_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  66
  67 #[test]
  68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  69         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  70         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  71         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  72         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  73         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  74         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  75         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  76         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  77
  78         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  79         // funding satoshis
  80         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  81         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  82         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  83
  84         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  85         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  86
  87         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  88         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  91         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  92         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  93                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  94                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  95                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  96                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  97                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  98                         match action {
  99                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 100                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 101                                 },
 102                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 103                         }
 104                 } else { assert!(false); }
 105         };
 106
 107         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 108
 109         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 111         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 124
 125         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 126 }
 127
 128 #[test]
 129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 130         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 131         // them.
 132         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 133         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 134         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 135         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 138
 139         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 140                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 141                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 142                 },
 143                 _ => panic!()
 144         }
 145 }
 146
 147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 148         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 149         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 150         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 151         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 157
 158         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 159         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 160         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 161         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 162         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 163         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 164
 165         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 166         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 167         if !send_from_initiator {
 168                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 169                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 170         }
 171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 172
 173         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 174         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         if send_from_initiator {
 176                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 177                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 178         }
 179         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 180         {
 181                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 182                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 183                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 184                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 185
 186                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 187                 match channel_phase {
 188                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 189                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 190                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                         },
 193                         ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
 194                 }
 195         }
 196
 197         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 198         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 199         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 200
 201         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 202         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 203         if send_from_initiator {
 204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 205                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 206                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 207                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 208                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 209         } else {
 210                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 211         }
 212 }
 213
 214 #[test]
 215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 216         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 217         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 218 }
 219
 220 #[test]
 221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 227
 228         // balancing
 229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 230
 231         // A                                        B
 232         // update_fee                            ->
 233         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 234         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 235         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 236         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 237         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 238         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 239         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 240         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 241         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 242         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 243         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 244         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 245         //                                       <- RAA
 246         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 247
 248         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 249         {
 250                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 251                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 252         }
 253         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255
 256         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 257         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 258         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 259                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 260                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 261                 },
 262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 263         };
 264
 265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 266
 267         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 268         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 269         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 270                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 290         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 295         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 299         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 300         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 304         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 308         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 309         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 313         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 318         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320
 321         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 323
 324         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 325         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 326         match events_2[0] {
 327                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 329         }
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333 }
 334
 335 #[test]
 336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 337         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 338         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 344
 345         // balancing
 346         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 347
 348         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 349         {
 350                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 351                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 352         }
 353         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 355
 356         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 357         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 358         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 360                         update_fee.as_ref()
 361                 },
 362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 363         };
 364
 365         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 366
 367         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 368         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 369         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 370                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 372
 373         let payment_event = {
 374                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 375                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 376                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 377         };
 378         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 379         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 380
 381         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 384         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 385         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 390
 391         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 392 }
 393
 394 #[test]
 395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 401
 402         // A                                        B
 403         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 404         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 405         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 406         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 407         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 408         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 409         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 410         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 411         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 412         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 413         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 414         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 415         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 416         //                                          B should send no response here
 417         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 418         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 419         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 420
 421         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 422         let initial_feerate;
 423         {
 424                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 425                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 426                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 427         }
 428         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 430
 431         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 432         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 433         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 434                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 435                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 436                 },
 437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 438         };
 439
 440         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 443         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 447         // transaction:
 448         {
 449                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 450                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 451         }
 452         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 454         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 455
 456         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 457         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 458                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 459                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 460         };
 461
 462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 463
 464         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 465         // Deliver (3)
 466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 467
 468         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 469         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 470         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 475         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 476         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 477         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 478         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 479
 480         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 481         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 482         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 489
 490         // Delever (4)
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 492         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 498
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 500         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 503
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 507 }
 508
 509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 510         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 511         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 512         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 513         // Node objects.
 514
 515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 519
 520         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 521                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 558         {
 559                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 560                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 561                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 562                 added_monitors.clear();
 563         }
 564
 565         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 567         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 570         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 573         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 575         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 576         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 597         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 598         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 599 }
 600
 601 #[test]
 602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 608
 609         {
 610                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 611                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 612         }
 613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 617         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 618         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 619                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 620                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 621                 },
 622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 623         };
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 625
 626         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 627         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 633
 634         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 635         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 638
 639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 642 }
 643
 644 #[test]
 645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 650         let channel_value = 5000;
 651         let push_sats = 700;
 652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 653         let channel_id = chan.2;
 654         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 655         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 656         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 657
 658         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 659
 660         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 661         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 662         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 663         // remote limit.
 664         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 665         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 666         {
 667                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 668                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 669         }
 670         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 672         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673
 674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 675
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 679         {
 680                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 681
 682                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 683                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 684                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 685                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 686                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 687                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 688         }
 689
 690         {
 691                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 693                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 694         }
 695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 696         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 698
 699         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 700
 701         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 702         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 703         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 704                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 705                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 706                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 707                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 708                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 709                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 711                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 715                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 716                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 717                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 718                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 719                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 720                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 722                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 723                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 724                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 725         };
 726
 727         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 728         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 729                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 730
 731         let res = {
 732                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 733                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 735                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 736                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 737                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 738                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 739                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 740                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 741                         push_sats,
 742                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 743                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 744                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 745                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746                         &mut htlcs,
 747                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 748                 );
 749                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 750         };
 751
 752         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 signature: res.0,
 755                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 756                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 757                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 758         };
 759
 760         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 761                 channel_id: chan.2,
 762                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 763         };
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 766
 767         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 768         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 769         //Should produce and error.
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 771         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 775                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 776 }
 777
 778 #[test]
 779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 783         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 784         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 785
 786         // balancing
 787         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 788
 789         {
 790                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 791                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 792         }
 793         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795
 796         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 797         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 798         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 799                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 800                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 801                 },
 802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 803         };
 804         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 805         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 806         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 808
 809         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 810
 811         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 812         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 813                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 814         {
 815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 817                 added_monitors.clear();
 818         }
 819         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821         // node[1] has nothing to do
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 828         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 834
 835         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 838         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 839         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 840         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 841
 842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 846
 847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 849         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850
 851         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 853         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 854         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 858         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 859
 860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 861
 862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 864         match events[0] {
 865                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 867         };
 868
 869         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 870
 871         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 873         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 876 }
 877
 878 #[test]
 879 fn test_update_fee() {
 880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 885         let channel_id = chan.2;
 886
 887         // A                                        B
 888         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 890         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 891         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 892         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 893         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 894         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 895         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 896         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 897         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 898         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 899         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 900
 901         // Create and deliver (1)...
 902         let feerate;
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 912         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 914                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 916                 },
 917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 918         };
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920
 921         // Generate (2) and (3):
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 923         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 925
 926         // Deliver (2):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930
 931         // Create and deliver (4)...
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 935         }
 936         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 939         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 940         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 941                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 942                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 943                 },
 944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 945         };
 946
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 950         // ... creating (5)
 951         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 953
 954         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 955         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 957         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 958         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 959
 960         // Deliver (5):
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 964
 965         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 967         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 970         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 971         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 972         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974
 975         // Deliver (7)
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 983         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984
 985         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 986         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 987         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 989         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 990 }
 991
 992 #[test]
 993 fn fake_network_test() {
 994         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 995         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 999         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000
1001         // Create some initial channels
1002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1005
1006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Send some more payments
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1016
1017         // Test failure packets
1018         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1020
1021         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1023
1024         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031
1032         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1057                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1060         });
1061         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1066
1067         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068         hops.push(RouteHop {
1069                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1073                 fee_msat: 0,
1074                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1076         });
1077         hops.push(RouteHop {
1078                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1082                 fee_msat: 0,
1083                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1085         });
1086         hops.push(RouteHop {
1087                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1091                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1092                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1094         });
1095         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1100
1101         // Claim the rebalances...
1102         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1104
1105         // Close down the channels...
1106         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 }
1119
1120 #[test]
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124         // commitment dance rounds.
1125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1131
1132         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1134
1135         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1136         for _ in 0..50 {
1137                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1141         }
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1151         // another HTLC.
1152         {
1153                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1157         }
1158
1159         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1161         {
1162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1165         }
1166
1167         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179
1180         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1183
1184         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1185
1186         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1195
1196         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1199
1200         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1202         }
1203         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1208
1209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1214
1215         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1217
1218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1219
1220         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1223                 match event {
1224                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1226                         },
1227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228                 };
1229         }
1230
1231         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1233         }
1234
1235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1261
1262         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1278
1279         // balancing
1280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1281
1282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1283
1284         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1287
1288         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1292
1293         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1303                 }
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1306
1307         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1311
1312         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1314
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1321         } else {
1322                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1323         };
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1331
1332         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1336
1337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1339         for e in events {
1340                 match e {
1341                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1345                         },
1346                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1352                         },
1353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1354                 }
1355         }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365
1366         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1368
1369         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1377         match err {
1378                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1381                 },
1382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1383         }
1384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1385
1386         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1403
1404         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1405
1406         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 htlc_id: 0,
1413                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418                 blinding_point: None,
1419         };
1420
1421         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1422
1423         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1424         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1425         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1426
1427         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1428
1429         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1430
1431         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1432         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1433         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1434                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1436                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1437                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1438                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1439                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1440                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1441                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1442
1443                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1444                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1445                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1446                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1447                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1448         };
1449         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1450                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1453                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1454                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1455                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1457                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1458                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1459                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1460         };
1461
1462         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1463         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1464                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1465
1466         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1467         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1468         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1469
1470         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1471                 offered: false,
1472                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1473                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1474                 payment_hash,
1475                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1476         };
1477
1478         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1479
1480         let res = {
1481                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1482                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1483                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1484                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1485                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1486                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1487                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1488                         commitment_number,
1489                         95000,
1490                         local_chan_balance,
1491                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1492                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1493                         feerate_per_kw,
1494                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1495                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1496                 );
1497                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1498         };
1499
1500         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1501                 channel_id: chan.2,
1502                 signature: res.0,
1503                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1504                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1505                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1506         };
1507
1508         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1509         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1510         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1511
1512         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1513         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1514                 channel_id: chan.2,
1515                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1516                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1517                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1518                 next_local_nonce: None,
1519         };
1520         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1521
1522         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1523         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1524         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1525         match events[0] {
1526                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1527                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1528                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1529                 },
1530                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1531         };
1532         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1533                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1534
1535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1536 }
1537
1538 #[test]
1539 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1540         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1541         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1542         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1543         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1544         // this situation.
1545         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1550         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1551
1552         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1554
1555         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1556
1557         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1558
1559         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1560         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1561         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1562         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1563                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1564         }
1565
1566         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1567         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1568                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1569                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1570         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1571 }
1572
1573 #[test]
1574 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1575         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1576         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1580         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1581         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1582
1583         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1584         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1585         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1586         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1587         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1588         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1589         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1590
1591         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1592         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1594         }
1595
1596         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1597                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1598         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1599         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1600         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1601         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1602         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1603         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1604         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1605                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1606         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1607         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1608                 channel_id: chan.2,
1609                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1610                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1611                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1612                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1613                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1614                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1615                 blinding_point: None,
1616         };
1617
1618         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1619         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1620         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1621         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1622         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1623         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1625         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1626                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1627 }
1628
1629 #[test]
1630 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1631         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1632         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1633         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635
1636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1638         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1640         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1641
1642         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1643         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1644         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1647         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1649
1650         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1651                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1652         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1653         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1654         // commitment transaction fee.
1655         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1656
1657         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1658         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1659                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1660         }
1661
1662         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1663         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1664                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1665         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1666         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1667                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1668                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1669 }
1670
1671 #[test]
1672 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1673         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1674         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1675         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1676         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1679         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1680         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1681         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1682
1683         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1684         // HTLC.
1685         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1686         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1687         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1688                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1689
1690         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1691         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1692         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1693         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1694         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1695         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1696         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1697
1698         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1700         match msg_events[0] {
1701                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1703                 },
1704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1705         }
1706 }
1707
1708 #[test]
1709 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1710         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1711         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1712         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1713         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1717
1718         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1719         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724
1725         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731
1732         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1733         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1734         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1736 }
1737
1738 #[test]
1739 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1743         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1745         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1746
1747         let feemsat = 239;
1748         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1749         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1751         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1752
1753         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1754         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1755         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1756         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1757
1758         // Add a pending HTLC.
1759         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1760         let payment_event_1 = {
1761                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1762                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1763                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1764
1765                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1768         };
1769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1770
1771         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1773         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1776         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1777
1778         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1779         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1780         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1781         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1782         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1783         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1784                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1785         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1786         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787                 channel_id: chan.2,
1788                 htlc_id: 1,
1789                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1790                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1791                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1792                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1794                 blinding_point: None,
1795         };
1796
1797         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1798         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1799         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1800         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1801         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1802         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1804         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1805                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1806 }
1807
1808 #[test]
1809 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1814         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1815         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1816         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1817         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1818         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1819         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1820
1821         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824
1825         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1826         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1827 }
1828
1829 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1830         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1831 }
1832
1833 #[test]
1834 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1837         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1838         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1839         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1840         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1841         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1842         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1843         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1844         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1845
1846         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1847         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1848
1849         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1850         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1851
1852         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1853                 ($node: expr) => {{
1854                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1855                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1856                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1857                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1858                         payment_event
1859                 }}
1860         }
1861
1862         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1863         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1864         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1865         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1866
1867         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1868
1869         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1870         {
1871                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1872                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1873                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1874                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1875                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1876
1877                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1878                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1879                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1881         }
1882
1883         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1884         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1885         loop {
1886                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1887                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1888                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1889                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1890                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1891                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1892                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1893                         break;
1894                 }
1895
1896                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1897                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1898                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1899                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1900                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1901
1902                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1904                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1905                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1906                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1907                 );
1908
1909                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1910                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1911                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1912                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1913                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1914         }
1915
1916         // adding pending output.
1917         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1918         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1919         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1920         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1921         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1922         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1923         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1924         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1925         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1926         // policy.
1927         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1928         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1929         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1930
1931         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1932         let payment_event_1 = {
1933                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1934                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1936
1937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1939                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1940         };
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1942
1943         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1944         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1945         {
1946                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1947                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1948                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1949                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1953         }
1954
1955         // split the rest to test holding cell
1956         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1957         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1958         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1959         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1960         {
1961                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1962                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1963         }
1964
1965         // now see if they go through on both sides
1966         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1967         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1968         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1969                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1971         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1973
1974         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1975         {
1976                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1977                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1978                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1979                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1980                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1981                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1982                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1983         }
1984
1985         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1986         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1987         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1988                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1990         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1991         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1992
1993         // flush the pending htlc
1994         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1995         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1997
1998         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1999         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2001         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002
2003         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2004         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007
2008         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2009         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2011
2012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2013
2014         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2015         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2016         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2017
2018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2019         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2020
2021         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2022         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2023         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2025         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2026         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2027
2028         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2029         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2030         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2031         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2032
2033         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2034         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2035
2036         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2037         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2038         match events[0] {
2039                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2040                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2041                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2042                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2043                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2044                         match &purpose {
2045                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2046                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2047                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2048                                 },
2049                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2050                         }
2051                 },
2052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2053         }
2054         match events[1] {
2055                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2056                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2057                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2058                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2059                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2060                         match &purpose {
2061                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2062                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2063                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2064                                 },
2065                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2066                         }
2067                 },
2068                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2069         }
2070
2071         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2073         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2074
2075         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2076         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2077         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2078
2079         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2080         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2081         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2082         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2083         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2084
2085         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2086         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2087 }
2088
2089 #[test]
2090 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2091         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2092         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2093         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2094         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2095         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2096         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2097         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2098         // To test this we:
2099         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2100         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2101         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2102         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2103         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2104         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2105         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2106         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2107         //    claim,
2108         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2109         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2110         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2111         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2112         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2116         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2117         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2118
2119         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2120         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2121         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2122         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2123         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2124
2125         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2126         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2127         let send_1 = {
2128                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2129                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2134         };
2135
2136         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2137         // initial fulfill/CS.
2138         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2139         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142
2143         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2144         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2145         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2146         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2149
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2155
2156         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2157         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2159         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2160         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2161
2162         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2164         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2165
2166         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2168         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169
2170         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2172         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2173
2174         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2175         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2176         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2177         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2178         // on-chain as necessary).
2179         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2183         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2184
2185         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2188
2189         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2190         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2191
2192         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2193         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2194         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2198
2199         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2200         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2201         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2202         let send_2 = {
2203                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2204                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2207                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2208                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2209         };
2210
2211         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2212         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215
2216         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2217
2218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2220         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2221
2222         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2224
2225         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2227         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2228         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2229
2230         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2233
2234         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2236
2237         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2238         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2239
2240         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2241         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2242 }
2243
2244 #[test]
2245 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2246         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2247         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2251         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252
2253         // Create some initial channels
2254         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2255         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2256         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2257         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2258
2259         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2262         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2263         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2264         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2265
2266         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2269         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2270         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2271
2272         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2273         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2276         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2277         {
2278                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2279                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2281                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2282                         let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2283                 }
2284
2285                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2286                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2287                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2288         }
2289         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2290         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2291         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2292         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2293
2294         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2295         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2296
2297         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2298         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2299         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2300         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2302         {
2303                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2304                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2305                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2306                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2308                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2309         }
2310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2311         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2312         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2313         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2314         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2315
2316         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2317                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2318                         {
2319                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2320                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2321                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2322
2323                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2325                                 match events[0] {
2326                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2327                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2328                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2329                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2330                                         },
2331                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332                                 };
2333                         }
2334                 }
2335         }
2336
2337         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2338         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2339         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2342         let node2_commitment_txid;
2343         {
2344                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2345                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2346                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2347                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2348
2349                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2350                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2352                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2354         }
2355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2359         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2360
2361         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2362         // confusing us in the following tests.
2363         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2364
2365         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2366         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2367         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2368         // buffer space).
2369
2370         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2371                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2372                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2373                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2374                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2375                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2376                                 msg.clone()
2377                         },
2378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2379                 };
2380                 match events[1] {
2381                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2382                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2383                         },
2384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2385                 }
2386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2387
2388                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2389                 {
2390                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2391                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2392                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2393                                         false
2394                                 } else { true }
2395                         });
2396                 }
2397
2398                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399
2400                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2401                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2402
2403                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2404                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2407                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2408                                 msg.clone()
2409                         },
2410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2411                 };
2412                 match events[1] {
2413                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2415                         },
2416                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2417                 }
2418                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2419                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2423                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2424                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2425         };
2426         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2427         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2430
2431         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2432                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2433         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2434 }
2435
2436 #[test]
2437 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2438         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2439         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2440         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2441         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2442         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2443         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2444         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2445         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2446         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2447         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2448         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2449         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2450         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2453         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         // Create some new channels:
2455         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2456
2457         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2458         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2459         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2462         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2468         // Revoke the old state
2469         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2470
2471         {
2472                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473                 {
2474                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2476                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2477                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2479                 }
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2483
2484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2486                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2487                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2488                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2489                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2490                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2491                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2492                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2493         }
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2496         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2501         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2502         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2503         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2504         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2505         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2506         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2507         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2508         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2509         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2510         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2513         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2517         // Create some new channels:
2518         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519
2520         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2521         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2522         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2523         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2528         // Revoke the old state
2529         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 {
2533                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2534                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2535                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2536
2537                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2539                 }
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2542
2543                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2545                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2546                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2547                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2548                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2549                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2550         }
2551         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2557 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2558         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2559         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2564         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2565         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2568         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2570         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2571         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2572
2573         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2574         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2575         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2576         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2579
2580         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2581
2582         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2585         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2587 }
2588
2589 #[test]
2590 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2591         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2592         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2593 }
2594
2595 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2596         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2597         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2598         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2599         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2600         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2601         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2602         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2603         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2604                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2607         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2608         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2609         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2610
2611         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2612                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2613                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2614         }
2615
2616         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2617         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2618         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2619         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2620         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2621
2622         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2623         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2624
2625         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2626         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2627
2628         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2629         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2630
2631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2632         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2633                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2634         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2635
2636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2637         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2638                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2639
2640         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2641         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2642         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2643                 match balance {
2644                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2646                 }
2647         });
2648         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2649         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2650         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2651         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2652 }
2653
2654
2655 #[test]
2656 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2657         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2659         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2663
2664         // Create some new channel:
2665         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2666
2667         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2669         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2670         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2671         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2672
2673         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2674         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2675         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2676         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2677         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2681         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2682
2683         //Revoke the old state
2684         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2685
2686         {
2687                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2689                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2690                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2691                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2692                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2693                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2695
2696                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2697                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2698
2699                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2700                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2701
2702                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2703                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2704                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2705                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2706                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2707                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2708                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2709                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2710
2711                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2712                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2713                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2714                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2715                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2716         }
2717         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2718         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2719         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2720 }
2721
2722 #[test]
2723 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2724         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2725         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2726         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2730
2731         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2732
2733         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2734         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2735         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2736         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2737         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2738         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2739
2740         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2741         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2742
2743         //Revoke the old state
2744         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2745
2746         {
2747                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2749                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2750                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2751                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2752                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2754                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2755                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2756                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2757                 }
2758
2759                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2760                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2761
2762                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2763
2764                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2767                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2768                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2769                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2770                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2771
2772                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2773                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2774                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2775
2776                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2777                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2778                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2779
2780                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2781                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2782                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2783
2784                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2785                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2786                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2787                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2788                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2789                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2790                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2791                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2792
2793                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2794                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2795                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2796                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2797                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2798                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2799                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2800         }
2801         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2802         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2803         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2804 }
2805
2806 #[test]
2807 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2808         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2809         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2810         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2811         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2812         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2813         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2814         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2815         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2816         // towards B.
2817         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2818         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2819         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2820         // PaymentSent event).
2821
2822         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2823         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2824         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2825         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2826
2827         // Create some initial channels
2828         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2829         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2830
2831         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2832         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2833         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2834         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2835         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2836
2837         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2838         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2839         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2840
2841         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2842         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2843
2844         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2845         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2846         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2847         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2848         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2849         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2850         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2851         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2852         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2854         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2855         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2856         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2857         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2858         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2859
2860         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2861         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2863         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2864         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2866         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2869         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2870         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2871         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2872         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2873         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2874
2875         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2876         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2877         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2878         {
2879                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2880                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2881                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2882                 added_monitors.clear();
2883         }
2884         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2885         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2886         match forwarded_events[0] {
2887                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2889         }
2890         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2891         match forwarded_events[1] {
2892                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2893                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2894                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2895                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2896                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2897                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2898                 },
2899                 _ => panic!()
2900         }
2901         match forwarded_events[2] {
2902                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2903                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2904                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2905                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2906                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2907                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2908                 },
2909                 _ => panic!()
2910         }
2911         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2912         {
2913                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2914                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2915                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2916                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2917                 added_monitors.clear();
2918         }
2919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2920
2921         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2922         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2923
2924         match nodes_2_event {
2925                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2927         }
2928
2929         match nodes_0_event {
2930                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2931                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2932                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2933                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2934                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2935                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2936                 },
2937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2938         };
2939
2940         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2941         match events[0] {
2942                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2944         }
2945
2946         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2947                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2948                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2949                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2950                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2951                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2952                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2953                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2954                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2955                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2956                         if $htlc_offered {
2957                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2958                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2959                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2960                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2961                         } else {
2962                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2963                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2964                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2965                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2966                         }
2967                         node_txn.clear();
2968                 } }
2969         }
2970         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2971         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2972
2973         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2974         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2975         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2976         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2977         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2978         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2980         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2981         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2982         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2983         let commitment_spend =
2984                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2985                         &node_txn[0]
2986                 } else {
2987                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2988                         // FullBlockViaListen
2989                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2990                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2991                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2992                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2993                                 &node_txn[0]
2994                         } else {
2995                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2996                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2997                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2998                                 &node_txn[2]
2999                         }
3000                 };
3001
3002         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3003         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3004         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3005         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3006         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3007         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3008         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3009         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3010
3011         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3012         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3013         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3014         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3016         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3017         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3018         let mut first_claimed = false;
3019         for event in events {
3020                 match event {
3021                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3022                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3023                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3024                                         first_claimed = true;
3025                                 } else {
3026                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3027                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3028                                 }
3029                         },
3030                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3031                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3032                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3033                 }
3034         }
3035         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3036 }
3037
3038 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3039         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3040         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3041         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3042         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3043         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3044         //            \                                  \
3045         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3046
3047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3050         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3051         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3052         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3053         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3054
3055         // Create some intial channels
3056         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3057         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3058
3059         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3060         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3061         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3062
3063         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3064
3065         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3066         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3067         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3068         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3070         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3072
3073         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3074         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3075         match events[0] {
3076                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3077                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3078                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3079                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3082                 },
3083                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3084         };
3085         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3086         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3088         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3089         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3090         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3091
3092         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3093         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3094         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3095         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3096                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3097         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3098         let timeout_tx = {
3099                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3100                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3101                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3102                 } else {
3103                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3104                 }
3105                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3106                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3107                 txn.remove(0)
3108         };
3109
3110         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3112         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3113
3114         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3115
3116         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3119         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3120         match events[0] {
3121                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3122                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3124                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3127                 },
3128                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3129         };
3130
3131         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3132         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3133         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3134
3135         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3136         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3137
3138         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3140         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3141         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3142         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3143         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3144         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3145 }
3146
3147 #[test]
3148 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3149         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3150         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3151         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3152 }
3153
3154 #[test]
3155 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3156         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3157         // and fail backward accordingly.
3158
3159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3162         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3163
3164         // Create some initial channels
3165         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3166         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3167
3168         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3169         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3170         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3171         // Revoke the old state
3172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3173
3174         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3175
3176         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3177         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3178         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3181
3182         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3184         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3185         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3186         match events[0] {
3187                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3188                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3189                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3190                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3191                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3192                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3193
3194                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3195                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3196                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3197                 },
3198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199         }
3200 }
3201
3202 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3203         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3204         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3205         // commitment transaction anymore.
3206         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3207         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3208         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3209         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3210         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3211         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3212         // transactions:
3213         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3214         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3215         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3216         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3217         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3218         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3219         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3221         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3222
3223         // Create some initial channels
3224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3225         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3226
3227         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3228         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3229         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3230         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3231         // Revoke the old state
3232         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3233
3234         let value = if use_dust {
3235                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3236                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3237                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3238                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3239         } else { 3000000 };
3240
3241         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3242         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3243         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3244
3245         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3246         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3247         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3248         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3249         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3250         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3251         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3252         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3253         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3254         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3255         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3256         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3257
3258         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3259         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3261         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3262         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3263         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3264         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3265         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3266         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3267         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3268         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3270         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3271         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3272         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3274
3275         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3276         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3279         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3280         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3281         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3282         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3283         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3284         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3285         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3286         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3287         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3289         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3290         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3291         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3293
3294         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3295         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3296         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3297         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3298                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3299         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3300         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3302
3303         if deliver_bs_raa {
3304                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3305                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3306                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3308                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3309                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3310                 match events[0] {
3311                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3313                 };
3314                 match events[1] {
3315                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3317                 }
3318                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3319                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3320         }
3321
3322         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3323         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3324
3325         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3327         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3328
3329         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3330         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3331         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3332                 ev,
3333                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3334         )));
3335         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3336                 ev,
3337                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3338         )));
3339         assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3340                 ev,
3341                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3342         )));
3343
3344         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3346
3347         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3348         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3349
3350         if deliver_bs_raa {
3351                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3352                 match nodes_2_event {
3353                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3354                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3355                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3356                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3357                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3358                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3359                         },
3360                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361                 }
3362         }
3363
3364         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3365         match nodes_2_event {
3366                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3367                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3368                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3369                 },
3370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3371         }
3372
3373         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3374         match nodes_0_event {
3375                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3376                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3377                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3378                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3379                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3380                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3381
3382                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3383                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3384                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3385
3386                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3387
3388                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3389                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3390                         match events[0] {
3391                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3392                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3393                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3394                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3395                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3396                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3397                                         }
3398                                 },
3399                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3400                         }
3401                         match events[1] {
3402                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3403                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3404                                 },
3405                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3406                         }
3407                         match events[2] {
3408                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3409                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3410                                 },
3411                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412                         }
3413                         match events[3] {
3414                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3415                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3416                                 },
3417                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3418                         }
3419                         match events[4] {
3420                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3421                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3422                                 },
3423                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3424                         }
3425                         match events[5] {
3426                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3427                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3428                                 },
3429                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3430                         }
3431                 },
3432                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3433         }
3434
3435         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3436         match events[0] {
3437                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3438                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3439         }
3440
3441         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3442         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3443         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3444 }
3445
3446 #[test]
3447 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3448         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3449         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3450         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3451         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3452 }
3453
3454 #[test]
3455 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3456         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3457         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3458         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3459         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3460 }
3461
3462 #[test]
3463 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3467         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3468         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3469
3470         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3471         {
3472                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3473                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3474                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3476
3477                 let payment_event = {
3478                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3479                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3480                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3481                 };
3482                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3483                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3484         }
3485
3486         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3487         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3488         {
3489                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3490                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3492
3493                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3494         }
3495
3496         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3497         {
3498                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3499
3500                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3501                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3502                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3503                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3504                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3505                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3506                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3507
3508                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3509                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3510                         channel_id: chan.2,
3511                         htlc_id: 0,
3512                         amount_msat: 0,
3513                         payment_hash,
3514                         cltv_expiry,
3515                         onion_routing_packet,
3516                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3517                         blinding_point: None,
3518                 };
3519                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3520         }
3521         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3522         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3523         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3524         match events[0] {
3525                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3526                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3527                 },
3528                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3529         }
3530         match events[1] {
3531                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3532                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3533                 },
3534                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3535         }
3536         match events[2] {
3537                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3538                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3539                 },
3540                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3541         }
3542         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3543         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3544 }
3545
3546 #[test]
3547 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3548         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3549         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3553         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3554         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3555                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3556                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3557                 // connect_style.
3558                 return;
3559         }
3560         let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3561
3562         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3563         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3565         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3568
3569         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3570         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3571         check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3572         check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3573
3574         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3575         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3576         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3579
3580         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3581         // registering new transactions
3582         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3583 }
3584
3585 #[test]
3586 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3587         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3591         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3593         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3594
3595         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3596
3597         let mut payment_event = {
3598                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3599                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3600                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3601
3602                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3603                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3604                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3605         };
3606
3607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3608         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3609
3610         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3611
3612         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3613         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3614         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3615         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3616
3617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3618         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3619         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3621         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3622
3623         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3624         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3625         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3626
3627         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3628         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3630         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3631         let commitment_tx = {
3632                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3633                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3634                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3635                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3636                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3637                 node_txn.remove(0)
3638         };
3639
3640         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3641
3642         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3643         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3645         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3646
3647         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3648         {
3649                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3650                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3651         }
3652         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3653         let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3654         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3655         let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3656         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3657         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3658         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3659         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3660
3661         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3662 }
3663
3664 #[test]
3665 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3666         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3667         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3668         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3669         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3670
3671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3674         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3675         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3676
3677         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3678
3679         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3680         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3683         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3684         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3685
3686         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3687         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3688
3689         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3690         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3691         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3692         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3693 }
3694
3695 #[test]
3696 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3697         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3698         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3703
3704         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3705         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3706         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3707         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3708         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3709         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3711
3712         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3713         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3714
3715         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3716
3717         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3718         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3719
3720         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3721         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3722         // broadcasted.
3723         {
3724                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3725         }
3726
3727         // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3728         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3729         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3730
3731         // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3732         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3733                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3734         }
3735
3736         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed`
3737         // when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the funding
3738         // transaction is broadcasted.
3739         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, true
3740                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3741         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3742                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3743 }
3744
3745 #[test]
3746 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3747         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3748         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3749         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3750         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3751         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3752         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3753         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3754
3755         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3756         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3757         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3758         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3759         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3760
3761         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3762         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3763         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3764         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3765
3766         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3767         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3768         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3769
3770         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3771         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3772         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3773         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3774
3775         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3776         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3777
3778         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3779         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3780
3781         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3782         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3783         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3784         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3785         {
3786                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3787                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3788                 match events[0] {
3789                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3790                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3791                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3792                         },
3793                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3794                 }
3795                 match events[1] {
3796                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3798                 }
3799                 match events[2] {
3800                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3801                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3802                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3803                         },
3804                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3805                 }
3806                 match events[3] {
3807                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3808                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3809                         },
3810                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3811                 }
3812         }
3813         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3814
3815         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3816         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3817 }
3818
3819 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3820         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3821         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3822         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3824         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3825
3826         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3827         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3828                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3829                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3830                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3831                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3832                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3833                 chan_id
3834         } else {
3835                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3836         };
3837
3838         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3839
3840         let payment_event = {
3841                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3842                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3843                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3844
3845                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3846                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3847                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3848         };
3849         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3850
3851         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3852                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3853         } else {
3854                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3855                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3856                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3857                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3858                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3859
3860                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3861                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3862                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3863                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3864
3865                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3866                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3867                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3868                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3869                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3870
3871                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3872                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3873                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3874                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3875                                         }
3876                                 }
3877                         }
3878                 }
3879         }
3880
3881         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3882         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3883         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3884                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3885                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3886                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3887                         //
3888                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3889                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3890                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3891                         //
3892                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3893                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3894                 }
3895                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3896                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3897                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3898                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3899                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3900                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3901         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3902                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3903                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3904                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3905                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3906                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3907         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3908                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3909                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3910                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3911                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3912         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3913                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3914                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3915                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3916                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3917         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3918                 // Everything was delivered...
3919                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3920         }
3921
3922         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3923         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3924                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3925                 match events_1[0] {
3926                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3927                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3928                 };
3929                 match events_1[1] {
3930                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3931                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3932                 };
3933         } else {
3934                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3935                 match events_1[0] {
3936                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3937                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3938                 };
3939         }
3940
3941         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3942         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3943         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3944
3945         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3946
3947         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3948         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3949         match events_2[0] {
3950                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3951                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3952                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3953                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3954                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3955                         match &purpose {
3956                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3957                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3958                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3959                                 },
3960                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3961                         }
3962                 },
3963                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3964         }
3965
3966         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3968         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3969
3970         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3971         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3972         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3973                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3974                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3975                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3976                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3977                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3978                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3979                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3980                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3981                 },
3982                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3983         };
3984
3985         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3986                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3987
3988                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3989                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3990                 match events_4[0] {
3991                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3992                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3993                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3994                         },
3995                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3996                 }
3997
3998                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3999                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4000                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4001                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4002
4003                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4004                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4005                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4006                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4007
4008                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4009                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4010                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4011                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4013
4014                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4015                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4016                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4018                                         }
4019                                 }
4020                         }
4021                 }
4022         }
4023
4024         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4025         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4026         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4027                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4028                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4029                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4030                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4031                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4032                 } else {
4033                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4034                 }
4035         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4036                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4037                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4038                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4039                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4040                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4041         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4042                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4043                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4044                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4045                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4046         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4047                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4048                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4049                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4050                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4051         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4052                 // Everything was delivered...
4053                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4054         }
4055
4056         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4057                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4058         }
4059         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4060                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4061                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4062         }
4063         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4064
4065         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4066                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4067         }
4068
4069         // Channel should still work fine...
4070         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4071         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4072         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4073 }
4074
4075 #[test]
4076 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4077         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4078         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4079         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4080         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4081 }
4082
4083 #[test]
4084 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4085         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4086         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4087         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4088         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4089 }
4090
4091 #[test]
4092 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4093         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4094         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4095         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4096         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4097         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4098         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4099         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4100         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4101         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4102
4103         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4104
4105         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4106         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4107         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4108         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4109         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4110         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4111
4112         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4113         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4114         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4115 }
4116
4117 #[test]
4118 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4122         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4123
4124         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4125         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4126         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4127         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4128         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4129
4130         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4131         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4132
4133         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4134         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4135
4136         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4137         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4138         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4139         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4140         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4141         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4142         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4143
4144         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4145         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4146         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4147 }
4148
4149 #[test]
4150 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4151         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4152         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4153         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4154         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4155
4156         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4157         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4158         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4159         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4160         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4161
4162         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4163         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4164
4165         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4166         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4167
4168         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4169         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4170
4171         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4172         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4173         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4174         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4175         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4176         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4177         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4178
4179         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4180         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4181         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4182 }
4183
4184 #[test]
4185 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4186         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4187         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4188         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4189         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4190         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4191         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4192         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4193
4194         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4195
4196         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4197         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4198         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4199                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4201
4202         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4203         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4204         match events_1[0] {
4205                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4207         }
4208
4209         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4210         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4212
4213         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4214         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4215         match events_2[0] {
4216                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4217                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4218                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4219                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4220                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4221                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4222                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4223
4224                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4225                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4226                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4227                         match events_3[0] {
4228                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4229                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4230                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4231                                 },
4232                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4233                         }
4234
4235                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4236                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4237                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4238                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4239                 },
4240                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4241         }
4242
4243         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4244         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4245
4246         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4247                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4248         }, true).unwrap();
4249         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4250         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4251         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4252                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4253         }, false).unwrap();
4254         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4255         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4256
4257         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4258         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4259         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4260         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4261
4262         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4263         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4264
4265         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4266         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4267
4268         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4269
4270         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4271         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4272         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4273         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4274         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4275         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4276         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4277         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4278         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4280
4281         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4282         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4283         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4284         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4285         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4286         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4287         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4289
4290         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4291         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4292         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4293         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4294         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4295         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4296         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4298
4299         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4300         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4301         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4303
4304         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4305         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4306         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4308
4309         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4310         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4312
4313         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4314
4315         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4316         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4317         match events_5[0] {
4318                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4319                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4320                         match &purpose {
4321                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4322                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4323                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4324                                 },
4325                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4326                         }
4327                 },
4328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4329         }
4330
4331         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4332         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4334
4335         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4336         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4337 }
4338
4339 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4340         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4341         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4345         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4346
4347         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4348
4349         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4350                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4351                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4352                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4353                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4354                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4355                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4356                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4357                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4358                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4359                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4360                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4361                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4362                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4363                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4364                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4365                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4366                 our_payment_hash
4367         } else {
4368                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4369         };
4370
4371         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4372         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4373         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4374         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4375         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4376                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4377                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4378                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4379         }
4380
4381         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4382
4383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4384         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4385         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4386         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4387         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4388         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4389
4390         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4391         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4392         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4393         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4394         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4395         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4396 }
4397
4398 #[test]
4399 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4400         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4401         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4402 }
4403
4404 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4405         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4406         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4407         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4408         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4409         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4410         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4411         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4412
4413         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4414         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4415         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4416         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4417
4418         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4419         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4420         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4421                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4422         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4424
4425         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4426         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4427         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4428         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4429                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4430         if forwarded_htlc {
4431                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4432                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4433                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4434                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4435                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4436         }
4437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4438
4439         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4440         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4441         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4442         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4443
4444         if forwarded_htlc {
4445                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4446                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4447                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4448                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4449                 match fail_commit[0] {
4450                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4451                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4452                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4453                         },
4454                         _ => unreachable!(),
4455                 }
4456                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4457         } else {
4458                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4459         }
4460 }
4461
4462 #[test]
4463 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4464         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4465         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4466 }
4467
4468 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4469         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4470                 {
4471                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4472                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4473                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4474                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4475                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4476                                 match event {
4477                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4478                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4479                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4480                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4481                                                 }
4482                                         },
4483                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4484                                 };
4485                         }
4486                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4487                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4488                                         txn.push(tx);
4489                                 }
4490                         }
4491                         txn
4492                 }
4493         }
4494 }
4495
4496 #[test]
4497 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4498         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4502         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4503
4504         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4505         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4506         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4508         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4509         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4510         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4511         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4512         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4513
4514         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4515         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4516
4517         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4518         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4519         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4520         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4521         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4522 }
4523
4524 #[test]
4525 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4526         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4527         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4531         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4532
4533         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4534         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4535         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4537         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4538
4539         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4540         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4541         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4542         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4543
4544         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4545         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4547         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4548         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4549
4550         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4551         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4552         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4553 }
4554
4555 #[test]
4556 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4557         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4558         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4559
4560         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4561         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4562         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4563         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4564
4565         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4566         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4567         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4568         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4570
4571         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4572         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4573         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4575         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4576
4577         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4578         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4579         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4580
4581         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4582         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4583         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4584         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4585         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4586 }
4587
4588 #[test]
4589 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4593         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4594
4595         // Create some initial channels
4596         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4597
4598         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4599
4600         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4601         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4602         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4603
4604         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4605         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4606         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4608         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4610         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4611         match events[0] {
4612                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4613                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4614         }
4615         match events[1] {
4616                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4617                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4618         }
4619
4620         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4621         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4622         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4623         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4624         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4625
4626         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4628         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4629
4630         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4631         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4632         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4633 }
4634
4635 #[test]
4636 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4640         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4641
4642         // Create some initial channels
4643         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4644
4645         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4646         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4647
4648         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4649
4650         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4651         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4652         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4653
4654         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4658         match events[0] {
4659                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4660                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4661         }
4662         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4663
4664         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4665         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4666         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4667         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4668         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4669
4670         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4671         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4672         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4673         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4674
4675         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4676         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4677         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4678         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4679         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4680 }
4681
4682 #[test]
4683 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4684         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4687         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4688
4689         // Create some initial channels
4690         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4691
4692         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4693         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4694         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4695         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4696
4697         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4698
4699         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4700         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4702         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4703
4704         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4705         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4706         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4707         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4708
4709         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4710         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4711
4712         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4713         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4714         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4715 }
4716
4717 #[test]
4718 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4719         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4720         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4723         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4724
4725         // Create some initial channels
4726         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4727
4728         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4729         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4730         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4731         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4732
4733         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4734
4735         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4736         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4739         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4740         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4741
4742         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4743         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4744         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4745         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4746         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4747         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4748
4749         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4750         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4751         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4753         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4754
4755         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4756         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4757         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4758         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4759         // transactions next...
4760         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4761         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4762
4763         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4764         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4765         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4766                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4767         } else {
4768                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4769                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4770         }
4771
4772         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4773         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4774
4775         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4776         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4777         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4778         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4779         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4780 }
4781
4782 #[test]
4783 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4784         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4785         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4786         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4787         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4788         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4789
4790         // Create some initial channels
4791         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4792
4793         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4794         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4795         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4796         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4797
4798         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4799         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4800
4801         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4802
4803         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4804         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4805         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4807         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4808         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4809
4810         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4811         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4813         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4814
4815         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4816         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4817         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4818
4819         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4820         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4821         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4823         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4824
4825         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4826         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4827
4828         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4829         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4830         // transactions next...
4831         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4832         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4833         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4834                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4835         } else {
4836                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4837                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4838         }
4839
4840         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4841         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4842
4843         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4844         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4845
4846         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4847         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4848
4849         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4850         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4851         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4852         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4853         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4854         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4855         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4856         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4857 }
4858
4859 #[test]
4860 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4861         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4862         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4863         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4864         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4865         // channel.
4866         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4867         // gets broadcast.
4868
4869         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4870         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4871         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4872         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4873
4874         // Create some initial channels
4875         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4876         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4877
4878         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4879         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4880         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4881         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4882         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4883
4884         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4885         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4886         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4887
4888         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4889         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4890         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4891         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4892         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4894         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4895         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4896         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4897         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4898         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4899
4900         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4901         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4903         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4904
4905         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4906         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4907         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4908         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4909         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4910         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4911
4912         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4913         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4915         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4916         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4917         match events[0] {
4918                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4919                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4920         }
4921         match events[1] {
4922                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4923                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4924                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4925                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4926                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4927                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4928                 },
4929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4930         }
4931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4932         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4933         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4934         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4935         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4936
4937         match nodes_2_event {
4938                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4939                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4940         }
4941
4942         match nodes_0_event {
4943                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4944                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4945                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4946                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4947                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4948                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4949                 },
4950                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4951         };
4952
4953         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4954         match msg_events[0] {
4955                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4957         }
4958
4959         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4961         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4962         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4963         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4964         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4965         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4966         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4967         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4968         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4969         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4970
4971         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4973 }
4974
4975 #[test]
4976 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4977         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4978         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4979         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4980         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4983         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4984         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4985         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4986         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4988                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4989         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4990
4991         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4992         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4993         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4994
4995         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4996         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4997         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4998         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4999         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5000
5001         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5002
5003         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5004         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5005         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5006         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5007         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5008                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5009         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5010         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5011
5012         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5013         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5014         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5015
5016         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5017         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5018         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5019         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5020         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5021
5022         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5023         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5024                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5025                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5026                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5027
5028                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5029                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5030                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5031
5032                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5033                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5034                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5035                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5036                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5037
5038                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5039                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5040                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5041                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5042                 } else {
5043                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5044                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5045                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5046                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5047                 }
5048
5049                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5051                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5052                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5053                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5054                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5055                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5056                 } else {
5057                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5058                 }
5059         }
5060
5061         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5062         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5063
5064         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5066         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5067         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5068         match events[0] {
5069                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5071         }
5072         match events[1] {
5073                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5074                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5075         }
5076         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5077         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5078         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5079         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5080         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5081         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5082         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5083         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5084         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5085         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5086
5087         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5088         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5089         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5090         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5091         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5092         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5093         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5094         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5095         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5096         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5097
5098         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5099         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5100         {
5101                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5102         }
5103         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5104
5105         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5106         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5107         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5108         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5109         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5110         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5111         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5112         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5113         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5115
5116         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5117         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5118         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5119 }
5120
5121 #[test]
5122 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5126         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5127
5128         // Create some initial channels
5129         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5130
5131         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5132         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5133         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5134         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5135         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5136
5137         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5138         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5139         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5141
5142         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5144         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5145         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5146         match events[0] {
5147                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5149         }
5150         match events[1] {
5151                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5152                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5153         }
5154         let node_tx = {
5155                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5156                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5157                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5158                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5159                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5160                 node_txn[0].clone()
5161         };
5162
5163         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5164         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5165
5166         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5167         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5168         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5169         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5170         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5171         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5172 }
5173
5174 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5175         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5176         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5177         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5178         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5179         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5180         // use the same payment hashes.
5181         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5182         //
5183         // A \         / E
5184         //    - C - D -
5185         // B /         \ F
5186         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5187         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5188         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5189         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5190         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5191         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5192         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5194                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5195         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5196
5197         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5198         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5199         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5200         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5201         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5202
5203         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5204         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5205         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5206         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5207
5208         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5209                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5210         // 0th HTLC:
5211         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5212         // 1st HTLC:
5213         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5214         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5215         // 2nd HTLC:
5216         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5217         // 3rd HTLC:
5218         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5219         // 4th HTLC:
5220         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5221         // 5th HTLC:
5222         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5223         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5224         // 6th HTLC:
5225         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5226         // 7th HTLC:
5227         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5228
5229         // 8th HTLC:
5230         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5231         // 9th HTLC:
5232         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5233         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5234
5235         // 10th HTLC:
5236         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5237         // 11th HTLC:
5238         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5239         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5240
5241         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5242         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5243         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5244         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5245         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5246
5247         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5248         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5249         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5250         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5251         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5252         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5254
5255         let failed_destinations = vec![
5256                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5257                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5258                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5259                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5260         ];
5261         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5263
5264         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5265         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5266         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5267         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5268         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5269         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5270
5271         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5272         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5273         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5275
5276         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5277                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5278                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5279         ];
5280         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5282
5283         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5284         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5285         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5286         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5287
5288         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5289
5290         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5291         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5292                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5293                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5294                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5295                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5296                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5297                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5298         ];
5299         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5301         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5302         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5303         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5304         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5305         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5306         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5307         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5308         if deliver_last_raa {
5309                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5310         } else {
5311                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5312         }
5313
5314         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5315         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5316         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5317         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5318         //
5319         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5320         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5321         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5322         //
5323         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5324         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5325         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5326
5327         if announce_latest {
5328                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5329         } else {
5330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5331         }
5332         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5333         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5334                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5335                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5336         } else {
5337                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5338                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5339         };
5340         match close_event {
5341                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5343         }
5344
5345         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5346         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5347         if deliver_last_raa {
5348                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5349
5350                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5351                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5352         } else {
5353                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5354                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5355                 } else {
5356                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5357                 };
5358
5359                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5360         }
5361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5362
5363         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5364         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5365         let mut a_done = false;
5366         for msg in cs_msgs {
5367                 match msg {
5368                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5369                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5370                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5371                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5372                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5373                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5374                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5375                                         }
5376                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5377                                         assert!(!a_done);
5378                                         a_done = true;
5379                                         &nodes[0]
5380                                 } else {
5381                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5382                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5383                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5384                                         }
5385                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5386                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5387                                         &nodes[1]
5388                                 };
5389                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5390                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5391                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5392                                 if announce_latest {
5393                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5394                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5395                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5396                                         }
5397                                 }
5398                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5399                         },
5400                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5401                 }
5402         }
5403
5404         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5405         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5406         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5407         let mut as_updates = 0;
5408         for event in as_events.iter() {
5409                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5410                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5411                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5412                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5413                         } else {
5414                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5415                         }
5416                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5417                                 as_updates += 1;
5418                         }
5419                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5420                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5421         }
5422         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5423         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5424         if announce_latest {
5425                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5426                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5427         }
5428         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5429
5430         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5431         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5432         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5433         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5434         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5435                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5436                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5437                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5438                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5439                         } else {
5440                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5441                         }
5442                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5443                                 bs_updates += 1;
5444                         }
5445                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5446                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5447         }
5448         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5449         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5450         if announce_latest {
5451                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5452         }
5453         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5454
5455         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5456         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5457         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5458         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5459         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5460         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5461 }
5462
5463 #[test]
5464 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5465         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5466 }
5467
5468 #[test]
5469 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5470         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5471 }
5472
5473 #[test]
5474 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5475         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5476         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5477         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5478 }
5479
5480 #[test]
5481 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5485         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5486
5487         // Create some initial channels
5488         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5489
5490         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5491         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5492         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5493         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5494
5495         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5496         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5497         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5499         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5500         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5501
5502         let htlc_timeout = {
5503                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5504                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5505                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5506                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5507                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5508                 node_txn[0].clone()
5509         };
5510
5511         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5513         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5514
5515         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5516         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5517         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5518         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5519         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5520         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5521         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5522         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5523         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5524         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5525                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5526 }
5527
5528 #[test]
5529 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5530         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5531         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5532         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5533         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5534
5535         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5536
5537         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5538         let seed = [42; 32];
5539         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5540         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5541         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5542         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5543         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5544         let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone());
5545         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5546         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5547         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5548         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5549
5550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5551         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5552
5553         // Create some initial channels
5554         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5555         // for node 0
5556         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5557         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5558         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5559
5560         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5561         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5562         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5563         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5564         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5565
5566         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5567         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5568         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5569         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5570         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5571
5572         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5573         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5574         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5575         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5576             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5577             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5578             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5579                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5580         }
5581
5582         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5584         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5585         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5587         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5588
5589         let htlc_timeout = {
5590                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5591                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5592                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5593                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5594                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5595                 node_txn[0].clone()
5596         };
5597
5598         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5599         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5600         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5601
5602         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5603         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5604         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5605         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5606         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5607         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5608         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5609         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5610         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5611         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5612         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5613                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5614 }
5615
5616 #[test]
5617 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5618         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5619         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5620         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5621         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5622
5623         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5624
5625         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5626         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5627
5628         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5629         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5630         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5631
5632         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5633         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5634         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5635
5636         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5637         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5638         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5639
5640         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5641         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5642         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5643 }
5644
5645 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5650         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5651
5652         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5653
5654         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5655         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5656         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5657         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5658         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5659
5660         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5661         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5662         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5663
5664         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5667         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5669
5670         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5671         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5672         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5673                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5674                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5675         }
5676         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5677         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5679         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5680 }
5681
5682 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5683         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5684         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5685         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5686         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5687         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5688
5689         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5690         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5691                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5693
5694         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5695
5696         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5697         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5698         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5699
5700         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5701         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5702
5703         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5704                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5705                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5706         }
5707         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5708         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5710         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5711 }
5712
5713 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5717         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5718         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5719
5720         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5721         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5722         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5723         // actually revoked.
5724         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5725         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5726         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5727         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5729
5730         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5731         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5732         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5734         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5735         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5737         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5739         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5740
5741         if check_revoke_no_close {
5742                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5743                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5744         }
5745
5746         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5747         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5748         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5749                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5750                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5751         }
5752         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5753                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5754                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5755                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5756                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5757         } else {
5758                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5759         }
5760 }
5761
5762 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5763 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5764 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5765 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5766 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5767 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5768 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5769 // non-dust HTLCs.
5770 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5771 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5772 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5773 #[test]
5774 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5775         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5776         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5777
5778         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5779         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5780 }
5781
5782 #[test]
5783 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5784         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5785         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5786         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5787         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5788 }
5789
5790 #[test]
5791 #[should_panic]
5792 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5793         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5794         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5796         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5797         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5798         for node in nodes.iter() {
5799                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5800         }
5801
5802         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5803         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5804         let push_msat=10001;
5805         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5806         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5807         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5808         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5809
5810         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5811         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5812         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5813 }
5814
5815 #[test]
5816 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5817         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5818         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5819         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5820         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5821
5822         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5823         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5824         let push_msat=10001;
5825         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5826
5827         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5828         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5829         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5830         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5831         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5832
5833         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5834         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5835         let push_msat=10001;
5836         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5837         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5838         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5839
5840         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5841         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5842         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5843
5844         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5845         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5846         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5847
5848         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5849         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5850         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5851
5852         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5853         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5854         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5855         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5856         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5857         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5858 }
5859
5860 #[test]
5861 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5862         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5863         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5864         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5865         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5866
5867         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5868         let push_msat=10001;
5869         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5870         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5871         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5872         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5873
5874         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5875         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5876         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5877                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5878                         msg.clone()
5879                 },
5880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5881         };
5882         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5883 }
5884
5885 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5886 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5887 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5888 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5889 #[test]
5890 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5891         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5894         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5895         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5896
5897         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5898         // pending_update_fee.
5899         {
5900                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5901                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5902         }
5903         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905
5906         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5907         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5908         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5910                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5911                 },
5912                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5913         };
5914
5915         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5916
5917         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5918         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5919         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5920         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5921
5922         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5923         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5924         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5925
5926         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5927         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5928                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5929         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5930         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5931
5932         // Flush the pending fee update.
5933         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5934         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5936         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5938
5939         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5940         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5941         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5942         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5943         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5944         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5945
5946         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5947         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5948         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5949         match &events[0] {
5950                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5951                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5952                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5953                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5954                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5955                 },
5956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5957         }
5958         match &events[1] {
5959                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5960                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5961                 },
5962                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5963         }
5964 }
5965
5966 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5967 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5968 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5969 #[test]
5970 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5974         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5975         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5976
5977         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5978         // pending_update_fee.
5979         {
5980                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5981                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5982         }
5983         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5985
5986         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5987         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5988         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5989                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5990                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5991                 },
5992                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5993         };
5994
5995         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5996
5997         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5998         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5999         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6000         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6001
6002         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6003         let amt_1 = 20000;
6004         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6005         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6006         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6007
6008         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6009         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6010                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6011         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6012         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6013         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6014         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6015                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6016         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6017         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6018
6019         // Flush the pending fee update.
6020         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6021         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6022         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6023         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6024         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6026
6027         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6028         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6029         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6030         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6031         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6032         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6033
6034         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6035         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6036         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6037         match &events[0] {
6038                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6039                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6040                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6041                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6042                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6043                 },
6044                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6045         }
6046         match &events[1] {
6047                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6048                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6049                 },
6050                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6051         }
6052
6053         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6054         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6055                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6056                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6057                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6058         };
6059         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6060                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6061                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6062         };
6063         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6065         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6066         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6067         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6068         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6069         match events[0] {
6070                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6071                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6072         }
6073         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6074         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6076         match events[0] {
6077                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6079         }
6080         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6082         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6083
6084         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6085         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6086         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6087         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6088 }
6089
6090 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6091 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6092 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6093 // once it's freed.
6094 #[test]
6095 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6098         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6099         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6100         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6101         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6102         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6103         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6104         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6105         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6106
6107         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6108         // pending_update_fee.
6109         {
6110                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6111                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6112         }
6113         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6115
6116         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6118         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6119                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6120                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6121                 },
6122                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6123         };
6124
6125         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6126
6127         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6128         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6129         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6130         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6131
6132         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6133         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6134         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6135         let payment_event = {
6136                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6137                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6139
6140                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6141                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6142
6143                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6144         };
6145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6147         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6149
6150         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6151         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6152
6153         // Flush the pending fee update.
6154         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6155         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6157         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6158         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6160
6161         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6162         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6163         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6164
6165         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6166                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6167                         msg.clone()
6168                 },
6169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6170         };
6171
6172         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6174         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6175
6176         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6177         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6178         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6179         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6180                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6182         }
6183
6184         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6185         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6187
6188         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6189         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6191         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6192                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6193                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6194                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6195                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6196                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6197                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6198                 },
6199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6200         };
6201
6202         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6203         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6204         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6205
6206         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6207         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6210         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6212         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6213         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6214         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6215                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6216                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6217         };
6218         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6219         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6221 }
6222
6223 #[test]
6224 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6225         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6226         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6227         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6228         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6229         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6230         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6231         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6232
6233         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6234                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6235         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6236
6237         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6238         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6239         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6240
6241         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6242                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6243         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6244         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6245 }
6246
6247 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6248 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6249 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6250
6251 #[test]
6252 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6253         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6254         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6255         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6256         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6257         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6258         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6259
6260         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6261         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6262
6263         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6264                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6265                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6266         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6267 }
6268
6269 #[test]
6270 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6271         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6275         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6276         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6277
6278         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6279         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6280         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6281                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6282                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6283                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6284
6285         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6286         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6287 }
6288
6289 #[test]
6290 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6291         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6296         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6297
6298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6299         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6300                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6304
6305         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6306         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6307         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6309         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6310                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6311 }
6312
6313 #[test]
6314 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6315         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6316         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6320         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6321         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6322
6323         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6324                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6325         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6326         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6327         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6328                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6329                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6330                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6331 }
6332
6333 #[test]
6334 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6335         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6336         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6337         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6342         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6343         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6344                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6345
6346         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6347         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6348         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6349                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350                 let payment_event = {
6351                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6352                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6353                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354
6355                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6356                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6357                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6358                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6359                         } else {
6360                                 assert!(false);
6361                         }
6362                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6363                 };
6364                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6365                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6366                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6367
6368                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6369                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6370         }
6371         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6372                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6373                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6374
6375         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6376 }
6377
6378 #[test]
6379 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6380         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6384         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6385         let channel_value = 100000;
6386         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6387         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6388
6389         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6390
6391         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6392         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6393         // limits us to.
6394         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6395         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6396                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6397                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6398         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6399
6400         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6401 }
6402
6403 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6404 #[test]
6405 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6406         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6407         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6408         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6409         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6410         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6411         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6412         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6413         {
6414                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6416                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6417                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6418         }
6419
6420         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6421         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6422                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6425         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6427         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6428         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6429         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6431         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6432 }
6433
6434 #[test]
6435 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6436         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6437         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6438         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6439         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6440         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6441         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6442
6443         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6444         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6445         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6446         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6447         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6448         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6449
6450         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6451         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6452         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6453                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6455         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6456
6457         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6458         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6459         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6460         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6461         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6462
6463         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6464         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6465         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6467         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6468 }
6469
6470 #[test]
6471 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6472         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6473         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6478         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6479
6480         let send_amt = 3999999;
6481         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6482                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6483         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6484         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6485         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6486         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6487         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6488                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6489         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6490
6491         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6492                 channel_id: chan.2,
6493                 htlc_id: 0,
6494                 amount_msat: 1000,
6495                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6496                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6497                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6498                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6499                 blinding_point: None,
6500         };
6501
6502         for i in 0..50 {
6503                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6504                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6505         }
6506         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6507         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6508
6509         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6510         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6511         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6513         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6514 }
6515
6516 #[test]
6517 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6518         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6519         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6520         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6522         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6523         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6524
6525         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6526         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6527                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6529         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6530         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6531         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6532
6533         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6534         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6535         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6537         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6538 }
6539
6540 #[test]
6541 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6542         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6546         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6547
6548         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6549         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6550         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6551                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6553         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6554         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6555         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6556
6557         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6558         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6559         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6561         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6562 }
6563
6564 #[test]
6565 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6566         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6567         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6568         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6569         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573
6574         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6575         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6576         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6577                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6579         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6580         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6581
6582         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6583         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6585         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6586                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6587         }, true).unwrap();
6588         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6589         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6590         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6591                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6592         }, false).unwrap();
6593         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6594         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6595         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6596         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6597         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6598         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6599
6600         //Resend HTLC
6601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6602         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6603         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6605         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6606
6607         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6608
6609         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6610         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6611         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6613         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6614 }
6615
6616 #[test]
6617 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6618         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6619
6620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6623         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6624         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6625         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6626         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6627                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6628
6629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6630         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6631         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6632
6633         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6634                 channel_id: chan.2,
6635                 htlc_id: 0,
6636                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6637         };
6638
6639         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6640
6641         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6642         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6643         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6645         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6646 }
6647
6648 #[test]
6649 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6650         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6651
6652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6655         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6656         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6657
6658         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6659         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6660                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6662         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6663         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6664
6665         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6666                 channel_id: chan.2,
6667                 htlc_id: 0,
6668                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6669         };
6670
6671         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6672
6673         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6674         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6675         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6677         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6678 }
6679
6680 #[test]
6681 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6682         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6683
6684         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6686         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6687         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6688         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6689
6690         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6691         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6692                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6694         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6695         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6696         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6697                 channel_id: chan.2,
6698                 htlc_id: 0,
6699                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6700                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6701         };
6702
6703         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6704
6705         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6706         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6707         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6709         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6710 }
6711
6712 #[test]
6713 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6714         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6715
6716         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6717         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6718         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6719         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6720         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6721
6722         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6723
6724         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6725         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6726         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6727
6728         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6729         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6730         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6731                 match events[0] {
6732                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6733                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6734                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6735                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6736                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6737                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6738                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6739                         },
6740                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6741                 }
6742         };
6743
6744         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6745
6746         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6747
6748         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6749         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6750         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6752         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6753 }
6754
6755 #[test]
6756 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6757         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6758
6759         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6760         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6761         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6762         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6763         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6764
6765         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6766
6767         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6769         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6770
6771         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6772         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6773         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6774                 match events[0] {
6775                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6776                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6777                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6778                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6779                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6780                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6781                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6782                         },
6783                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6784                 }
6785         };
6786
6787         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6788
6789         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6790
6791         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6792         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6793         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6796 }
6797
6798 #[test]
6799 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6800         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6801
6802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6805         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6806         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6807
6808         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6809         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6810                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6812
6813         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6814         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6815
6816         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6818         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6819
6820         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6821
6822         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6823                 match events[0] {
6824                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6825                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6826                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6827                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6828                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6829                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6830                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6831                         },
6832                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6833                 }
6834         };
6835         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6836         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6837
6838         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6839         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6840         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6842         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6843 }
6844
6845 #[test]
6846 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6847         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6848         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6849
6850         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6851         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6852         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6853         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6854         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6855         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6856
6857         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6858
6859         //First hop
6860         let mut payment_event = {
6861                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6862                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6863                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6864                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6865                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6866                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6867         };
6868         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6870         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6871         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6872         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6876         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6877
6878         //Second Hop
6879         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6880         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6882         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6883
6884         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6885         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6886         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6887                 match events_3[0] {
6888                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6889                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6890                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6891                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6892                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6893                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6894                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6895                         },
6896                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6897                 }
6898         };
6899
6900         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6901
6902         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6903         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6905         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6906         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6907
6908         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6909         match events_4[0] {
6910                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6911                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6912                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6913                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6914                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6915                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6916                 },
6917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6918         };
6919
6920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6921 }
6922
6923 #[test]
6924 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6925         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6926         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6927         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6928         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6929         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6930         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6931
6932         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6933
6934         // First hop
6935         let mut payment_event = {
6936                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6937                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6938                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6940         };
6941
6942         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6943         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6946         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6947         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6948
6949         // Second Hop
6950         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6954
6955         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6956         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6957         match events_3[0] {
6958                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6959                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6960                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6961                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6962
6963                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6964                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6965                 },
6966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6967         }
6968
6969         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6970                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6971                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6972         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6973         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6975
6976         match events_4[0] {
6977                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6978                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6979                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6980                 },
6981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6982         }
6983
6984         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6985         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6986
6987         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6988         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6989         match events_5[0] {
6990                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6991                 } => {
6992                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6993                         assert!(is_permanent);
6994                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6995                 },
6996                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6997         }
6998         match events_5[1] {
6999                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7000                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7001                 },
7002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7003         }
7004
7005         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7006 }
7007
7008 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7009         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7010         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7011         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7012
7013         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7014         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7015         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7016         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7017         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7018         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7019
7020         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7021                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7022
7023         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7024         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7025         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7026         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7027
7028         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7029         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7030
7031         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7032         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7034         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7036
7037         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7038         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7039         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7041
7042         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7043         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7044
7045         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7046         match events[0] {
7047                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7048                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7049                 },
7050                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7051         }
7052         match events[1] {
7053                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7054                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7055                 },
7056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057         }
7058
7059         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7060         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7061         if announce_latest {
7062                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7063         } else {
7064                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7065         }
7066
7067         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7069         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7070
7071         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7072         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7073         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7074         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7076         let mut first_failed = false;
7077         for event in events {
7078                 match event {
7079                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7080                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7081                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7082                                         first_failed = true;
7083                                 } else {
7084                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7085                                 }
7086                         },
7087                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7088                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7089                 }
7090         }
7091 }
7092
7093 #[test]
7094 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7095         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7096         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7097 }
7098
7099 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7100         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7101         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7102         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7103         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7104         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7105         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7106
7107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7110         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7111         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7112
7113         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7114                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7115
7116         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7117         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7118
7119         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7120         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7121
7122         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7123         if revoked {
7124                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7125                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7126         }
7127
7128         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7129         if local {
7130                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7131                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7132                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7133                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7134                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7135
7136                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7137                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7139                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7140                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7141                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7142                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7143                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7144                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7145                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7146                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7147         } else {
7148                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7149                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7150                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7151                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7153                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7154
7155                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7156                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7157                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7158                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7159                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7160                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7161                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7162
7163                 if !revoked {
7164                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7165                 } else {
7166                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7167                 }
7168                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7169                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7170                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7171                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7172                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7173         }
7174 }
7175
7176 #[test]
7177 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7178         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7179         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7180         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7181 }
7182
7183 #[test]
7184 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7185         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7186
7187         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7188         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7189         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7190         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7191         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7195         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7196
7197         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7198         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7199                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7200                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7201         {
7202                 match error {
7203                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7204                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7205                 }
7206         } else { assert!(false) }
7207
7208         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7209         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7210         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7211         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7212         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7213                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7214                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7215         {
7216                 match error {
7217                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7218                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7219                 }
7220         } else { assert!(false); }
7221
7222         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7223         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7224         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7225         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7226         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7227         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7228         let reason_msg;
7229         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7230                 match action {
7231                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7232                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7233                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7234                         },
7235                         _ => { panic!(); }
7236                 }
7237         } else { panic!(); }
7238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7239
7240         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7241         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7242         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7243         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7244         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7245                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7246                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7247         {
7248                 match error {
7249                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7250                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7251                 }
7252         } else { assert!(false); }
7253 }
7254
7255 #[test]
7256 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7257         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7258         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7259         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7260
7261         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7262         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7263         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7264         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7265
7266         // Create some initial channels
7267         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7268
7269         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7270         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7271         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7272                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7273         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7274         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7275                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7276         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7277         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7278         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7279                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7281
7282         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7283         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7284         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7285         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7286         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7287
7288         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7289         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7290         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7291         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7292
7293         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7294         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7295         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7296
7297         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7298         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7299         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7300                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7301                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7302                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7303                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7304                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7305                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7306                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7307                 },
7308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7309         };
7310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7311
7312         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7313         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7314
7315         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7316         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7317         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7318         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7319 }
7320
7321 #[test]
7322 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7323         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7324         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7325
7326         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7327         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7328         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7329         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7330
7331         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7332         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7334
7335         // Disconnect peers
7336         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7337         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7338
7339         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7340                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7341         }
7342         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7343         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7344         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7345         for e in msg_events {
7346                 match e {
7347                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7348                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7349                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7350                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7351                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7352                                 }
7353                         },
7354                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7355                 }
7356         }
7357         // Reconnect peers
7358         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7359                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7360         }, true).unwrap();
7361         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7362         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7363         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7364                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7365         }, false).unwrap();
7366         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7367         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7368
7369         // Reestablish chan_1
7370         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7371         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7372         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7373         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7374         // Reestablish chan_2
7375         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7376         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7377         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7378         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7379         // Reestablish chan_3
7380         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7381         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7382         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7383         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7384
7385         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7386                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7387         }
7388         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7389         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7390         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7391         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7392         for e in msg_events {
7393                 match e {
7394                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7395                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7396                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7397                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7398                                         // the old one.
7399                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7400                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7401                                 }
7402                         },
7403                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7404                 }
7405         }
7406         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7407         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7408 }
7409
7410 #[test]
7411 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7412         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7413         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7414
7415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7419
7420         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7421
7422         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7423         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7424                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7425         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7426         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7427
7428         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7429         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7430         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7431         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7432         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7433         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7434
7435         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7436         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7437                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7438                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7439                 }
7440         }
7441
7442         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7443         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7444
7445         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7446         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7447         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7449
7450         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7451         let penalty_1;
7452         let feerate_1;
7453         {
7454                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7455                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7456                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7457                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7458                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7459                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7460                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7461                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7462                 node_txn.clear();
7463         };
7464
7465         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7466         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7467         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7468         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7469         {
7470                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7471                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7472                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7473                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7474                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7475                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7476                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7477                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7478                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7479                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7480                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7481                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7482                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7483                         node_txn.clear();
7484                 }
7485         }
7486         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7487
7488         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7489         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7490         let penalty_3;
7491         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7492         {
7493                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7494                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7495                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7496                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7497                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7498                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7499                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7500                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7501                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7502                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7503                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7504                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7505                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7506                         node_txn.clear();
7507                 }
7508         }
7509         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7510
7511         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7512         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7513 }
7514
7515 #[test]
7516 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7517         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7518         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7519
7520         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7521         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7524         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7525
7526         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7527         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7528         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7529         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7530         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7531         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7532         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7533                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7534         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7535         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7536                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7537         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7538         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7539                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7540         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7541
7542         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7543         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7544         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7545
7546         // Revoke local commitment tx
7547         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7548
7549         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7550         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7551         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7553         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7554         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7555
7556         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7557                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7558                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7559
7560                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7561                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7562                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7563
7564                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7565                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7566                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7567                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7568
7569                 txn
7570         };
7571
7572         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7573         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7574         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7575         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7576         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7577         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7578         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7579         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7580         match events.last().unwrap() {
7581                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7582                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7583         }
7584         let first;
7585         let feerate_1;
7586         let penalty_txn;
7587         {
7588                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7589                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7590                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7591
7592                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7593                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7594                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7595                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7596                 // future).
7597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7598                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7600                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7602                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7603
7604                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7605                 // available, which we check here:
7606                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7607                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7608                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7609
7610                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7612
7613                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7614                 // output, checked above).
7615                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7617                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7618
7619                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7620                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7621                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7622                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7623                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7624                 node_txn.clear();
7625         }
7626
7627         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7628         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7629         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7630         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7631         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7632
7633         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7634         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7635         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7636         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7637         let node_txn = {
7638                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7639                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7640
7641                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7642                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7643                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7644                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7645                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7646                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7647                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7648                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7649                 node_txn.clear();
7650                 txn
7651         };
7652         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7653         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7654         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7655         {
7656                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7657                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7658                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7659                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7660                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7661                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7662                 // up bumped justice generation.
7663                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7664                 node_txn.clear();
7665         }
7666         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7668 }
7669
7670 #[test]
7671 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7672         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7673         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7674
7675         // Create 2 HTLCs
7676         // Provide preimage for one
7677         // Check aggregation
7678
7679         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7680         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7681         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7682         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7683
7684         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7685         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7686         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7687
7688         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7689         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7690         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7691         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7692         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7693
7694         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7695         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7696         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7697         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7699         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7700
7701         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7702         let timeout;
7703         let preimage;
7704         let preimage_bump;
7705         let feerate_timeout;
7706         let feerate_preimage;
7707         {
7708                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7709                 // 3 transactions including:
7710                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7711                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7712                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7713                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7714                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7715                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7716                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7717                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7718
7719                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7720                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7721                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7722                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7723
7724                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7725                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7726                 } else {
7727                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7728                 };
7729
7730                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7731                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7732                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7733
7734                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7735                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7736                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7737                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7738
7739                 node_txn.clear();
7740         };
7741         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7742         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7743
7744         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7745         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7746         {
7747                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7748                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7749                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7750                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7751                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7752                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7753
7754                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7755                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7756                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7757                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7758                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7759
7760                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7761                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7762                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7763                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7764                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7765
7766                 node_txn.clear();
7767         }
7768
7769         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7770         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7771 }
7772
7773 #[test]
7774 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7775         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7776         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7777         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7778         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7779         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7780         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7781         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7782         // implement that).
7783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7787         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7788
7789         let per_commitment_secret;
7790         let next_per_commitment_point;
7791         {
7792                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7793                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7794                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7795                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7796                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7797
7798                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7799
7800                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7801                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7802                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7803
7804                 // Must revoke without gaps
7805                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7806                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7807
7808                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7809                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7810                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7811         }
7812
7813         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7814                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7815                         channel_id,
7816                         per_commitment_secret,
7817                         next_per_commitment_point,
7818                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7819                         next_local_nonce: None,
7820                 });
7821         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7823         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7824                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7825 }
7826
7827 #[test]
7828 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7829         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7830         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7831
7832         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7833         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7834         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7835         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7836
7837         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7838         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7839         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7840         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7841
7842         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7843         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7844         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7845
7846         // Revoke local commitment tx
7847         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7848
7849         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7850         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7851         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7852         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7853
7854         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7855         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7856         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7857         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7858         let penalty_txn = {
7859                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7860                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7861                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7862                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7864                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7865                 node_txn.clear();
7866                 penalty_txn
7867         };
7868         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7869         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7870         {
7871                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7872                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7873                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7874         }
7875 }
7876
7877 #[test]
7878 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7879         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7880         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7884         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7885
7886         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7887
7888         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7889         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7890         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7891         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7892         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7893
7894         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7895         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7897         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7898
7899         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7901         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7902         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7903         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7904         match close_ev[0] {
7905                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7906                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7907                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7908                 },
7909                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7910         }
7911 }
7912
7913 #[test]
7914 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7915         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7916         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7917         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7918         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7919
7920         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7921         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7922         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7923
7924         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7925
7926         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7927         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7928         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7929         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7930 }
7931
7932 #[test]
7933 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7934         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7935         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7936         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7937         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7938         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7939         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7940
7941         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7942         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7943         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7944
7945         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7946         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7947         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7948 }
7949
7950 #[test]
7951 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7952         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7953         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7954         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7955         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7956         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7957
7958         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7959         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7960         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7961         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7962         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7963         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7964         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7965         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7966         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7967         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7968         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7969         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7970
7971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7974         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975
7976         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7977         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7978         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7979         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7980         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7981
7982         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7983         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7984
7985         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7986         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7987         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7988         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7989         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7990         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7991
7992         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7993         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7994         // `channel_value`.
7995         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7996         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7997         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7998         // `channel_value`.
7999         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8000 }
8001
8002 #[test]
8003 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8004         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8005         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8006         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8007         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8008         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8009         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8010
8011         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8012         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8013
8014         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8015
8016         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8017         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8018         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8019
8020         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8021         match events[0] {
8022                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8023                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8024                 }
8025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8026         }
8027
8028         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8029         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8030
8031         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8032                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8033                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034                 }
8035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8036         }
8037
8038         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8039
8040         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8041         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8042
8043         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8044         match events[0] {
8045                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8046                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8047                 }
8048                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8049         }
8050 }
8051
8052 #[test]
8053 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8054         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8055         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8056         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8057         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8058         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8059         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8060
8061         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8062         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8063
8064         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8065
8066         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8067         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8068         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8069
8070         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8071         match events[0] {
8072                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8073                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8074                 }
8075                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8076         }
8077
8078         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8079         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8080
8081         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8082                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8083                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8084                 }
8085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8086         }
8087
8088         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8089         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8090 }
8091
8092 #[test]
8093 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8094         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8095         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8096         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8097         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8098         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8099         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100
8101         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8102         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8103
8104         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8105
8106         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8107         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8108         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8109
8110         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8111         match events[0] {
8112                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8113                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8114                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8115                         match api_res {
8116                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8117                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8118                                 },
8119                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8120                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8121                         }
8122                 }
8123                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8124         }
8125
8126         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8127         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8128         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8129
8130         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8131                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8132                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133                 }
8134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8135         }
8136 }
8137
8138 #[test]
8139 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8140         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8141         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8142         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8143         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8144
8145         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8146         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8147         match api_res {
8148                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8149                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8150                 },
8151                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8152                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8153         }
8154 }
8155
8156 #[test]
8157 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8158         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8159         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8160         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8161         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8162         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8163         let node_count = 4;
8164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8167         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168
8169         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8170         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8171         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8172         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8173
8174         let total_msat = 100_000;
8175         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8176         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8177         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8178
8179         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8180         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8181         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8182         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8183         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8184         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8185         route.paths.push(path_1);
8186
8187         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8188         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8189         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8190         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8191         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8192         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8193         route.paths.push(path_2);
8194
8195         // Send payment
8196         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8197         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8198                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8199         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8200                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8202
8203         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8204         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8205
8206         // First path
8207         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8208         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8209         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8210
8211         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8212                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8213
8214                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8215                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8216                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8217                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8218                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8219                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8220                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8221                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8222                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8223                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8224                                 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8225                         } = onion_payloads[1] {
8226                                 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8227                         } else { panic!() }
8228                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8229                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8230                 }
8231
8232                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8233                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8234                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8235                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8236
8237                 if idx == 0 {
8238                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8239                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8240                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8241                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8242                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8243                 } else {
8244                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8245                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8246                 }
8247
8248                 prev_node = node;
8249         }
8250
8251         // Second path
8252         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8253         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8254
8255         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8256 }
8257
8258 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8259
8260         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8261         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8262
8263         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8264         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8265         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8266         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8267
8268         let src_idx = 0;
8269         let dst_idx = 1;
8270
8271         // Create channels for each amount
8272         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8273         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8274         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8275         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8276                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8277                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8278                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8279                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8280                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8281                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8282                 expected_paths.push(path);
8283         }
8284         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8285
8286         // Create a route for each amount
8287         let example_amount = 100000;
8288         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8289         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8290         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8291                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8292                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8293                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8294                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8295                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8296                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8297                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8298                 route.paths.push(path);
8299         }
8300
8301         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8302         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8303         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8304                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8305         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8306                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8308
8309         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8310         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8311         let mut amount_received = 0;
8312         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8313                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8314
8315                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8316                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8317                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8318                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8319         }
8320
8321         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8322 }
8323
8324 #[test]
8325 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8326         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8327         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8328 }
8329
8330 #[test]
8331 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8332         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8336         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8337
8338         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8339         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8340         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8341         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8342
8343         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8344         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8345         route.paths.push(path);
8346         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8347         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8348         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8349         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8350         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8351         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8352         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8353         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8354 }
8355
8356 #[test]
8357 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8358         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8362         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8363
8364         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8365
8366         {
8367                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8368                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8369                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8370                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8371                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8372                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8373                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8374                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8375                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8376         }
8377         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8378         // values from previous calls.
8379         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8380         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8381         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8382         match events[0] {
8383                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8384                         match &purpose {
8385                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8386                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8387                                 },
8388                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8389                         }
8390                 },
8391                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8392         }
8393 }
8394
8395 #[test]
8396 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8397         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8400         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8401         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8402
8403         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8404
8405         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8406         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8407         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8408         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8409
8410         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8411         // resulting events.
8412         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8413                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8414                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8415                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8416                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8417                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8418                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8419
8420                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8421                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8422                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8423                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8424                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8425
8426                         // We should fail the payment back
8427                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8428                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8429                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8430                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8431                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8432                                 },
8433                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8434                         }
8435                 }
8436         }
8437
8438         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8439         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8440         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8441
8442         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8443         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8444                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8445         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8446         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8447
8448         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8449         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8450                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8451         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8452         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8453
8454         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8455         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8456                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8457         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8458         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8459 }
8460
8461 #[test]
8462 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8463         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8464         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8465         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8466         // error.
8467         //
8468         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8469         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8470         // commitment at same time.
8471
8472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8475         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8476
8477         // Create some initial channel
8478         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8479         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8480
8481         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8482         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8483
8484         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8485         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8486
8487         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8488         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8489         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8490         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8491         let watchtower = {
8492                 let new_monitor = {
8493                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8494                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8495                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8496                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8497                         new_monitor
8498                 };
8499                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8500                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8501                 watchtower
8502         };
8503         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8504         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8505         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8506         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8507         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8508
8509         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8510         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8512         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8513
8514         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8515         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8516         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8517         {
8518                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8519                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8520                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8521                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8522                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8523                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8524                         } else { assert!(false); }
8525                 } else {
8526                         assert!(false);
8527                 }
8528         }
8529         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8531         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8532         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8533 }
8534
8535 #[test]
8536 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8537         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8538         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8539         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8540         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8541
8542         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8545         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8546
8547         // Create some initial channel
8548         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8549         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8550
8551         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8552         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8553
8554         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8555         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8556
8557         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8558         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8559         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8560         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8561         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8562                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8563         );
8564         let watchtower_alice = {
8565                 let new_monitor = {
8566                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8567                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8568                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8569                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8570                         new_monitor
8571                 };
8572                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8573                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8574                 watchtower
8575         };
8576         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8577         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8578         // requirements here.
8579         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8580         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8581         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8582
8583         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8584         {
8585                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8586                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8587                 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8588                 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8589         };
8590
8591         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8592         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8593         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8594         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8595         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8596         let watchtower_bob = {
8597                 let new_monitor = {
8598                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8599                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8600                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8601                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8602                         new_monitor
8603                 };
8604                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8605                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8606                 watchtower
8607         };
8608         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8609
8610         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8611         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8612         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8613                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8615
8616         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8617         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8618         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8619         {
8620                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8621                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8622                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8623                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8624                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8625                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8626                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8627                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8628                         } else { assert!(false); }
8629                 } else {
8630                         assert!(false);
8631                 }
8632         }
8633         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8635
8636         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8637         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8638
8639         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8640         let bob_state_y;
8641         {
8642                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8643                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8644                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8645         };
8646
8647         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8648         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8649         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8650         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8651         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8652                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8653         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8654         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8655         {
8656                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8657                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8658                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8659         }
8660 }
8661
8662 #[test]
8663 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8664         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8665         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8666         // message).
8667         //
8668         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8669         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8670         //
8671         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8672         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8673         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8674         // before receiving funding_signed.
8675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8678         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8679
8680         // Create an initial channel
8681         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8682         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8683         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8684         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8685         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8686
8687         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8688         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8689
8690         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8692
8693         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8695         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8696         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8697         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8698                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8699 }
8700
8701 #[test]
8702 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8703         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8704         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8705         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8706         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8707         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8708         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8709
8710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714
8715         // Create some initial channels
8716         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8717
8718         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8719         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8720         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8721         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8722         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8723         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8724
8725         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8726         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8727         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8728         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8729         // this test before #653 fix.
8730         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8731         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8733         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8734         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8735
8736         let htlc_timeout = {
8737                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8738                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8739                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8740                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8741                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8742                 node_txn[0].clone()
8743         };
8744
8745         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8746         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8747         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8748 }
8749
8750 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8751         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8752         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8753         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8754         //
8755         // Steps of the test:
8756         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8757         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8758         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8759         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8760         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8761         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8762         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8763         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8767         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8768
8769         // Create some initial channels
8770         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8771         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8772
8773         // Steps (1) and (2):
8774         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8775         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8776
8777         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8778         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8779         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8780         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8781         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8782         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8783         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8784
8785         // Steps (3) and (4):
8786         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8787         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8788         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8789         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8790
8791         // Bob force-closes
8792         if !broadcast_alice {
8793                 force_closing_node = 1;
8794                 counterparty_node = 0;
8795         }
8796         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8797         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8799         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8800         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8801                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8802                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8803                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8804                 };
8805                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8806                 if broadcast_alice {
8807                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8808                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8809                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8810                 }
8811         }
8812
8813         // Step (5):
8814         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8815         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8816         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8818         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8819
8820         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8821         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8822         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8823         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8824         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8825         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8826
8827         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8828         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8829         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8830         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8831         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8832                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8833                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8834                 match events[0] {
8835                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8836                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8837                         },
8838                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8839                 };
8840         }
8841         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8842         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8843         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8845
8846         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8847         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8848         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8849                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8850                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8851                         (*msg).clone()
8852                 },
8853                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8854         };
8855         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8856                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8857                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8858                         (*updates).clone()
8859                 },
8860                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8861         };
8862
8863         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8865         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8867
8868         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8869         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8870         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8871                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8872                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8873                         (*msg).clone()
8874                 },
8875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8876         };
8877         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8879
8880         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8881         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8882         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8883         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8884         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8885                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8886                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8887                 if broadcast_alice {
8888                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8889                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8890                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8891                 }
8892                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8893                 if broadcast_alice {
8894                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8895                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8896                 } else {
8897                         if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8898                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8899                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8900                         } else {
8901                                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8902                         }
8903                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8904                 }
8905         }
8906
8907         // Step (6):
8908         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8909         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8910         {
8911                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8912                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8913                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8914                 };
8915                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8916                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8917                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8918                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8919                 if broadcast_alice {
8920                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8921                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8922                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8923                 } else {
8924                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8925                         let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8926                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8927                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8928                 }
8929         }
8930 }
8931
8932 #[test]
8933 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8934         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8935         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8936         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8937         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8938 }
8939
8940 #[test]
8941 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8942         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8943         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8944         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8947         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8948
8949         // Create an first channel channel
8950         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8951         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8952
8953         // Create an second channel
8954         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8955         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8956
8957         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8958         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8959         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8960
8961         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8962         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8963         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8964         {
8965                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8966                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8967                 match &events[0] {
8968                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8969                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8970                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8971                         },
8972                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8973                 }
8974         }
8975
8976         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8977         {
8978                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8979                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8980                 match &events[0] {
8981                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8982                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8983                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8984                         },
8985                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8986                 }
8987         }
8988 }
8989
8990 #[test]
8991 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
8992         // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
8993         // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
8994         // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
8995         // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
8996         // funding outpoint.
8997         //
8998         // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
8999         // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9000         // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9001         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9002         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9003         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9004         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9005
9006         let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9007         let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9008
9009         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9010                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9011
9012         let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9013         assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9014         match cs_funding_events[0] {
9015                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9016                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9017         }
9018
9019         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9020         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9021         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9022         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9023         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9025
9026         let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9027         let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9028         assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9029         assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9030         // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9031         // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9032         // appropriate error message.
9033         let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9036         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9037         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9038         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9039
9040         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9041         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9042         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 }
9044
9045 #[test]
9046 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9047         // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9048         // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9049         // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9050         // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9051         // we require the user not do.
9052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9055         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9056
9057         let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9058
9059         let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9060                 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9061
9062         // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9063         // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9064         let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9065         let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9066         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9067
9068         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9069
9070         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9071         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9072         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9074         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9075
9076         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9077         // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9078         // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9080         get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9081         let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9082         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9083 }
9084
9085 #[test]
9086 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9087         // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9088         // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9089         // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9090         //
9091         // This was previously broken.
9092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9095         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9096
9097         let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9098         let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9099         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9100
9101         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9102         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9103         let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id;
9104         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9105         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9106         let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9107         accept_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9108         nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9109
9110         // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9111         // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9112         let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9113
9114         nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9115
9116         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9117         funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9118         // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9119         funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9120         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9121         get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9122         let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9123         let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9124         let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9125         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9126
9127         assert_eq!(
9128                 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9129                 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9130         );
9131 }
9132
9133 #[test]
9134 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9135         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9136         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9137         //
9138         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9139         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9140         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9141         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9142         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9143         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9144         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9145         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9146
9147         // Create an initial channel
9148         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9149         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9150         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9151         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9152
9153         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9154         // that it is rejected.
9155         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9156         {
9157                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159                 match events[0] {
9160                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9161                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9162                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9163                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9164                                 // move forward with it.
9165                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9166                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9167                         },
9168                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9169                 }
9170         }
9171
9172         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9173         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9174
9175         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9177
9178         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9179         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9180         {
9181                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9182                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9183                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9184                 added_monitors.clear();
9185         }
9186         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9187
9188         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9189
9190         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9191         let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9192
9193         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9194         // temporary one).
9195
9196         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9197         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9198         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9199         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9200         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9201         {
9202                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9203                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9204                 match events[0] {
9205                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9206                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9207                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9208                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9209                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9210                         },
9211                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9212                 }
9213         }
9214
9215         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9216         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9217         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9218         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9219         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9220         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9221
9222         let funding_created = {
9223                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9224                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9225                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9226                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9227                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9228                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9229                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9230                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9231                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9232                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9233                         },
9234                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9235                 }.unwrap()
9236         };
9237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9238         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9239         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9240         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9242
9243         check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9244                 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9245                         err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9246                 })
9247         ]);
9248
9249         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9250         {
9251                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9252                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9253                 match events[0] {
9254                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9255                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9256                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9257                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9258                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9259                         },
9260                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9261                 }
9262         }
9263
9264         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9265         // everything is functional.
9266         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9267         {
9268                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9269                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9270                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9271                 added_monitors.clear();
9272         }
9273         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9274
9275         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9276         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9277         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9278         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9279
9280         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9281         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9282         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9283
9284         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9285 }
9286
9287 #[test]
9288 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9289         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9290         //
9291         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9292         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9293         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9294         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9295         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9296         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9297         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9298
9299         // Create some initial channels
9300         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9301         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9302         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9303
9304         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9305         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9306         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9307
9308         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9309         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9310         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9311
9312         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9313         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9316         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9317                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9318         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9319         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9320         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9321         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9322
9323         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9324         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9325         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9327         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9328                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9329         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9330         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9331         match events[0] {
9332                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9333                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9334                 },
9335                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9336         }
9337         match events[1] {
9338                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9339                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9340                 },
9341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9342         }
9343         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9344         // peer_disconnected.
9345         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9346         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9347
9348         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9349         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9350         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9351 }
9352
9353 #[test]
9354 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9355         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9356         //
9357         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9358         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9359         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9360         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9361         //
9362         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9363         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9364         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9365         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9366         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9367         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9368         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9369
9370         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9371         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9372         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9373
9374         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9375
9376         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9377         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9378         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9379         // its length.
9380         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9381         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9382         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9383                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9384                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9385         }
9386
9387         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9388         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9390         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9391
9392         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9394         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9395
9396         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9397         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9398
9399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9400         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9401         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9402
9403         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9404         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9405         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9406                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9408         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9409         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9410         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9411                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9412                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9413                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9414                 } else { panic!(); }
9415         } else { panic!(); }
9416         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9417
9418         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9419         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9420         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9421         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9422                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9423                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9424                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9425                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9426                                 vout: idx as u32,
9427                         },
9428                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9429                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9430                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9431                 }).collect(),
9432                 output: vec![TxOut {
9433                         value: 1000,
9434                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9435                 }]
9436         };
9437         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9438         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9439 }
9440
9441 #[test]
9442 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9443         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9444         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9445         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9446         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9447         //
9448         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9449         // immediately operational after opening.
9450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9454
9455         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9456         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9457
9458         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9459         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9460
9461         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9462
9463         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9464         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9465
9466         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9468         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9469
9470         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9472         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9473
9474         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9475
9476         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9478
9479         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9480         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9481
9482         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9483         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9484         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9485         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9486         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9487         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9488         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9489         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9490         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9491         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9492
9493         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9494         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9496         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9497         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9498         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9499 }
9500
9501 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9502         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9503         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9504         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9505         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9506         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9507         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9508         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9509         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9510         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9511         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9512         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9513         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9514         // until we learned about an additional block.
9515         //
9516         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9517         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9518         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9519         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9520         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9521         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9522         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9523
9524         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9525         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9526         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9527         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9528         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9529
9530         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9531         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9532         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9534         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9535         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9536
9537         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9538         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9539                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9540         }
9541         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9542                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9543         if test_height_before_timelock {
9544                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9545                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9546                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9547                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9548         } else {
9549                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9550                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9551                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9552                 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9553                         &spending_txn[1]
9554                 } else {
9555                         &spending_txn[0]
9556                 };
9557                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9558                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9559                 // timelock is up).
9560                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9561                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9562
9563                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9564                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9565                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9566                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9567                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9568                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9569                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9570
9571                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9572                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9573                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9574                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9575                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9576                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9577                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9578                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9579                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9580         }
9581 }
9582
9583 #[test]
9584 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9585         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9586         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9587 }
9588
9589 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9590         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9591         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9592         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9593         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9594
9595         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9596
9597         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9598                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9599         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9600
9601         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9602
9603         {
9604                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9605                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9606                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9607                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9608                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9609                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9610                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9611                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9612         }
9613         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9614         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9615
9616         {
9617                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9618                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9619                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9620                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9621                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9623                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9624                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9625                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9626                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9627                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9628                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9629                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9630         }
9631
9632         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9633         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9634
9635         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9636                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9637                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9638
9639                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9640                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9641                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9642                 ];
9643                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9644                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9645
9646                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9647                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9648                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9649
9650                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9651                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9652                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9653
9654                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9655                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9656                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9657                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9658                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9659                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9660         } else {
9661                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9662                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9663                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9664
9665                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9666                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9667                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9668                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9669
9670                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9671
9672                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9673         }
9674 }
9675
9676 #[test]
9677 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9678         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9679         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9680         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9681         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9682         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9683 }
9684
9685 #[test]
9686 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9687         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9688         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9689         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9690 }
9691
9692 #[test]
9693 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9694         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9695         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9697         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9699         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9700
9701         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9702         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9703         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9704         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9705
9706         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9707                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9708         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9709         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9710         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9711                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9712                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9713                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9714         });
9715
9716         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9717
9718         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9719         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9720
9721         let session_privs = {
9722                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9723                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9724                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9725                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9726                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9727                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9728         };
9729         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9730                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9731                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9733
9734         {
9735                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9736                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9737                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9738         }
9739         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9740
9741         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9742                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9744
9745         {
9746                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9747                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9748                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9749
9750                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9751                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9752
9753                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9754                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9755
9756                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9757                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9758                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9759
9760                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9761                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9762                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9763
9764                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9765                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9766                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9767         }
9768         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9769         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9770         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9771         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9772
9773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9774
9775         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9776         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9777         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9778
9779         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9781
9782         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9783         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9784         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9785
9786         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9787
9788         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9789                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9790                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9792
9793         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9794         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9795         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9796
9797         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9798         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9799 }
9800
9801 #[test]
9802 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9803         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9804         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9805         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9806         // amount.
9807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9810         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9811
9812         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9813         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9814         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9815         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9816
9817         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9818         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9819         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9820                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9821                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9822                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9823         });
9824
9825         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9826         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9827         // amount of time to respond to.
9828
9829         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9830         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9831         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9832
9833         let failed_destinations = vec![
9834                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9835                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9836         ];
9837         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9838
9839         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9840
9841         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9842         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9843                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9845
9846         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9847         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9848         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9849         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9850
9851         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9852         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9853         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9855         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9856 }
9857
9858 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9859 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9860 enum ExposureEvent {
9861         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9862         AtHTLCForward,
9863         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9864         AtHTLCReception,
9865         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9866         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9867 }
9868
9869 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9870         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9871         // policy.
9872         //
9873         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9874         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9875         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9876         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9877         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9878         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9879         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9880         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9881
9882         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9883         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9884         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9885                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9886                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9887                 // originally written.
9888                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9889         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9890         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9891         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9892         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9893
9894         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9895         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9896         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9897         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9898         if on_holder_tx {
9899                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9900         }
9901         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9902         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9903         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9904
9905         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9906
9907         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9908
9909         if on_holder_tx {
9910                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9911                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9912                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9913                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9914                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9915                         },
9916                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9917                 }
9918         }
9919
9920         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9921         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9923         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9924
9925         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9927         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9928
9929         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9930         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9931         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9932
9933         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9934         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9935                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9936
9937         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9938                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9939                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9940                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9941                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9942                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9943         };
9944         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9945         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9946
9947         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9948         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9949
9950         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9951         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9952
9953         if on_holder_tx {
9954                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9955                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9956                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9957                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9958                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9959                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9960                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9961                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9962                         }
9963                 } else {
9964                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9965                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9966                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9967                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9968                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9969                         }
9970                 }
9971         } else {
9972                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9973                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9974                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9975                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9976                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9977                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9978                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9979                         }
9980                 } else {
9981                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9982                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9983                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9984                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9985                         }
9986                 }
9987         }
9988
9989         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9990                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9991                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9992                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9993                 if on_holder_tx {
9994                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9995                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9996                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9997                 } else {
9998                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9999                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10000                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10001                 }
10002         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10003                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10004                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10005                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10006                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10007                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10008                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10009                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10010                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10011                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10012                 if on_holder_tx {
10013                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10014                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10015                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10016                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10017                 } else {
10018                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10019                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10020                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10021                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
10022                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10023                 }
10024         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10025                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10026                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10027                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10028                 // to cross the threshold.
10029                 for _ in 0..20 {
10030                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10031                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10032                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10033                 }
10034                 {
10035                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10036                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10037                 }
10038                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10039                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10040                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10041         }
10042
10043         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10044         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10045         added_monitors.clear();
10046 }
10047
10048 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
10049         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10050         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10051         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10052         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10053         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10054         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10055         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10056         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10057         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10058         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10059         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
10060         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
10061 }
10062
10063 #[test]
10064 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10065         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
10066         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
10067 }
10068
10069 #[test]
10070 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10071         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10072         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10073         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10074         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10075
10076         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10077         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10078         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10079         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10080         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10081
10082         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10083
10084         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10085         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10086         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10087         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10088         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10089                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10090                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10091                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10092                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10093                         }]}
10094                 },
10095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10096         };
10097         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10098         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10099                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10100                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10101                 },
10102                 _ => panic!()
10103         }
10104         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10105         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10106         match events[0] {
10107                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
10108                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
10109                 },
10110                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10111         }
10112 }
10113
10114 #[test]
10115 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10116         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10117         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10119         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10120
10121         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10122         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10123         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10124         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10125         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10126
10127         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10128
10129         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10130         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10131         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10132         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10133         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10134                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10135                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10136                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10137                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10138                         }]}
10139                 },
10140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10141         };
10142
10143         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10144         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10145         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10146 }
10147
10148 #[test]
10149 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10150         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10151         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10152         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10153         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10154         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10155         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10156         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10157
10158         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10159
10160         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10161         {
10162                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10163                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10164         }
10165
10166         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10167         {
10168                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10169                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10170         }
10171         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10173
10174         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10175         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10176         match events[0] {
10177                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10178                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10179                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10180                 },
10181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10182         };
10183
10184         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10185         // it.
10186         {
10187                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10188                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10189         }
10190         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10192
10193         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10194         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10195         match events[0] {
10196                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10197                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10198                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10199                 },
10200                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10201         };
10202
10203         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10204         // channel.
10205         {
10206                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10207                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10208         }
10209         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10211
10212         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10213         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10214         match events[0] {
10215                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10216                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10217                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10218                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10219                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10220                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10221                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10222                 },
10223                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10224         };
10225 }
10226
10227 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10228         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10231         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10232         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10233         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10234                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10235         let recv_value = 100_000;
10236
10237         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10238
10239         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10240         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10241                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10242                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10243                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10244         } else {
10245                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10246                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10247         };
10248         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10249         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10250                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10252         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10253         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10254         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10256         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10257         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10258
10259         if valid_delta {
10260                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10261                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10262
10263                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10264         } else {
10265                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10266
10267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10268
10269                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10270                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10271                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10272
10273                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10274         }
10275 }
10276
10277 #[test]
10278 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10279         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10280         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10281         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10282         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10283 }
10284
10285 #[test]
10286 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10287         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10288         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10289         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10290         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10291         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10292         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10293
10294         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10295         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10296                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10297                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10298                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10299                                         Some(())
10300                                 } else {
10301                                         None
10302                                 }
10303                         } else {
10304                                 None
10305                         }
10306                 );
10307                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10308         };
10309
10310         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10311         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10312         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10313                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10314                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10315
10316                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10317                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10318                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10319                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10320                 }
10321
10322                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10323                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10324                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10325
10326                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10327                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10328                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10329         };
10330
10331         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10332
10333         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10334         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10335         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10336         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10337         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10338         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10339         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10340         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10341
10342         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10343         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10344         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10345         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10346         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10347         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10348
10349         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10350         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10351         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10352         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10353         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10354
10355         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10356         //
10357         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10358         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10359         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10360         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10361         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10362                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10363         };
10364         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10365         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10366                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10367         };
10368         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10369
10370         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10371         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10372         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10373         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10374                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10375         );
10376         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10377         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10378
10379         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10380         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10381                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10382                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10383                         Some(msg.clone())
10384                 } else {
10385                         None
10386                 }
10387         ).unwrap();
10388         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10389
10390         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10391         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10392                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10393                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10394         }
10395
10396         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10397         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10398         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10399
10400         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10401         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10402         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10403
10404         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10405         // waiting on any messages.
10406         for node in &nodes {
10407                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10408                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10409                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10410                 }
10411         }
10412 }
10413
10414 #[test]
10415 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10416         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10417         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10418         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10419         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10420
10421         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10422         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10423         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10424         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10425         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10426
10427         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10428         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10429         match events[0] {
10430                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10431                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10432         };
10433
10434         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10435         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10436                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10437                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10438                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10439         };
10440
10441         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10442         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10443
10444         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10445         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10446                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10447                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10448         }
10449
10450         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10451         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10452         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10453
10454         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10455         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10456         match msg_events[0] {
10457                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10458                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10459                 },
10460                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10461         }
10462         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10463 }
10464
10465 #[test]
10466 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10467         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10468         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10469         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10470         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10471
10472         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10473         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10474         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10475         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10477
10478         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10479         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10480         match events[0] {
10481                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10482                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10483         };
10484
10485         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10486         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10487                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10488                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10489                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10490         };
10491
10492         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10493         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10494
10495         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10496         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10497                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10498                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10499         }
10500
10501         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10502         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10503         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10504
10505         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10506         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10507         match msg_events[0] {
10508                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10509                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10510                 },
10511                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10512         }
10513         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10514 }
10515
10516 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10517         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10518         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10519         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10520         //
10521         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10522         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10523         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10526         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10528         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10529         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10530
10531         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10532         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10533
10534         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10535         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10536
10537         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10538         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10539
10540         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10542         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10543
10544         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10546         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10547
10548         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10549                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10550                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10551                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10552                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10553         }
10554
10555         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10556                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10557         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10558         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10559                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10560         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10561
10562         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10563         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10564         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10565         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10566
10567         if do_reload {
10568                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10569                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10570                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10571                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10572
10573                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10574                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10575
10576                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10577                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10578         }
10579
10580         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10581         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10582         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10583                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10584         } else { panic!(); }
10585         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10586                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10587         } else { panic!(); }
10588         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10589         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10590
10591         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10592         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10593         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10594         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10595 }
10596
10597 #[test]
10598 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10599         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10600         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10601 }
10602
10603 #[test]
10604 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10608         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10609
10610         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10611         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10612                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10613                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10614         ]);
10615
10616         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10617         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10618         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10619         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10620
10621         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10622         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10623         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10624
10625         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10626         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10627
10628         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10629         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10630         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10631         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10632
10633         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10634         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10635         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10636         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10637
10638         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10639         // completed.
10640         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10641         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10642
10643         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10644         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10645                 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10646         );
10647         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10648
10649         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10650         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10651         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10652         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10653
10654         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10655         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10656                 *e,
10657                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10658                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10659                         ..
10660                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10661         )));
10662         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10663                 *e,
10664                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10665                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10666                         ..
10667                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10668         )));
10669 }
10670
10671 #[test]
10672 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10673         // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10674         // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10678         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10679
10680         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10681         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10682                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10683                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10684         ]);
10685
10686         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10687         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10688         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10689         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10690
10691         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10692         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10693         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10694
10695         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10696         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10697
10698         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10699         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10700         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10701         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10702         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10703
10704         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10705
10706         // The monitor should become closed.
10707         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10708         {
10709                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10710                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10711                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10712                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10713         }
10714
10715         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10716         match msg_events[0] {
10717                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10718                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10719         }
10720
10721         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10722         {
10723                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10724                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10725                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10726                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10727                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10728         }
10729
10730         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10731         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10732                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10733                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10734                         discard_funding: true,
10735                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10736                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10737                         ..Default::default()
10738                 },
10739                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10740                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10741                         discard_funding: true,
10742                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10743                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10744                         ..Default::default()
10745                 },
10746         ]);
10747
10748         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10749         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10750 }
10751
10752 #[test]
10753 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10754         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10755         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10756         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10757         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10758
10759         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10760         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10761                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10762                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10763         ]);
10764
10765         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10766         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10767         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10768         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10769
10770         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10771         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10772         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10773
10774         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10775         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10776         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10777         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10778
10779         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10780         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10781         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10782         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10783
10784         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10785         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10786
10787         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10788         let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10789         let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10790         let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10791         let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10792         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10793         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10794         {
10795                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10796                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10797                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10798                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10799                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10800                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10801                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10802         }
10803         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10804         match msg_events[0] {
10805                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10806                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10807         }
10808
10809         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10810         {
10811                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10812                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10813                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10814                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10815                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10816         }
10817
10818         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10819         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10820                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10821                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10822                         discard_funding: true,
10823                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10824                         user_channel_id: Some(42),
10825                         ..Default::default()
10826                 },
10827                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10828                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10829                         discard_funding: true,
10830                         channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10831                         user_channel_id: Some(43),
10832                         ..Default::default()
10833                 },
10834         ]);
10835
10836         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10837         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10838 }
10839
10840 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10841         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10842         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10845         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10846         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10848         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10849
10850         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10851         let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
10852
10853         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10854         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10855
10856         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10857                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10858         } else {
10859                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10860         };
10861
10862         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10863         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10864         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10865         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10866                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10867                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10868         }
10869         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10870         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10871
10872         let commitment_tx = {
10873                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10874                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10875                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10876                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10877                 commitment_tx
10878         };
10879
10880         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10881         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10882
10883         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10884         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10885         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10886
10887         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10888         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10889 }
10890
10891 #[test]
10892 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10893         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10894         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10895 }