1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
131 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
133 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
134 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
135 if !send_from_initiator {
136 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
137 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
139 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
141 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
142 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
143 if send_from_initiator {
144 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
145 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
147 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
150 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
151 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
152 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
155 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
156 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
157 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
159 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
160 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
161 if send_from_initiator {
162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
163 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
164 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
165 // well as an additional HTLC.
166 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
168 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
174 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
183 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
184 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
187 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
191 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
192 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
193 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
194 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
195 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
196 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
197 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
198 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
199 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
200 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
202 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
204 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
206 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
208 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
211 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
214 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
215 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
216 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
217 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
218 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
225 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
226 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
227 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
230 let payment_event = {
231 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
232 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
233 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
235 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
238 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
239 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
240 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
241 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
242 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
245 // deliver(1), generate (3):
246 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
247 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
248 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
252 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
253 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
254 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
260 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
261 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
262 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
263 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
270 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
275 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
278 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
281 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
282 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
284 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
294 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
295 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
299 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
300 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
303 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
305 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
307 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
310 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
315 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
316 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
324 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
325 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
326 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
329 let payment_event = {
330 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
331 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
332 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
334 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
337 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
338 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
339 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
340 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
341 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
344 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
347 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
355 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
356 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
359 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
360 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
361 // update_fee (never committed) ->
363 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
364 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
365 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
366 // <- (1) RAA delivered
367 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
368 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
369 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
370 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
372 // B should send no response here
373 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
374 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
377 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
380 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
381 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
382 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
387 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
388 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
389 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
390 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
391 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
396 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
397 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
398 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
399 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
402 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
406 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
408 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
412 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
413 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
414 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
415 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
420 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
424 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
425 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
426 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
428 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
432 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
433 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
436 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
437 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
438 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
440 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
442 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
443 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
447 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
448 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
451 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
456 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
457 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
461 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
466 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
467 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
468 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
469 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
470 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
471 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
472 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
473 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
474 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
475 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
479 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
480 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
482 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
486 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
487 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
488 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
491 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
492 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
493 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
497 fn test_1_conf_open() {
498 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
499 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
500 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
503 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
504 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
505 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
506 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
514 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
516 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
519 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
520 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
523 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
524 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
525 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
527 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
528 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
529 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
531 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
532 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
534 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
536 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
537 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
539 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
541 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
542 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
544 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
545 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
547 added_monitors.clear();
549 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
551 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
552 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
554 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
555 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
556 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
557 added_monitors.clear();
560 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
561 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
563 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
564 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
566 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
567 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
568 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
569 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
573 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
595 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
600 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
603 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
606 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
609 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
610 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
611 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
612 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
613 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
619 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
620 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
623 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
628 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
629 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
632 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
633 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
638 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
642 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
643 let channel_value = 5000;
645 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
646 let channel_id = chan.2;
647 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
648 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
650 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
651 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
652 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
654 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
655 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
657 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
658 *feerate_lock = feerate;
660 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
662 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
664 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
666 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
668 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
670 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
672 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
673 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
674 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
675 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
676 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
677 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
681 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
682 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
685 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
686 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
689 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
691 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
692 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
693 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
694 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
695 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
696 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
697 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
698 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
699 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
701 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
702 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
716 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
717 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
718 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
719 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
720 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
721 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
723 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
724 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
725 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
726 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
728 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
730 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
733 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
736 htlc_signatures: res.1
739 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
741 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
744 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
746 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
747 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
748 //Should produce and error.
749 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
750 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
752 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
753 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
757 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
758 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
761 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
762 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
765 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
768 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
771 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
774 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
775 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
776 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
777 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
778 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
782 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
783 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
784 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
787 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
789 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
790 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
792 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
793 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
794 added_monitors.clear();
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
798 // node[1] has nothing to do
800 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
801 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
804 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
805 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
806 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
810 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
812 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
813 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
819 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
822 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
824 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
826 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
828 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
830 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
831 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
833 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
835 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
839 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
840 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
842 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
846 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
848 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
849 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
850 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
851 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
856 fn test_update_fee() {
857 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
858 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
859 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
860 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
861 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
862 let channel_id = chan.2;
865 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
866 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
867 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
868 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
869 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
870 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
871 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
872 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
873 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
874 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
875 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
878 // Create and deliver (1)...
881 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
882 feerate = *feerate_lock;
883 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
885 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
888 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
889 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
890 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
892 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
896 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
898 // Generate (2) and (3):
899 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
900 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
904 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
905 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
908 // Create and deliver (4)...
910 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
911 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
913 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
915 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
916 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
917 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
918 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
919 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
924 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
925 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
928 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
931 // Handle (3), creating (6):
932 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
934 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
935 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
938 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
939 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
942 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
943 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
944 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
945 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
953 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
955 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
956 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
958 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
960 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
962 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
965 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
970 fn fake_network_test() {
971 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
972 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
976 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
978 // Create some initial channels
979 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
980 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
981 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
983 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
984 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 // Send some more payments
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
994 // Test failure packets
995 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
996 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
998 // Add a new channel that skips 3
999 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1001 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1010 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1011 hops.push(RouteHop {
1012 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1013 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1014 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1015 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1017 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1019 hops.push(RouteHop {
1020 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1025 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1027 hops.push(RouteHop {
1028 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1030 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1033 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1035 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1036 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1039 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1040 hops.push(RouteHop {
1041 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1046 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1048 hops.push(RouteHop {
1049 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1054 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1056 hops.push(RouteHop {
1057 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1059 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1062 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1064 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1065 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1068 // Claim the rebalances...
1069 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1070 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1072 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1073 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1075 // Send some payments across both channels
1076 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1077 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1078 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1082 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1084 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1086 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1088 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1089 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1090 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1092 // Close down the channels...
1093 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1111 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1112 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1113 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1114 // commitment dance rounds.
1115 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1116 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1118 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1124 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1126 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1135 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1138 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1140 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1141 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1143 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1146 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1147 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1149 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1170 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1172 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1189 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1195 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1201 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1204 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1206 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1210 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1217 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1221 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1242 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1263 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1266 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1268 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1274 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1278 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1279 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1281 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1282 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1283 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1284 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1285 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1287 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1290 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1292 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1294 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1295 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1297 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1298 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1303 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1304 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1306 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1307 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1308 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1313 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1315 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1317 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1323 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1328 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1348 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1349 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1351 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1353 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1355 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1357 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1359 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1360 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1361 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1364 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1366 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1369 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1373 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1377 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1378 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1380 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1381 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1385 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1387 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1389 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1390 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1393 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1394 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1395 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1396 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1401 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1402 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1403 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1405 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1407 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1409 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1410 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1411 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1412 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1418 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1424 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1427 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1428 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1431 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1434 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1435 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1436 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1438 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1439 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1440 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1442 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1444 amount_msat: 3460001,
1445 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1447 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1450 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1453 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1460 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1461 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1463 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1466 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1469 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1472 htlc_signatures: res.1
1475 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1477 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1479 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1480 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1482 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1483 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1485 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1487 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1491 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1497 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1510 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1515 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1517 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1519 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1521 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1522 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1523 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1526 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1527 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1528 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1529 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1531 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1535 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1536 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1537 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1540 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1542 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1547 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1548 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1550 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1555 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1565 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1572 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1593 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1598 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1601 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1602 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1603 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1604 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1605 // commitment transaction fee.
1606 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1608 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1609 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1610 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1613 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1615 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1616 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1620 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1621 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1622 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1623 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1629 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1631 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1632 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1633 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1634 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1636 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1637 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1638 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1639 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1640 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1641 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1642 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1644 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1645 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1646 match msg_events[0] {
1647 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1648 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1655 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1656 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1657 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1658 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1664 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1665 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1672 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1679 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1680 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1681 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1694 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1695 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1698 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1700 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1703 // Add a pending HTLC.
1704 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705 let payment_event_1 = {
1706 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1709 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1715 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1717 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1721 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1731 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1737 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1759 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1768 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1784 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1787 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1790 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1792 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1800 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1804 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1806 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1808 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1809 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1829 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1831 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1835 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1838 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1840 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1842 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1845 // adding pending output.
1846 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1847 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1848 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1849 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1850 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1851 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1852 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1853 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1854 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1856 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1857 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1858 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1860 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1861 let payment_event_1 = {
1862 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1863 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1865 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1866 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1867 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1871 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1872 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1874 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1875 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1880 // split the rest to test holding cell
1881 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1882 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1884 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1886 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1887 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1890 // now see if they go through on both sides
1891 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1892 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1893 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1895 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1898 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1900 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1901 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1907 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1908 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1909 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1914 // flush the pending htlc
1915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1916 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1919 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1925 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1930 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1933 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1935 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1936 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1937 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1940 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1942 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1943 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1946 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1949 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1952 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1954 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1957 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1960 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1961 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1962 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1964 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1968 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1974 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1978 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1982 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1992 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1993 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1996 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1997 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2002 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2016 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2025 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2036 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2039 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2041 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2044 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2051 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052 // initial fulfill/CS.
2053 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2063 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091 // on-chain as necessary).
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2098 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2105 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2112 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2116 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2123 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2128 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2130 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2134 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2152 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2165 // Create some initial channels
2166 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2171 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2178 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2189 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2195 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2201 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2204 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2210 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2217 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2223 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2226 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2227 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2229 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2232 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2233 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2234 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2235 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2243 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2244 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2245 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2247 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2248 let node2_commitment_txid;
2250 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2252 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2253 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2255 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2256 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2257 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2259 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2261 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2262 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2267 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2268 // confusing us in the following tests.
2269 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2271 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2272 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2273 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2276 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2277 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2280 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2281 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2284 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2288 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2294 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2296 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2297 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2298 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2304 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2307 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2309 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2310 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2313 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2316 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2325 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2327 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2328 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2329 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2331 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2332 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2333 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2334 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2337 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2342 fn test_justice_tx() {
2343 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2344 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2345 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2348 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2349 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2350 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2352 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2353 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2354 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2355 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2359 // Create some new channels:
2360 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2362 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2363 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2364 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2365 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2367 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2368 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2369 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2373 // Revoke the old state
2374 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2377 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2379 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2380 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2383 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2385 node_txn.truncate(1);
2387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2388 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2391 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2393 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2394 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2396 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2398 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2399 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2401 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2403 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2404 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2406 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2407 // Create some new channels:
2408 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2410 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2414 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2417 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2418 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2419 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2422 // Revoke the old state
2423 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2425 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2427 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2429 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2431 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2435 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2437 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2442 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2452 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2453 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2457 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2458 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2459 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2460 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2461 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2462 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2463 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2464 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2465 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2467 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2468 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2474 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2477 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2478 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2486 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2487 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2493 // Create some new channel:
2494 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2496 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2497 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2498 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2499 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2500 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2502 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2503 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2504 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2505 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2506 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2510 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2512 //Revoke the old state
2513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2516 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2519 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2523 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2525 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2528 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2529 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2531 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2532 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2533 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2536 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2537 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2538 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2540 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2544 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2551 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2552 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2558 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2560 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2561 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2562 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2563 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2564 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2565 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2567 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2570 //Revoke the old state
2571 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2574 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2576 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2582 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2586 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2587 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2589 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2590 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2591 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2592 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2593 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2594 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2596 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2597 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2598 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2600 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2601 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2602 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2604 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2607 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2610 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2614 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2615 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2618 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2619 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2620 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2622 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2628 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2629 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2630 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2631 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2632 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2633 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2634 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2635 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2636 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2638 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2639 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2640 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2641 // PaymentSent event).
2643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2646 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2648 // Create some initial channels
2649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2650 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2652 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2653 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2654 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2656 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2658 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2659 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2660 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2662 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2663 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2665 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2666 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2667 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2669 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2671 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2673 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2674 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2675 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2676 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2677 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2679 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2680 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2682 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2683 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2684 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2685 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2686 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2687 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2691 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2692 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2693 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2694 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2695 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2697 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2698 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2699 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2700 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2702 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2703 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2704 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2705 added_monitors.clear();
2707 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2709 match forwarded_events[0] {
2710 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2713 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2714 } else { panic!(); }
2715 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2716 } else { panic!(); }
2717 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2719 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2727 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2736 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2737 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2738 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2740 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2741 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2745 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2746 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2747 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2748 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2749 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2750 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2751 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2752 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2753 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2756 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2761 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2762 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2764 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2771 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2772 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2773 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2774 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2776 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2777 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2778 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2779 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2780 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2781 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2784 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2785 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2786 let commitment_spend =
2787 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2788 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2789 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2790 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2793 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2794 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2795 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2799 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2800 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2801 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2804 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2806 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2809 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2810 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2812 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2813 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2814 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2815 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2816 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2818 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2820 let mut first_claimed = false;
2821 for event in events {
2823 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2824 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2825 assert!(!first_claimed);
2826 first_claimed = true;
2828 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2829 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2832 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2833 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2837 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2840 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2841 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2842 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2843 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2844 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2845 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2847 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2849 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2850 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2851 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2852 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2853 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2854 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2855 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2857 // Create some intial channels
2858 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2859 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2861 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2862 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2863 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2865 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2867 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2868 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2870 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2872 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2875 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2879 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2880 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2881 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2882 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2883 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2887 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2888 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2890 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2891 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2894 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2896 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2897 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2898 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2899 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2900 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2903 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2904 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2906 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2908 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2909 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2911 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2913 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2916 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2920 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2922 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2924 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2925 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2930 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2932 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2933 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2934 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2935 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2936 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2949 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2959 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2963 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2971 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2974 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2978 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2979 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2980 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2981 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2985 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2986 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2987 // and fail backward accordingly.
2989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2994 // Create some initial channels
2995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2998 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2999 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001 // Revoke the old state
3002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3004 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3006 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3007 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3008 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3018 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3020 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3024 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3026 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3032 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3033 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3034 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3035 // commitment transaction anymore.
3036 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3037 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3038 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3039 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3040 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3041 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3043 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3044 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3045 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3046 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3047 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3053 // Create some initial channels
3054 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3057 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3058 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3061 // Revoke the old state
3062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3064 let value = if use_dust {
3065 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3066 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3067 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3070 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3072 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3074 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3078 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3082 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3083 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3085 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3087 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3099 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3100 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3101 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3115 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3119 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3120 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3123 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3124 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3125 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3126 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3127 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3133 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3134 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3139 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3142 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3143 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3146 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3147 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3149 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3154 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3156 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3157 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3160 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3161 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3167 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3171 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3174 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3175 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3176 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3177 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3180 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3181 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3182 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3183 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3190 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3191 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3192 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3193 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3194 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3200 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3201 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3202 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3203 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3205 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3207 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3208 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3209 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3213 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3216 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3217 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3218 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3219 // that we should update our routing table for.
3220 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3221 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3228 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3229 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3245 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3246 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3250 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3251 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3252 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3253 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3254 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3258 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3259 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3260 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3261 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3262 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3266 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3270 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3271 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3273 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3275 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3276 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3279 let payment_event = {
3280 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3282 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3284 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3285 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3288 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3289 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3291 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3294 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3297 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3299 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3302 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3303 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3304 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3305 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3306 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3308 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3309 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3315 onion_routing_packet,
3317 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3321 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3323 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3324 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3329 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3330 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3332 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3334 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3339 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3340 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3341 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3345 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3346 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3348 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3349 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3350 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3351 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3353 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3355 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3356 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3357 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3359 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3360 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3361 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3363 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3365 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3366 // registering new transactions
3367 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3368 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3372 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3373 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3377 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3379 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3381 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3383 let mut payment_event = {
3384 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3387 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3389 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3392 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3393 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3395 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3397 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3398 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3399 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3400 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3403 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3404 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3406 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3408 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3409 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3410 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3412 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3413 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3415 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3417 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3418 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3419 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3420 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3421 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3425 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3427 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3428 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3430 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3432 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3434 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3435 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3437 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3438 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3439 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3440 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3441 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3442 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3449 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3450 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3451 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3452 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3453 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3458 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3459 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3461 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3463 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3465 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3466 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3467 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3469 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3472 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3473 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3477 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3478 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3479 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3480 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3481 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3482 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3483 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3484 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3486 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3490 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3491 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3492 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3495 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3496 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3497 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3499 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3500 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3501 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3502 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3504 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3507 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3508 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3510 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3512 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3513 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3515 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3516 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3517 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3519 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3522 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3523 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3524 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3529 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3535 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3538 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3539 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3543 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3545 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3546 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3547 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3548 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3549 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3550 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3551 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3553 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3556 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3558 let payment_event = {
3559 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3562 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3564 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3566 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3568 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3569 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3572 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3573 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3575 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3577 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3578 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3579 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3582 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3583 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3584 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3585 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3588 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3589 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3590 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3598 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3600 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3601 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3602 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3603 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3605 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3606 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3607 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3609 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3610 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3612 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3613 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3614 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3615 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3616 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3617 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3618 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3619 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3621 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3622 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3623 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3624 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3625 // Everything was delivered...
3626 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3629 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3630 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3632 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3636 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3638 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3640 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3642 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3643 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3645 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3646 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3647 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3649 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3650 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3651 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3653 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3659 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3662 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3664 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3665 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3666 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3668 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3669 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3670 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3671 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3672 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3677 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3678 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3680 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3681 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3683 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3684 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3685 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3690 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3691 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3693 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3695 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3696 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3697 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3700 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3701 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3702 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3703 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3706 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3707 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3708 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3716 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3717 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3718 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3719 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3720 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3721 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3723 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3725 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3726 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3729 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3731 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3732 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3734 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3735 // Everything was delivered...
3736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3739 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3740 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3743 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3745 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3747 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3748 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3751 // Channel should still work fine...
3752 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3753 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3754 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3758 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3759 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3760 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3761 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3762 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3766 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3767 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3768 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3769 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3770 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3774 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3775 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3776 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3778 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3779 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3780 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3781 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3782 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3783 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3785 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3786 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3788 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3789 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3791 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3793 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3794 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3795 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3805 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3806 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3807 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3808 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3809 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3810 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3813 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3815 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3816 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3817 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3823 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3825 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3826 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3827 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3828 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3829 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3830 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3831 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3836 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3837 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3838 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3843 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3844 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3845 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3846 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3847 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3848 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3853 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3854 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3855 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3857 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3858 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3859 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3861 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3862 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3863 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3865 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3866 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3867 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3869 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3870 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3871 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3872 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3873 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3874 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3875 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3876 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3878 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3879 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3880 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3881 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3882 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3883 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3885 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3886 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3887 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3888 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3892 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3893 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3895 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3896 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3899 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3901 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3902 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3903 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3904 let mut found_announcement = false;
3905 for event in msgs.iter() {
3907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3908 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3910 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3914 assert!(found_announcement);
3918 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3919 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3920 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3924 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3925 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3927 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3929 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3930 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3931 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3934 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3937 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3941 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3944 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3947 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3948 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3949 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3950 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3951 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3952 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3953 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3955 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3956 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3957 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3959 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3960 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3961 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3966 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3967 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3968 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3974 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3975 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3977 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3978 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3979 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3980 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3981 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3982 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3984 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3985 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3986 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3987 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3989 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3990 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3992 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3993 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3995 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3997 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3998 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3999 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4000 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4001 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4003 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4004 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4005 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4008 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4009 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4010 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4011 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4012 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4013 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4014 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4017 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4018 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4019 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4020 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4021 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4022 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4023 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4026 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4027 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4028 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4031 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4032 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4033 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4036 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4037 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4042 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4043 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4045 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4046 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4048 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4049 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4050 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4052 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4058 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4059 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4062 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4063 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4066 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4067 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4068 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4074 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4076 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4077 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4078 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4079 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4080 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4081 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4082 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4086 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4087 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4088 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4091 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4094 let mut block = Block {
4095 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4098 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4099 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4100 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4101 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4102 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4103 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4104 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4107 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4110 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4111 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4112 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4113 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4114 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4116 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4117 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4118 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4119 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4120 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4121 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4125 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4126 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4127 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4130 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4131 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4135 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4136 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4137 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4139 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4140 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4141 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4142 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4144 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4145 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4147 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4149 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4152 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4153 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4154 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4155 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4159 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4165 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4167 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4168 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4173 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4174 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4175 match fail_commit[0] {
4176 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4177 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4180 _ => unreachable!(),
4182 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4184 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4189 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4190 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4191 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4195 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4199 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4200 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4201 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4202 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4203 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4206 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4208 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4210 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4211 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4212 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4213 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4215 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4216 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4217 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4218 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4219 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4220 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4221 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4222 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4223 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4224 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4226 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4227 let config = UserConfig::default();
4228 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4229 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4230 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4231 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4232 default_config: config,
4234 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4235 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4236 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4241 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4242 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4244 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4245 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4249 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4250 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4251 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4252 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4254 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4255 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4257 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4259 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4260 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4261 for node in nodes.iter() {
4262 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4263 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4264 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4267 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4271 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4272 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4273 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4274 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4276 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4277 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4278 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4279 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4280 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4281 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4283 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4284 let channel_value = 100000;
4285 let push_msat = 10001;
4286 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4287 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4288 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4289 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4290 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4291 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4292 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4294 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4296 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4297 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4299 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4301 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4302 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4303 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4304 added_monitors.clear();
4307 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4308 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4310 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4311 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4312 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4313 added_monitors.clear();
4315 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4320 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4321 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4322 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4323 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4325 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4326 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4327 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4328 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4329 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4330 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4331 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4332 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4333 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4334 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4336 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4337 let config = UserConfig::default();
4338 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4339 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4340 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4341 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4342 default_config: config,
4344 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4345 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4346 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4351 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4352 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4354 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4356 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4357 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4359 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4360 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4361 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4363 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4365 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4366 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4369 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4370 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4371 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4372 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4374 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4375 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4376 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4377 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4379 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4380 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4381 for node in nodes.iter() {
4382 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4383 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4384 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4387 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4391 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4395 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4396 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4397 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4398 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4399 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4400 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4401 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4403 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4404 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4406 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4408 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4409 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4410 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4412 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4413 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4414 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4415 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4416 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4417 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4418 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4419 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4420 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4421 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4423 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4424 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4425 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4426 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4427 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4428 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4430 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4431 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4432 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4437 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4438 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4440 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4441 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4444 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4446 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4447 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4451 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4452 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4456 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4457 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4458 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4459 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4460 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4461 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4462 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4463 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4464 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4466 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4467 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4468 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4469 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4470 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4473 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4475 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4476 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4478 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4479 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4480 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4481 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4483 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4485 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4486 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4487 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4488 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4489 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4492 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4493 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4494 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4495 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4496 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4497 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4500 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4501 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4502 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4503 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4504 assert!(read.is_empty());
4505 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4508 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4509 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4510 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4511 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4512 assert!(read.is_empty());
4513 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4516 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4517 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4518 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4519 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4521 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4522 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4523 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4525 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4527 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4530 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4531 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4532 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4533 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4535 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4536 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4537 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4539 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4541 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4542 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4544 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4545 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4546 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4547 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4548 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4551 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4552 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4555 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4558 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4559 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4560 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4561 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4562 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4564 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4565 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4566 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4567 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4568 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4569 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4570 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4572 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4573 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4580 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4581 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4583 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4584 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4585 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4586 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4587 for event in events.drain(..) {
4589 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4590 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4591 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4592 all_outputs.push(outp);
4595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4598 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4599 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4609 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4610 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4616 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4617 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4620 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4621 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4623 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4626 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4629 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4630 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4631 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4632 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4633 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4637 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4638 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4639 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4645 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4646 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4649 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4651 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4652 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4653 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4654 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4656 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4657 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4659 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4660 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4662 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4663 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4664 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4668 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4669 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4670 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4672 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4673 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4678 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4679 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4680 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4681 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4683 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4684 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4685 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4687 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4689 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4690 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4691 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4693 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4694 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4695 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4696 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4697 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4701 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4707 // Create some initial channels
4708 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4710 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4712 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4713 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4714 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4716 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4717 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4719 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4721 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4723 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4727 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4728 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4731 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4732 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4733 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4734 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4735 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4736 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4737 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4739 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4740 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4741 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4743 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4744 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4745 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4749 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4753 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4755 // Create some initial channels
4756 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4758 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4761 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4763 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4764 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4765 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4767 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4768 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4770 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4772 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4775 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4777 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4778 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4779 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4780 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4781 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4784 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4785 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4786 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4787 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4789 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4790 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4791 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4792 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4793 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4797 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4803 // Create some initial channels
4804 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4806 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4807 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4808 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4809 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4811 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4813 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4814 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4816 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4818 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4819 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4821 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4823 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4824 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4826 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4827 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4828 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4832 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4833 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4834 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4839 // Create some initial channels
4840 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4842 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4843 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4844 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4845 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4847 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4849 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4850 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4851 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4853 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4854 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4856 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4857 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4858 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4859 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4860 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4861 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4862 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4864 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4865 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4866 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4867 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4869 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4871 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4872 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4873 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4874 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4875 // transactions next...
4876 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4877 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4880 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4881 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4882 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4884 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4885 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4888 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4889 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4891 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4892 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4894 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4895 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4896 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4897 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4898 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4902 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4903 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4904 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4909 // Create some initial channels
4910 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4912 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4913 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4915 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4917 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4922 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4923 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4924 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4927 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4929 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4930 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4931 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4932 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4934 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4935 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4936 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4938 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4939 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4940 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4941 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4943 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4945 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4946 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4948 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4949 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4950 // transactions next...
4951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4952 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4953 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4956 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4961 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4963 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4965 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4966 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4968 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4969 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4971 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4972 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4973 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4974 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4975 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4976 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4977 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4978 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4982 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4983 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4984 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4985 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4986 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4988 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4994 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4996 // Create some initial channels
4997 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4998 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5000 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5001 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5002 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5003 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5004 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5006 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5010 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5011 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5012 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5013 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5015 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5016 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5018 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5019 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5021 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5022 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5024 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5026 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5027 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5028 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5029 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5030 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5031 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5032 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5033 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5034 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5035 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5037 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5038 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5039 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5041 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5042 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5044 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5048 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5049 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5050 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5055 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5056 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5057 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5058 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5062 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5063 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5064 match msg_events[0] {
5065 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5068 match msg_events[1] {
5069 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5072 match msg_events[2] {
5073 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5074 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5075 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5076 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5077 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5082 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5083 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5084 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5085 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5086 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5087 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5088 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5089 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5090 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5091 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5092 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5093 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5094 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5096 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5101 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5102 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5103 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5104 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5105 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5108 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5109 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5110 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5111 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5113 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5114 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5116 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5117 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5120 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5121 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5122 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5123 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5124 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5126 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5128 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5129 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5130 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5131 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5132 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5133 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5135 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5136 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5137 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5139 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5140 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5142 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5143 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5145 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5146 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5147 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5148 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5149 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5150 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5152 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5153 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5154 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5155 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5156 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5157 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5158 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5160 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5161 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5162 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5163 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5166 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5167 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5169 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5170 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5172 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5176 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5177 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5179 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5180 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5181 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5182 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5183 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5184 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5185 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5186 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5187 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5188 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5189 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5190 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5191 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5193 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5194 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5195 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5196 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5197 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5198 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5199 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5200 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5201 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5204 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5205 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5207 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5209 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5211 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5212 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5213 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5214 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5215 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5216 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5217 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5218 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5219 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5220 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5224 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5225 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5227 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5229 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5230 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5231 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5238 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5244 // Create some initial channels
5245 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5247 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5248 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5249 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5250 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5251 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5253 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5254 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5256 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5258 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5259 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5261 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5265 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5266 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5269 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5270 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5271 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5272 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5273 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5275 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5279 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5280 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5282 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5283 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5284 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5285 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5286 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5287 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5290 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5291 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5292 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5293 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5294 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5295 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5296 // use the same payment hashes.
5297 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5302 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5303 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5304 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5305 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5306 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5307 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5308 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5310 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5311 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5313 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5314 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5315 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5319 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5320 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5321 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5322 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5324 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5326 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5328 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5329 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5331 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5333 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5335 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5337 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5338 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5340 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5342 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5345 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5347 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5348 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5351 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5353 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5354 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5356 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5357 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5358 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5359 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5360 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5362 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5363 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5364 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5365 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5366 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5367 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5369 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5372 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5373 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5374 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5375 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5376 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5377 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5379 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5380 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5381 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5386 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5387 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5388 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5389 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5391 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5393 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5395 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5396 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5397 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5398 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5399 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5400 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5401 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5402 if deliver_last_raa {
5403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5405 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5408 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5409 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5410 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5411 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5413 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5414 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5415 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5417 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5418 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5419 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5421 if announce_latest {
5422 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5424 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5426 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5427 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5435 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5439 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5440 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5441 if deliver_last_raa {
5442 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5448 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5449 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5450 let mut a_done = false;
5451 for msg in cs_msgs {
5453 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5454 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5455 // should be failed-backwards here.
5456 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5457 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5458 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5459 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5461 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5466 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5467 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5468 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5470 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5471 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5474 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5475 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5476 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5477 if announce_latest {
5478 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5479 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5480 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5483 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5489 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5490 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5491 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5492 let mut as_updates = 0;
5493 for event in as_events.iter() {
5494 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5495 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5496 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5497 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5499 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5501 if network_update.is_some() {
5504 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5506 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5507 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5508 if announce_latest {
5509 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5510 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5512 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5514 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5515 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5516 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5517 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5518 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5519 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5520 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5521 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5522 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5524 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5526 if network_update.is_some() {
5529 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5531 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5532 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5533 if announce_latest {
5534 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5536 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5538 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5539 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5540 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5541 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5542 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5543 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5547 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5548 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5552 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5553 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5557 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5558 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5559 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5560 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5564 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5568 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5570 // Create some initial channels
5571 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5573 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5574 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5575 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5576 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5578 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5579 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5580 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5582 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5583 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5585 let htlc_timeout = {
5586 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5587 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5588 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5589 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5590 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5591 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5595 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5596 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5597 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5599 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5600 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5601 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5602 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5603 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5604 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5605 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5606 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5607 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5608 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5609 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5613 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5614 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5615 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5616 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5620 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5621 let seed = [42; 32];
5622 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5623 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5624 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5625 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5626 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5627 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5630 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5632 // Create some initial channels
5633 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5635 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5636 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5637 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5639 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5640 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5641 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5642 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5643 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5645 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5646 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5647 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5648 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5649 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5651 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5652 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5653 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5654 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5655 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5656 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5657 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5658 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5661 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5662 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5663 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5664 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5668 let htlc_timeout = {
5669 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5670 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5671 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5672 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5676 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5677 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5678 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5680 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5681 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5682 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5683 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5684 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5685 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5686 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5687 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5688 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5689 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5690 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5691 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5695 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5701 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5703 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5704 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5706 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5707 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5708 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5710 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5711 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5712 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5714 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5715 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5718 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5719 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5720 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5723 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5724 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5725 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5727 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5728 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5730 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5732 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5733 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5734 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5737 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5738 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5739 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5741 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5743 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5744 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5747 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5748 let mut block = Block {
5749 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5752 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5753 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5754 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5756 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5757 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5759 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5762 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5766 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5767 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5769 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5770 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5773 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5775 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5776 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5777 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5779 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5780 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5782 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5783 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5784 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5786 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5787 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5792 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5793 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5794 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5795 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5796 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5797 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5799 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5800 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5801 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5802 // actually revoked.
5803 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5804 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5805 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5806 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5809 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5810 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5811 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5813 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5814 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5816 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5820 if check_revoke_no_close {
5821 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5825 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5826 let mut block = Block {
5827 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5830 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5831 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5832 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5834 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5835 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5836 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5838 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5840 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5844 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5845 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5846 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5847 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5848 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5849 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5850 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5852 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5853 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5854 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5856 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5857 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5858 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5860 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5861 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5865 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5866 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5867 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5868 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5869 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5874 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5879 //Force duplicate channel ids
5880 for node in nodes.iter() {
5881 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5884 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5885 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5886 let push_msat=10001;
5887 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5888 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5889 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5891 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5892 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5896 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5897 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5898 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5899 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5900 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5902 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5903 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5904 let push_msat=10001;
5905 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5907 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5908 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5909 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5910 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5911 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5913 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5914 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5915 let push_msat=10001;
5916 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5917 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5918 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5920 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5921 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5922 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5924 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5925 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5926 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5928 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5929 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5930 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5932 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5933 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5934 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5935 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5936 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5937 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5941 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5942 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5943 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5944 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5945 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5947 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5948 let push_msat=10001;
5949 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5950 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5951 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5952 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5954 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5955 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5956 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5957 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5962 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5965 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5966 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5967 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5968 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5970 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5974 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5975 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5977 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5978 // pending_update_fee.
5980 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5981 *feerate_lock += 20;
5983 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5986 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5987 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5988 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5989 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5990 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5992 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5995 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5997 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5998 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5999 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6002 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6003 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6005 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6006 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6007 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6008 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6010 // Flush the pending fee update.
6011 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6012 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6014 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6017 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6018 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6019 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6020 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6022 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6023 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6024 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6025 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6027 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6028 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6031 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6032 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6033 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6034 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6035 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6036 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6037 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6038 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6039 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6046 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6047 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6049 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6050 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6051 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6052 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6053 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6054 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6056 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6057 // pending_update_fee.
6059 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6060 *feerate_lock += 200;
6062 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6065 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6067 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6068 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6069 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6074 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6076 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6077 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6078 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6080 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6082 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6083 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6084 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6086 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6087 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6088 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6089 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6090 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6091 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6092 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6094 // Flush the pending fee update.
6095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6096 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6098 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6099 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6102 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6103 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6104 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6105 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6106 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6107 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6108 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6109 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6110 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6112 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6116 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6117 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6118 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6119 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6120 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6121 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6122 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6123 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6124 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6129 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6130 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6131 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6133 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6135 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6136 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6143 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6146 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6147 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6149 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6150 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6153 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6156 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6158 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6159 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6160 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6161 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6164 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6165 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6166 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6169 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6172 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6173 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6174 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6175 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6177 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6178 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6179 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6181 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6182 // pending_update_fee.
6184 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6185 *feerate_lock += 20;
6187 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6190 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6192 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6194 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6201 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6202 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6203 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6205 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6207 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6208 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6209 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6210 let payment_event = {
6211 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6214 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6215 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6217 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6219 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6221 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6224 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6225 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6227 // Flush the pending fee update.
6228 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6229 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6231 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6232 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6235 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6236 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6237 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6239 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6240 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6246 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6248 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6250 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6251 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6252 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6253 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6254 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6258 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6259 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6262 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6263 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6264 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6265 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6266 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6267 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6268 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6269 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6270 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6271 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6276 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6278 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6280 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6281 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6284 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6286 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6287 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6288 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6289 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6293 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6297 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6298 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6299 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6302 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6303 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6310 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6311 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6313 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6314 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6315 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6316 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6321 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6329 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6330 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6331 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6333 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6334 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6338 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6339 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6343 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6344 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6346 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6347 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6349 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6350 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6352 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6353 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6356 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6360 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6361 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6362 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6366 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6367 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6369 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6370 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6371 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6376 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6377 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6378 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6382 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6383 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6384 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6386 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6387 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6388 let payment_event = {
6389 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6392 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6393 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6394 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6395 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6399 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6403 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6405 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6406 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6408 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6409 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6410 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6413 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6417 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6418 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6422 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6423 let channel_value = 100000;
6424 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6425 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6427 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6429 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6430 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6432 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6433 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6434 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6436 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6437 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6442 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6444 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6445 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6451 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6453 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6454 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6455 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6458 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6459 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6461 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6462 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6463 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6464 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6465 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6466 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6472 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6473 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6478 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6480 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6481 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6482 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6483 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6484 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6486 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6487 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6488 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6490 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6492 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6493 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6494 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6495 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6498 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6499 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6500 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6506 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6507 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6508 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6512 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6513 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6516 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6517 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6518 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6519 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6520 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6522 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6526 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6527 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6528 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6531 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6532 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6535 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6538 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6539 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6540 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6542 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6546 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6547 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6551 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6552 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6554 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6555 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6557 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6558 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6559 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6561 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6562 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6563 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6565 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6569 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6570 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6571 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6576 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6577 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6578 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6580 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6581 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6582 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6584 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6585 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6586 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6588 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6592 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6593 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6594 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6595 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6599 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6601 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6602 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6603 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6605 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6606 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6608 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6609 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6610 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6611 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6612 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6613 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6614 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6615 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6616 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6617 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6618 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6619 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6620 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6624 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6625 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6627 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6629 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6631 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6632 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6633 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6635 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6639 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6640 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6645 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6647 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6648 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6651 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6652 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6654 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6657 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6660 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6662 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6663 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6664 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6666 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6670 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6671 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6676 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6679 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6680 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6682 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6683 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6685 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6688 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6691 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6693 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6694 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6695 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6697 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6701 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6702 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6707 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6708 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6710 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6711 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6714 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6718 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6719 failure_code: 0x8000,
6722 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6724 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6725 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6726 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6728 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6732 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6733 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6738 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6741 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6743 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6746 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6747 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6748 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6751 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6752 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6753 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6754 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6755 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6756 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6764 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6766 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6767 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6768 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6770 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6774 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6775 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6781 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6783 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6785 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6788 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6790 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6792 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6793 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6794 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6795 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6796 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6797 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6798 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6804 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6806 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6808 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6809 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6810 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6812 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6816 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6817 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6822 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6823 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6825 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6826 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6829 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6830 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6836 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6838 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6840 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6841 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6842 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6843 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6844 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6845 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6846 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6848 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6851 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6852 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6854 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6855 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6856 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6858 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6862 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6863 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6864 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6869 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6870 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6871 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6873 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6876 let mut payment_event = {
6877 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6881 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6883 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6885 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6886 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6887 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6888 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6890 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6891 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6894 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6895 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6897 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6899 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6900 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6901 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6903 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6904 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6905 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6906 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6907 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6908 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6909 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6915 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6920 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6921 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6923 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6925 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6926 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6928 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6930 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6938 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6939 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6940 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6941 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6943 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6944 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6947 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6948 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6950 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6952 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6953 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6954 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6955 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6957 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6958 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6960 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6961 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6963 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6966 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6967 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6968 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6971 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6972 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6974 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6976 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6977 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6982 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6983 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6985 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6988 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6989 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6990 if announce_latest {
6991 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6993 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6996 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6998 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7000 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7001 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7002 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7003 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7005 let mut first_failed = false;
7006 for event in events {
7008 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7009 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7010 assert!(!first_failed);
7011 first_failed = true;
7013 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7022 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7023 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7024 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7027 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7028 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7029 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7030 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7031 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7032 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7033 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7035 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7037 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7038 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7039 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7041 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7043 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7044 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7046 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7047 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7049 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7051 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7052 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7055 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7057 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7058 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7059 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7060 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7061 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7063 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7064 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7066 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7067 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7068 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7069 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7070 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7071 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7072 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7073 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7075 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7076 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7077 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7079 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7080 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7081 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7082 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7084 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7085 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7086 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7087 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7088 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7089 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7090 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7092 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7094 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7098 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7099 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7100 else { first = false; }
7102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7105 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7106 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7107 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7116 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7117 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7118 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7119 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7123 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7124 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7126 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7127 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7128 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7129 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7130 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7136 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7137 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7139 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7142 } else { assert!(false) }
7144 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7145 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7146 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7147 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7148 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7150 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7153 } else { assert!(false); }
7155 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7156 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7157 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7158 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7159 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7160 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7162 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7164 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7165 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7166 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7170 } else { panic!(); }
7171 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7173 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7174 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7175 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7176 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7177 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7179 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7182 } else { assert!(false); }
7186 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7187 // We want to be sure that :
7188 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7189 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7190 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7191 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7192 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7198 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7199 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7200 // during signing due to revoked tx
7201 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7202 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7207 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7209 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7211 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7212 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7213 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7214 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7217 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7219 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7220 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7222 // Restore node A from previous state
7223 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7224 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7225 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7226 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7227 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7228 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7229 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7231 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7232 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7233 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7234 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7235 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7236 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7238 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7239 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7243 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7244 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7245 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7246 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7250 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7251 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7253 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7255 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7256 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7260 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7261 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7264 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7265 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7266 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7267 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7268 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7269 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7270 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7272 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7273 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7278 panic!("Unexpected event")
7282 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7283 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7284 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7285 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7288 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7289 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7290 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7291 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7292 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7293 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7294 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7295 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7296 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7297 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7298 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7302 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7303 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7304 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7305 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7312 // Create some initial channels
7313 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7315 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7316 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7317 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7318 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7319 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7320 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7325 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7326 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7329 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7330 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7331 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7332 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7334 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7335 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7336 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7338 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7339 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7340 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7341 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7342 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7343 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7344 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7345 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7346 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7347 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7353 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7354 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7356 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7357 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7358 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7359 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7363 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7364 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7365 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7372 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7373 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7374 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7377 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7378 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7380 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7381 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7382 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7383 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7384 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7385 for e in msg_events {
7387 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7388 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7389 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7390 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7391 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7398 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7399 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7400 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7401 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7402 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7403 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7405 // Reestablish chan_1
7406 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7407 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7408 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7409 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7410 // Reestablish chan_2
7411 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7412 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7413 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7414 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7415 // Reestablish chan_3
7416 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7417 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7418 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7419 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7421 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7422 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7423 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7424 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7425 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7426 for e in msg_events {
7428 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7429 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7430 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7431 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7433 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7434 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7440 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7441 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7445 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7446 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7447 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7448 // to forward through that channel.
7449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7451 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7452 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7453 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7455 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7456 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7457 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7458 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7460 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7462 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7463 // not send for private channels.
7464 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7465 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7466 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7467 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7468 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7470 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7471 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7472 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7475 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7479 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7480 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7481 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7482 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7483 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7484 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7485 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7486 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7487 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7488 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7490 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7492 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7494 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7496 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7498 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7499 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7500 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7501 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7502 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7503 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7504 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7505 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7506 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7508 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7509 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7517 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7519 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7520 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7523 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7525 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7527 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7528 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7530 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7531 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7533 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7534 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7535 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7536 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7537 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7539 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7540 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7541 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7542 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7544 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7545 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7546 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7547 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7548 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7549 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7551 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7553 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7554 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7555 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7556 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7557 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7558 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7559 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7561 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7562 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7563 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7564 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7568 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7569 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7571 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7572 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7574 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7576 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7577 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7578 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7579 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7580 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7581 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7582 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7583 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7585 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7586 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7587 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7588 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7589 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7590 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7591 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7592 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7596 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7597 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7601 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7602 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7603 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7610 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7612 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7613 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7614 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7616 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7617 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7618 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7619 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7620 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7621 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7623 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7624 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7625 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7626 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7630 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7631 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7633 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7635 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7636 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7639 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7643 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7644 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7645 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7646 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7647 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7648 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7649 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7650 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7654 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7656 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7657 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7659 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7660 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7661 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7662 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7663 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7664 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7665 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7666 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7667 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7668 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7669 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7670 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7671 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7675 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7677 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7678 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7680 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7682 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7683 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7684 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7685 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7686 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7687 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7688 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7689 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7690 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7691 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7692 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7693 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7694 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7698 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7700 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7701 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7705 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7706 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7707 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7709 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7710 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7716 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7717 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7718 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7719 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7720 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7721 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7722 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7723 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7724 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7725 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7727 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7728 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7729 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7731 // Revoke local commitment tx
7732 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7734 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7735 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7736 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7740 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7742 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7744 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7746 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7747 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7748 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7750 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7751 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7752 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7753 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7755 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7756 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7757 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7759 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7764 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7771 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7773 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7775 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7776 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7777 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7778 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7781 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7784 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7785 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7787 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7788 // available, which we check here:
7789 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7790 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7791 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7794 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7796 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7797 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7798 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7799 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7801 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7802 // output, checked above).
7803 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7804 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7805 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7807 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7808 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7809 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7810 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7811 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7815 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7816 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7817 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7818 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7821 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7825 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7826 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7827 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7831 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7837 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7838 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7839 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7840 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7842 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7845 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7846 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7847 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7848 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7849 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7850 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7851 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7852 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7856 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7857 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7858 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7859 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7861 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7862 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7863 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7864 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7865 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7866 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7867 // up bumped justice generation.
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7871 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7876 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7877 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7878 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7881 // Provide preimage for one
7882 // Check aggregation
7884 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7885 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7886 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7887 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7889 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7890 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7891 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7893 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7894 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7895 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7896 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7897 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7899 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7900 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7901 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7903 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7905 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7909 let feerate_timeout;
7910 let feerate_preimage;
7912 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7913 // 9 transactions including:
7914 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7915 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7916 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7918 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7919 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7920 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7921 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7922 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7924 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7926 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7927 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7929 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7931 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7932 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7933 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7934 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7936 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7937 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7938 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7939 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7943 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7944 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7946 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7947 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7949 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7952 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7954 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7956 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7957 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7958 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7959 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7960 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7962 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7963 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7964 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7965 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7966 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7971 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7972 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7976 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7977 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7978 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7979 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7980 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7981 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7982 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7983 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7988 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7989 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7991 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7992 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7994 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7996 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7997 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7998 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8000 // Must revoke without gaps
8001 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8002 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8004 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8005 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8006 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8008 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8009 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8010 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8012 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8016 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8017 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8018 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8026 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8027 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8028 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8030 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8032 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8034 // Revoke local commitment tx
8035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8037 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8038 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8040 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8042 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8045 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8047 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8048 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8049 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8050 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8051 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8052 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8056 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8057 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8058 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8060 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8061 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8062 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8067 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8068 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8069 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8075 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8077 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8078 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8079 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8080 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8081 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8083 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8084 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8086 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8088 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8090 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8091 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8094 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8095 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8096 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8103 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8110 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8111 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8113 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8115 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8116 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8118 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8122 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8123 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8124 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8130 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8131 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8132 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8135 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8140 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8141 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8145 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8147 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8148 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8149 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8152 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8153 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8154 route.paths.push(path);
8155 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8156 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8157 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8158 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8159 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8160 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8161 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8162 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8166 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8167 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8171 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8173 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8176 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8177 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8178 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8180 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8181 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8183 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8185 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8186 // values from previous calls.
8187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8188 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8191 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8193 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8196 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8204 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8205 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8213 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8215 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8216 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8217 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8218 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8219 } else { panic!(); }
8221 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8223 header: BlockHeader {
8225 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8226 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8227 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8231 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8232 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8233 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8234 } else { panic!(); }
8236 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8237 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8238 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8239 block.header.time += 1;
8240 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8241 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8242 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8245 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8246 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8250 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8253 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8254 // values from previous calls.
8255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8256 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8259 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8260 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8261 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8262 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8269 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8270 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8276 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8278 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8279 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8280 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8281 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8283 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8284 // resulting events.
8285 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8289 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8291 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8293 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8294 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8295 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8296 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8299 // We should fail the payment back
8300 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8301 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8302 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8303 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8304 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8311 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8312 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8313 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8315 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8316 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8317 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8318 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8320 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8321 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8322 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8323 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8325 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8326 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8327 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8328 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8332 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8333 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8334 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8335 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8337 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8338 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8339 // commitment at same time.
8341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8344 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8346 // Create some initial channel
8347 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8348 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8350 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8353 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8354 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8356 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8357 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8358 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8359 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8361 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8362 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8363 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8364 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8365 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8366 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8367 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8368 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8371 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8372 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8373 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8374 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8375 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8377 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8378 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8380 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8383 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8384 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8385 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8386 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8387 } else { assert!(false); }
8388 } else { assert!(false); };
8389 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8396 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8397 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8398 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8399 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8400 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8405 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8407 // Create some initial channel
8408 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8409 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8411 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8412 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8414 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8415 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8417 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8418 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8419 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8420 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8421 let watchtower_alice = {
8422 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8423 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8424 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8425 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8426 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8427 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8428 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8429 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8432 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8433 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8434 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8435 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8436 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8438 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8440 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8441 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8445 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8446 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8447 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8448 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8449 let watchtower_bob = {
8450 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8451 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8452 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8453 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8454 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8455 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8456 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8457 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8460 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8461 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8463 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8464 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8466 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8473 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8474 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8475 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8476 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8477 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8478 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8479 } else { assert!(false); }
8480 } else { assert!(false); };
8481 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8484 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8485 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8486 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8488 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8491 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8492 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8493 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8497 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8498 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8499 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8501 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8502 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8503 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8504 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8505 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8506 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8511 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8512 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8513 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8516 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8517 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8519 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8520 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8521 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8522 // before receiving funding_signed.
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528 // Create an initial channel
8529 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8530 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8532 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8535 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8543 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8544 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8549 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8550 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8551 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8552 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8553 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8554 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8555 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8562 // Create some initial channels
8563 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8565 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8566 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8567 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8568 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8569 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8570 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8572 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8573 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8574 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8575 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8576 // this test before #653 fix.
8577 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8578 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8580 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8581 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8583 let htlc_timeout = {
8584 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8585 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8586 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8587 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8591 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8592 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8593 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8594 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8597 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8598 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8599 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8600 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8602 // Steps of the test:
8603 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8604 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8605 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8606 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8607 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8608 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8609 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8610 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8614 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8616 // Create some initial channels
8617 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8618 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8620 // Steps (1) and (2):
8621 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8622 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8624 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8625 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8626 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8627 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8628 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8629 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8630 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8632 // Steps (3) and (4):
8633 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8634 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8635 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8636 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8637 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8638 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8640 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8641 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8642 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8643 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8644 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8646 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8647 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8648 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8649 if broadcast_alice {
8650 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8652 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8654 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8655 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8659 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8660 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8661 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8663 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8664 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8665 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8666 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8667 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8668 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8671 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8672 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8673 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8674 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8678 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8683 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8684 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8685 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8688 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8690 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8691 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8692 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8697 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8698 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8699 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8705 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8707 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8710 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8711 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8712 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8713 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8714 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8719 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8722 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8723 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8724 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8725 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8726 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8727 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8728 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8729 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8730 if broadcast_alice {
8731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8735 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8736 if broadcast_alice {
8737 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8738 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8739 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8740 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8742 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8743 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8745 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8746 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8751 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8752 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8754 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8755 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8756 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8757 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8759 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8760 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8761 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8763 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8764 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8765 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8766 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8767 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8768 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8769 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8771 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8772 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8778 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8779 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8780 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8781 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8782 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8786 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8787 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8788 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8790 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8791 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8792 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8793 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8799 // Create an initial channel
8800 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8801 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8802 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8803 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8805 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8806 // that it is rejected.
8807 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8809 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8812 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8813 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8814 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8815 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8816 // move forward with it.
8817 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8818 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8824 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8825 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8827 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8830 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8831 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8833 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8834 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8835 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8836 added_monitors.clear();
8838 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8840 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8841 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8843 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8846 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8847 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8848 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8849 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8850 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8855 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8856 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8857 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8858 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8859 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8865 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8866 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8867 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8869 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8870 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8872 let funding_created = {
8873 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8874 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8875 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8876 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8879 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8880 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8881 // still needs to be cleared here.
8882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8884 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8886 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8889 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8890 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8891 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8892 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8893 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8900 // everything is functional.
8901 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8903 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8904 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8905 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8906 added_monitors.clear();
8909 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8910 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8911 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8912 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8914 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8915 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8916 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8917 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8921 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8922 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8924 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8925 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8926 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8930 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8932 // Create some initial channels
8933 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8934 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8935 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8937 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8938 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8939 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8941 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8942 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8943 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8945 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8946 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8948 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8949 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8952 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8953 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8955 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8956 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8957 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8960 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8964 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8970 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8974 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8975 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8976 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8977 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8979 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8981 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8983 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8987 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8988 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8990 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8991 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8992 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8993 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8999 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9000 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9001 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9003 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9004 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9005 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9006 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9009 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9010 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9016 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9017 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9020 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9021 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9023 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9024 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9025 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9027 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9028 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9029 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9030 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9031 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9032 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9033 } else { panic!(); }
9034 } else { panic!(); }
9035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9038 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9039 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9040 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9041 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9042 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9043 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9044 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9045 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9046 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9047 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9048 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9049 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9050 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9051 // until we learned about an additional block.
9053 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9054 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9058 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9059 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9062 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9063 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9064 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9065 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9067 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9068 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9069 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9071 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9072 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9074 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9075 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9076 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9078 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9079 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9080 if test_height_before_timelock {
9081 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9082 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9083 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9084 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9086 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9087 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9088 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9089 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9090 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9091 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9093 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9094 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9096 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9097 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9098 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9099 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9100 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9112 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9117 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9118 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9119 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9123 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9124 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9125 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9127 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9132 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9133 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9134 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9135 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9136 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9137 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9139 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9140 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9141 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9144 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9146 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9152 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9153 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9154 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9157 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9163 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9167 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9168 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9169 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9171 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9172 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9173 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9174 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9175 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9177 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9178 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9179 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9180 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9182 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9183 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9184 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9185 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9186 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9187 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9188 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9189 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9191 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9192 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9193 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9194 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9195 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9196 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9197 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9199 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9200 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9201 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9202 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9206 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9207 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9209 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9210 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9211 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9214 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9215 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9216 // the commitment state.
9217 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9222 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9225 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9227 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9228 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9231 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9238 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9244 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9245 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9246 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9247 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9248 let params = RouteParameters {
9249 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9250 final_value_msat: 10000,
9251 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9253 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9254 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9256 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9257 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9259 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9261 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9262 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9263 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9264 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9268 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9274 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9275 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9276 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9277 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9279 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9280 let params = RouteParameters {
9281 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9282 final_value_msat: 10000,
9283 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9285 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9286 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9287 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9288 let route = find_route(
9289 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9290 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9293 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9294 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9298 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9299 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9300 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9301 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9304 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9305 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9306 enum ExposureEvent {
9307 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9309 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9311 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9312 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9315 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9316 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9319 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9320 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9321 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9322 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9323 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9324 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9325 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9326 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9329 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9330 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9336 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9338 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9340 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9343 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9344 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9346 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9349 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9350 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9354 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9355 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9358 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9361 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9362 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9363 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9365 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9366 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9367 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9368 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9370 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9371 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9373 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9374 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9376 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9377 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9380 if dust_outbound_balance {
9381 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9382 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9383 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9384 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9386 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9389 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9390 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9391 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9392 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9393 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9397 if dust_outbound_balance {
9398 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9399 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9400 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9401 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9402 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9405 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9406 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9407 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9408 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9413 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9414 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9415 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9416 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9417 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9419 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9420 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9421 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9423 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9425 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9426 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9427 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9429 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9431 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9432 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9433 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9435 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9436 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9437 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9438 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9440 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9441 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9443 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9444 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9445 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9447 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9448 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9450 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9452 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9455 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9457 added_monitors.clear();
9461 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9462 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9463 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9464 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9465 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9466 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9467 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9468 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9469 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9470 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9471 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9472 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9473 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);