1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils;
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
67 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
68 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
69 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
70 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
71 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
72 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
73 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
74 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
75 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
77 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
79 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
80 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
81 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
83 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
84 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
86 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
87 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
89 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
90 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
91 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
92 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
93 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
94 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
95 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
96 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
98 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
99 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
101 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
103 } else { assert!(false); }
106 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
108 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
109 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
118 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
124 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
128 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
129 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
131 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
133 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
134 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
138 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
139 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
140 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
146 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
147 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
148 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
149 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
150 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
155 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
157 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
158 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
159 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
160 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
161 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
162 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
164 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
165 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
166 if !send_from_initiator {
167 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
168 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
170 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
172 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
173 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
174 if send_from_initiator {
175 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
176 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
178 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
180 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
181 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
182 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
183 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
184 if send_from_initiator {
185 let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
186 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
187 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
189 let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
190 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
191 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
195 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
196 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
197 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
199 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
200 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
201 if send_from_initiator {
202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
203 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
204 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
205 // well as an additional HTLC.
206 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
213 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
214 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
215 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
219 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
223 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
231 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
233 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
234 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
235 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
236 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
237 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
238 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
239 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
240 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
242 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
244 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
246 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
248 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
251 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
254 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
255 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
256 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
258 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
265 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
266 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
267 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
268 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
271 let payment_event = {
272 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
273 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
274 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
276 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
279 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
282 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
283 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
286 // deliver(1), generate (3):
287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
288 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
289 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
293 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
295 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
296 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
297 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
298 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
302 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
304 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
305 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
306 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
307 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
311 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
312 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
316 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
322 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
323 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
325 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
334 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
335 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
336 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
337 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
338 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
340 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
346 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
348 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
354 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
355 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
356 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
357 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
365 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
366 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
367 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
371 let payment_event = {
372 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
373 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
374 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
376 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
377 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
379 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
389 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
393 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
401 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
402 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
403 // update_fee (never committed) ->
405 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
406 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
407 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
408 // <- (1) RAA delivered
409 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
410 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
411 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
412 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
414 // B should send no response here
415 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
416 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
419 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
422 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
423 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
424 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
426 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
430 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
431 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
432 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
433 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
438 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
439 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
440 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
441 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
444 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
447 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
448 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
450 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
455 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
456 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
457 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
462 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
466 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
467 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
468 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
470 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
472 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
473 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
474 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
475 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
476 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
478 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
479 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
480 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
485 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
490 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
497 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
498 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
499 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
502 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
507 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
508 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
509 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
510 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
518 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
519 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
520 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
526 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
530 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
537 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
540 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
543 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
550 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
554 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
555 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
560 added_monitors.clear();
563 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
564 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
565 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
568 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
570 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
571 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
572 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
573 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
574 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
578 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
595 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
596 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
600 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
605 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
608 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
611 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
614 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
615 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
616 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
617 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
618 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
624 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
625 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
628 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
629 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
633 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
634 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
637 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
643 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
648 let channel_value = 5000;
650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
651 let channel_id = chan.2;
652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
653 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
654 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
656 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
658 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
659 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
660 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
662 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
663 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
665 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
666 *feerate_lock = feerate;
668 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
670 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
674 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
676 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
678 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
680 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
682 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
683 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
684 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
685 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
689 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
690 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
693 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
694 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
697 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
699 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
700 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
701 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
702 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
703 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
704 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
705 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
706 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
707 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
710 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
711 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
712 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
713 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
714 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
715 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
716 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
717 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
718 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
721 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
722 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
723 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
726 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
727 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
728 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
729 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
730 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
731 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
732 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
734 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
735 local_funding, remote_funding,
736 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
737 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
741 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
744 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
747 htlc_signatures: res.1,
749 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
752 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
754 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
757 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
759 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
760 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
761 //Should produce and error.
762 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
763 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
765 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
766 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
770 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
774 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
778 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
781 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
784 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
787 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
788 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
789 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
790 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
791 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
795 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
796 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
797 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
800 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
802 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
803 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
804 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
806 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
807 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
808 added_monitors.clear();
810 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
811 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
812 // node[1] has nothing to do
814 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
815 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
818 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
819 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
820 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
822 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
826 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
827 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
828 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
829 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
830 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
831 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
834 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
838 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
840 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
842 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
844 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
845 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
847 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
849 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
853 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
856 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
860 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
862 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
863 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
864 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
865 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
866 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
870 fn test_update_fee() {
871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
875 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
876 let channel_id = chan.2;
879 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
880 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
881 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
882 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
883 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
884 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
885 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
886 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
887 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
888 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
889 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
892 // Create and deliver (1)...
895 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
896 feerate = *feerate_lock;
897 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
899 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
902 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
903 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
904 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
905 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
906 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
912 // Generate (2) and (3):
913 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
914 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
919 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
922 // Create and deliver (4)...
924 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
925 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
927 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
930 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
931 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
932 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
933 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
938 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
939 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
942 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
943 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
945 // Handle (3), creating (6):
946 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
948 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
949 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
952 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
953 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
957 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
958 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
959 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
960 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
961 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
962 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
963 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
967 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
969 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
970 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
972 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
974 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
976 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
977 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
978 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
980 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
984 fn fake_network_test() {
985 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
986 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
990 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
992 // Create some initial channels
993 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
994 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
995 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
997 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
998 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003 // Send some more payments
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1008 // Test failure packets
1009 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1010 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1012 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1013 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1015 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1016 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1017 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1018 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1019 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1020 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1021 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1023 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1024 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1025 hops.push(RouteHop {
1026 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1027 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1028 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1029 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033 hops.push(RouteHop {
1034 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1036 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1049 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1050 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1053 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1054 hops.push(RouteHop {
1055 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1056 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1057 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1058 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1060 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1062 hops.push(RouteHop {
1063 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1064 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1065 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1066 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1068 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1070 hops.push(RouteHop {
1071 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1072 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1073 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1074 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1076 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1078 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1079 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1080 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1082 // Claim the rebalances...
1083 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1084 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1086 // Close down the channels...
1087 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1088 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1091 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1094 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1103 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1104 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1105 // commitment dance rounds.
1106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1109 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1110 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1111 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1113 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1114 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1116 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1118 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1119 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1120 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1121 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1125 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1131 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1134 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1135 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1136 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1137 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1140 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1141 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1143 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1144 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1148 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1150 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1151 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1155 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1156 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1157 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1162 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1165 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1167 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1168 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1172 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1177 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1182 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1184 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1186 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1188 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1190 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1192 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1196 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1199 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1201 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1202 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1203 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1205 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1206 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1212 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1213 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1220 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1221 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1222 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1223 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1224 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1225 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1226 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1228 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1230 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1231 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1233 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1235 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1237 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1238 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1240 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1241 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1243 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1244 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1245 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1249 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1250 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1251 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1252 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1258 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1261 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1263 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1265 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1266 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1267 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1269 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1270 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1271 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1274 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1275 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1277 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1278 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1279 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1280 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1281 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1282 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1283 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1288 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1290 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1291 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1293 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1294 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1296 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1297 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1298 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1299 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1300 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1301 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1303 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1306 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1307 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1309 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1310 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1311 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1313 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1314 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1315 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1318 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1323 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1324 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1325 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1327 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1328 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1329 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1330 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1331 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1332 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1340 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1344 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1345 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1347 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1348 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1350 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1351 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1352 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1353 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1354 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1355 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1356 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1357 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1359 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1360 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1361 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1363 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1371 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1375 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1376 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1378 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1379 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1380 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1381 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1385 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1387 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1389 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1390 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1391 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1394 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1395 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1396 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1397 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1398 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1401 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1403 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1404 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1405 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1407 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1409 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1411 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1412 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1413 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1414 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1415 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1416 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1418 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1419 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1421 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1422 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1423 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1424 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1425 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1428 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1429 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1430 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1431 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1432 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1433 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1434 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1435 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1438 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1439 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1440 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1442 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1443 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1444 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1446 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1448 amount_msat: 3460001,
1449 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1451 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1454 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1457 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1458 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1459 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1460 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1461 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1465 local_funding, remote_funding,
1466 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1468 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1469 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1471 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1474 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1477 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1479 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1482 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1483 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1484 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1486 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1487 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1489 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1490 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1492 next_local_nonce: None,
1494 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1496 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1498 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1500 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1501 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1502 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1504 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1507 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1513 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1514 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1515 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1516 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1517 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1526 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1527 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1529 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1533 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1534 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1535 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1536 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1537 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1540 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1541 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1542 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1543 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1544 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1548 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1549 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1550 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1551 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1552 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1553 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1554 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1555 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1557 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1558 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1559 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1560 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1561 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1562 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1563 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1565 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1566 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1567 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1570 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1571 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1572 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1573 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1575 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1576 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1577 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1578 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1579 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1580 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1581 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1583 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1584 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1585 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1586 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1587 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1588 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1591 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1592 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1593 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1594 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1595 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1596 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1598 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1602 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1603 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1604 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1605 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1606 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1610 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1611 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1612 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1614 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1615 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1616 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1617 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1618 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1619 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1620 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1622 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1623 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1624 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1625 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1626 // commitment transaction fee.
1627 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1629 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1630 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1631 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1634 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1635 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1636 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1637 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1638 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1639 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1640 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1644 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1645 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1646 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1647 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1648 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1651 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1652 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1653 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1655 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1657 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1658 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1659 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1660 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1662 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1663 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1664 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1665 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1666 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1667 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1668 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1670 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1671 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1672 match msg_events[0] {
1673 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1674 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1681 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1682 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1683 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1687 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1688 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1690 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1691 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1693 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1695 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1697 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1698 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1699 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1700 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1701 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1702 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1704 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1705 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1706 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1707 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1711 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1715 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1716 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1717 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1720 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1721 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1722 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1723 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1725 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1726 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1727 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1728 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1730 // Add a pending HTLC.
1731 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1732 let payment_event_1 = {
1733 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1734 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1737 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1739 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1741 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1743 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1744 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1745 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1746 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1747 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1748 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1750 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1751 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1752 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1753 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1754 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1755 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1756 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1757 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1758 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1761 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1762 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1763 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1764 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1765 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1769 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1770 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1771 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1772 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1773 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1775 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1779 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1783 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1784 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1785 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1786 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1787 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1788 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1789 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1791 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1792 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1793 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1795 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1796 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1799 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1800 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1804 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1807 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1808 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1809 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1810 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1812 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1813 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1814 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1816 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1817 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1819 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1820 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1822 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1824 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1826 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1827 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1832 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1833 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1834 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1835 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1837 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1839 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1841 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1842 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1843 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1844 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1845 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1847 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1848 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1849 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1850 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1853 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1854 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1856 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1857 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1858 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1859 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1860 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1861 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1862 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1866 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1867 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1868 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1869 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1870 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1872 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1873 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1874 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1875 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1876 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1879 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1880 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1881 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1882 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1883 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1886 // adding pending output.
1887 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1888 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1889 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1890 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1891 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1892 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1893 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1894 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1895 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1897 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1898 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1899 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1901 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1902 let payment_event_1 = {
1903 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1904 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1907 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1909 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1913 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1914 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1916 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1917 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1918 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1919 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1920 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1921 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1922 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1925 // split the rest to test holding cell
1926 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1927 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1928 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1929 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1931 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1932 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1935 // now see if they go through on both sides
1936 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1937 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1938 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1939 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1941 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1944 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1946 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1947 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1948 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1949 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1950 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1951 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1952 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1955 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1956 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1957 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1958 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1960 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1961 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1963 // flush the pending htlc
1964 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1965 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1968 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1969 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1971 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1973 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1974 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1975 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1978 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1979 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1984 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1985 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1986 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1989 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1991 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1992 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1994 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1998 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1999 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2000 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2001 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2006 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2009 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2010 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2011 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2012 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2013 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2015 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2016 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2017 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2019 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2025 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2026 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2027 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2028 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2029 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2031 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2032 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2033 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2035 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2041 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2043 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2045 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2046 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2047 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2049 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2050 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2051 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2052 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2053 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2055 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2056 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2060 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2061 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2062 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2063 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2064 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2065 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2066 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2067 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2069 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2070 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2071 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2072 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2073 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2074 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2075 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2076 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2078 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2079 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2080 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2081 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2082 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2086 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2087 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2089 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2090 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2091 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2092 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2093 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2095 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2096 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2098 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2099 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2101 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2103 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2106 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2107 // initial fulfill/CS.
2108 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2109 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2111 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2114 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2115 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2116 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2121 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2130 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2144 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2145 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2146 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2147 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2148 // on-chain as necessary).
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2153 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2160 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2162 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2163 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2164 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2167 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2170 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2171 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2173 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2174 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2176 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2178 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2181 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2182 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2184 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2186 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2188 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2195 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2197 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2198 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2200 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2202 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2204 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2208 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2210 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2211 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2215 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2216 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2217 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2221 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2223 // Create some initial channels
2224 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2225 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2226 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2227 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2229 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2232 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2233 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2234 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2236 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2239 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2240 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2242 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2243 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2245 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2247 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2248 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2249 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2251 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2253 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2254 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2255 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2256 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2257 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2259 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2260 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2262 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2263 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2264 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2268 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2269 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2270 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2271 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2273 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2279 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2281 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2282 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2284 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2285 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2286 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2288 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2289 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2291 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2292 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2293 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2294 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2302 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2303 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2304 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2306 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2307 let node2_commitment_txid;
2309 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2310 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2311 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2312 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2314 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2315 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2316 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2318 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2320 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2321 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2322 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2323 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2324 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2326 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2327 // confusing us in the following tests.
2328 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2330 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2331 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2332 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2335 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2336 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2337 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2339 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2340 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2346 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2347 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2353 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2355 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2356 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2357 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2363 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2365 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2366 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2368 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2369 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2370 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2371 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2372 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2375 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2378 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2379 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2384 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2386 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2387 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2388 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2390 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2391 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2392 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2393 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2395 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2397 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2398 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2403 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2404 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2405 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2406 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2407 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2408 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2409 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2410 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2411 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2412 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2413 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2414 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2415 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2419 // Create some new channels:
2420 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2422 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2423 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2424 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2425 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2429 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2430 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2431 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2433 // Revoke the old state
2434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2437 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2439 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2440 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2441 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2442 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2447 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2449 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2451 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2452 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2454 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2455 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2466 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2467 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2468 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2469 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2470 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2471 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2472 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2473 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2474 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2475 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2476 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2477 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2478 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2481 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2482 // Create some new channels:
2483 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2485 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2486 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2487 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2488 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2489 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2490 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2491 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2492 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2493 // Revoke the old state
2494 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2496 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2498 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2499 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2500 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2502 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2503 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2506 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2508 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2509 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2510 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2512 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2513 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2514 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2516 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2517 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2518 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2522 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2523 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2524 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2528 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2529 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2530 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2531 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2532 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2533 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2534 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2535 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2536 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2538 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2539 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2543 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2545 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2547 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2548 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2549 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2551 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2555 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2556 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2557 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2558 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2559 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2560 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2561 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2563 // Create some new channel:
2564 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2566 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2567 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2568 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2569 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2570 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2572 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2573 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2574 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2575 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2576 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2577 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2578 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2579 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2580 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2582 //Revoke the old state
2583 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2586 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2588 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2589 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2592 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2593 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2595 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2596 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2598 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2599 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2601 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2602 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2603 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2604 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2605 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2606 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2607 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2608 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2610 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2611 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2612 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2613 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2614 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2616 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2617 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2618 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2622 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2623 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2624 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2625 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2630 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2632 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2633 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2634 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2635 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2636 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2637 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2639 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2640 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2642 //Revoke the old state
2643 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2646 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2648 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2650 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2651 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2652 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2653 match events.last().unwrap() {
2654 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2659 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2661 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2663 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2664 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2665 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2666 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2667 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2668 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2669 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2671 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2672 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2673 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2675 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2676 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2677 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2679 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2680 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2681 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2684 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2685 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2686 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2687 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2688 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2689 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2690 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2692 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2693 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2694 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2695 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2696 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2697 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2698 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2700 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2701 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2702 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2706 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2707 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2708 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2709 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2710 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2711 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2712 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2713 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2714 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2716 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2717 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2718 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2719 // PaymentSent event).
2721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2724 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2726 // Create some initial channels
2727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2728 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2730 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2731 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2732 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2733 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2734 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2736 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2737 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2738 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2740 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2741 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2743 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2744 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2745 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2746 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2747 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2748 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2749 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2750 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2751 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2753 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2754 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2755 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2756 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2757 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2759 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2762 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2763 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2767 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2768 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2769 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2770 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2771 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2772 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2774 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2775 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2776 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2780 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2781 added_monitors.clear();
2783 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2784 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2785 match forwarded_events[0] {
2786 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2789 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2790 match forwarded_events[1] {
2791 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2792 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2793 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2794 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2795 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2796 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2800 match forwarded_events[2] {
2801 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2802 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2803 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2804 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2805 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2806 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2810 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2812 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2813 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2814 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2815 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2816 added_monitors.clear();
2818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2820 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2821 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2823 match nodes_2_event {
2824 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2828 match nodes_0_event {
2829 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2830 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2831 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2832 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2833 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2834 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2836 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2839 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2841 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2845 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2846 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2847 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2848 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2849 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2850 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2853 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2854 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2856 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2857 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2858 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2859 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2861 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2862 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2863 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2864 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2869 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2870 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2872 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2873 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2874 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2875 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2876 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2877 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2879 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2880 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2881 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2882 let commitment_spend =
2883 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2886 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2887 // FullBlockViaListen
2888 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2889 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2890 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2891 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2895 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2896 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2901 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2902 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2903 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2904 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2905 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2906 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2907 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2908 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2910 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2911 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2912 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2913 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2915 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2917 let mut first_claimed = false;
2918 for event in events {
2920 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2921 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2922 assert!(!first_claimed);
2923 first_claimed = true;
2925 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2926 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2929 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2930 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2934 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2937 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2938 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2939 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2940 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2941 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2942 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2944 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2946 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2947 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2948 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2949 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2950 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2951 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2952 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2954 // Create some intial channels
2955 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2956 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2958 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2959 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2960 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2962 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2964 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2965 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2966 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2967 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2969 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2972 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2975 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2976 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2977 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2978 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2979 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2980 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2984 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2985 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2987 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2988 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2989 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2991 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2992 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2993 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2994 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2995 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2997 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2998 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2999 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3001 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3003 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3004 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3008 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3012 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3019 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3020 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3021 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3023 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3029 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3030 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3031 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3033 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3034 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3036 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3038 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3039 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3040 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3041 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3042 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3046 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3047 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3048 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3049 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3053 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3054 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3055 // and fail backward accordingly.
3057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3060 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3062 // Create some initial channels
3063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3064 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3066 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3067 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3068 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3069 // Revoke the old state
3070 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3072 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3074 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3075 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3076 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3078 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3080 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3082 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3085 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3086 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3087 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3088 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3089 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3090 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3092 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3093 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3094 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3100 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3101 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3102 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3103 // commitment transaction anymore.
3104 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3105 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3106 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3107 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3108 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3109 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3111 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3112 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3113 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3114 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3115 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3119 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3121 // Create some initial channels
3122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3123 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3125 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3126 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3127 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3128 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3129 // Revoke the old state
3130 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3132 let value = if use_dust {
3133 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3134 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3135 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3136 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3139 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3140 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3141 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3143 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3146 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3147 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3148 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3149 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3151 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3152 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3153 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3154 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3156 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3157 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3159 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3160 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3161 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3162 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3163 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3164 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3165 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3166 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3168 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3169 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3170 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3173 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3176 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3177 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3178 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3179 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3180 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3181 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3183 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3184 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3185 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3187 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3188 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3189 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3192 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3193 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3194 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3195 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3196 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3197 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3198 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3202 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3203 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3204 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3206 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3209 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3216 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3217 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3220 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3221 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3223 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3225 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3227 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3228 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3230 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3231 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3234 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3235 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3240 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3241 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3249 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3250 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3253 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3254 match nodes_2_event {
3255 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3256 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3257 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3258 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3259 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3266 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3267 match nodes_2_event {
3268 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3269 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3270 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3276 match nodes_0_event {
3277 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3278 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3279 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3280 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3281 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3282 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3284 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3285 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3288 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3290 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3293 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3294 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3295 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3296 // that we should update our routing table for.
3297 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3298 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3301 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3304 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3305 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3310 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3311 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3316 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3317 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3322 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3323 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3328 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3329 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3337 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3339 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3340 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3343 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3344 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3345 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3349 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3350 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3351 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3352 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3353 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3357 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3358 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3359 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3360 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3361 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3365 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3369 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3370 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3372 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3374 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3375 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3376 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3379 let payment_event = {
3380 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3382 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3384 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3385 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3388 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3389 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3391 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3392 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3395 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3398 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3400 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3402 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3403 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3404 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3405 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3406 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3407 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3408 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3410 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3411 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3417 onion_routing_packet,
3418 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3420 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3422 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3424 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3426 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3427 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3432 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3433 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3438 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3439 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3443 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3448 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3449 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3450 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3455 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3456 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3457 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3461 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3463 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3464 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3465 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3466 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3468 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3470 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3471 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3472 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3474 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3475 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3476 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3478 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3480 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3481 // registering new transactions
3482 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3486 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3487 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3491 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3492 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3493 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3495 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3497 let mut payment_event = {
3498 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3499 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3504 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3507 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3510 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3512 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3513 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3514 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3515 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3518 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3519 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3521 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3523 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3524 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3525 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3527 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3528 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3530 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3532 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3533 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3534 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3535 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3536 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3540 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3542 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3547 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3549 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3550 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3552 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3553 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3554 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3555 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3556 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3557 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3558 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3560 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3564 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3565 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3566 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3567 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3568 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3570 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3571 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3572 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3573 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3574 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3576 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3578 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3579 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3581 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3582 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3583 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3585 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3588 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3589 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3593 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3594 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3595 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3601 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3602 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3603 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3604 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3606 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3607 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3609 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3610 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3612 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3614 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3615 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3617 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3618 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3624 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3625 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3626 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3627 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3629 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
3630 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false);
3634 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3635 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3639 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3640 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3641 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3643 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3644 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3645 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3647 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3648 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3649 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3650 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3652 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3653 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3654 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3656 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3657 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3658 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3659 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3661 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3662 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3664 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3665 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3667 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3669 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3672 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3673 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3674 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3679 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3683 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3684 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3685 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3690 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3691 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3697 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3698 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3701 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3702 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3706 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3708 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3709 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3710 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3711 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3712 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3713 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3714 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3717 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3720 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3722 let payment_event = {
3723 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3724 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3727 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3729 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3731 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3733 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3734 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3737 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3738 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3740 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3742 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3743 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3744 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3747 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3748 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3749 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3750 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3753 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3754 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3755 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3763 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3765 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3766 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3767 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3768 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3770 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3771 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3772 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3774 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3775 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3777 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3778 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3779 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3780 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3781 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3782 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3783 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3784 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3785 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3786 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3787 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3788 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3789 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3790 // Everything was delivered...
3791 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3795 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3796 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3798 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3802 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3806 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3808 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3813 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3814 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3817 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3819 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3820 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3822 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3823 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3824 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3825 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3826 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3828 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3829 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3830 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3832 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3838 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3840 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3842 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3843 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3844 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3845 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3846 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3847 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3848 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3849 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3850 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3851 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3852 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3857 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3858 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3860 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3861 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3863 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3864 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3865 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3870 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3871 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3873 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3875 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3876 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3877 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3880 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3881 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3882 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3883 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3886 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3887 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3888 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3896 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3897 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3898 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3899 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3900 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3901 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3903 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3905 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3906 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3907 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3908 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3909 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3910 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3911 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3912 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3913 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3914 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3915 // Everything was delivered...
3916 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3919 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3920 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3922 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3923 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3924 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3926 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3928 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3929 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3932 // Channel should still work fine...
3933 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3934 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3935 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3939 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3940 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3941 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3942 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3943 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3947 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3948 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3949 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3950 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3951 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3955 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3956 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3957 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3958 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3959 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3963 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3964 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3966 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3968 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3969 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3970 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3971 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3972 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3973 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3975 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3976 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3977 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3981 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3982 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3983 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3987 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3988 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3990 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3992 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3993 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3994 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3995 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3998 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3999 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4001 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4005 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4006 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4009 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4010 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4012 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4013 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4014 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4015 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4020 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4021 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4022 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4024 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4025 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4026 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4031 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4032 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4033 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4039 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4040 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4042 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4043 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4045 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4046 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4047 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4048 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4050 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4051 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4053 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4054 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4055 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4056 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4058 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4059 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4061 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4062 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4064 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4066 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4067 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4068 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4069 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4070 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4071 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4072 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4073 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4074 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4077 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4078 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4079 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4081 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4082 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4083 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4086 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4087 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4088 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4089 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4090 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4091 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4092 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4095 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4096 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4097 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4101 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4102 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4105 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4106 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4111 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4112 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4114 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4115 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4117 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4118 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4119 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4121 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4127 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4128 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4131 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4135 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4136 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4137 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4143 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4145 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4146 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4147 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4148 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4149 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4150 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4151 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4152 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4153 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4154 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4155 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4157 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4159 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4160 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4161 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4164 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4167 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4168 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4169 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4170 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4171 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4172 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4173 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4174 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4180 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4181 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4182 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4183 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4184 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4186 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4187 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4188 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4189 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4190 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4191 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4195 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4196 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4197 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4200 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4201 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4205 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4207 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4209 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4210 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4211 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4212 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4214 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4215 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4216 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4217 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4218 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4221 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4222 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4223 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4224 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4225 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4228 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4235 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4237 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4243 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4244 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4245 match fail_commit[0] {
4246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4247 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4250 _ => unreachable!(),
4252 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4254 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4259 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4260 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4261 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4264 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4265 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4267 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4268 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4269 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4271 for event in events.drain(..) {
4273 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4274 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4275 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4276 all_outputs.push(outp);
4279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4282 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4283 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4293 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4294 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4298 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4300 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4301 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4304 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4305 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4306 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4307 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4308 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4310 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4313 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4314 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4315 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4316 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4317 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4321 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4322 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4323 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4327 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4329 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4330 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4331 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4333 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4335 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4336 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4337 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4338 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4340 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4341 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4343 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4344 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4346 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4347 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4348 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4352 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4353 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4354 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4362 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4363 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4365 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4367 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4368 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4369 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4371 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4373 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4374 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4375 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4377 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4378 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4379 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4380 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4381 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4385 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4386 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4387 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4389 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4391 // Create some initial channels
4392 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4394 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4396 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4397 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4398 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4400 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4401 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4402 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4404 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4406 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4408 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4412 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4413 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4416 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4417 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4418 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4419 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4420 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4422 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4424 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4426 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4427 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4428 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4432 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4433 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4434 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4435 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4436 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4438 // Create some initial channels
4439 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4441 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4442 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4444 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4446 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4447 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4448 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4450 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4453 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4455 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4458 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4460 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4461 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4462 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4463 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4464 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4466 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4467 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4468 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4469 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4471 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4472 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4473 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4474 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4475 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4479 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4485 // Create some initial channels
4486 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4488 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4489 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4490 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4491 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4495 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4496 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4498 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4500 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4501 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4502 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4503 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4505 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4506 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4508 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4509 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4510 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4514 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4515 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4516 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4519 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4521 // Create some initial channels
4522 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4524 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4525 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4529 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4531 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4532 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4533 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4535 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4536 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4538 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4539 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4540 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4541 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4542 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4543 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4545 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4546 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4547 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4549 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4551 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4552 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4553 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4554 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4555 // transactions next...
4556 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4557 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4559 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4560 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4561 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4562 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4564 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4565 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4568 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4569 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4571 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4572 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4573 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4575 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4579 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4580 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4581 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4586 // Create some initial channels
4587 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4589 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4590 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4591 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4592 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4594 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4595 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4597 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4599 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4600 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4601 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4603 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4604 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4606 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4607 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4608 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4609 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4611 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4612 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4613 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4615 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4616 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4617 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4619 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4621 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4624 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4625 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4626 // transactions next...
4627 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4628 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4629 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4630 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4632 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4633 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4636 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4637 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4639 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4640 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4642 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4643 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4645 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4646 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4647 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4648 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4649 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4650 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4651 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4652 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4656 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4657 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4658 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4659 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4660 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4662 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4668 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4670 // Create some initial channels
4671 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4672 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4674 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4675 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4676 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4677 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4678 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4680 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4681 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4682 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4684 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4685 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4686 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4687 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4688 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4690 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4691 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4692 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4693 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4694 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4696 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4697 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4699 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4701 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4702 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4703 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4704 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4705 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4706 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4708 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4709 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4714 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4718 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4719 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4720 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4721 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4722 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4723 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4728 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4729 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4730 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4731 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4733 match nodes_2_event {
4734 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4738 match nodes_0_event {
4739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4740 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4741 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4742 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4743 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4744 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4749 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4750 match msg_events[0] {
4751 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4755 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4756 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4758 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4759 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4760 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4761 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4762 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4763 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4764 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4765 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4767 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4772 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4773 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4774 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4775 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4776 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4779 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4780 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4781 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4782 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4783 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4784 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4785 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4787 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4788 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4789 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4791 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4792 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4793 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4794 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4795 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4797 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4799 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4800 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4801 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4802 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4803 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4804 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4805 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4806 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4808 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4809 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4810 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4812 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4813 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4816 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4818 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4819 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4821 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4822 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4826 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4828 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4830 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4831 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4832 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4834 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4835 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4836 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4837 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4839 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4840 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4841 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4842 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4845 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4846 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4847 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4848 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4849 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4850 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4851 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4853 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4857 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4858 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4860 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4862 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4863 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4865 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4869 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4870 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4872 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4873 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4874 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4875 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4876 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4877 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4878 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4879 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4880 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4881 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4883 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4884 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4886 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4887 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4888 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4889 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4890 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4891 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4894 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4897 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4899 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4901 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4902 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4903 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4904 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4905 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4906 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4907 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4908 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4909 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4913 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4914 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4918 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4919 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4920 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4921 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4922 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4924 // Create some initial channels
4925 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4927 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4928 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4929 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4930 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4931 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4933 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4934 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4935 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4938 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4940 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4941 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4943 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4947 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4948 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4951 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4952 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4953 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4955 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4959 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4960 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4962 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4963 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4964 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4965 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4966 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4967 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4970 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4971 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4972 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4973 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4974 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4975 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4976 // use the same payment hashes.
4977 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4982 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4983 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4984 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4985 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4986 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4987 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4988 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4990 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4991 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4993 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4994 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4995 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4996 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4997 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4999 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5000 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5002 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5004 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5005 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5007 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5009 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5010 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5012 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5014 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5016 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5018 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5019 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5021 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5023 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5026 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5028 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5029 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5032 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5034 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5035 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5037 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5038 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5039 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5040 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5041 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5043 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5044 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5045 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5046 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5047 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5048 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5051 let failed_destinations = vec![
5052 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5053 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5054 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5055 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5060 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5061 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5062 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5063 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5064 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5065 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5067 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5068 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5069 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5072 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5073 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5074 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5079 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5080 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5081 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5084 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5086 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5087 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5088 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5089 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5090 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5091 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5092 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5093 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5095 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5097 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5098 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5099 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5100 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5101 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5102 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5103 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5104 if deliver_last_raa {
5105 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5107 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5110 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5111 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5112 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5113 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5115 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5116 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5117 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5119 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5120 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5121 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5123 if announce_latest {
5124 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5126 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5128 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5129 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5131 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5133 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5134 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5137 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5141 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5142 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5143 if deliver_last_raa {
5144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5146 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5147 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5149 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5150 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5152 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5155 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5159 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5160 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5161 let mut a_done = false;
5162 for msg in cs_msgs {
5164 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5165 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5166 // should be failed-backwards here.
5167 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5168 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5169 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5170 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5172 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5177 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5178 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5179 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5181 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5182 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5185 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5186 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5187 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5188 if announce_latest {
5189 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5190 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5191 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5194 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5200 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5201 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5202 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5203 let mut as_updates = 0;
5204 for event in as_events.iter() {
5205 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5206 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5207 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5208 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5210 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5212 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5215 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5216 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5218 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5219 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5220 if announce_latest {
5221 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5222 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5224 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5226 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5227 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5228 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5229 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5230 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5231 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5232 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5233 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5234 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5236 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5238 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5241 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5242 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5244 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5245 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5246 if announce_latest {
5247 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5249 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5251 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5252 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5253 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5254 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5255 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5256 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5260 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5261 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5265 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5266 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5270 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5271 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5272 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5273 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5277 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5281 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5283 // Create some initial channels
5284 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5286 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5287 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5288 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5289 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5291 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5292 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5293 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5295 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5296 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5298 let htlc_timeout = {
5299 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5302 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5303 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5307 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5308 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5309 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5311 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5312 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5313 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5314 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5315 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5316 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5317 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5318 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5319 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5320 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5321 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5325 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5326 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5327 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5328 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5329 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5333 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5334 let seed = [42; 32];
5335 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5336 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5337 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5338 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5339 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5340 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5341 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5342 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5343 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5346 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5348 // Create some initial channels
5349 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5351 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5352 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5353 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5355 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5356 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5357 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5358 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5359 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5361 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5362 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5363 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5364 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5365 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5367 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5368 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5369 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5370 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5371 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5372 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5373 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5374 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5377 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5378 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5379 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5380 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5382 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5384 let htlc_timeout = {
5385 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5386 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5389 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5393 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5394 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5395 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5397 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5398 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5399 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5400 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5401 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5402 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5403 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5404 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5405 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5406 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5407 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5408 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5412 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5418 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5420 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5421 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5423 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5424 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5425 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5427 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5428 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5429 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5431 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5432 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5433 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5435 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5436 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5437 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5440 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5441 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5442 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5443 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5444 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5445 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5447 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5449 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5450 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5451 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5453 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5455 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5456 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5457 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5461 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5462 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5465 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5466 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5467 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5468 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5469 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5471 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5472 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5474 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5477 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5481 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5482 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5484 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5485 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5486 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5489 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5491 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5492 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5493 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5495 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5496 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5498 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5499 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5500 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5502 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5503 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5505 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5508 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5509 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5510 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5511 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5512 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5513 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5515 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5516 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5517 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5518 // actually revoked.
5519 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5520 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5521 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5525 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5526 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5527 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5529 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5532 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5534 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5536 if check_revoke_no_close {
5537 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5541 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5542 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5543 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5544 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5545 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5547 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5548 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5549 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5551 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5553 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5557 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5558 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5559 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5560 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5561 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5562 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5563 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5565 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5566 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5567 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5569 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5570 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5571 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5573 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5574 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5578 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5579 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5580 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5581 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5582 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5587 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5592 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5593 for node in nodes.iter() {
5594 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5597 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5598 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5599 let push_msat=10001;
5600 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5601 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5602 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5603 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5605 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5606 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5607 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5611 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5615 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5617 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5618 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5619 let push_msat=10001;
5620 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5622 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5623 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5624 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5625 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5626 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5628 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5629 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5630 let push_msat=10001;
5631 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5632 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5633 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5635 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5636 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5637 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5639 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5640 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5641 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5643 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5644 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5645 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5647 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5648 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5649 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5650 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5651 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5652 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5656 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5662 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5663 let push_msat=10001;
5664 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5665 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5666 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5667 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5669 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5670 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5671 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5672 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5677 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5680 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5681 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5682 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5683 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5685 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5686 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5687 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5688 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5689 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5692 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5693 // pending_update_fee.
5695 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5696 *feerate_lock += 20;
5698 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5701 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5703 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5704 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5705 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5712 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5713 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5714 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5715 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5717 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5718 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5719 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5721 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5722 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5723 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5724 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5725 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5727 // Flush the pending fee update.
5728 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5729 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5731 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5734 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5735 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5736 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5737 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5738 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5739 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5741 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5742 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5743 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5745 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5746 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5747 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5748 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5749 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5754 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5755 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5757 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5761 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5762 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5763 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5765 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5769 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5770 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5772 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5773 // pending_update_fee.
5775 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5776 *feerate_lock += 200;
5778 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5781 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5783 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5784 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5785 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5787 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5790 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5792 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5793 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5794 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5795 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5797 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5799 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5800 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5801 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5803 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5804 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5805 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5806 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5807 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5808 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5809 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5810 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5811 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5812 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5814 // Flush the pending fee update.
5815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5816 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5818 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5822 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5823 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5824 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5825 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5826 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5827 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5829 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5830 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5831 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5833 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5834 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5835 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5836 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5837 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5839 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5842 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5843 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5848 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5849 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5850 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5851 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5852 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5854 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5855 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5856 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5858 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5860 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5861 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5862 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5863 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5865 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5868 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5869 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5870 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5872 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5875 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5877 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5879 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5880 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5881 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5882 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5885 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5886 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5887 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5890 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5891 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5892 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5893 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
5894 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5895 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
5896 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
5897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5898 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5899 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5900 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5902 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5903 // pending_update_fee.
5905 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5906 *feerate_lock += 20;
5908 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5911 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5912 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5913 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5914 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5915 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5920 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5922 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5923 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5924 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5925 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5927 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5928 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5929 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5930 let payment_event = {
5931 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5932 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5935 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5936 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5938 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5945 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5946 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5948 // Flush the pending fee update.
5949 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5950 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5956 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5957 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5960 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5961 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5969 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5971 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5972 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5973 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5974 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5975 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5979 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5980 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5983 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5984 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5985 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5986 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5987 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5988 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5989 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5990 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5991 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5992 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5997 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5998 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5999 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6001 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6002 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6004 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6005 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6007 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6008 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6009 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6010 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6013 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6018 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6019 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6020 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6023 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6024 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6028 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6029 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6031 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6032 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6034 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6035 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6036 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6037 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6041 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6042 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6046 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6047 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6049 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6050 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6051 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6052 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6053 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6054 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6056 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6057 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6061 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6062 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6066 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6067 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6069 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6070 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6071 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6073 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6074 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6076 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6077 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6078 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6080 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6084 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6085 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6086 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6090 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6091 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6093 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6094 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6095 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6096 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6097 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6098 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6099 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6100 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6104 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6105 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6106 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6107 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6111 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6112 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6113 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6114 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6116 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6117 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6118 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6119 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6120 let payment_event = {
6121 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6122 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6127 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6128 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6134 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6136 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6139 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6141 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6142 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6143 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6145 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6149 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6150 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6154 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6155 let channel_value = 100000;
6156 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6157 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6159 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6161 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6162 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6164 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6165 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6166 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6167 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6168 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6170 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6173 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6175 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6176 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6180 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6182 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6184 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6185 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6186 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6187 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6190 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6194 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6195 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6197 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6198 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6199 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6205 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6206 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6211 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6213 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6214 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6215 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6216 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6217 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6218 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6220 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6221 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6222 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6223 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6225 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6227 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6228 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6229 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6230 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6231 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6233 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6234 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6235 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6237 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6241 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6242 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6243 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6247 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6248 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6250 let send_amt = 3999999;
6251 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6252 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6253 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6254 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6255 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6256 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6257 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6258 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6259 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6261 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6265 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6266 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6267 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6268 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6272 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6273 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6275 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6276 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6278 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6279 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6280 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6282 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6286 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6287 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6288 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6291 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6292 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6294 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6295 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6296 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6298 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6299 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6300 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6302 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6303 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6304 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6306 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6310 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6311 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6315 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6318 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6319 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6320 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6322 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6323 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6326 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6327 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6328 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6330 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6334 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6335 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6336 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6337 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6343 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6344 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6345 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6346 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6348 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6349 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6351 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6352 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6354 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6355 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6357 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6358 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6359 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6360 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6362 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6363 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6364 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6365 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6366 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6367 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6370 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6371 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6372 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6374 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6376 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6378 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6379 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6380 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6382 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6386 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6387 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6394 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6395 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6396 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6399 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6400 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6402 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6405 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6408 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6410 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6411 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6412 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6414 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6418 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6419 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6427 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6428 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6429 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6431 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6434 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6437 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6440 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6442 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6443 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6444 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6446 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6450 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6451 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6453 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6459 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6460 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6465 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6468 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6469 failure_code: 0x8000,
6472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6474 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6475 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6476 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6478 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6482 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6483 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6485 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6486 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6488 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6489 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6491 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6493 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6495 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6497 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6499 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6501 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6502 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6503 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6504 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6505 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6506 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6507 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6513 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6515 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6517 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6519 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6525 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6526 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6534 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6536 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6538 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6540 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6542 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6544 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6545 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6546 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6547 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6548 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6549 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6550 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6556 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6558 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6560 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6561 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6562 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6564 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6568 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6569 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6571 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6575 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6577 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6578 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6579 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6582 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6583 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6587 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6589 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6591 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6593 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6594 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6595 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6596 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6597 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6598 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6599 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6604 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6605 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6607 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6608 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6609 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6611 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6615 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6616 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6617 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6619 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6620 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6621 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6622 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6623 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6624 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6626 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6629 let mut payment_event = {
6630 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6631 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6633 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6635 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6637 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6639 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6641 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6642 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6644 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6645 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6648 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6649 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6653 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6654 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6655 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6658 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6659 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6660 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6661 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6662 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6663 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6669 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6672 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6674 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6675 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6677 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6680 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6681 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6682 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6683 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6684 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6693 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6694 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6695 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6696 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6697 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6698 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6699 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6701 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6704 let mut payment_event = {
6705 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6706 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6715 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6716 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6719 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6720 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6722 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6724 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6725 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6727 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6728 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6729 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6730 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6733 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6739 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6740 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6741 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6742 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6746 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6747 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6748 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6753 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6754 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6756 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6757 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6759 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6761 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6762 assert!(is_permanent);
6763 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6768 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6769 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6774 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6777 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6778 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6779 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6780 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6782 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6783 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6786 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6787 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6789 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6790 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6792 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6793 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6794 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6795 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6797 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6798 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6800 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6801 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6803 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6806 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6807 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6808 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6811 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6812 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6814 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6816 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6817 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6822 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6823 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6828 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6829 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6830 if announce_latest {
6831 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6833 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6836 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6840 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6843 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6845 let mut first_failed = false;
6846 for event in events {
6848 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6849 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6850 assert!(!first_failed);
6851 first_failed = true;
6853 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6856 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6863 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6864 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6865 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6868 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6869 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6870 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6871 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6872 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6873 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6874 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6879 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6880 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6882 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6883 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6885 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6886 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6888 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6889 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6891 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6893 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6894 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6897 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6899 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6900 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6901 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6902 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6905 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6906 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6908 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6909 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6910 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6911 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6912 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6913 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6914 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6915 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6917 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6918 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6919 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6921 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6922 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6924 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6925 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6926 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6927 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6928 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6929 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6930 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6933 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6935 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6937 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6938 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6940 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6941 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6946 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6947 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6948 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6949 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6953 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6954 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6956 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6957 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6958 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6959 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6960 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6966 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
6967 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6968 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6969 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6972 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6975 } else { assert!(false) }
6977 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
6978 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6979 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6980 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6981 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6982 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6983 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6986 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6989 } else { assert!(false); }
6991 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6992 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6993 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6994 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6995 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6996 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6998 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7000 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7001 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7002 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7006 } else { panic!(); }
7007 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7009 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7010 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7011 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7012 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7013 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7014 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7015 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7018 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7021 } else { assert!(false); }
7025 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7026 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7027 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7028 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7035 // Create some initial channels
7036 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7038 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7039 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7040 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7041 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7042 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7043 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7044 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7045 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7050 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7051 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7054 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7055 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7056 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7059 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7060 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7061 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7065 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7066 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7067 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7068 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7069 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7070 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7071 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7072 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7078 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7081 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7082 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7083 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7084 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7088 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7089 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7090 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7098 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7099 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7102 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7103 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7105 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7106 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7108 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7109 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7110 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7111 for e in msg_events {
7113 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7114 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7115 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7116 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7117 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7124 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7125 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7127 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7128 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7129 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7130 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7132 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7133 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7135 // Reestablish chan_1
7136 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7137 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7138 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7139 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7140 // Reestablish chan_2
7141 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7142 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7143 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7144 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7145 // Reestablish chan_3
7146 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7147 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7148 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7149 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7151 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7152 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7154 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7155 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7156 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7157 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7158 for e in msg_events {
7160 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7161 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7162 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7163 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7165 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7166 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7169 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7172 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7173 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7177 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7178 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7179 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7186 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7188 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7189 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7190 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7191 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7192 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7194 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7195 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7196 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7197 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7198 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7199 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7201 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7202 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7203 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7204 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7208 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7209 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7211 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7212 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7213 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7216 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7220 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7221 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7222 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7223 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7224 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7225 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7226 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7227 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7231 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7232 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7233 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7234 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7236 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7237 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7238 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7239 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7240 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7241 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7242 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7243 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7244 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7245 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7246 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7247 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7248 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7252 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7254 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7255 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7257 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7259 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7260 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7261 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7262 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7263 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7264 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7265 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7266 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7267 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7268 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7269 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7270 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7271 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7275 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7277 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7278 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7282 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7283 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7284 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7286 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7287 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7290 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7292 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7293 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7294 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7295 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7296 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7297 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7298 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7299 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7300 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7301 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7302 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7303 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7305 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7306 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7307 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7309 // Revoke local commitment tx
7310 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7312 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7313 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7314 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7316 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7317 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7319 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7320 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7321 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7323 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7324 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7325 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7327 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7328 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7329 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7330 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7335 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7336 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7337 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7338 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7339 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7340 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7341 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7342 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7343 match events.last().unwrap() {
7344 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7351 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7352 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7353 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7355 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7356 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7357 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7358 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7360 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7361 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7362 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7363 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7364 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7365 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7367 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7368 // available, which we check here:
7369 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7370 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7371 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7373 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7374 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7376 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7377 // output, checked above).
7378 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7379 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7380 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7382 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7383 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7384 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7385 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7386 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7390 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7391 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7392 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7393 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7394 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7396 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7397 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7398 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7399 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7401 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7402 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7404 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7405 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7406 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7407 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7408 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7409 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7410 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7411 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7415 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7416 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7417 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7419 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7420 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7421 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7422 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7423 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7424 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7425 // up bumped justice generation.
7426 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7429 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7434 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7435 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7436 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7439 // Provide preimage for one
7440 // Check aggregation
7442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7445 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7447 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7448 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7449 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7451 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7452 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7453 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7454 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7455 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7457 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7458 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7459 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7460 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7462 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7464 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7468 let feerate_timeout;
7469 let feerate_preimage;
7471 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7472 // 3 transactions including:
7473 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7474 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7475 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7476 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7477 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7478 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7479 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7480 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7482 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7483 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7484 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7485 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7487 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7488 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7490 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7493 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7494 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7495 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7497 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7498 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7499 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7500 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7504 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7505 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7507 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7508 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7510 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7511 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7512 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7513 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7514 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7515 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7517 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7518 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7519 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7520 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7521 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7523 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7524 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7525 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7526 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7527 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7532 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7533 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7537 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7538 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7539 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7540 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7541 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7542 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7543 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7544 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7546 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7547 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7548 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7549 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7550 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7552 let per_commitment_secret;
7553 let next_per_commitment_point;
7555 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7556 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7557 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7559 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7561 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7562 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7563 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7565 // Must revoke without gaps
7566 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7567 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7569 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7570 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7571 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7574 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7575 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7577 per_commitment_secret,
7578 next_per_commitment_point,
7580 next_local_nonce: None,
7582 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7588 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7589 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7590 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7597 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7598 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7599 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7600 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7602 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7603 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7604 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7606 // Revoke local commitment tx
7607 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7609 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7610 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7611 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7612 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7614 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7615 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7617 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7619 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7620 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7621 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7622 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7623 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7624 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7628 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7629 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7631 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7632 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7633 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7638 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7639 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7640 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7644 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7646 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7648 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7649 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7650 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7651 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7652 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7654 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7657 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7659 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7661 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7662 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7665 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7666 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7667 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7674 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7680 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7681 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7682 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7684 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7686 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7687 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7688 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7689 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7693 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7694 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7695 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7701 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7702 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7703 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7706 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7707 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7711 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7712 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7713 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7714 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7715 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7716 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7718 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7719 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7720 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7721 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7722 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7723 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7724 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7725 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7726 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7727 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7728 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7729 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7731 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7734 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7736 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7737 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7738 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7739 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7740 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7742 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7743 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7745 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7746 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7747 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7748 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7749 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7750 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7752 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7753 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7755 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7756 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7757 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7759 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7763 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7764 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7765 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7771 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7772 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7776 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7777 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7778 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7780 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7782 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7783 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7788 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7789 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7791 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7792 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7793 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7800 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7801 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7803 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7805 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7806 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7813 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7814 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7815 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7816 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7821 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7822 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7824 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7826 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7827 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7828 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7830 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7832 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7833 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7838 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7839 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7841 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7842 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7843 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7845 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7851 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7852 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7853 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7854 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7855 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7856 // and the channel should be closed.
7857 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7858 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7862 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7864 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7865 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7866 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7870 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7871 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7873 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7874 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7876 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7877 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7878 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7879 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7880 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7881 let accept_chan_msg = {
7882 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7883 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7884 let channel = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7885 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7887 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7889 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7891 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7892 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7894 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7895 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7897 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7898 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7900 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7901 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7902 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7903 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7904 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7905 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7910 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7914 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7915 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7916 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7920 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7922 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7923 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7925 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7927 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7928 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7929 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7931 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7933 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7934 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7935 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7937 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7938 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7940 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7941 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7944 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7947 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7948 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7949 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7951 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7952 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7953 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7960 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7961 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7962 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7963 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7966 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7967 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7969 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7970 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7972 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7973 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7978 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7979 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7980 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7981 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7982 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7983 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7988 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7990 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7991 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7992 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7993 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7995 let total_msat = 100_000;
7996 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7997 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7998 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8000 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8001 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8002 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8003 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8004 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8005 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8006 route.paths.push(path_1);
8008 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8009 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8010 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8011 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8012 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8013 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8014 route.paths.push(path_2);
8017 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8018 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8019 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8020 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8021 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8024 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8028 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8029 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8030 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8032 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8033 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8035 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8036 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8037 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8038 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8039 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8040 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8041 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8042 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8043 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8044 onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8045 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8046 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8049 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8050 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8051 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8052 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8055 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8056 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8057 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8058 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8059 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8061 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8062 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8069 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8070 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8072 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8075 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8077 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8078 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8083 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8088 // Create channels for each amount
8089 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8090 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8091 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8092 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8093 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8094 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8095 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8096 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8097 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8098 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8099 expected_paths.push(path);
8101 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8103 // Create a route for each amount
8104 let example_amount = 100000;
8105 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8106 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8107 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8108 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8109 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8110 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8111 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8112 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8113 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8114 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8115 route.paths.push(path);
8118 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8119 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8120 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8121 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8122 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8123 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8126 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8127 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8128 let mut amount_received = 0;
8129 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8130 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8132 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8133 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8134 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8135 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8138 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8142 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8143 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8144 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8148 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8149 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8150 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8151 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8152 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8153 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8155 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8156 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8157 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8158 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8160 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8161 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8162 route.paths.push(path);
8163 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8164 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8165 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8166 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8167 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8168 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8169 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8170 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8174 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8175 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8176 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8177 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8179 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8181 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8184 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8185 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8186 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8187 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8189 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8190 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8194 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8195 // values from previous calls.
8196 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8197 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8200 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8202 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8203 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8205 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8213 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8214 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8222 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8223 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8224 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8225 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8227 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8228 // resulting events.
8229 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8230 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8232 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8233 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8235 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8237 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8238 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8239 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8240 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8243 // We should fail the payment back
8244 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8245 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8247 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8255 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8256 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8257 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8259 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8260 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8261 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8262 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8263 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8265 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8266 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8267 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8268 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8269 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8271 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8272 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8273 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8274 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8275 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8279 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8280 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8281 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8282 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8285 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8286 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8287 // commitment at same time.
8289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8292 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8294 // Create some initial channel
8295 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8296 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8298 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8299 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8301 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8302 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8304 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8305 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8306 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8307 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8310 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8311 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8312 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8313 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8316 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8317 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8320 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8321 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8322 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8323 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8324 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8326 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8327 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8329 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8331 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8332 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8333 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8335 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8336 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8337 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8338 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8339 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8340 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8341 } else { assert!(false); }
8343 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8345 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8350 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8351 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8352 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8353 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8354 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8361 // Create some initial channel
8362 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8363 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8365 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8366 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8368 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8369 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8371 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8372 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8373 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8374 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8375 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8376 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8378 let watchtower_alice = {
8380 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8381 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8382 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8383 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8386 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8387 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8390 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8391 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8392 // requirements here.
8393 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8394 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8395 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8397 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8399 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8400 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8404 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8405 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8406 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8407 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8408 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8409 let watchtower_bob = {
8411 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8412 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8413 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8414 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8417 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8418 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8421 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8423 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8424 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8425 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8426 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8429 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8431 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8433 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8434 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8435 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8436 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8437 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8438 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8439 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8441 } else { assert!(false); }
8443 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8446 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8447 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8449 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8452 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8453 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8454 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8457 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8458 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8459 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8460 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8461 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8462 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8463 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8465 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8466 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8467 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8468 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8469 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8470 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8475 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8476 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8477 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8480 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8481 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8483 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8484 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8485 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8486 // before receiving funding_signed.
8487 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8488 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8489 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8490 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8492 // Create an initial channel
8493 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8494 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8495 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8496 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8497 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8499 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8500 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8502 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8505 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8506 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8508 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8509 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8513 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8514 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8515 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8516 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8517 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8518 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8519 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8526 // Create some initial channels
8527 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8529 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8530 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8531 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8532 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8533 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8534 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8536 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8537 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8538 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8539 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8540 // this test before #653 fix.
8541 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8542 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8544 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8545 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8547 let htlc_timeout = {
8548 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8549 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8550 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8551 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8552 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8556 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8557 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8558 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8561 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8562 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8563 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8564 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8566 // Steps of the test:
8567 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8568 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8569 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8570 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8571 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8572 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8573 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8574 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8575 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8578 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8580 // Create some initial channels
8581 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8582 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8584 // Steps (1) and (2):
8585 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8586 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8588 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8589 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8590 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8591 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8592 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8593 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8594 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8596 // Steps (3) and (4):
8597 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8598 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8599 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8600 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8603 if !broadcast_alice {
8604 force_closing_node = 1;
8605 counterparty_node = 0;
8607 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8608 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8610 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8611 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8612 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8613 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8614 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8616 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8617 if broadcast_alice {
8618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8620 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8625 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8626 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8627 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8629 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8631 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8632 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8633 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8634 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8635 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8636 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8639 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8640 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8641 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8642 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8645 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8646 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8651 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8652 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8653 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8656 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8658 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8659 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8660 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8663 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8665 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8666 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8667 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8673 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8675 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8678 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8679 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8680 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8681 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8682 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8685 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8687 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8690 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8691 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8692 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8693 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8694 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8695 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8696 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8697 if broadcast_alice {
8698 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8700 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8702 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8703 if broadcast_alice {
8704 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8705 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8707 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8708 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8713 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8714 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8716 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8717 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8718 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8720 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8721 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8722 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8723 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8724 if broadcast_alice {
8725 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8726 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8727 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8729 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8730 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8731 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8737 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8738 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8739 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8740 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8741 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8745 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8746 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8747 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8748 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8749 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8750 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8751 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8753 // Create an first channel channel
8754 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8755 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8757 // Create an second channel
8758 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8759 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8761 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8762 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8763 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8765 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8766 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8767 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8769 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8770 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8772 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8773 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8774 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8780 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8782 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8785 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8786 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8787 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8795 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8796 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8797 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8799 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8800 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8801 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8802 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8803 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8804 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8806 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8808 // Create an initial channel
8809 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8810 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8811 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8812 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8814 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8815 // that it is rejected.
8816 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8818 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8821 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8822 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8823 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8824 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8825 // move forward with it.
8826 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8827 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8833 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8834 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8836 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8839 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8840 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8842 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8843 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8844 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8845 added_monitors.clear();
8847 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8849 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8851 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8852 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8854 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8857 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8858 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8859 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8860 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8861 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8863 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8866 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8867 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8868 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8869 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8870 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8876 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8877 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8878 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8879 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8880 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8881 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8883 let (_, funding_created) = {
8884 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8885 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8886 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8887 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8888 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8889 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8890 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8891 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8892 as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
8894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8895 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8896 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8897 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8900 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8902 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8905 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8906 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8907 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8908 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8909 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8915 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8916 // everything is functional.
8917 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8919 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8920 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8921 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8922 added_monitors.clear();
8924 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8926 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8927 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8928 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8929 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8931 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8932 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8933 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8935 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8939 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8940 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8942 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8943 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8944 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8948 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8950 // Create some initial channels
8951 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8952 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8953 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8956 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8957 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8959 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8960 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8963 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8964 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8966 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8967 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8969 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8970 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8971 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8973 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8974 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8975 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8977 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8978 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8981 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8982 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8987 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8988 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8990 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8992 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8993 // peer_disconnected.
8994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8995 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8997 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8998 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8999 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9003 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9004 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9006 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9007 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9008 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9009 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9011 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9012 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9013 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9017 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9019 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9020 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9021 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9023 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9025 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9026 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9027 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9029 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9030 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9031 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9032 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9033 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9036 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9037 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9039 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9041 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9043 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9045 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9046 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9049 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9050 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9052 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9053 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9054 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9056 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9057 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9058 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9059 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9060 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9061 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9062 } else { panic!(); }
9063 } else { panic!(); }
9064 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9066 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9067 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9068 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9069 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9070 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9071 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9072 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9076 script_sig: Script::new(),
9077 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9078 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9080 output: vec![TxOut {
9082 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9085 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9086 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9089 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9090 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9091 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9092 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9093 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9094 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9095 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9096 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9097 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9098 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9099 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9100 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9101 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9102 // until we learned about an additional block.
9104 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9105 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9109 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9110 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9112 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9113 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9114 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9115 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9116 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9118 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9119 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9120 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9122 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9123 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9125 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9126 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9127 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9129 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9130 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9131 if test_height_before_timelock {
9132 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9133 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9134 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9135 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9137 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9138 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9139 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9140 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9141 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9142 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9144 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9145 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9147 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9148 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9149 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9150 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9151 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9156 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9157 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9159 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9160 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9161 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9163 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9168 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9169 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9170 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9173 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9177 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9179 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9181 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9182 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9183 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9185 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9188 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9189 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9191 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9193 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9195 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9198 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9201 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9202 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9205 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9207 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9209 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9210 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9211 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9212 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9213 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9217 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9219 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9220 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9221 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9223 let expected_destinations = vec![
9224 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9225 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9228 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9231 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9235 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9236 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9238 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9239 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9240 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9241 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9242 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9243 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9245 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9246 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9247 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9250 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9254 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9256 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9261 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9262 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9263 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9264 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9265 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9266 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9270 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9271 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9272 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9273 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9277 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9278 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9279 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9283 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9286 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9288 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9290 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9291 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9292 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9293 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9294 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9295 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9296 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9297 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9300 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9302 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9303 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9305 let session_privs = {
9306 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9307 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9308 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9309 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9310 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9311 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9313 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9314 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9315 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9321 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9323 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9325 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9326 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9330 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9331 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9332 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9334 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9335 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9337 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9340 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9342 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9344 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9348 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9349 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9350 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9353 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9354 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9355 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9359 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9360 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9361 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9363 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9366 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9370 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9372 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9373 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9374 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9377 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9378 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9379 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9381 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9382 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9386 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9390 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9392 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9393 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9394 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9395 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9396 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9397 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9398 final_value_msat: 10000,
9400 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9401 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9402 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9404 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9405 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9406 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9408 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9409 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9410 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9411 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9412 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9413 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9417 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9421 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9423 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9424 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9426 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9427 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9428 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9429 final_value_msat: 10000,
9431 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9432 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9433 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9434 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9435 let route = find_route(
9436 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9437 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9440 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9441 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9442 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9444 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9445 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9446 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9447 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9448 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9449 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9453 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9454 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9455 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9456 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9461 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9463 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9464 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9465 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9466 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9468 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9469 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9470 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9471 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9472 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9473 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9476 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9477 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9478 // amount of time to respond to.
9480 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9481 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9482 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9484 let failed_destinations = vec![
9485 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9486 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9490 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9492 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9493 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9497 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9499 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9500 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9502 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9503 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9504 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9506 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9509 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9510 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9511 enum ExposureEvent {
9512 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9514 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9516 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9517 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9520 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9521 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9524 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9525 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9526 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9527 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9528 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9529 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9530 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9531 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9534 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9535 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9536 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9537 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9538 // originally written.
9539 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9540 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9543 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9545 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9546 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9547 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9548 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9550 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9552 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9553 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9554 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9556 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9558 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9561 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9562 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9563 let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9564 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9567 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9568 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9570 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9572 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9576 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9577 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9578 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9580 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9581 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9582 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9584 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9585 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9586 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9587 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9588 (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9589 chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9591 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9592 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9594 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9595 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9597 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9598 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9601 if dust_outbound_balance {
9602 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9603 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9604 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9605 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9606 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9607 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9608 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9611 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9612 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9613 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9614 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9615 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9619 if dust_outbound_balance {
9620 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9621 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9622 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9623 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9624 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9625 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9628 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9629 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9630 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9631 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9636 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9637 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9638 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9639 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9641 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9642 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9643 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9645 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9646 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9647 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9649 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9650 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9651 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9652 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9654 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9655 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9656 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9657 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9658 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9660 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9661 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9662 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9663 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9665 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9666 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9667 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9668 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
9669 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9671 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9672 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9673 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
9674 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
9675 // to cross the threshold.
9677 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
9678 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9679 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9682 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9683 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9685 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9687 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9690 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9691 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9692 added_monitors.clear();
9695 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9696 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9697 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9698 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9699 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9700 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9701 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9702 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9703 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9704 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9705 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9706 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9707 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9711 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9712 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
9713 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
9717 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9723 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9724 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9726 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9727 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9729 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9731 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9732 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9733 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9735 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9736 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9737 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9738 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9739 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9744 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9745 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9746 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9747 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9752 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9753 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9754 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9755 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9759 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9760 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9761 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9762 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9763 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9768 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9770 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9772 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9773 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9776 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9778 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9779 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9781 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9784 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9785 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9788 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9789 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9794 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9797 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9798 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9800 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9803 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9804 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9806 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9808 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9810 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9813 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9816 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9817 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9819 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9822 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9823 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9825 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9826 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9827 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9828 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9832 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9836 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9837 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9841 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9842 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9843 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9844 let recv_value = 100_000;
9846 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9848 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9849 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9850 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9851 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9852 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9854 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9855 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9857 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9858 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9859 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9861 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9863 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9864 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9865 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9866 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9869 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9870 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9872 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9878 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9880 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9882 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9887 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9888 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9889 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9890 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9891 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9895 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9896 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9897 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9898 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9901 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9903 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9904 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9905 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9906 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9907 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9916 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9919 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9920 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9921 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9922 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
9923 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9925 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
9926 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
9927 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9928 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9931 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
9932 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9933 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9935 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
9936 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9937 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
9940 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9942 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
9943 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
9944 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9945 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9946 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9947 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9948 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
9949 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
9951 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
9952 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9953 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
9954 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
9955 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
9956 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
9958 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
9959 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
9960 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9961 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9962 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
9964 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
9966 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
9967 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
9968 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9969 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9970 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
9971 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9973 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
9974 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
9975 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9977 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
9979 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
9980 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
9981 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9982 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
9983 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
9985 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
9986 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
9988 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
9989 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9990 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
9991 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9997 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
9999 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10000 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10001 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10002 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10005 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10006 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10007 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10009 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10010 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10011 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10013 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10014 // waiting on any messages.
10015 for node in &nodes {
10016 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10017 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10018 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10024 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10028 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10030 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10031 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10032 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10033 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10034 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10036 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10039 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10043 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10044 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10045 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10046 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10047 assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10050 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10051 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10053 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10054 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10055 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10056 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10059 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10060 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10061 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10063 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
10067 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10073 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10074 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10075 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10076 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10077 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10079 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10082 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10086 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10087 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10088 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10089 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10090 assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10093 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10094 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10096 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10097 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10098 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10099 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10102 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10103 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10104 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);