 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5031 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5032 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5033 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5034 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5036 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5037 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5038 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5040 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5041 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5042 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5043 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5044 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5046 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5048 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5049 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5051 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5052 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5053 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5054 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5057 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5058 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5059 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5060 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5061 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5062 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5063 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5065 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5069 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5070 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5072 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5074 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5075 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5077 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5081 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5082 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5084 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5085 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5086 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5087 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5088 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5089 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5090 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5091 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5092 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5093 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5095 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5096 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5098 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5099 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5100 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5101 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5102 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5103 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5106 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5107 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5111 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5113 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5114 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5115 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5116 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5117 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5118 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5119 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5120 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5121 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5125 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5126 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5130 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5136 // Create some initial channels
5137 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5139 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5140 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5141 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5142 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5143 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5145 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5146 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5147 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5150 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5152 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5155 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5156 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5159 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5160 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5163 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5164 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5165 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5166 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5167 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5171 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5172 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5174 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5175 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5176 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5177 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5178 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5179 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5182 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5183 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5184 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5185 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5186 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5187 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5188 // use the same payment hashes.
5189 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5194 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5197 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5198 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5199 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5200 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5202 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5203 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5205 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5206 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5207 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5208 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5209 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5211 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5212 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5213 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5214 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5216 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5217 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5219 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5221 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5222 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5224 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5226 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5228 let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5230 let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5231 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5233 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5235 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5238 let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5240 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5241 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5244 let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5246 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5247 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5249 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5250 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5251 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5252 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5253 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5255 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5256 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5257 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5258 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5259 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5260 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5263 let failed_destinations = vec![
5264 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5265 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5266 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5267 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5272 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5273 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5274 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5275 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5276 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5279 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5280 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5281 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5284 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5285 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5286 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5288 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5291 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5292 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5293 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5294 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5296 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5298 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5299 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5300 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5301 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5302 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5303 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5304 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5305 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5307 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5309 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5310 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5311 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5312 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5313 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5314 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5315 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5316 if deliver_last_raa {
5317 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5319 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5322 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5323 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5324 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5325 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5327 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5328 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5329 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5331 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5332 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5333 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5335 if announce_latest {
5336 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5338 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5340 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5341 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5343 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5346 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5349 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5353 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5355 if deliver_last_raa {
5356 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
5358 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5359 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5361 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5362 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5364 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5367 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5371 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5372 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5373 let mut a_done = false;
5374 for msg in cs_msgs {
5376 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5377 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5378 // should be failed-backwards here.
5379 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5380 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5381 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5382 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5384 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5389 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5390 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5391 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5393 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5397 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5398 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5399 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5400 if announce_latest {
5401 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5402 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5403 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5406 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5412 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5413 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5414 let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5415 let mut as_updates = 0;
5416 for event in as_events.iter() {
5417 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5418 assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5419 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5420 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5422 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5424 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5427 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5428 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5430 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5431 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5432 if announce_latest {
5433 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5434 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5436 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5438 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5439 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5440 let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5441 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5442 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5443 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5444 assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5445 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5446 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5448 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5450 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5453 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5454 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5456 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5457 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5458 if announce_latest {
5459 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5461 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5463 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5464 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5465 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5466 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5467 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5468 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5472 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5473 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5477 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5478 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5482 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5483 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5484 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5485 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5489 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5493 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5495 // Create some initial channels
5496 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5498 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5499 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5500 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5501 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5503 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5504 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5505 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5507 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5508 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5510 let htlc_timeout = {
5511 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5512 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5513 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5514 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5515 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5519 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5520 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5521 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5523 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5524 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5525 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5526 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5527 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5528 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5529 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5530 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5531 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5532 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5533 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5537 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5538 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5539 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5540 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5541 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5545 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5546 let seed = [42; 32];
5547 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5548 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5549 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5550 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5551 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5552 let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5553 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5554 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5555 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5556 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5559 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5561 // Create some initial channels
5562 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5564 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5565 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5566 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5568 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5569 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5570 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5571 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5572 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5574 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5575 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5576 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5577 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5578 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5580 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5581 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5582 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5583 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5584 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5585 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5586 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5587 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5590 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5591 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5592 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5593 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5595 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5597 let htlc_timeout = {
5598 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5599 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5600 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5601 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5602 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5606 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5607 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5608 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5610 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5611 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5612 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5613 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5614 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5615 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5616 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5617 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5618 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5619 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5620 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5621 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5625 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5633 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5634 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5636 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5637 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5638 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5640 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5641 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5642 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5644 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5645 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5646 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5648 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5649 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5650 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5653 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5657 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5658 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5660 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5662 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5663 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5664 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5666 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5668 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5669 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5670 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5672 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5674 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5675 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5679 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5680 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5681 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5682 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5684 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5685 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5687 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5690 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5694 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5695 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5697 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5698 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5699 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5702 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5704 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5705 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5706 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5708 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5709 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5711 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5712 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5713 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5715 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5721 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5725 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5726 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5728 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5729 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5730 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5731 // actually revoked.
5732 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5733 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5734 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5735 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5739 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5740 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5742 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5743 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5745 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5747 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5749 if check_revoke_no_close {
5750 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5754 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5755 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5756 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5757 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5758 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5760 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5761 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5762 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5764 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5766 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5770 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5771 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5772 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5773 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5774 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5775 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5776 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5778 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5779 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5780 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5782 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5783 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5784 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5786 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5787 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5791 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5792 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5793 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5794 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5795 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5800 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5805 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5806 for node in nodes.iter() {
5807 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5810 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5811 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5812 let push_msat=10001;
5813 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5814 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5815 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5816 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5818 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5819 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5820 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5824 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5830 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5831 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5832 let push_msat=10001;
5833 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5835 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5836 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5837 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5838 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5839 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5841 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5842 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5843 let push_msat=10001;
5844 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5845 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5848 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5849 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5850 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5852 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5853 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5854 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5856 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5857 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5858 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5860 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5861 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5862 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5863 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5864 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5865 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5869 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5873 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5875 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5876 let push_msat=10001;
5877 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5878 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5879 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5880 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5882 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5883 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5884 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5885 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5890 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5893 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5894 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5895 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5896 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5898 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5902 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5905 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5906 // pending_update_fee.
5908 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5909 *feerate_lock += 20;
5911 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5914 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5916 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5917 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5918 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5923 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5925 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5926 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5927 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5928 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5930 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5931 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5932 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5934 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5935 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5936 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5937 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5938 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5940 // Flush the pending fee update.
5941 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5942 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5944 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5947 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5948 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5949 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5950 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5951 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5952 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5954 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5955 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5958 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5959 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5961 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5962 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5968 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5974 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5975 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5976 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5978 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5982 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5983 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5985 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5986 // pending_update_fee.
5988 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5989 *feerate_lock += 200;
5991 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5994 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5996 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5997 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5998 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6003 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6005 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6006 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6007 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6008 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6010 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6012 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6013 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6014 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6016 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6017 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6018 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6019 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6020 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6021 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6022 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6023 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6024 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6025 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6027 // Flush the pending fee update.
6028 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6029 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6032 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6035 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6036 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6037 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6038 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6039 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6040 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6042 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6046 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6047 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6048 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6049 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6050 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6055 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6056 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6061 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6062 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6063 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6064 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6065 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6067 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6068 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6071 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6073 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6074 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6075 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6076 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6078 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6081 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6082 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6085 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6088 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6090 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6092 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6095 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6098 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6099 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6100 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6103 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6106 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6107 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6108 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6109 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6111 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6112 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6113 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6115 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6116 // pending_update_fee.
6118 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6119 *feerate_lock += 20;
6121 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6124 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6126 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6127 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6128 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6133 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6135 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6136 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6137 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6138 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6140 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6141 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6142 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6143 let payment_event = {
6144 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6145 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6148 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6151 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6155 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6156 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6158 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6159 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6161 // Flush the pending fee update.
6162 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6163 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6165 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6166 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6169 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6170 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6173 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6174 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6180 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6182 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6184 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6185 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6186 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6187 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
6188 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6192 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6193 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6196 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6197 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6198 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6199 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6200 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6201 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6202 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6203 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6204 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6205 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6210 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6212 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6214 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6215 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6217 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6220 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6221 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6222 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6223 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6226 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6227 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6232 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6233 //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6234 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6238 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6239 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6241 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6242 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6243 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6245 // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6246 let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6247 route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6249 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6250 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6251 ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6252 assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6255 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6256 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6257 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6260 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6261 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6264 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6265 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6266 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6268 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6269 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6271 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6272 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6273 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6274 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6278 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6279 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6283 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6284 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6286 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6287 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6288 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6289 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6290 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6291 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6293 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6294 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6298 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6299 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6303 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6304 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6306 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6307 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6308 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6310 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6311 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6313 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6314 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6315 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6318 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6322 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6323 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6324 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6331 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6332 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6333 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6334 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6335 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6336 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6337 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6338 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6342 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6343 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6344 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6345 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6349 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6350 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6351 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6352 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6354 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6355 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6356 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6358 let payment_event = {
6359 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6360 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6363 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6366 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6370 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6376 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6377 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6379 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6380 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6381 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6383 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6387 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6388 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393 let channel_value = 100000;
6394 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6395 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6397 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6399 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6400 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6402 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6403 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6404 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6405 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6406 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6408 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6411 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6413 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6414 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6420 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6422 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6423 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6424 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6425 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6428 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6429 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6430 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6433 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6435 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6436 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6437 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6439 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6443 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6444 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6448 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6449 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6451 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6452 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6453 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6454 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6455 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6456 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6458 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6459 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6460 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6466 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6467 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6468 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6469 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6471 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6472 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6473 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6475 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6479 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6480 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6481 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6485 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6486 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6488 let send_amt = 3999999;
6489 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6490 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6491 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6492 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6493 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6494 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6495 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6496 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6497 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6499 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6503 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6504 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6505 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6506 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6507 blinding_point: None,
6511 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6512 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6514 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6515 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6517 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6519 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6526 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6530 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6533 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6534 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6535 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6537 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6541 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6543 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6549 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6550 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6559 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6562 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6563 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6565 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6569 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6574 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6575 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6576 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6580 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6583 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6584 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6585 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6588 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6590 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6591 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6592 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6593 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6594 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6596 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6597 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6598 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6599 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6601 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6602 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6603 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6604 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6605 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6606 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6610 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6613 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6615 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6617 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6618 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6619 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6621 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6625 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6626 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6630 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6631 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6632 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6633 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6634 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6635 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6639 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6641 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6644 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6649 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6650 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6651 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6653 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6657 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6658 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6663 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6664 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6666 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6667 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6668 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6670 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6671 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6673 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6676 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6681 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6682 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6683 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6689 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6690 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6695 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6696 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6698 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6699 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6700 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6702 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6703 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6704 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6707 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6708 failure_code: 0x8000,
6711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6713 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6714 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6715 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6717 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6721 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6722 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6724 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6725 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6727 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6730 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6732 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6734 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6736 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6737 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6738 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6740 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6741 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6742 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6743 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6744 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6745 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6746 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6752 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6754 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6756 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6757 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6758 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6764 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6765 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6770 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6771 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6773 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6775 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6777 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6779 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6781 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6783 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6784 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6785 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6786 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6787 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6788 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6789 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6795 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6797 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6799 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6800 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6801 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6803 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6807 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6808 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6813 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6816 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6817 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6818 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6821 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6822 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6824 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6826 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6828 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6830 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6832 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6833 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6834 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6835 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6836 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6837 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6838 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6843 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6846 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6847 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6848 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6850 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6854 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6855 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6856 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6861 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6862 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6863 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6865 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6868 let mut payment_event = {
6869 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6870 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6872 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6874 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6876 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6878 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6879 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6880 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6881 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6883 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6884 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6887 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6888 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6890 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6892 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6893 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6894 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6896 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6897 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6898 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6899 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6900 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6901 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6902 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6908 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6911 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6913 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6914 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6916 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6918 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6919 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6920 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6921 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6922 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6923 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6932 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6936 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6937 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6938 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6940 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6943 let mut payment_event = {
6944 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6945 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6947 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6954 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6955 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6958 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6959 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6963 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6964 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6966 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6967 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6968 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6969 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6972 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6978 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6979 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6980 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6981 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6985 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6986 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6992 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6993 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6995 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6996 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6998 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
7000 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7001 assert!(is_permanent);
7002 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7007 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7008 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7013 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7016 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7017 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7018 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7019 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7021 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7022 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7026 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7028 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7029 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7031 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7032 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7033 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7034 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7036 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7037 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7039 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7040 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7045 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7047 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7050 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7051 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7053 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7055 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7056 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7061 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7062 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7064 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7067 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7068 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7069 if announce_latest {
7070 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7072 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7075 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7077 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7080 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7081 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7082 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7084 let mut first_failed = false;
7085 for event in events {
7087 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7088 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7089 assert!(!first_failed);
7090 first_failed = true;
7092 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7095 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7102 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7103 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7104 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7107 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7108 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7109 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7110 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7111 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7112 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7113 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7118 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7119 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7121 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7122 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7124 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7125 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7127 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7128 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7130 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7132 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7136 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7138 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7139 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7140 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7141 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7142 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7144 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7145 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7147 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7148 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7149 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7150 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7151 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7152 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7153 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7154 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7156 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7157 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7158 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7160 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7161 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7163 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7164 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7165 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7166 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7167 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7168 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7172 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7174 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7176 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7177 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7178 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7180 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7185 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7186 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7187 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7188 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7192 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7193 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7195 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7196 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7197 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7198 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7199 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7203 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7205 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7206 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7207 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7208 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7211 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7214 } else { assert!(false) }
7216 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7217 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7218 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7219 open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7220 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7221 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7222 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7225 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7228 } else { assert!(false); }
7230 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7231 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7232 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7233 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7234 accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7235 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7237 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7239 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7240 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7241 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7245 } else { panic!(); }
7246 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7248 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7249 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7250 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7251 open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7252 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7253 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7254 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7257 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7260 } else { assert!(false); }
7264 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7265 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7266 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7267 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7272 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7274 // Create some initial channels
7275 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7277 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7278 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7279 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7280 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7281 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7282 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7283 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7284 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7285 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7286 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7287 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7292 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7294 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7296 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7297 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7298 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7301 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7302 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7303 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7305 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7307 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7308 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7309 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7310 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7311 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7312 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7313 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7314 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7321 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7323 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7324 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7325 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7326 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7330 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7331 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7332 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7334 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7337 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7339 // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7340 connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7342 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7344 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7347 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7348 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7350 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7351 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7353 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7354 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7355 let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7356 for e in msg_events {
7358 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7359 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7360 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7361 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7362 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7369 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7370 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7372 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7373 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7374 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7375 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7377 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7378 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7380 // Reestablish chan_1
7381 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7382 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7383 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7384 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7385 // Reestablish chan_2
7386 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7387 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7388 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7389 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7390 // Reestablish chan_3
7391 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7392 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7393 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7394 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7396 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7397 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7399 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7400 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7401 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7402 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7403 for e in msg_events {
7405 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7406 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7407 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7408 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7410 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7411 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7414 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7417 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7418 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7422 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7423 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7424 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7426 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7427 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7428 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7429 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7433 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7434 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7435 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7436 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7437 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7439 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7440 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7441 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7442 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7443 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7444 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7446 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7447 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7448 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7449 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7453 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7454 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7456 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7457 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7458 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7461 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7465 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7466 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7467 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7468 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7469 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7470 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7471 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7472 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7476 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7477 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7478 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7479 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7481 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7482 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7483 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7486 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7487 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7488 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7489 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7490 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7491 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7492 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7493 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7497 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7499 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7500 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7502 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7504 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7505 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7506 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7510 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7511 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7512 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7513 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7514 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7515 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7516 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7520 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7522 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7523 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7527 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7528 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7529 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7531 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7532 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7537 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7538 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7539 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7540 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7541 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7542 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7543 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7544 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7545 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7546 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7547 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7548 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7549 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7550 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7551 let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
7553 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7554 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7555 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7557 // Revoke local commitment tx
7558 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7560 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7561 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7562 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7564 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7565 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7567 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7568 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7569 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7571 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7572 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7573 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7575 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7576 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7577 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7578 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7583 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7584 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7585 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7586 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7587 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7588 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7589 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7590 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
7591 match events.last().unwrap() {
7592 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7599 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7600 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7601 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7603 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7604 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7605 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7606 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7611 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7612 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7613 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7615 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7616 // available, which we check here:
7617 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7618 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7619 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7621 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7622 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7624 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7625 // output, checked above).
7626 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7627 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7628 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7630 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7631 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7632 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7633 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7634 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7638 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7639 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7640 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7641 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7642 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7644 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7645 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7646 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7647 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7649 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7650 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7652 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7653 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7654 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7655 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7656 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7657 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7658 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7659 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7663 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7664 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7665 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7667 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7668 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7669 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7670 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7671 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7672 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7673 // up bumped justice generation.
7674 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7677 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7682 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7683 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7684 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7687 // Provide preimage for one
7688 // Check aggregation
7690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7695 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7696 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7697 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7699 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7700 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7701 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7702 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7703 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7705 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7706 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7707 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7708 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7710 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7712 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7716 let feerate_timeout;
7717 let feerate_preimage;
7719 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7720 // 3 transactions including:
7721 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7723 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7724 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7725 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7726 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7727 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7728 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7730 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7731 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7732 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7733 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7735 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7736 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7738 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7741 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7742 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7745 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7746 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7747 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7748 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7752 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7753 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7755 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7756 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7758 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7760 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7761 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7762 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7763 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7765 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7766 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7767 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7768 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7769 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7771 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7772 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7773 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7774 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7775 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7780 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7781 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7785 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7786 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7787 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7788 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7789 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7790 // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7791 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7792 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7798 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7800 let per_commitment_secret;
7801 let next_per_commitment_point;
7803 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7804 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7805 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7806 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7807 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7809 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7811 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7812 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7813 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7815 // Must revoke without gaps
7816 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7817 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7819 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7820 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7821 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7824 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7825 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7827 per_commitment_secret,
7828 next_per_commitment_point,
7830 next_local_nonce: None,
7832 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7834 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7835 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7839 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7840 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7841 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7848 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7849 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7850 let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7851 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7853 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7857 // Revoke local commitment tx
7858 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7860 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7861 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7862 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7863 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7865 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7868 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7870 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7871 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7872 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7873 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7874 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7875 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7879 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7880 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7882 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7883 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7884 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7889 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7890 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7891 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7895 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7897 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7899 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7900 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7901 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7902 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7905 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7906 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7910 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7912 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7913 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7914 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7916 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7917 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7918 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7925 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7929 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7931 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7932 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7933 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7935 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7937 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7938 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7939 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7940 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7944 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7945 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7946 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7952 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7953 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7954 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7956 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7957 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7958 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7962 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7963 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7964 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7965 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7966 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7967 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7969 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7970 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7971 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7972 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7973 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7974 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7975 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7976 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7977 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7978 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7979 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7980 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7982 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7983 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7985 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7987 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7988 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7989 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7990 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7991 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7993 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7994 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7996 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7997 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7998 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7999 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8000 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8001 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8003 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8004 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8006 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8007 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8008 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8010 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8014 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8015 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8016 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8022 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8023 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8027 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8028 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8029 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8031 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8033 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8034 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8039 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8042 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8043 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8044 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8048 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8049 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8051 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8052 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8054 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8056 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8057 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8064 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8065 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8066 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8070 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8073 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8077 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8078 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8079 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8080 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8081 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8083 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8084 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8089 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8090 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8092 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8093 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8094 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8099 // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8104 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8105 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8106 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8112 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8113 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8115 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8117 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8118 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8119 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8121 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8123 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8124 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8125 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8127 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8128 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8130 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8131 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8137 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8138 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8139 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8141 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8142 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8143 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8150 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8151 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8152 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8153 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8156 let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8157 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8159 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8160 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8162 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8163 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8168 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8169 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8170 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8171 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8172 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8173 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8178 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8181 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8182 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8183 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8185 let total_msat = 100_000;
8186 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8187 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8188 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8190 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8191 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8192 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8193 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8194 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8195 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8196 route.paths.push(path_1);
8198 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8199 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8200 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8201 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8202 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8203 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8204 route.paths.push(path_2);
8207 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8208 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8209 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8210 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8211 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8215 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8218 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8219 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8220 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8222 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8223 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8225 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8226 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8227 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8228 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8229 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8230 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8231 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8232 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8233 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8234 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8235 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8236 } = onion_payloads[1] {
8237 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8239 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8240 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8243 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8244 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8245 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8246 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8249 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8250 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8251 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8252 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8253 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8255 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8256 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8263 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8264 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8266 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8269 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8271 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8272 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8277 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8282 // Create channels for each amount
8283 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8284 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8285 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8286 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8287 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8288 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8289 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8290 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8291 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8292 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8293 expected_paths.push(path);
8295 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8297 // Create a route for each amount
8298 let example_amount = 100000;
8299 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8300 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8301 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8302 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8303 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8304 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8305 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8306 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8307 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8308 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8309 route.paths.push(path);
8312 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8313 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8314 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8315 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8316 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8317 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8320 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8321 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8322 let mut amount_received = 0;
8323 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8324 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8326 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8327 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8328 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8329 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8332 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8336 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8337 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8338 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8342 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8343 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8346 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8347 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8349 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8354 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8355 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8356 route.paths.push(path);
8357 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8358 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8359 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8360 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8361 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8362 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8363 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8364 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8368 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8369 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8378 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8379 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8380 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8381 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8383 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8384 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8386 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8388 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8389 // values from previous calls.
8390 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8391 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8394 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8396 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8397 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8399 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8407 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8408 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8409 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8410 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8411 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8412 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8414 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8416 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8417 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8418 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8419 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8421 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8422 // resulting events.
8423 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8424 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8426 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8427 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8429 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8431 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8432 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8433 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8434 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8437 // We should fail the payment back
8438 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8439 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8440 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8441 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8449 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8450 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8451 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8453 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8454 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8455 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8456 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8457 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8459 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8460 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8462 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8463 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8465 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8466 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8467 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8468 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8469 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8473 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8474 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8475 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8476 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8479 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8480 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8481 // commitment at same time.
8483 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8484 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8485 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8486 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8488 // Create some initial channel
8489 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8490 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8492 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8493 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8495 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8496 let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8498 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8499 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8500 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8501 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8504 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8505 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8506 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8507 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8510 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8511 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8514 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8515 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8516 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8517 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8518 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8520 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8521 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8523 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8525 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8527 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8529 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8530 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8531 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8532 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8533 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8534 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8535 } else { assert!(false); }
8540 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8542 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8543 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8547 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8548 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8549 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8550 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8551 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8556 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8558 // Create some initial channel
8559 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8560 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8562 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8563 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8565 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8566 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8568 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8569 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8570 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8571 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8572 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8573 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8575 let watchtower_alice = {
8577 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8578 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8579 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8580 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8583 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8584 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8587 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8588 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8589 // requirements here.
8590 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8591 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8592 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8594 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8596 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8597 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8598 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8599 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8602 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8603 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8604 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8605 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8606 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8607 let watchtower_bob = {
8609 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8610 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8611 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8612 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8615 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8616 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8619 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8621 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8622 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8623 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8624 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8627 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8628 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8629 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8631 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8632 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8633 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8634 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8635 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8636 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8637 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8639 } else { assert!(false); }
8644 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8647 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8648 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8650 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8653 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8654 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8655 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8658 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8659 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8660 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8661 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8662 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
8663 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8664 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8665 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8667 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8668 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8669 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8674 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8675 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8676 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8679 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8680 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8682 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8683 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8684 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8685 // before receiving funding_signed.
8686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8689 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8691 // Create an initial channel
8692 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8693 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8695 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8696 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8698 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8699 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8701 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8704 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8705 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8706 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8707 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8708 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8709 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8713 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8714 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8715 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8716 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8717 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8718 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8719 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8726 // Create some initial channels
8727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8729 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8730 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8731 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8732 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8733 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8734 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8736 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8737 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8738 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8739 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8740 // this test before #653 fix.
8741 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8742 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8744 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8745 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8747 let htlc_timeout = {
8748 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8749 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8750 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8752 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8756 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8757 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8758 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8761 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8762 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8763 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8764 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8766 // Steps of the test:
8767 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8768 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8769 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8770 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8771 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8772 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8773 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8774 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8778 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8780 // Create some initial channels
8781 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8782 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8784 // Steps (1) and (2):
8785 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8786 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8788 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8789 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8790 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8791 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8792 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8793 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8794 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8796 // Steps (3) and (4):
8797 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8798 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8799 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8800 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8803 if !broadcast_alice {
8804 force_closing_node = 1;
8805 counterparty_node = 0;
8807 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
8808 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
8809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8811 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8812 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8813 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8814 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8815 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8817 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8818 if broadcast_alice {
8819 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8821 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8826 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8827 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8828 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8830 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8832 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8833 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8834 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8835 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8836 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8837 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8840 let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8841 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8842 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8843 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8844 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8845 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8847 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8848 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8853 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8854 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8855 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8858 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8860 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8861 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8862 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8867 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8868 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8869 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8875 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8877 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8880 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8881 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8882 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8883 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8884 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8889 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8892 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8893 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8894 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8895 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8896 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8897 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8898 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8899 if broadcast_alice {
8900 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8902 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8904 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8905 if broadcast_alice {
8906 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8907 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8909 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8910 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8911 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8913 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8915 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8920 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8921 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8923 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8924 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8925 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8927 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8928 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8929 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8930 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8931 if broadcast_alice {
8932 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8933 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8934 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8936 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8937 let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8938 check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8939 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8945 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8946 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8947 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8948 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8949 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8953 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8954 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8955 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8959 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8961 // Create an first channel channel
8962 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8963 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8965 // Create an second channel
8966 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8967 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8970 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8971 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
8973 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8974 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8975 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8977 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8980 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8981 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8982 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8988 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8990 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8991 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8993 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8994 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8995 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
8997 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9003 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
9004 // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
9005 // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9006 // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9007 // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9008 // funding outpoint.
9010 // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9011 // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9012 // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9016 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9018 let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9019 let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9021 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9022 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9024 let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9025 assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9026 match cs_funding_events[0] {
9027 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9031 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9032 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9033 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9034 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9035 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9038 let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9039 let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9040 assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9041 assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9042 // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9043 // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9044 // appropriate error message.
9045 let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9048 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9050 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9052 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9053 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9054 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9058 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9059 // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9060 // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9061 // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9062 // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9063 // we require the user not do.
9064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9067 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9069 let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9071 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9072 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9074 // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9075 // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9076 let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9077 let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9078 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9080 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9082 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9083 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9084 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9086 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9088 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9089 // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9090 // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9092 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9093 let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9094 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9098 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9099 // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9100 // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9101 // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9103 // This was previously broken.
9104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9107 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9109 let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9110 let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9111 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9113 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9114 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9115 let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9116 open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9117 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9118 let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9119 accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9120 nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9122 // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9123 // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9124 let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9126 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9128 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9129 funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9130 // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9131 funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9132 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9133 get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9134 let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9135 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9136 let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9137 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9140 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9141 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9146 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9147 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9148 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9150 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9151 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9152 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9153 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9157 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9159 // Create an initial channel
9160 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9161 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9162 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9163 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9165 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9166 // that it is rejected.
9167 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9169 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9170 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9172 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9173 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9174 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9175 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9176 // move forward with it.
9177 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9178 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9184 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9185 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9187 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9190 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9193 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9194 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9195 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9196 added_monitors.clear();
9198 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9200 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9202 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9203 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9205 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9208 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9209 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9210 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9211 open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9212 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9214 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9217 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9218 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9219 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9220 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9221 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9227 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9228 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9229 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9230 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9231 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9232 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9234 let funding_created = {
9235 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9236 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9237 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9238 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9239 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9240 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9241 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9242 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9243 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9244 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9246 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9250 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9251 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9252 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9255 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9256 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9257 err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9261 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9263 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9266 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9267 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9268 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9269 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9270 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9276 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9277 // everything is functional.
9278 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9280 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9281 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9282 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9283 added_monitors.clear();
9285 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9287 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9288 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9290 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9292 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9293 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9294 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9296 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9300 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9301 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9303 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9304 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9305 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9309 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9311 // Create some initial channels
9312 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9313 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9314 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9316 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9317 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9318 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9320 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9321 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9324 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9325 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9327 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9328 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9329 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9330 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9331 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9332 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9333 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9335 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9336 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9337 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9339 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9340 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9341 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9344 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9345 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9350 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9351 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9353 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9355 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9356 // peer_disconnected.
9357 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9358 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9360 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9361 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9362 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9366 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9367 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9369 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9370 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9371 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9372 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9374 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9375 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9376 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9380 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9382 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9383 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9384 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9386 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9388 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9389 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9390 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9392 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9393 let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9394 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9395 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9396 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9399 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9400 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9402 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9404 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9406 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9408 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9409 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9413 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9415 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9416 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9417 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9418 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9420 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9421 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9422 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9423 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9424 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9425 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9426 } else { panic!(); }
9427 } else { panic!(); }
9428 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9430 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9431 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9432 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9433 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9434 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9435 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9436 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9440 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9441 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9442 witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9444 output: vec![TxOut {
9446 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9449 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9454 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9455 // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9456 // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9457 // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9458 // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9460 // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9461 // immediately operational after opening.
9462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9467 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9468 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9470 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9471 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9473 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9475 // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9476 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9478 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9480 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9482 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9484 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9486 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9488 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9491 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9492 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9494 // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9495 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9496 // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9497 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9498 // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9499 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9500 // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9501 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9502 // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9503 let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9505 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9506 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9507 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9508 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9509 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9510 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9513 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9514 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9515 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9516 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9517 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9518 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9519 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9520 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9521 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9522 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9523 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9524 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9525 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9526 // until we learned about an additional block.
9528 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9529 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9533 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9534 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9536 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9537 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9538 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9539 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9540 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9541 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
9542 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
9543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9544 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9546 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9547 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9549 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9550 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9551 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9553 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9554 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9555 if test_height_before_timelock {
9556 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9557 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9558 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9559 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9561 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9562 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9563 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9564 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9569 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9570 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9572 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9573 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9575 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9576 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9577 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9578 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9579 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9580 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9583 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9584 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9585 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9586 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9587 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9588 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9589 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9590 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9591 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9596 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9597 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9598 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9601 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9605 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9607 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9609 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9610 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9611 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9613 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9616 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9617 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9619 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9621 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9623 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9626 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9629 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9630 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9631 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9633 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9635 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9636 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9637 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9638 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9639 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9640 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9641 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9644 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9645 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9647 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9648 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9649 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9651 let expected_destinations = vec![
9652 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9653 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9655 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9656 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9659 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9660 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9662 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9663 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9666 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9667 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9668 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9669 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9670 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9671 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9673 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9675 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9678 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9680 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9682 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9684 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9689 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9690 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9691 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9692 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9693 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9694 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9698 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9699 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9700 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9701 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9705 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9706 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9707 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9711 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9713 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9714 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9715 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9716 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9718 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9719 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9720 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9721 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9722 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9723 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9724 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9725 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9728 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9730 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9731 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9733 let session_privs = {
9734 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9735 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9736 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9737 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9738 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9739 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9741 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9742 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9743 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9747 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9749 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9751 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9753 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9754 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9758 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9760 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9762 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9763 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9765 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9768 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9769 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9770 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9772 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9774 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9776 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9777 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9778 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9780 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9781 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9783 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9787 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9788 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9789 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9791 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9794 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9795 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9796 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9798 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9800 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9801 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9802 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9805 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9807 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9809 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9810 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9814 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9815 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9816 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9817 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9822 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9824 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9825 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9826 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9827 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9829 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9830 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9831 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9832 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9833 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9834 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9837 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9838 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9839 // amount of time to respond to.
9841 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9842 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9843 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9845 let failed_destinations = vec![
9846 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9847 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9849 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9851 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9853 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9854 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9855 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9858 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9860 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9861 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9863 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9864 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9865 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9867 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9870 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9871 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9872 enum ExposureEvent {
9873 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9875 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9877 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9878 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9881 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9882 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9885 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9886 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9887 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9888 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9889 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9890 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9891 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9892 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9895 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9896 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9897 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9898 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9899 // originally written.
9900 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9901 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9904 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9906 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9907 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9908 open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9909 open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9911 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9914 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9915 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9917 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9919 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9922 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9923 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9924 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9925 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9926 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9928 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9932 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9933 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9935 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9937 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9939 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9941 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9942 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9943 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9945 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9946 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9947 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9949 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9950 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9951 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9952 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9953 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9954 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9956 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9957 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9959 // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
9960 // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
9961 // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
9962 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
9963 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9965 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9966 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9969 if dust_outbound_balance {
9970 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9971 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9972 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9973 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9974 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9975 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9976 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9979 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9980 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9981 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9982 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9983 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9987 if dust_outbound_balance {
9988 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9989 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9990 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9991 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9992 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9993 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9996 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9997 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9998 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9999 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10004 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10005 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
10006 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
10007 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10009 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10010 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10011 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10013 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10014 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10015 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10017 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10018 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10019 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10020 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10022 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10024 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10025 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10026 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10028 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10029 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10030 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10031 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10033 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10034 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10035 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10036 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10037 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10039 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10040 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10041 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10042 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10043 // to cross the threshold.
10045 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10046 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10047 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10050 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10051 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10053 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10055 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10058 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10059 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10060 added_monitors.clear();
10063 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10064 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10065 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10066 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10067 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10068 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10069 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10070 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10071 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10072 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10073 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10074 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10075 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10079 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10080 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10081 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10085 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10089 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10091 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10092 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10093 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10094 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10095 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10097 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10099 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10100 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10101 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10103 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10104 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10105 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10106 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10107 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10112 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10113 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10114 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10115 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10119 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10122 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10123 assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10130 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10136 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10137 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10138 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10139 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10140 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10142 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10144 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10145 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10146 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10148 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10149 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10150 // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10151 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10152 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10158 // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10159 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10160 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10164 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10165 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10166 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10167 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10168 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10171 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10173 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10175 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10177 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10178 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10181 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10183 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10184 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10186 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10189 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10190 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10192 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10193 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10194 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10199 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10202 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10203 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10205 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10208 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10209 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10218 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10221 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10222 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10224 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10227 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10228 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10230 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10231 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10233 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10234 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10235 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10242 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10243 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10246 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10247 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10248 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10249 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10250 let recv_value = 100_000;
10252 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10254 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10255 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10256 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10257 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10258 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10260 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10261 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10263 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10264 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10265 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10267 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10269 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10270 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10271 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10272 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10275 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10276 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10278 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10284 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10285 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10286 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10288 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10293 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10294 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10295 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10296 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10297 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10301 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10302 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10303 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10304 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10307 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10309 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10310 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10311 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10312 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10313 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10322 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10325 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10326 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10327 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10328 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10329 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10331 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10332 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10333 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10334 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10337 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10338 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10339 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10341 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10342 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10343 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10346 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10348 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10349 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10350 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10351 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10352 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10353 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10354 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10355 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10357 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10358 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10359 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10360 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10362 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10364 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10365 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10366 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10367 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10368 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10370 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10372 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10373 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10374 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10375 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10376 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10377 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10379 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10380 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10381 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10383 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10385 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10386 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10387 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10388 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10389 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10391 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10392 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10394 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10395 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10396 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10397 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10403 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10405 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10406 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10407 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10408 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10411 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10412 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10413 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10415 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10416 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10417 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10419 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10420 // waiting on any messages.
10421 for node in &nodes {
10422 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10423 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10424 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10430 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10431 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10436 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10437 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10438 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10439 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10440 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10442 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10445 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10449 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10450 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10451 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10452 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10453 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10456 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10457 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10459 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10460 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10461 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10462 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10465 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10466 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10467 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10469 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10470 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10471 match msg_events[0] {
10472 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10473 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10477 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10481 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10487 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10488 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10489 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10490 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10491 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10493 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10494 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10496 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10500 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10501 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10502 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10503 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10504 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10507 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10508 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10510 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10511 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10512 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10513 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10516 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10517 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10518 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10520 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10521 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10522 match msg_events[0] {
10523 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10524 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10528 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10532 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10533 // Create network of two nodes
10534 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10535 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10537 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10539 // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10540 // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10541 // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10542 let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10543 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10544 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10546 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10547 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10549 // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10552 // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10553 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10555 // In the meantime, some time passes.
10556 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10557 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10560 // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10561 // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10563 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10566 // Since accept channel message was never received
10567 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10568 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10569 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10570 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10575 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10576 // Create network of two nodes
10577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10582 // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10583 // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10584 // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10585 let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10586 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10587 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10589 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10590 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10592 // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10593 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10595 // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10596 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10598 // The peers now reconnect
10599 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10600 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10602 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10603 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10604 }, false).unwrap();
10606 // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10607 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10608 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10609 match &msg_events[0] {
10610 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10611 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10615 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10616 // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10617 // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10618 // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10620 // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10621 // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10622 // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10625 let (persister, chain_monitor);
10626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10627 let nodes_0_deserialized;
10628 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10630 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10631 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10633 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10634 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10636 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10637 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10639 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10641 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10643 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10645 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10647 for dest in &[1, 2] {
10648 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10649 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10650 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10651 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10654 let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10655 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10656 let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10657 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10658 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10659 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10661 let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10662 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10663 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10667 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10668 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10669 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10670 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10673 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10675 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10676 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10679 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10680 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10681 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10682 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10683 } else { panic!(); }
10684 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10685 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10686 } else { panic!(); }
10687 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10688 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10690 // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10691 // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10692 get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10693 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10697 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10698 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10699 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10703 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10707 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10709 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10710 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10711 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10712 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10715 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10716 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10717 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10718 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10720 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10721 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10722 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10724 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10725 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10727 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10728 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10729 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10730 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10732 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10733 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10734 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10735 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10737 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10739 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10742 // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10743 nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10744 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10746 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10748 // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10749 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10750 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10751 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10754 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10756 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10757 ref counterparty_node_id,
10759 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10761 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10763 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10764 ref counterparty_node_id,
10766 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10771 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10772 // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10773 // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10777 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10779 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10780 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10781 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10782 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10785 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10786 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10787 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10788 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10790 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10791 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10792 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10794 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10795 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10797 // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10798 let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10799 let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10800 let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10801 let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10802 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10803 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10805 // The monitor should become closed.
10806 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10808 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10809 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10810 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10811 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10814 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10815 match msg_events[0] {
10816 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10817 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10820 // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10822 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10823 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10824 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10825 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10826 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10829 // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10830 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10831 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10832 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10833 discard_funding: true,
10834 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10835 user_channel_id: Some(42),
10836 ..Default::default()
10838 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10839 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10840 discard_funding: true,
10841 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10842 user_channel_id: Some(43),
10843 ..Default::default()
10847 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10848 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10852 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10856 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10858 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10859 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10860 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10861 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10864 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10865 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10866 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10867 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10869 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10870 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10871 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10873 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10874 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10875 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10876 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10878 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10879 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10880 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10881 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10883 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10886 // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10887 let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10888 let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10889 let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10890 let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10891 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10892 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10893 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10895 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10896 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10897 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10898 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10899 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10900 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10901 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10903 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10904 match msg_events[0] {
10905 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10906 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10909 // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10911 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10912 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10913 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10914 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10915 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10918 // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10919 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10920 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10921 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10922 discard_funding: true,
10923 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10924 user_channel_id: Some(42),
10925 ..Default::default()
10927 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10928 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10929 discard_funding: true,
10930 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10931 user_channel_id: Some(43),
10932 ..Default::default()
10936 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10937 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10940 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10941 // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10942 // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10943 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10944 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10945 let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10946 min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10948 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10950 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10951 let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10953 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10954 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10956 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10957 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10959 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10961 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
10962 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
10963 let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10964 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10965 match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10966 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10969 check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10970 check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10972 let commitment_tx = {
10973 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10974 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10975 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10976 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10980 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10981 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10983 check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10984 check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10985 check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10987 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10988 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10992 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10993 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10994 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10998 fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
10999 // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
11000 // and the channel fails for the initiator.
11001 let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
11002 let mut config1 = config0.clone();
11003 config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
11004 config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11005 config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
11007 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11008 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11009 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
11010 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11012 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11013 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11015 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11018 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11019 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
11020 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
11024 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11026 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11027 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);