1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
113 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
119 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
128 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
131 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
135 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
136 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
137 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
138 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
139 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
140 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
141 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
142 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
143 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
144 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
146 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
148 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
150 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
152 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
158 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
159 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
160 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
161 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
162 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
169 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
170 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
171 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
174 let payment_event = {
175 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
176 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
177 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
179 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
182 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
183 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
184 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
185 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
186 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
189 // deliver(1), generate (3):
190 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
191 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
192 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
196 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
197 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
199 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
200 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
201 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
205 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
206 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
208 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
209 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
210 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
213 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
214 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
215 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
218 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
219 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
222 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
225 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
226 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
238 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
239 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
243 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
247 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
249 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
251 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
254 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
257 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
258 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
259 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
260 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
268 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
269 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
270 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 let payment_event = {
274 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
275 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
276 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
278 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
281 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
283 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
284 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
285 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
291 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
304 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
305 // update_fee (never committed) ->
307 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
308 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
309 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
310 // <- (1) RAA delivered
311 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
312 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
313 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
314 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
316 // B should send no response here
317 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
318 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
321 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
324 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
325 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
326 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
328 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
331 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
333 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
335 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
340 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
341 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
342 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
343 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
346 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
349 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
350 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
352 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
354 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
356 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
357 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
358 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
359 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
364 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
368 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
369 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
370 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
373 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
374 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
375 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
376 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
377 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
378 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
380 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
384 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
387 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
391 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
392 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
395 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
396 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
399 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
400 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
401 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
404 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
405 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
410 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
411 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
412 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
413 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
414 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
415 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
416 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
417 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
418 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
419 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
424 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
426 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
428 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
430 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
431 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
435 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
436 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
437 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
442 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
443 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
444 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
448 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
449 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
450 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
456 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
458 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
460 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
463 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
464 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
467 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
468 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
469 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
472 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
473 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
475 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
476 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
478 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
480 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
481 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
483 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
485 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
486 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
488 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
489 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
490 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
491 added_monitors.clear();
493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
495 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
496 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
498 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
499 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
500 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
501 added_monitors.clear();
504 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
505 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
508 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
510 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
511 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
513 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
533 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
534 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
535 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
543 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
544 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
547 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
553 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
554 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
555 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
557 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
561 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
563 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
564 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
567 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
568 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
571 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
572 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
576 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
577 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
587 let channel_value = 1977;
588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
589 let channel_id = chan.2;
590 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
595 *feerate_lock = feerate;
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
599 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
605 //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
606 //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
608 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
610 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
611 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
612 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
613 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
614 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
615 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
618 //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
619 //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
621 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
622 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
624 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
625 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 2), 1);
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
628 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
630 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
631 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
632 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
633 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
634 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
635 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
636 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
637 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
638 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
640 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
641 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
642 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
643 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
644 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
645 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
646 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
647 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
650 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
651 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
652 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
655 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
656 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
657 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
658 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
659 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
660 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
663 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
664 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
667 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
669 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
672 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
675 htlc_signatures: res.1
678 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
680 feerate_per_kw: feerate + 124,
683 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
685 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
686 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
687 //Should produce and error.
688 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
689 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
696 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
700 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
701 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
704 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
707 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
710 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
713 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
714 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
715 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
717 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
722 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
723 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
726 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
728 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
729 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
731 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
732 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
733 added_monitors.clear();
735 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
736 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
737 // node[1] has nothing to do
739 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
740 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
743 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
744 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
745 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
747 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
749 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
751 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
752 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
753 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
754 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
755 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
756 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
758 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
759 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
761 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
763 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
765 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
767 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
769 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
770 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
772 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
774 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
776 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
778 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
779 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
781 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
785 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
787 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
788 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
789 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
790 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
791 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
795 fn test_update_fee() {
796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
799 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
800 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
801 let channel_id = chan.2;
804 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
805 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
806 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
807 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
808 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
809 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
810 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
811 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
812 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
813 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
814 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
817 // Create and deliver (1)...
820 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
821 feerate = *feerate_lock;
822 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
824 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
827 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
828 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
829 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
830 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
831 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
837 // Generate (2) and (3):
838 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
839 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
843 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
844 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
847 // Create and deliver (4)...
849 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
850 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
852 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
854 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
855 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
856 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
857 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
858 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
863 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
867 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
868 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
870 // Handle (3), creating (6):
871 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
873 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
874 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
877 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
878 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
881 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
882 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
883 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
884 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
885 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
886 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
887 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
888 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
892 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
894 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
895 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
897 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
899 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
901 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
902 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
903 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
904 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
905 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
909 fn fake_network_test() {
910 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
911 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
915 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
917 // Create some initial channels
918 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
919 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
920 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
922 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
923 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
924 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
925 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
926 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
928 // Send some more payments
929 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
930 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
931 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
933 // Test failure packets
934 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
935 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
937 // Add a new channel that skips 3
938 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
940 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
941 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
942 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
943 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
944 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
945 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
946 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
948 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
949 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
951 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
952 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
953 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
954 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
956 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
959 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
960 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
961 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
962 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
964 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
967 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
968 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
969 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
970 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
972 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
974 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
975 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
976 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
978 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
980 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
981 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
982 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
983 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
985 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
988 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
989 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
990 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
991 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
993 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
996 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
997 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
998 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
999 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1001 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1003 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1004 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1005 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1007 // Claim the rebalances...
1008 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1009 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1011 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1012 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1014 // Send some payments across both channels
1015 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1016 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1017 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1020 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1021 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1022 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1023 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1025 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1027 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1029 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1031 // Close down the channels...
1032 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1033 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1034 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1035 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1036 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1037 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1038 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1039 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1041 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1042 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1044 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1045 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1050 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1051 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1052 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1053 // commitment dance rounds.
1054 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1057 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1058 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1059 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1062 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1063 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1064 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1065 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1069 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1070 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1071 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1072 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1074 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1075 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1077 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1079 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1080 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1081 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1082 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1085 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1086 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1088 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1092 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1093 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1094 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1095 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1098 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1099 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1100 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1105 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1106 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1107 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1109 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1111 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1112 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1113 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1116 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1117 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1119 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1123 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1125 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1126 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1128 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1130 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1132 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1134 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1140 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1145 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1146 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1147 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1149 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1150 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1156 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1157 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1164 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1165 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1166 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1170 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1172 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1173 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1174 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1175 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1181 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1182 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1184 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1185 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1187 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1188 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1189 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1193 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1194 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1195 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1196 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1202 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1205 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1207 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1209 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1210 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1211 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1213 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1214 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1217 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1218 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1220 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1221 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1222 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1223 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1224 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1225 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1226 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1229 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1231 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1233 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1234 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1236 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1237 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1238 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1239 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1240 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1241 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1242 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1243 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1245 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1246 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1247 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1249 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1250 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1251 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1252 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1253 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1254 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1255 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1256 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1258 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1262 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1263 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1264 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1265 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1267 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1268 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1269 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1270 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1271 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1272 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1274 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1280 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1284 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1285 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1287 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1288 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1290 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1291 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1292 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1293 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1294 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1296 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1298 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1299 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1300 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1303 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1305 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1306 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1308 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1312 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1316 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1317 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1319 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1320 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1321 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1322 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1324 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1326 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1327 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1328 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1329 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1332 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1333 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1334 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1335 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1340 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1341 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1342 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1344 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1346 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1348 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1349 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1350 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1351 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1353 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1354 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1355 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1357 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1358 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1359 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1360 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1361 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1363 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1364 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1365 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1366 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1367 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1368 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1369 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1370 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1373 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1374 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1375 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1377 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1378 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1379 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1381 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1383 amount_msat: 3460001,
1384 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1386 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1389 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1392 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1394 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1395 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1399 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1400 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1402 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1403 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1405 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1408 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1411 htlc_signatures: res.1
1414 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1415 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1416 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1418 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1419 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1421 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1422 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1424 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1426 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1428 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1430 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1431 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1432 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1436 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1437 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1443 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1444 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1445 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1446 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1447 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1449 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1450 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1451 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1454 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1456 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1457 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1458 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1460 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1462 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1463 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1465 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1466 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1467 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1468 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1469 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1470 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1474 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1475 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1476 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1477 // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1478 // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1479 // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1480 // the update_add_htlc.
1481 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1482 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1485 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1486 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1488 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1489 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1490 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1491 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1492 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1493 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1494 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1495 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1496 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1499 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1500 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1501 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1502 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1505 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1506 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1507 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1508 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1509 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1510 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1512 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1517 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1518 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1519 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1520 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1521 chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1522 chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1526 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1528 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1529 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1530 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1531 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1532 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1533 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1536 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1537 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1538 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1539 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1540 // commitment transaction fee.
1541 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1543 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1544 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1545 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1546 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1550 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1551 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1552 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1556 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1557 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1559 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1560 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1561 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1562 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1563 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1564 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1566 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1567 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1568 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1569 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1570 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1571 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1573 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1574 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1575 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1576 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1580 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1584 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1585 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1586 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1589 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1590 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1591 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1593 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1594 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1595 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1596 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1598 // Add a pending HTLC.
1599 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1600 let payment_event_1 = {
1601 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1604 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1605 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1606 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1610 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1611 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1612 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1613 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1614 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1616 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1618 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1619 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1620 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1621 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1622 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1623 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1626 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1627 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1628 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1629 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1633 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1634 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1635 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1636 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1637 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1639 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1643 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1648 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1649 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1650 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1651 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1652 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1654 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1655 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1656 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1658 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1659 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1662 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1663 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1667 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1671 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1672 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1673 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1675 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1677 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1679 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1680 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1682 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1683 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1685 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1687 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1689 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1690 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1695 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1696 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1697 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1699 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1701 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1703 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1704 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1705 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1706 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1707 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1708 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1709 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1712 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1713 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1715 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1716 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1717 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1718 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1719 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1720 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1721 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1724 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1726 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1727 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1728 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1729 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1730 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1733 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1734 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1735 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1736 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1737 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1740 // adding pending output.
1741 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1742 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1743 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1744 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1745 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1746 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1747 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1748 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1749 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1751 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1752 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1753 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1755 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1756 let payment_event_1 = {
1757 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1760 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1762 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1764 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1766 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1767 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1769 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1770 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1771 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1772 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1775 // split the rest to test holding cell
1776 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1777 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1778 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1779 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1781 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1782 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1785 // now see if they go through on both sides
1786 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1787 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1788 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1790 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1793 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1795 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1796 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1797 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1799 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1802 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1803 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1804 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1809 // flush the pending htlc
1810 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1811 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1814 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1815 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1817 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1820 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1821 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1824 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1825 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1830 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1831 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1832 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1834 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1835 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1837 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1838 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1839 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1840 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1842 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1844 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1845 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1846 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1847 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1849 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1852 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1855 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1856 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1857 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1859 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1860 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1861 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1863 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1869 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1870 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1871 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1873 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1874 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1875 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1877 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1883 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1884 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1885 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1887 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1888 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1889 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1891 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1892 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1893 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1894 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1895 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1897 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1898 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1902 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1903 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1904 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1905 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1906 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1907 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1908 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1909 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1911 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1912 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1913 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1914 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1915 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1916 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1917 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1918 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1920 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1921 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1922 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1923 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1924 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1925 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1926 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1927 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1928 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1929 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1931 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1932 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1933 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1934 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1936 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1937 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1939 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1941 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1943 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1946 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1947 // initial fulfill/CS.
1948 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1950 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1952 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1953 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1954 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1956 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1959 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1961 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1962 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1964 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1965 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1967 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1968 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1970 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1976 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1978 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1980 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1982 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1983 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1984 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1985 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1986 // on-chain as necessary).
1987 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1988 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1991 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1993 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1995 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1998 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2000 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2001 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2002 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2006 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2007 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2008 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2010 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2012 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2014 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2018 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2022 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2024 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2028 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2033 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2035 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2037 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2039 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2043 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2045 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2050 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2051 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2052 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2056 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2058 // Create some initial channels
2059 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2060 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2061 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2062 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2064 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2065 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2066 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2067 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2068 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2069 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2071 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2072 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2073 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2074 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2075 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2077 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2078 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2082 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2083 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2084 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2086 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2088 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2089 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2090 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2091 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2094 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2095 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2097 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2098 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2099 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2100 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2104 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2105 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2106 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2108 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2110 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2111 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2112 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2113 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2114 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2116 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2117 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2119 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2120 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2122 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2125 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2126 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2127 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2128 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2136 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2137 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2138 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2141 let node2_commitment_txid;
2143 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2144 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2145 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2146 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2148 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2149 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2150 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2152 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2154 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2155 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2156 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2157 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2158 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2160 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2161 // confusing us in the following tests.
2162 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2164 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2165 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2166 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2169 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2170 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2171 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2173 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2174 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2180 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2181 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2187 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2189 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2190 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2191 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2197 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2199 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2200 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2202 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2203 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2205 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2206 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2213 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2218 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2220 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2221 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2222 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2224 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2225 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2226 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2227 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2229 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2230 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2231 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 fn test_justice_tx() {
2236 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2237 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2238 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2239 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2240 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2241 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2242 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2243 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2244 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2245 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2246 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2247 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2248 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252 // Create some new channels:
2253 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2255 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2256 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2257 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2258 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2259 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2260 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2261 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2262 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2263 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2264 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2265 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2266 // Revoke the old state
2267 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2272 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2273 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2276 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2277 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2278 node_txn.truncate(1);
2280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2281 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2284 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2286 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2287 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2289 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2290 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2291 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2292 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2294 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2296 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2297 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2299 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2300 // Create some new channels:
2301 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2303 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2307 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2308 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2309 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2310 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2311 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2312 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2313 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2314 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2315 // Revoke the old state
2316 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2318 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2320 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2321 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2322 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2324 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2325 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2328 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2330 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2331 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2332 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2334 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2335 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2336 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2338 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2339 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2340 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2344 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2345 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2346 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2350 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2351 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2352 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2353 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2354 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2355 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2356 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2357 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2358 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2360 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2361 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2363 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2364 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2365 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2367 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2368 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2370 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2371 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2372 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2374 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2378 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2379 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2380 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2381 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2386 // Create some new channel:
2387 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2389 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2390 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2391 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2392 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2393 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2395 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2396 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2397 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2398 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2399 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2400 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2401 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2403 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2405 //Revoke the old state
2406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2409 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2414 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2415 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2416 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2418 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2419 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2421 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2422 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2424 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2425 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2426 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2427 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2428 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2429 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2430 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2431 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2433 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2434 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2437 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2439 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2443 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2444 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2445 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2446 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2449 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2451 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2453 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2454 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2455 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2456 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2457 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2458 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2460 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2461 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2463 //Revoke the old state
2464 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2467 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2469 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2471 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2472 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2473 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2475 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2479 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2480 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2482 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2483 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2484 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2485 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2486 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2487 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2489 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2490 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2491 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2492 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2493 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2494 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2495 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2497 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2498 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2499 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2500 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2502 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2503 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2507 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2510 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2511 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2512 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2513 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2515 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2516 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2517 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2522 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2523 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2524 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2525 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2526 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2527 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2528 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2529 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2531 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2532 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2533 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2534 // PaymentSent event).
2536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2539 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2541 // Create some initial channels
2542 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2543 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2545 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2546 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2547 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2548 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2549 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2551 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2552 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2553 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2555 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2556 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2558 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2559 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2560 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2561 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2562 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2563 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2564 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2566 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2567 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2568 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2569 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2570 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2572 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2573 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2575 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2577 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2578 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2579 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2580 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2581 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2582 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2583 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2584 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2585 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2586 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2587 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2588 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2590 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2591 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2592 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2593 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2595 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2596 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2597 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2598 added_monitors.clear();
2600 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2601 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2602 match forwarded_events[0] {
2603 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2606 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2607 } else { panic!(); }
2608 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2609 } else { panic!(); }
2610 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2612 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2614 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2615 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2616 added_monitors.clear();
2618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2620 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2624 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2629 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2630 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2631 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2632 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2633 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2638 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2639 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2640 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2641 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2642 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2643 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2644 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2645 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2646 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2647 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2649 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2650 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2651 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2652 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2654 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2655 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2656 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2657 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2659 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2660 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2664 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2665 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2666 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2667 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2669 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2670 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2671 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2672 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2673 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2674 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2676 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2677 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2678 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2679 let commitment_spend =
2680 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2681 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2682 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2683 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2686 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2687 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2688 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2692 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2693 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2694 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2695 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2696 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2697 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2698 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2700 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2701 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2702 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2703 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2705 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2706 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2707 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2708 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2709 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2711 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2713 let mut first_claimed = false;
2714 for event in events {
2716 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2717 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2718 assert!(!first_claimed);
2719 first_claimed = true;
2721 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2722 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2725 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2726 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2732 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2733 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2734 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2735 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2736 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2737 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2739 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2744 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2745 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2746 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2747 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2749 // Create some intial channels
2750 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2751 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2753 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2755 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2757 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2759 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2760 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2761 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2762 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2764 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2767 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2768 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2771 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2773 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2782 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2783 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2784 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2785 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2786 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2788 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2789 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2790 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2791 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2792 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2795 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2800 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2804 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2805 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2806 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2808 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2812 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2814 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2816 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2817 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2822 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2824 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2825 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2826 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2827 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2828 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2829 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2832 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2836 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2841 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2842 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2843 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2844 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2845 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2846 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2851 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2852 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2853 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2855 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2856 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2858 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2860 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2861 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2862 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2863 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2864 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2865 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2866 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2871 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2872 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2873 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2877 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2878 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2879 // and fail backward accordingly.
2881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2886 // Create some initial channels
2887 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2888 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2890 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2891 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2892 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2893 // Revoke the old state
2894 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2896 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2898 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2899 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2900 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2902 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2906 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2910 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2912 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2917 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2918 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2925 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2926 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2927 // commitment transaction anymore.
2928 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2929 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2930 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2931 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2932 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2933 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2935 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2936 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2937 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2938 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2939 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2940 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2941 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2942 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2943 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2945 // Create some initial channels
2946 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2947 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2949 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2950 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2951 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2952 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2953 // Revoke the old state
2954 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2956 let value = if use_dust {
2957 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2958 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2959 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2962 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2963 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2964 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2966 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2967 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2969 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2970 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2971 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2972 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2974 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2975 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2976 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2977 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2979 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2982 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2983 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2984 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2985 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2986 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2987 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2988 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2989 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2991 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2992 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2993 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2996 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3002 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3003 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3006 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3007 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3008 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3011 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3012 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3015 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3016 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3017 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3018 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3019 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3020 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3024 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3025 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3026 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3034 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3035 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3038 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3039 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3041 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3043 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3046 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3048 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3049 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3052 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3053 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3057 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3059 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3063 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3066 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3067 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3068 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3069 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3072 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3073 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3074 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3075 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3077 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3081 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3082 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3083 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3084 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3085 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3086 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3091 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3092 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3093 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3095 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3097 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3099 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3101 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3105 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3108 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3109 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3110 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3111 // that we should update our routing table for.
3112 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3113 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3116 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3119 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3120 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3121 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3123 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3126 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3127 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3128 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3136 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3137 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3138 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3142 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3143 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3144 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3145 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3146 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3150 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3151 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3152 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3153 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3154 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3158 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3162 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3163 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3165 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3167 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3168 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3171 let payment_event = {
3172 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3173 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3174 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3176 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3177 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3180 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3181 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3183 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3186 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3189 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3191 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3193 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3194 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3195 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3196 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3197 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3198 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3200 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3201 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3207 onion_routing_packet,
3209 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3211 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3213 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3215 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3216 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3218 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3221 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3222 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3226 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3231 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3232 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3233 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3237 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3240 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3241 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3242 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3245 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3247 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3248 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3249 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3251 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3252 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3253 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3255 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3257 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3258 // registering new transactions
3259 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3260 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3264 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3265 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3269 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3270 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3271 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3273 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3275 let mut payment_event = {
3276 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3279 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3281 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3284 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3287 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3289 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3290 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3291 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3292 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3295 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3296 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3298 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3300 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3301 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3302 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3304 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3307 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3309 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3310 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3311 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3312 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3313 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3317 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3319 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3320 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3322 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3324 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3326 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3327 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3329 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3330 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3331 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3332 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3333 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3334 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3335 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3337 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3341 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3342 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3343 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3344 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3345 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3350 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3351 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3353 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3355 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3357 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3359 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3361 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3362 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3364 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3365 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3369 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3370 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3371 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3372 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3373 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3374 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3376 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3378 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3379 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3380 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3382 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3383 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3384 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3385 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3387 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3388 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3389 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3391 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3392 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3393 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3394 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3396 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3397 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3399 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3400 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3402 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3404 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3407 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3408 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3409 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3415 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3416 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3423 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3426 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3427 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3433 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3434 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3435 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3436 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3437 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3438 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3439 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3441 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3444 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3446 let payment_event = {
3447 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3450 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3452 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3454 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3456 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3457 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3460 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3463 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3465 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3466 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3467 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3470 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3471 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3472 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3473 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3476 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3477 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3478 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3486 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3489 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3490 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3491 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3493 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3494 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3495 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3497 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3498 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3500 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3501 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3502 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3503 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3504 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3505 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3506 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3507 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3508 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3509 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3510 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3511 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3512 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3513 // Everything was delivered...
3514 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3517 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3518 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3520 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3526 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3528 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3530 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3531 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3533 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3534 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3535 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3537 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3538 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3539 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3541 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3544 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3547 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3550 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3551 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3552 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3553 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3554 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3555 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3556 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3557 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3558 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3559 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3560 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3565 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3566 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3568 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3569 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3571 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3572 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3573 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3578 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3579 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3581 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3583 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3584 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3585 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3588 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3589 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3590 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3591 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3594 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3595 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3596 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3604 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3605 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3607 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3608 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3609 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3610 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3612 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3613 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3614 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3621 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3622 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3623 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3624 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3625 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3626 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3627 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3628 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3629 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3630 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3631 // Everything was delivered...
3632 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3639 // Channel should still work fine...
3640 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3641 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3642 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3646 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3647 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3648 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3649 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3650 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3654 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3655 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3656 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3657 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3658 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3662 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3663 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3664 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3665 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3667 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3668 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3669 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3670 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3671 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3673 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3674 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3676 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3677 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3679 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3681 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3682 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3683 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3688 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3690 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3691 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3693 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3694 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3695 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3696 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3697 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3698 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3703 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3704 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3705 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3711 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3713 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3714 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3715 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3716 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3717 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3718 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3719 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3722 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3724 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3725 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3726 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3731 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3732 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3733 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3734 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3735 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3736 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3742 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3743 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3745 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3746 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3747 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3749 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3750 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3751 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3753 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3754 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3755 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3757 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3758 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3759 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3760 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3761 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3762 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3763 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3764 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3766 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3767 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3768 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3769 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3770 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3771 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3773 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3774 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3775 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3776 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3780 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3781 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3783 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3784 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3787 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3789 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3790 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3791 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3792 let mut found_announcement = false;
3793 for event in msgs.iter() {
3795 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3796 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3798 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802 assert!(found_announcement);
3806 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3807 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3808 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3812 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3813 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3815 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3817 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3818 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3819 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3822 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3823 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3829 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3832 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3833 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3835 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3836 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3837 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3838 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3839 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3840 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3841 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3843 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3844 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3845 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3847 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3848 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3849 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3854 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3855 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3856 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3862 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3863 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3865 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3866 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3867 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3868 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3869 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3870 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3872 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3873 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3874 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3875 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3877 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3878 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3880 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3881 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3883 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3885 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3886 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3887 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3888 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3889 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3891 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3892 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3893 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3896 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3897 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3898 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3899 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3900 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3901 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3902 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3906 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3907 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3908 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3909 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3910 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3911 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3914 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3915 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3916 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3920 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3924 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3925 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3928 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3930 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3931 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3933 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3934 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3936 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3937 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3938 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3940 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3943 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3946 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3947 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3950 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3953 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3954 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3955 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3959 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3961 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3963 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3964 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3965 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3966 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3967 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3968 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3969 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3973 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3974 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3975 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3978 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3981 let mut block = Block {
3982 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3985 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3986 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3987 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3988 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3989 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3990 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3991 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3997 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3998 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3999 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4000 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4001 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4003 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4005 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4006 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4007 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4008 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4012 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4013 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4014 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4017 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4018 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4022 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4023 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4024 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4026 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4027 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4028 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4029 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4031 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4032 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4034 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4036 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4039 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4040 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4041 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4042 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4046 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4052 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4053 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4054 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4055 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4058 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4060 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4061 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4062 match fail_commit[0] {
4063 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4065 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4067 _ => unreachable!(),
4069 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4071 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4076 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4077 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4078 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4082 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4086 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4087 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4088 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4089 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4090 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4091 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4093 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4095 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4097 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4098 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4099 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4100 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4102 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4103 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4104 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4105 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4106 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4107 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4108 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4109 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4110 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4111 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4113 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4114 let config = UserConfig::default();
4115 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4116 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4117 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4118 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4119 default_config: config,
4121 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4122 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4123 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4128 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4129 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4131 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4132 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4133 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4136 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4137 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4138 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4139 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4143 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4144 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4146 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4147 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4148 for node in nodes.iter() {
4149 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4150 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4151 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4154 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4158 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4159 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4163 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4164 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4165 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4166 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4167 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4168 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4170 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4171 let channel_value = 100000;
4172 let push_msat = 10001;
4173 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4174 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4175 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4176 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4177 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4178 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4179 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4181 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4183 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4184 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4186 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4188 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4189 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4190 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4191 added_monitors.clear();
4194 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4195 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4197 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4198 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4199 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4200 added_monitors.clear();
4202 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4207 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4208 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4209 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4210 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4212 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4213 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4214 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4215 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4216 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4217 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4218 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4219 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4220 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4221 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4223 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4224 let config = UserConfig::default();
4225 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4226 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4227 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4228 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4229 default_config: config,
4231 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4232 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4233 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4238 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4239 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4241 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4243 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4244 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4246 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4247 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4248 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4250 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4252 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4256 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4257 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4258 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4259 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4261 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4262 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4263 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4264 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4266 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4267 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4268 for node in nodes.iter() {
4269 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4270 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4271 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4274 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4278 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4282 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4283 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4284 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4285 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4286 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4287 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4288 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4290 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4291 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4293 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4295 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4296 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4297 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4299 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4300 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4301 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4302 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4303 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4304 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4305 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4306 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4307 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4308 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4310 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4311 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4312 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4313 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4314 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4315 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4317 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4318 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4319 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4324 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4325 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4327 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4328 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4331 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4333 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4334 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4338 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4339 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4343 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4344 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4345 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4346 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4347 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4348 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4349 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4350 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4351 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4353 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4354 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4355 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4356 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4357 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4360 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4362 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4363 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4365 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4366 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4367 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4368 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4370 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4372 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4373 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4374 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4375 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4376 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4379 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4380 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4381 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4382 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4383 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4384 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4387 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4388 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4389 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4390 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4391 assert!(read.is_empty());
4392 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4395 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4396 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4397 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4398 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4399 assert!(read.is_empty());
4400 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4403 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4404 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4405 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4406 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4408 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4409 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4410 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4412 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4414 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4417 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4418 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4419 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4420 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4422 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4423 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4424 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4426 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4428 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4429 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4431 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4432 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4433 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4434 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4435 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4438 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4439 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4442 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4443 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4445 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4446 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4448 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4449 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4451 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4452 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4453 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4454 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4455 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4456 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4457 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4459 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4460 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4462 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4467 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4468 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4470 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4471 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4472 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4474 for event in events.drain(..) {
4476 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4477 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4478 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4479 all_outputs.push(outp);
4482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4485 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4486 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4496 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4497 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4503 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4504 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4505 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4507 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4508 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4509 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4510 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4511 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4513 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4514 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4516 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4517 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4518 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4519 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4520 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4524 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4525 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4526 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4530 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4533 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4534 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4536 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4538 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4540 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4543 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4544 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4546 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4547 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4549 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4550 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4551 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4555 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4556 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4557 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4562 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4564 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4565 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4566 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4567 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4568 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4570 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4571 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4572 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4574 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4576 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4577 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4578 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4580 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4581 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4582 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4583 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4584 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4588 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4594 // Create some initial channels
4595 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4597 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4599 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4600 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4601 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4603 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4604 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4606 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4608 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4610 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4614 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4615 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4618 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4619 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4620 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4621 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4622 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4623 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4624 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4626 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4628 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4630 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4631 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4632 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4636 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4642 // Create some initial channels
4643 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4645 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4646 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4648 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4650 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4651 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4652 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4654 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4659 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4662 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4664 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4665 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4666 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4667 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4668 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4669 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4671 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4672 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4673 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4674 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4676 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4677 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4678 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4679 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4680 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4684 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4688 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4690 // Create some initial channels
4691 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4693 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4694 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4695 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4696 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4698 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4700 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4703 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4705 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4706 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4708 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4710 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4711 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4713 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4714 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4715 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4719 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4720 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4721 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4726 // Create some initial channels
4727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4729 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4730 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4731 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4732 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4734 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4736 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4737 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4740 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4741 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4743 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4744 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4745 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4746 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4747 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4748 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4749 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4751 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4752 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4753 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4754 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4758 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4759 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4760 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4761 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4762 // transactions next...
4763 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4766 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4767 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4768 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4769 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4771 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4772 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4776 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4778 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4779 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4781 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4782 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4783 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4784 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4785 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4789 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4790 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4791 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4796 // Create some initial channels
4797 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4799 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4800 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4802 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4804 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4805 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4807 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4809 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4810 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4816 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4817 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4818 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4819 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4821 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4822 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4823 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4825 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4826 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4827 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4828 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4830 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4832 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4833 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4835 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4836 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4837 // transactions next...
4838 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4839 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4840 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4841 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4843 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4844 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4847 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4848 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4850 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4852 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4855 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4856 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4858 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4859 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4860 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4861 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4862 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4863 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4864 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4865 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4869 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4870 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4871 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4872 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4873 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4875 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4881 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4883 // Create some initial channels
4884 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4885 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4887 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4888 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4889 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4890 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4891 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4893 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4895 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4897 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4898 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4899 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4900 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4902 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4903 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4904 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4905 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4906 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4908 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4909 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4911 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4913 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4914 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4915 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4916 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4917 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4918 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4919 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4920 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4921 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4922 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4924 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4925 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4926 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4928 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4931 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4935 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4936 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4937 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4942 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4943 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4944 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4945 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4949 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4950 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4951 match msg_events[0] {
4952 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4955 match msg_events[1] {
4956 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4959 match msg_events[2] {
4960 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4961 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4964 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4965 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4969 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4970 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4971 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4972 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4973 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4974 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4975 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4976 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4977 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4978 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4979 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4980 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4981 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4983 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4988 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4989 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4990 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4991 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4992 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4995 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4996 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4997 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4998 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5000 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5001 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5003 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5004 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5005 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5007 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5008 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5009 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5010 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5011 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5013 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5015 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5016 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5017 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5018 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5019 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5020 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5022 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5023 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5024 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5027 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5032 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5033 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5034 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5035 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5036 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5037 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5039 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5040 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5041 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5042 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5043 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5044 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5045 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5047 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5049 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5053 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5054 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5056 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5057 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5059 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5063 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5064 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5066 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5067 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5068 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5069 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5070 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5071 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5072 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5073 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5074 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5075 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5076 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5077 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5078 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5080 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5081 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5082 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5083 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5084 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5085 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5086 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5087 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5088 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5091 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5092 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5096 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5098 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5099 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5100 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5101 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5102 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5103 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5104 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5105 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5106 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5107 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5111 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5114 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5116 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5117 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5118 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5125 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5131 // Create some initial channels
5132 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5134 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5135 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5136 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5137 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5138 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5140 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5141 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5143 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5148 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5152 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5153 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5156 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5157 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5158 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5159 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5160 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5161 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5162 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5166 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5167 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5169 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5170 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5171 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5172 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5173 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5174 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5177 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5178 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5179 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5180 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5181 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5182 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5183 // use the same payment hashes.
5184 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5189 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5192 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5193 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5194 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5195 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5196 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5197 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5198 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5202 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5203 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5204 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5206 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5209 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5211 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5213 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5215 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5216 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5218 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5220 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5222 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5224 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5225 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5227 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5229 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5232 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5234 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5235 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5238 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5240 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5241 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5243 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5244 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5245 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5246 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5247 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5249 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5250 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5251 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5252 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5253 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5254 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5256 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5259 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5260 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5261 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5262 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5263 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5266 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5267 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5268 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5273 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5274 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5275 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5276 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5278 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5282 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5283 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5284 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5285 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5286 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5287 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5288 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5289 if deliver_last_raa {
5290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5292 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5295 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5296 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5297 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5298 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5300 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5301 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5302 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5304 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5305 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5306 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5308 if announce_latest {
5309 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5311 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5313 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5314 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5315 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5318 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5322 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5326 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5327 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5328 if deliver_last_raa {
5329 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5331 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5335 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5336 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5337 let mut a_done = false;
5338 for msg in cs_msgs {
5340 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5341 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5342 // should be failed-backwards here.
5343 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5344 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5345 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5346 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5348 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5353 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5354 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5355 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5357 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5358 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5361 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5362 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5363 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5364 if announce_latest {
5365 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5366 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5367 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5370 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5376 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5377 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5378 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5379 let mut as_updates = 0;
5380 for event in as_events.iter() {
5381 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5382 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5383 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5384 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5386 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5388 if network_update.is_some() {
5391 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5393 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5394 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5395 if announce_latest {
5396 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5397 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5399 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5401 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5402 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5403 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5404 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5405 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5406 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5407 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5408 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5409 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5411 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5413 if network_update.is_some() {
5416 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5418 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5419 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5420 if announce_latest {
5421 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5423 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5425 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5426 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5427 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5428 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5429 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5430 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5434 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5435 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5439 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5440 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5444 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5445 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5446 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5447 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5451 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5452 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5455 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5457 // Create some initial channels
5458 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5460 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5461 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5462 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5465 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5466 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5470 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5472 let htlc_timeout = {
5473 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5474 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5475 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5476 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5477 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5478 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5482 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5483 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5484 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5486 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5487 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5488 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5489 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5490 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5491 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5492 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5493 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5494 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5495 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5496 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5500 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5501 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5502 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5503 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5507 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5508 let seed = [42; 32];
5509 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5510 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5511 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5512 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5513 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5514 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5517 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5519 // Create some initial channels
5520 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5522 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5523 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5524 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5526 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5527 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5528 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5529 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5530 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5532 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5533 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5534 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5535 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5536 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5538 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5539 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5540 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5541 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5542 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5543 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5544 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5545 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5548 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5549 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5550 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5551 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5555 let htlc_timeout = {
5556 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5557 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5558 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5559 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5563 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5564 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5565 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5567 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5568 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5569 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5570 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5571 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5573 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5575 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5576 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5577 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5578 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5582 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5588 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5590 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5591 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5593 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5594 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5595 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5597 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5598 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5599 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5601 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5602 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5603 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5605 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5606 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5607 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5610 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5617 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5619 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5620 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5621 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5624 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5625 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5626 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5629 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5630 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5631 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5636 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5638 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5639 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5642 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5643 let mut block = Block {
5644 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5647 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5648 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5649 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5651 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5652 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5654 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5657 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5662 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5664 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5665 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5668 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5670 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5671 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5672 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5674 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5675 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5677 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5678 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5679 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5681 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5682 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5687 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5691 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5692 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5694 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5695 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5696 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5697 // actually revoked.
5698 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5699 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5700 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5701 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5704 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5706 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5708 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5709 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5711 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5713 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5715 if check_revoke_no_close {
5716 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5720 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721 let mut block = Block {
5722 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5725 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5726 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5727 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5729 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5730 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5735 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5739 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5740 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5741 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5742 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5743 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5744 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5745 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5747 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5748 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5749 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5751 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5752 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5753 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5755 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5756 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5760 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5761 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5762 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5763 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5764 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5769 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5774 //Force duplicate channel ids
5775 for node in nodes.iter() {
5776 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5779 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5780 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5781 let push_msat=10001;
5782 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5783 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5786 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5787 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5791 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5797 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5798 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5799 let push_msat=10001;
5800 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5802 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5803 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5804 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5805 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5806 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5808 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5809 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5810 let push_msat=10001;
5811 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5812 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5813 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5815 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5816 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5817 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5819 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5820 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5821 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5823 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5824 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5825 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5827 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5828 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5829 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5830 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5831 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5832 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5836 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5842 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5843 let push_msat=10001;
5844 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5845 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5847 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5849 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5850 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5851 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5852 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5857 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5860 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5861 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5862 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5863 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5865 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5872 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5873 // pending_update_fee.
5875 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5876 *feerate_lock += 20;
5878 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5883 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5884 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5885 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5892 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5893 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5894 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5896 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5897 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5898 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5900 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5901 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5902 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5903 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5905 // Flush the pending fee update.
5906 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5907 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5909 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5912 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5913 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5914 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5915 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5916 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5917 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5918 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5919 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5920 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5922 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5923 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5926 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5927 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5928 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5929 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5930 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5931 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5932 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5933 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5934 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5940 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5941 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5942 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5944 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5949 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5951 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5952 // pending_update_fee.
5954 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5955 *feerate_lock += 200;
5957 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5960 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5962 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5963 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5964 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5969 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5971 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5972 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5973 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5975 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5977 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5978 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5979 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5981 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5982 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5983 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5984 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5985 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5986 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5987 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5989 // Flush the pending fee update.
5990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5991 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5993 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5994 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5997 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5998 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5999 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6000 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6002 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6003 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6004 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6005 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6007 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6008 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6009 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6011 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6012 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6013 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6014 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6015 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6016 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6017 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6018 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6019 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6024 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6025 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6026 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6027 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6028 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6030 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6031 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6034 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6036 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6037 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6041 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6044 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6048 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6049 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6051 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6053 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6056 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6059 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6060 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6061 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6067 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6068 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6069 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6072 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6073 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6075 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6076 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6077 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6078 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6080 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6081 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6082 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6084 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6085 // pending_update_fee.
6087 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6088 *feerate_lock += 20;
6090 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6093 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6095 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6096 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6097 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6102 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6104 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6105 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6106 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6108 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6110 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6111 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6112 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6113 let payment_event = {
6114 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6125 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6127 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6128 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6130 // Flush the pending fee update.
6131 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6132 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6134 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6135 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6138 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6139 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6142 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6143 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6149 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6151 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6153 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6154 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6155 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6156 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6157 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6158 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6161 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6162 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6165 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6166 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6168 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6169 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6170 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6171 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6172 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6173 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6174 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6179 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6183 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6184 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6189 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6191 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6192 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6195 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6196 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6201 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6202 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6205 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6206 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6211 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6213 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6214 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6216 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6217 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6218 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6219 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6223 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6224 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6228 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6229 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6231 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6232 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6233 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6234 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6236 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6237 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6241 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6242 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6246 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6247 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6249 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6250 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6253 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6256 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6259 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6263 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6264 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6265 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6272 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6273 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6274 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6278 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6279 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6280 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6281 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6285 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6286 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6287 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6289 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6290 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291 let payment_event = {
6292 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6297 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6298 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6302 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6308 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6309 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6311 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6312 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6313 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6315 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6316 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6321 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let channel_value = 100000;
6327 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6330 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6332 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6333 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6335 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6336 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6337 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6339 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6340 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6342 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6345 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6347 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6348 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6352 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6353 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6354 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6356 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6357 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6358 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6361 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6362 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6364 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6365 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6366 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6367 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6368 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6369 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6376 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6383 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6384 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6385 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6386 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6387 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6389 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6390 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6391 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6393 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6395 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6396 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6397 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6398 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6401 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6402 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6403 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6405 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6409 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6410 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6411 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6415 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6416 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6418 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6419 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6420 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6421 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6422 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6423 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6425 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6429 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6430 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6431 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6434 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6435 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6438 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6439 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6441 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6442 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6443 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6445 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6449 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6450 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6454 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6455 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6457 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6458 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6460 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6461 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6462 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6464 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6465 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6466 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6472 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6473 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6480 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6481 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6483 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6484 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6485 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6487 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6488 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6489 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6491 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6495 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6496 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6497 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6498 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6502 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6504 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6505 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6506 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6508 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6509 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6511 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6514 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6515 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6516 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6517 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6518 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6519 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6520 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6521 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6522 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6523 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6526 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6527 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6528 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6530 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6532 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6534 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6535 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6536 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6542 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6543 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6549 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6550 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6551 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6554 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6557 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6560 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6565 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6567 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6573 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6574 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6579 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6580 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6582 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6583 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6588 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6591 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6594 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6596 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6597 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6598 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6600 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6604 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6605 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6610 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6611 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6613 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6614 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6616 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6618 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6621 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6622 failure_code: 0x8000,
6625 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6627 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6628 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6629 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6631 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6635 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6636 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6642 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6644 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6646 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6649 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6650 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6651 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6653 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6654 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6655 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6656 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6657 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6658 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6659 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6665 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6667 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6669 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6670 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6671 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6673 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6677 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6678 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6683 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6684 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6686 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6688 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6691 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6693 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6695 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6696 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6697 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6698 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6699 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6700 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6701 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6707 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6709 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6711 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6712 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6713 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6719 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6720 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6725 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6726 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6728 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6729 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6732 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6733 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6737 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6739 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6741 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6743 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6744 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6745 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6746 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6747 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6748 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6749 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6754 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6755 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6757 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6758 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6759 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6760 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6765 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6766 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6767 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6772 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6773 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6774 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6776 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6779 let mut payment_event = {
6780 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6784 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6790 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6791 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6793 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6794 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6797 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6798 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6800 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6802 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6803 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6804 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6806 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6807 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6808 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6809 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6810 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6811 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6812 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6818 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6821 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6822 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6823 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6826 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6828 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6829 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6830 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6831 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6832 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6833 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6841 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6842 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6843 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6844 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6846 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6847 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6848 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6851 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6853 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6855 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6856 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6857 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6858 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6860 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6861 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6863 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6864 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6869 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6870 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6871 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6874 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6875 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6877 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6879 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6880 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6885 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6886 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6891 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6892 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6893 if announce_latest {
6894 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6896 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6899 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6903 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6904 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6905 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6906 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6908 let mut first_failed = false;
6909 for event in events {
6911 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6912 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6913 assert!(!first_failed);
6914 first_failed = true;
6916 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6925 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6926 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6927 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6930 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6931 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6932 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6933 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6934 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6935 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6936 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6941 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6942 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6944 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6946 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6947 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6949 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6950 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6952 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6954 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6955 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6958 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6960 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6961 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6962 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6963 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6964 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6966 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6967 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6969 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6970 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6971 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6972 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6974 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6975 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6976 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6978 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6984 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6985 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6987 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6988 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6989 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6990 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6992 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6993 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6995 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
6997 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6998 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7001 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7002 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7003 else { first = false; }
7005 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7008 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7009 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7010 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7019 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7020 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7021 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7022 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7026 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7027 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7029 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7030 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7031 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7032 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7033 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7034 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7035 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7036 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7037 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7039 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7040 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7042 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7045 } else { assert!(false) }
7047 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7048 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7049 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7050 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7051 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7053 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7054 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7056 } else { assert!(false); }
7058 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7059 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7060 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7061 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7062 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7063 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7065 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7067 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7068 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7069 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7073 } else { panic!(); }
7074 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7076 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7077 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7078 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7079 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7080 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7082 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7085 } else { assert!(false); }
7089 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7090 // We want to be sure that :
7091 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7092 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7093 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7094 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7095 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7101 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7102 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7103 // during signing due to revoked tx
7104 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7105 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7110 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7112 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7114 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7115 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7116 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7117 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7119 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7120 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7122 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7123 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7125 // Restore node A from previous state
7126 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7127 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7128 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7129 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7130 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7131 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7132 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7134 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7135 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7136 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7137 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7138 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7139 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7141 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7142 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7146 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7147 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7148 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7149 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7153 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7154 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7156 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7158 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7159 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7163 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7164 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7167 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7168 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7169 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7170 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7171 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7172 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7173 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7175 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7176 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7181 panic!("Unexpected event")
7185 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7186 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7187 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7188 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7191 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7192 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7194 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7195 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7196 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7197 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7198 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7199 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7200 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7201 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7205 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7206 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7207 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7208 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7213 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7215 // Create some initial channels
7216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7218 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7219 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7220 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7221 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7222 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7223 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7227 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7228 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7232 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7233 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7237 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7238 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7239 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7241 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7243 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7244 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7245 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7246 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7247 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7248 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7249 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7250 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7256 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7257 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7259 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7260 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7261 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7262 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7266 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7267 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7268 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7273 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7275 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7276 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7277 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7280 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7281 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7283 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7284 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7285 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7286 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7287 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7288 for e in msg_events {
7290 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7291 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7292 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7293 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7294 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7301 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7302 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7303 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7304 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7305 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7306 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7308 // Reestablish chan_1
7309 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7310 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7311 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7312 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7313 // Reestablish chan_2
7314 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7315 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7316 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7317 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7318 // Reestablish chan_3
7319 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7320 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7321 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7322 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7324 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7325 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7326 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7327 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7328 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7329 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7330 for e in msg_events {
7332 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7333 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7334 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7335 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7336 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7339 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7345 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7346 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7347 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7348 // to forward through that channel.
7349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7351 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7352 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7353 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7355 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7356 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7357 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7358 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7360 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7362 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7363 // not send for private channels.
7364 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7365 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7366 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7367 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7368 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7370 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7371 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7372 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7375 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7376 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7379 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7380 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7381 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7382 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7383 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7384 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7385 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7386 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7387 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7388 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7390 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7391 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7392 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7394 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7396 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7398 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7399 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7400 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7401 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7402 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7403 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7404 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7405 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7406 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7408 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7409 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7411 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7413 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7414 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7415 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7417 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7418 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7419 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7420 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7421 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7423 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7425 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7427 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7428 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7430 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7431 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7433 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7434 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7435 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7436 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7437 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7439 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7440 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7441 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7442 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7444 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7445 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7446 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7447 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7448 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7449 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7451 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7453 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7454 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7455 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7456 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7457 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7458 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7459 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7461 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7462 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7463 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7464 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7468 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7469 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7471 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7472 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7474 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7476 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7477 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7478 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7479 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7480 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7481 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7482 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7483 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7485 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7486 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7487 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7488 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7489 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7490 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7491 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7492 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7494 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7496 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7497 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7501 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7502 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7503 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7510 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7512 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7513 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7514 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7516 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7517 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7518 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7519 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7520 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7521 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7523 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7524 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7525 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7526 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7530 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7531 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7533 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7535 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7536 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7539 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7543 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7544 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7545 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7546 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7547 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7548 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7549 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7550 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7554 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7555 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7556 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7557 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7559 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7560 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7561 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7562 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7563 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7564 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7565 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7566 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7567 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7568 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7569 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7570 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7571 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7575 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7577 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7578 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7580 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7582 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7583 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7584 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7586 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7587 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7588 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7589 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7590 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7591 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7592 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7593 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7594 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7598 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7600 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7601 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7605 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7606 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7607 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7610 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7615 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7616 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7617 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7618 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7619 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7620 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7621 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7622 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7623 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7624 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7625 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7627 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7628 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7629 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7631 // Revoke local commitment tx
7632 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7634 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7635 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7636 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7637 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7639 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7640 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7642 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7643 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7644 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7646 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7647 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7648 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7650 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7651 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7652 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7653 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7655 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7656 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7657 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7658 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7659 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7660 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7661 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7662 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7664 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7671 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7672 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7673 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7675 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7676 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7677 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7678 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7680 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7681 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7682 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7683 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7684 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7685 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7687 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7688 // available, which we check here:
7689 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7690 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7691 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7693 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7694 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7696 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7697 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7698 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7699 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7701 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7702 // output, checked above).
7703 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7704 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7705 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7707 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7708 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7709 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7710 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7711 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7715 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7716 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7717 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7718 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7719 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7721 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7724 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7725 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7726 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7727 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7728 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7731 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7737 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7738 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7739 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7740 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7742 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7745 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7746 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7747 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7748 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7749 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7750 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7751 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7752 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7756 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7757 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7759 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7761 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7762 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7763 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7764 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7765 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7766 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7767 // up bumped justice generation.
7768 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7776 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7777 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7778 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7781 // Provide preimage for one
7782 // Check aggregation
7784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7787 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7789 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7790 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7791 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7793 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7794 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7795 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7796 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7797 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7799 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7800 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7801 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7803 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7805 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7809 let feerate_timeout;
7810 let feerate_preimage;
7812 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7813 // 9 transactions including:
7814 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7815 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7816 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7818 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7819 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7820 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7821 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7822 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7823 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7824 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7826 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7827 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7829 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7831 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7832 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7833 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7834 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7836 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7837 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7838 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7839 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7843 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7844 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7846 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7847 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7849 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7850 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7852 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7853 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7854 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7856 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7857 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7858 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7859 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7860 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7862 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7863 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7864 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7865 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7866 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7871 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7872 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7876 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7877 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7878 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7879 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7880 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7881 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7882 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7883 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7888 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7889 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7891 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7892 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7894 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7896 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7897 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7898 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7900 // Must revoke without gaps
7901 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7902 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7904 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7905 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7906 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7908 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7909 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7910 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7912 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7916 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7917 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7918 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7920 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7923 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7925 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7926 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7927 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7928 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7930 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7931 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7932 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7934 // Revoke local commitment tx
7935 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7937 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7938 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7942 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7943 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7945 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7947 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7948 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7949 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7950 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7951 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7952 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7956 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7957 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7958 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7960 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7961 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7962 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7967 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7968 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7969 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7977 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7978 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7979 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7981 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7983 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7984 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7986 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7988 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7990 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7991 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7992 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7994 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7995 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7996 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8003 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8004 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8009 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8010 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8011 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8013 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8015 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8016 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8017 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8018 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8022 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8023 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8024 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8030 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8031 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8032 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8035 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8036 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8040 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8041 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8042 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8043 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8045 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8047 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8048 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8049 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8050 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8052 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8053 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8054 route.paths.push(path);
8055 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8056 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8057 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8058 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8059 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8060 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8061 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8062 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8066 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8067 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8076 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8077 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8078 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8080 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8081 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8085 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8086 // values from previous calls.
8087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8088 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8091 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8093 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8094 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8096 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8104 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8105 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8109 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8113 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8115 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8116 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8117 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8118 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8119 } else { panic!(); }
8121 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8123 header: BlockHeader {
8125 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8126 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8127 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8131 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8132 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8133 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8134 } else { panic!(); }
8136 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8137 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8138 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8139 block.header.time += 1;
8140 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8141 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8142 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8145 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8146 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8148 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8149 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8150 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8153 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8154 // values from previous calls.
8155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8156 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8159 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8160 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8161 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8162 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8169 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8170 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8178 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8179 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8180 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8181 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8183 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8184 // resulting events.
8185 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8189 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8190 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8191 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8193 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8194 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8195 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8199 // We should fail the payment back
8200 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8201 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8202 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8203 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8204 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8211 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8212 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8213 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8215 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8216 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8217 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8218 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8220 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8221 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8222 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8223 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8225 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8226 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8227 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8228 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8232 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8233 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8234 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8235 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8237 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8238 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8239 // commitment at same time.
8241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8244 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8246 // Create some initial channel
8247 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8248 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8250 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8251 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8253 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8254 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8256 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8257 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8258 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8259 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8261 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8262 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8263 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8264 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8265 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8266 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8267 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8268 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8271 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8272 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8273 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8274 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8275 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8277 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8278 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8280 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8282 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8283 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8284 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8285 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8286 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8287 } else { assert!(false); }
8288 } else { assert!(false); };
8289 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8291 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8296 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8297 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8298 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8299 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8300 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8305 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8307 // Create some initial channel
8308 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8309 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8311 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8312 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8314 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8315 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8317 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8318 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8319 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8320 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8321 let watchtower_alice = {
8322 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8323 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8324 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8325 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8326 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8327 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8328 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8329 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8332 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8333 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8334 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8335 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8336 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8338 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8340 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8341 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8345 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8346 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8347 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8348 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8349 let watchtower_bob = {
8350 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8351 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8352 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8353 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8354 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8355 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8356 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8357 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8360 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8361 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8363 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8364 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8366 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8370 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8371 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8372 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8373 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8374 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8375 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8376 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8377 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8378 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8379 } else { assert!(false); }
8380 } else { assert!(false); };
8381 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8384 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8385 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8386 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8388 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8391 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8392 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8393 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8397 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8398 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8401 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8402 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8403 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8404 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8405 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8406 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8411 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8412 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8413 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8416 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8417 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8419 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8420 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8421 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8422 // before receiving funding_signed.
8423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8428 // Create an initial channel
8429 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8430 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8431 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8432 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8435 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8436 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8438 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8441 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8443 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8444 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8445 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8449 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8450 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8451 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8452 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8453 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8454 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8455 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8462 // Create some initial channels
8463 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8465 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8466 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8467 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8468 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8469 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8470 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8472 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8473 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8474 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8475 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8476 // this test before #653 fix.
8477 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8478 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8480 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8481 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8483 let htlc_timeout = {
8484 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8485 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8486 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8487 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8491 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8492 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8493 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8494 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8497 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8498 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8499 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8500 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8502 // Steps of the test:
8503 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8504 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8505 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8506 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8507 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8508 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8509 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8510 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8516 // Create some initial channels
8517 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8518 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8520 // Steps (1) and (2):
8521 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8522 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8524 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8525 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8526 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8527 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8528 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8529 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8530 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8532 // Steps (3) and (4):
8533 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8534 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8535 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8536 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8537 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8538 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8540 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8541 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8542 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8543 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8544 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8546 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8547 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8548 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8549 if broadcast_alice {
8550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8552 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8554 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8555 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8559 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8560 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8561 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8563 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8564 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8565 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8566 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8567 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8568 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8570 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8571 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8572 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8573 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8574 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8577 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8578 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8580 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8583 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8584 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8585 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8588 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8590 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8591 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8592 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8597 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8598 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8599 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8605 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8607 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8610 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8612 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8613 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8614 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8619 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8622 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8623 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8624 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8625 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8626 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8627 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8628 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8629 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8630 if broadcast_alice {
8631 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8633 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8635 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8636 if broadcast_alice {
8637 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8638 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8639 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8640 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8642 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8643 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8645 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8646 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8651 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8652 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8654 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8655 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8656 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8657 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8659 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8660 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8661 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8663 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8664 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8665 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8666 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8667 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8668 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8669 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8671 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8672 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8678 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8679 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8680 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8681 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8682 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8686 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8687 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8688 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8690 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8691 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8692 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8693 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8697 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8699 // Create an initial channel
8700 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8701 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8703 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8705 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8706 // that it is rejected.
8707 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8712 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8713 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8714 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8715 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8716 // move forward with it.
8717 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8718 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8724 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8725 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8727 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8730 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8731 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8733 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8734 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8735 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8736 added_monitors.clear();
8738 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8741 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8743 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8746 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8747 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8748 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8749 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8752 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8753 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8755 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8756 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8757 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8758 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8759 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8765 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8766 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8767 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8768 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8769 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8770 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8772 let funding_created = {
8773 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8774 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8775 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8776 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8779 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8780 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8781 // still needs to be cleared here.
8782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8784 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8786 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8789 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8790 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8791 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8792 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8793 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8799 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8800 // everything is functional.
8801 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8803 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8804 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8805 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8806 added_monitors.clear();
8809 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8810 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8811 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8812 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8814 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8815 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8816 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8817 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8821 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8822 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8824 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8825 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8826 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8830 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8832 // Create some initial channels
8833 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8834 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8835 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8837 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8838 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8839 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8841 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8842 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8843 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8845 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8846 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8848 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8849 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8850 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8852 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8853 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8855 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8856 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8857 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8859 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8860 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8863 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8864 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8869 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8870 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8874 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8875 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8876 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8877 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8878 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8879 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8881 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8882 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8883 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8887 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8888 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8890 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8891 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8892 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8893 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8897 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8899 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8900 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8901 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8903 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8904 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8905 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8906 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8909 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8910 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8913 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8916 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8917 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8920 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8921 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8923 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8924 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8925 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8927 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8928 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8929 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8930 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8931 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8932 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8933 } else { panic!(); }
8934 } else { panic!(); }
8935 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8938 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8939 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8940 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8941 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8942 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8943 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8944 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8945 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8946 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8947 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8948 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8949 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8950 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8951 // until we learned about an additional block.
8953 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8954 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8955 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8956 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8957 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8958 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8959 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8961 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8962 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8963 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8964 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8965 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8967 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8968 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8971 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8972 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8974 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8975 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8976 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8978 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8979 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8980 if test_height_before_timelock {
8981 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8982 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8983 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8984 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8986 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8987 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8988 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8989 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8990 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8991 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8993 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8994 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8996 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8997 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8998 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8999 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9000 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9004 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9005 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9006 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9007 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9008 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9009 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9010 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9012 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9017 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9018 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9019 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9023 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9024 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9025 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9027 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9032 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9033 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9034 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9035 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9036 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9037 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9039 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9040 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9041 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9044 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9046 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9047 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9052 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9053 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9059 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9060 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9063 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9065 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9067 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9068 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9069 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9071 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9072 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9073 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9074 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9075 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9077 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9078 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9079 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9080 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9082 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9083 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9084 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9085 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9086 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9087 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9088 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9089 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9091 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9092 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9093 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9094 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9095 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9096 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9097 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9099 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9100 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9101 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9102 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9106 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9107 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9109 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9110 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9111 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9114 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9115 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9116 // the commitment state.
9117 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9119 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9121 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9122 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9125 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9128 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9130 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9131 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9134 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9138 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9144 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9145 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9146 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9147 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9148 let params = RouteParameters {
9149 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9150 final_value_msat: 10000,
9151 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9154 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9156 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9157 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9159 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9161 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9162 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9163 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9164 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9168 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9174 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9175 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9176 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9177 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9179 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9180 let params = RouteParameters {
9181 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9182 final_value_msat: 10000,
9183 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9185 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9186 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9187 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9188 let route = find_route(
9189 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9190 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9193 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9194 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9198 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9199 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9200 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9201 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9204 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9205 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9206 enum ExposureEvent {
9207 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9209 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9211 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9212 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9215 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9216 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9219 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9220 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9221 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9222 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9223 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9224 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9225 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9226 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9229 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9230 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9233 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9235 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9236 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9237 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9238 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9240 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9242 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9243 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9244 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9246 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9249 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9250 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9254 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9255 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9258 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9261 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9262 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9263 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9265 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9266 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9267 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9268 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9270 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9271 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9273 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9274 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9276 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9277 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9280 if dust_outbound_balance {
9281 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9282 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9283 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9284 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9285 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9286 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9289 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9290 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9291 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9292 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9293 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9297 if dust_outbound_balance {
9298 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9299 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9300 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9301 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9302 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9305 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9306 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9307 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9308 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9313 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9314 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9315 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9316 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9317 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9319 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9320 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9321 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9323 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9325 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9326 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9329 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9331 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9332 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9333 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9335 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9336 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9337 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9338 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9340 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9341 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9343 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9344 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9345 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9347 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9348 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9350 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9352 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9355 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9356 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9357 added_monitors.clear();
9361 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9362 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9363 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9364 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9365 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9366 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9367 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9368 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9369 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9370 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9371 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9372 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9373 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);