_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 #[test]
  66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  67         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  68         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  69         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  70         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  71         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  72         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  73         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  74         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  75
  76         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  77         // funding satoshis
  78         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  79         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  80         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  81
  82         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  83         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  84
  85         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  86         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  87
  88         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  89         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  90         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  91                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  92                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  93                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  94                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  95                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  96                         match action {
  97                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  98                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  99                                 },
 100                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 101                         }
 102                 } else { assert!(false); }
 103         };
 104
 105         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 106
 107         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 109         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 124 }
 125
 126 #[test]
 127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 128         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 129         // them.
 130         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 132         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 133         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 136
 137         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 138                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 139                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 140                 },
 141                 _ => panic!()
 142         }
 143 }
 144
 145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 146         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 147         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 148         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 149         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 153         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 154         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 155
 156         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 157         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 158         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 159         let opt_anchors = false;
 160         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 161         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 162
 163         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 164         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if !send_from_initiator {
 166                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 170
 171         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 172         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 173         if send_from_initiator {
 174                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 175                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 176         }
 177         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 178         {
 179                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 180                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 181                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 182                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 183                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 184                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 185                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 186         }
 187
 188         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 189         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 190         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 191
 192         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 193         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 194         if send_from_initiator {
 195                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 196                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 197                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 198                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 199                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 200         } else {
 201                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 #[test]
 206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 208         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 209 }
 210
 211 #[test]
 212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 218
 219         // balancing
 220         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 221
 222         // A                                        B
 223         // update_fee                            ->
 224         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 225         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 226         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 227         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 228         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 229         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 230         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 231         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 232         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 233         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 234         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 235         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 236         //                                       <- RAA
 237         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 238
 239         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 240         {
 241                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 242                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 243         }
 244         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 246
 247         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 248         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 249         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 251                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 252                 },
 253                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 254         };
 255
 256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 257
 258         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 259         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 260         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 261                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 263
 264         let payment_event = {
 265                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 266                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 267                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 268         };
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 270         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 271
 272         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 274         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 275         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 278
 279         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 281         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 284
 285         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 286         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 291         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 295         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 300         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 304         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 307
 308         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 309         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 314
 315         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 316         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 317         match events_2[0] {
 318                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         }
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 324 }
 325
 326 #[test]
 327 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 328         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 329         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 330         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 331         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 332         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 333         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 334         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 335
 336         // balancing
 337         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 338
 339         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 340         {
 341                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 342                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 343         }
 344         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 346
 347         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 348         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 349         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 350                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 351                         update_fee.as_ref()
 352                 },
 353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 354         };
 355
 356         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 357
 358         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 359         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 360         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 361                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 363
 364         let payment_event = {
 365                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 366                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 367                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 368         };
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 371
 372         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 374         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 375         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 376         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 378
 379         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 381
 382         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 383 }
 384
 385 #[test]
 386 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 387         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 388         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 389         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 390         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 391         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 392
 393         // A                                        B
 394         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 395         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 396         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 397         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 398         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 399         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 400         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 401         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 402         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 403         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 404         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 405         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 406         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 407         //                                          B should send no response here
 408         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 409         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 410         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 411
 412         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 413         let initial_feerate;
 414         {
 415                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 416                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 417                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 418         }
 419         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 421
 422         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 423         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 424         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 425                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 426                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 427                 },
 428                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 429         };
 430
 431         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 433         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 434         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 436
 437         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 438         // transaction:
 439         {
 440                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 441                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 442         }
 443         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 445         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 446
 447         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 448         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 449                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 450                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 451         };
 452
 453         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 454
 455         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 456         // Deliver (3)
 457         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 458
 459         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 460         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 461         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 467         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 469         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 470
 471         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 472         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 473         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 475         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 476
 477         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 478         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 480
 481         // Delever (4)
 482         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 483         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 485
 486         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 487         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 489
 490         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 491         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 492         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 498 }
 499
 500 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 501         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 502         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 503         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 504         // Node objects.
 505
 506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 510
 511         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 512                 let block = Block {
 513                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 514                         txdata: vec![],
 515                 };
 516                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 517                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 518         }
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 522         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 525         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 526         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 529         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 530
 531         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 532
 533         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 534         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 536         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 537
 538         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 539         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 540         {
 541                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 542                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 543                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 544                 added_monitors.clear();
 545         }
 546         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 547
 548         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 549
 550         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 551         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 552         {
 553                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 554                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 555                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 556                 added_monitors.clear();
 557         }
 558
 559         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 560         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 561         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 567         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 569         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 570         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 571 }
 572
 573 #[test]
 574 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 593 }
 594
 595 #[test]
 596 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 597         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 598         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 599         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 600         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 601         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 602
 603         {
 604                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 605                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 606         }
 607         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 609
 610         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 611         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 612         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 613                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 614                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 615                 },
 616                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 617         };
 618         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 619
 620         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 621         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 625         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 627
 628         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 629         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 630         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 632
 633         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 634         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 636 }
 637
 638 #[test]
 639 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 640         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 641         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 643         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 644         let channel_value = 5000;
 645         let push_sats = 700;
 646         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 647         let channel_id = chan.2;
 648         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 649         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 650         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 651
 652         let opt_anchors = false;
 653
 654         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 655         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 656         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 657         // remote limit.
 658         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 659         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 660         {
 661                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 662                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 663         }
 664         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 665         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 666         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 667
 668         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 669
 670         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 671
 672         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 673         {
 674                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 675
 676                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 677                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 678                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 679                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 680                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 681                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 682         }
 683
 684         {
 685                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 686                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 687                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 688         }
 689         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 690         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 692
 693         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 694
 695         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 696         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 697         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 698                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 699                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 700                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 701                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 702                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 703                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 704                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 705         };
 706         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 707                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 708                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 709                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 710                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 711                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 712                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 713                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 714                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 715         };
 716
 717         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 718         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 719                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 720
 721         let res = {
 722                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 723                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 724                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 725                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 726                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 727                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 728                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 729                         push_sats,
 730                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 731                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 732                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 733                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 734                         &mut htlcs,
 735                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 736                 );
 737                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 738         };
 739
 740         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 741                 channel_id: chan.2,
 742                 signature: res.0,
 743                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 744         };
 745
 746         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 747                 channel_id: chan.2,
 748                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 749         };
 750
 751         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 752
 753         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 754         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 755         //Should produce and error.
 756         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 757         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 759         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 760         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 761 }
 762
 763 #[test]
 764 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 765         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 766         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 767         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 768         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 769         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 770
 771         // balancing
 772         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 773
 774         {
 775                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 776                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 777         }
 778         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 780
 781         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 782         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 783         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 784                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 785                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 786                 },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 790         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 791         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 793
 794         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 795
 796         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 797         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 798                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 799         {
 800                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 801                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 802                 added_monitors.clear();
 803         }
 804         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 805         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 806         // node[1] has nothing to do
 807
 808         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 809         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 811
 812         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 813         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 814         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 816         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 818         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 819
 820         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 824         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 825         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 828         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 830         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 831
 832         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 834         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 835
 836         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 838         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 839         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 840
 841         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 842         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 843         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 844
 845         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 846
 847         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 848         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 849         match events[0] {
 850                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 851                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 852         };
 853
 854         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 855
 856         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 857         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 858         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 859         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 860         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 861 }
 862
 863 #[test]
 864 fn test_update_fee() {
 865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 868         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 869         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 870         let channel_id = chan.2;
 871
 872         // A                                        B
 873         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 874         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 875         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 876         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 877         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 878         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 879         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 880         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 881         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 882         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 883         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 884         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 885
 886         // Create and deliver (1)...
 887         let feerate;
 888         {
 889                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 890                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 891                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 892         }
 893         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 895
 896         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 897         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 898         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 899                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 900                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 901                 },
 902                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 903         };
 904         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 905
 906         // Generate (2) and (3):
 907         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 908         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 910
 911         // Deliver (2):
 912         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 913         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 915
 916         // Create and deliver (4)...
 917         {
 918                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 919                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 920         }
 921         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 923         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 924         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 925         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 926                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 927                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 928                 },
 929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 930         };
 931
 932         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 933         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 935         // ... creating (5)
 936         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 937         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 938
 939         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 940         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 942         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 943         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 944
 945         // Deliver (5):
 946         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 947         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 949
 950         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 951         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 952         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 956         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 957         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 959
 960         // Deliver (7)
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 963         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 964         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 965
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 968         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 969
 970         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 971         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 972         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 973         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 974         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 975 }
 976
 977 #[test]
 978 fn fake_network_test() {
 979         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 980         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 984         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 985
 986         // Create some initial channels
 987         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 988         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 989         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 990
 991         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 995         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 996
 997         // Send some more payments
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1001
1002         // Test failure packets
1003         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1004         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1005
1006         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1007         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1008
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1016
1017         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1018         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1019         hops.push(RouteHop {
1020                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1024                 fee_msat: 0,
1025                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1026         });
1027         hops.push(RouteHop {
1028                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1030                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032                 fee_msat: 0,
1033                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034         });
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1040                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1042         });
1043         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1044         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1045         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1046
1047         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1048         hops.push(RouteHop {
1049                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1053                 fee_msat: 0,
1054                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1055         });
1056         hops.push(RouteHop {
1057                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1059                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1061                 fee_msat: 0,
1062                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1063         });
1064         hops.push(RouteHop {
1065                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1066                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1067                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1068                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1069                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1070                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1071         });
1072         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1073         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1074         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1075
1076         // Claim the rebalances...
1077         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1078         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1079
1080         // Close down the channels...
1081         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1082         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1085         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1088         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1091         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 }
1094
1095 #[test]
1096 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1097         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1098         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1099         // commitment dance rounds.
1100         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1101         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1102         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1103         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1104         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1105         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1106
1107         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1108         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1109                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1110                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1111                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1112                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1113         }
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1115
1116         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1123         // another HTLC.
1124         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1127                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1128                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1129                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1130                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1131                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1132         }
1133
1134         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1135         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1136         {
1137                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1138                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1139                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1140         }
1141
1142         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1143         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1144         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1145         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1146
1147         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1148         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1149         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1150         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1151         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1152         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1154
1155         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1156         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1157         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1158
1159         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1160
1161         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1162         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1163         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165
1166         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1170
1171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1174
1175         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1176                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1177         }
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1183
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1188         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189
1190         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1192
1193         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1194
1195         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1196         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1197         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1198                 match event {
1199                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1200                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1201                         },
1202                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203                 };
1204         }
1205
1206         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1207                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1208         }
1209
1210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 }
1212
1213 #[test]
1214 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1215         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1216         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1217         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1218         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1219         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1220         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1221
1222         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1227         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1228
1229         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1235         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1236
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1238         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1239         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 }
1241
1242 #[test]
1243 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1244         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1245         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1246         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1247         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1248         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1249         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1250         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1251
1252         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1253
1254         // balancing
1255         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1256
1257         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1258
1259         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1260         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1261         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1262
1263         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1264         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1265         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267
1268         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1269         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1270
1271         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1272         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1273         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1274                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1277                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1278                 }
1279         }
1280         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1281
1282         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1284         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1285         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1286
1287         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1288         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1289
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1291         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1292         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1293         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1294         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1295                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1296         } else {
1297                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1298         };
1299
1300         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1302
1303         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1304         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1305         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1306
1307         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1309         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1310         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1311
1312         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1313         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1314         for e in events {
1315                 match e {
1316                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1317                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1318                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1319                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1320                         },
1321                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1322                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1323                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1324                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1325                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1326                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1327                         },
1328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1329                 }
1330         }
1331 }
1332
1333 #[test]
1334 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1338         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1339         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1340
1341         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1342         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1343
1344         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1345         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1346         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1347         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1348         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1349                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1350         match err {
1351                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1352                         match &fails[0] {
1353                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1354                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1355                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1356                         }
1357                 },
1358                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1359         }
1360         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1361         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1362
1363         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1364 }
1365
1366 #[test]
1367 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1368         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1369         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1370         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1371         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1372         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1373
1374         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1375         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1376         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1377         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1378
1379         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1380
1381         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1382         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1383                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1384         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1385         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1386                 channel_id: chan.2,
1387                 htlc_id: 0,
1388                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1389                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1390                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1391                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1392         };
1393
1394         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1395
1396         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1397         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1398         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1399
1400         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1401
1402         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1403
1404         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1405         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1406         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1407                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1408                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1409                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1410                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1411                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1412                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1413
1414                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1415                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1416                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1417                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1418                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1419         };
1420         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1421                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1422                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1423                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1424                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1425                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1426                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1427                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1428                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1429         };
1430
1431         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1432         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1433                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1434
1435         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1436         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1437         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1438
1439         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1440                 offered: false,
1441                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1442                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1443                 payment_hash,
1444                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1445         };
1446
1447         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1448
1449         let res = {
1450                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1451                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1452                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1453                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1454                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1455                         commitment_number,
1456                         95000,
1457                         local_chan_balance,
1458                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1459                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1460                         feerate_per_kw,
1461                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1462                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1463                 );
1464                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1465         };
1466
1467         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1468                 channel_id: chan.2,
1469                 signature: res.0,
1470                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1471         };
1472
1473         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1474         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1475         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1476
1477         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1478         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1479                 channel_id: chan.2,
1480                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1481                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1482         };
1483         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1484
1485         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1486         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1487         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1488         match events[0] {
1489                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1490                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1491                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1492                 },
1493                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1494         };
1495         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1496                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1497
1498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1499 }
1500
1501 #[test]
1502 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1503         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1504         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1505         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1506         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1507         // this situation.
1508         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1511         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1512         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1513         let opt_anchors = false;
1514
1515         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1517
1518         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1519
1520         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1521
1522         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1523         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1524                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1525         }
1526
1527         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1528         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1529         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1530                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1531                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1532                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1533         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1534         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1535 }
1536
1537 #[test]
1538 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1539         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1540         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1544         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1545         let opt_anchors = false;
1546
1547         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1548         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1549         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1550         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1551         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1552         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1553         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1554
1555         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1556         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1557                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1558         }
1559
1560         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1561         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1562         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1564         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1565         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1566         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1567                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1568         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1569         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1570                 channel_id: chan.2,
1571                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1572                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1573                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1574                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1575                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1576         };
1577
1578         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1579         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1580         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1581         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1582         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1583         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1585         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1586 }
1587
1588 #[test]
1589 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1590         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1591         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1592         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1593         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1594
1595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1598         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1599         let opt_anchors = false;
1600
1601         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1602         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1603         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1604         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1605         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1606         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1608
1609         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1610                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1611         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1612         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1613         // commitment transaction fee.
1614         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1615
1616         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1617         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1618                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1619         }
1620
1621         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1622         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1623         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1624                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1625                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1626                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1627 }
1628
1629 #[test]
1630 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1631         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1632         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1633         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1634         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1635         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1636         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1637         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1638         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1639         let opt_anchors = false;
1640
1641         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1642         // HTLC.
1643         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1644         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1645         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1646                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1647
1648         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1649         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1650         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1651         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1652         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1653         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1654         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1655
1656         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1657         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1658         match msg_events[0] {
1659                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1660                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1661                 },
1662                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1663         }
1664 }
1665
1666 #[test]
1667 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1668         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1669         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1670         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1671         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1672         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1673         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1674         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1675
1676         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1677         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1678         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682
1683         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1684         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689
1690         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1691         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1692         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1693         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1694 }
1695
1696 #[test]
1697 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1698         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1699         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1700         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1701         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1702         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1703         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1704
1705         let feemsat = 239;
1706         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1707         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1708         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1709         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1710
1711         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1712         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1713         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1714         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715
1716         // Add a pending HTLC.
1717         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1718         let payment_event_1 = {
1719                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1720                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1721                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1722
1723                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1724                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1725                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1726         };
1727         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1728
1729         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1730         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1731         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1732         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1733         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1734
1735         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1736         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1737         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1738         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1739         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1740         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1741                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1742         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1743         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1744                 channel_id: chan.2,
1745                 htlc_id: 1,
1746                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1747                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1748                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1749                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1750         };
1751
1752         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1753         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1754         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1755         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1756         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1757         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1759         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1760 }
1761
1762 #[test]
1763 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1767         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1768         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1769         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1770         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1771         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1772         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1773         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1774
1775         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1776         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1777         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1778
1779         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1781 }
1782
1783 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1784         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1785 }
1786
1787 #[test]
1788 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1789         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1791         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1792         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1793         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1794         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1795         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1796         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1797         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1798         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1799
1800         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1802
1803         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1804         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1805
1806         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1807                 ($node: expr) => {{
1808                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1809                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1810                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1811                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1812                         payment_event
1813                 }}
1814         }
1815
1816         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1817         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1818         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1819         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1820
1821         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1822
1823         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1824         {
1825                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1826                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1827                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1828                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1829                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1830
1831                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1832                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1833                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1834                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1835                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1836                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1837         }
1838
1839         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1840         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1841         loop {
1842                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1843                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1844                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1845                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1846                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1847                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1848                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1849                         break;
1850                 }
1851
1852                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1853                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1854                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1855                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1856                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1857
1858                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1859                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1860                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1861                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1862                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1863                 );
1864
1865                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1866                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1867                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1868                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1869                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1870         }
1871
1872         // adding pending output.
1873         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1874         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1875         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1876         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1877         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1878         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1879         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1880         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1881         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1882         // policy.
1883         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1884         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1885         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1886
1887         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1888         let payment_event_1 = {
1889                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1890                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1891                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1892
1893                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1894                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1895                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1896         };
1897         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1898
1899         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1900         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1901         {
1902                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1903                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1904                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1905                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1906                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1907                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1908         }
1909
1910         // split the rest to test holding cell
1911         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1912         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1913         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1914         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1915         {
1916                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1917                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1918         }
1919
1920         // now see if they go through on both sides
1921         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1922         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1923         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1924                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1926         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1927         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1928
1929         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1930         {
1931                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1932                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1933                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1934                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1935                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1936                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1937                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1938         }
1939
1940         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1941         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1942         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1943                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1945         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1946         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1947
1948         // flush the pending htlc
1949         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1950         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1952
1953         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1954         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1956         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1957
1958         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1959         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1960         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1962
1963         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1964         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1966
1967         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1968
1969         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1970         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1971         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1972
1973         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1974         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1975
1976         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1977         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1979         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1980         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1982
1983         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1984         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1985         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1986         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1987
1988         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1989         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1990
1991         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1992         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1993         match events[0] {
1994                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1995                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1996                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1997                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1998                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1999                         match &purpose {
2000                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2001                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2002                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2003                                 },
2004                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2005                         }
2006                 },
2007                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2008         }
2009         match events[1] {
2010                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
2011                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2012                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2013                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2014                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2015                         match &purpose {
2016                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2017                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2018                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2019                                 },
2020                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2021                         }
2022                 },
2023                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2024         }
2025
2026         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2027         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2029
2030         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2031         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2032         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2033
2034         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2035         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2036         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2038         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2039
2040         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2041         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2042 }
2043
2044 #[test]
2045 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2046         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2047         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2048         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2049         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2050         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2051         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2052         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2053         // To test this we:
2054         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2055         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2056         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2057         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2058         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2059         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2060         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2061         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2062         //    claim,
2063         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2064         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2065         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2066         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2067         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2071         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2072         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2073
2074         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2075         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2076         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2077         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2078         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2079
2080         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2081         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2082         let send_1 = {
2083                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2084                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2085                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2086                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2087                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2088                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2089         };
2090
2091         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2092         // initial fulfill/CS.
2093         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2094         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2097
2098         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2099         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2100         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2101         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2104
2105         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2106         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2109         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2110
2111         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2112         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2115         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2116
2117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2120
2121         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124
2125         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2127         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2128
2129         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2130         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2131         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2132         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2133         // on-chain as necessary).
2134         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2135         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2137         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2138         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2139
2140         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2143
2144         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2145         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2146
2147         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2148         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2149         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2153
2154         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2155         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2156         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2157         let send_2 = {
2158                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2159                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2160                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2162                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2163                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2164         };
2165
2166         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2167         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2169         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2170
2171         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2172
2173         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2175         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2176
2177         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2179
2180         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2182         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2183         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2184
2185         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2188
2189         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2191
2192         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2193         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2194
2195         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2196         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2197 }
2198
2199 #[test]
2200 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2201         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2202         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2203         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2204         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2205         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2206         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2207
2208         // Create some initial channels
2209         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2210         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2211         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2212         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2213
2214         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2215         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2216         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2217         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2218         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2219         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2220
2221         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2222         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2223         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2224         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2225         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2226
2227         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2228         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2230         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2231         {
2232                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2233                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2234                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2235                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2236                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2237         }
2238         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2239         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2240         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2241         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2242         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2243
2244         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2245         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2246
2247         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2248         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2249         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2252         {
2253                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2258                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2259         }
2260         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2262         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2263         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2264         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2265
2266         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2267                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2268                         {
2269                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2270                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2271                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2272
2273                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2274                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2275                                 match events[0] {
2276                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2277                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2278                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2279                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2280                                         },
2281                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2282                                 };
2283                         }
2284                 }
2285         }
2286
2287         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2288         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2289         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2291         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2292         let node2_commitment_txid;
2293         {
2294                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2295                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2296                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2297                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2298
2299                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2300                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2303                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2304         }
2305         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2306         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2307         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2308         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2309         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2310
2311         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2312         // confusing us in the following tests.
2313         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2314
2315         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2316         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2317         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2318         // buffer space).
2319
2320         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2321                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2322                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2323                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2324                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2325                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2326                                 msg.clone()
2327                         },
2328                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2329                 };
2330                 match events[1] {
2331                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2332                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2333                         },
2334                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2335                 }
2336                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2337
2338                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2339                 {
2340                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2341                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2342                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2343                                         false
2344                                 } else { true }
2345                         });
2346                 }
2347
2348                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2349
2350                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2351                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2352
2353                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2354                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2355                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2356                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2357                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2358                                 msg.clone()
2359                         },
2360                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2361                 };
2362                 match events[1] {
2363                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2364                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2365                         },
2366                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2367                 }
2368                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2369                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2370
2371                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2372                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2373                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2374         };
2375         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2376         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2377         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379
2380         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2381                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2382         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2383         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2384 }
2385
2386 #[test]
2387 fn test_justice_tx() {
2388         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2389         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2390         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2391         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2392         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2393         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2394         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2395         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2396         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2397         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2398         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2399         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2400         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2401         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2402         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2403         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2404         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2405         // Create some new channels:
2406         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407
2408         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2409         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2410         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2411         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2412         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2413         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2417         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2419         // Revoke the old state
2420         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2421
2422         {
2423                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2424                 {
2425                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2426                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2427                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2428
2429                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2431                 }
2432                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2433                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2434                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2435
2436                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2438                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2439                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2441                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2443                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2444                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445         }
2446         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2447
2448         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2449         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450
2451         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2452         // Create some new channels:
2453         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2454         {
2455                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2456                 node_txn.clear();
2457         }
2458
2459         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2460         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2461         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2462         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2464         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2465         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2466         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2467         // Revoke the old state
2468         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2469         {
2470                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471                 {
2472                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2473                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2474                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2475
2476                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2477                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2478                 }
2479                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2480                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2481
2482                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2484                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2486                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2487                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2488                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2489         }
2490         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2491         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2492         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2493 }
2494
2495 #[test]
2496 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2497         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2498         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2502         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2503         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2504         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2505         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2507         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2509         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2510         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2511
2512         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2513         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2515         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2516         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2517         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2518
2519         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520
2521         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2522         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2525         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526 }
2527
2528 #[test]
2529 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2530         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2531         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2532         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2533         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2534         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2535         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2536
2537         // Create some new channel:
2538         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2539
2540         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2541         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2542         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2543         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2544         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2545
2546         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2547         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2548         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2549         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2550         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2551         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2552         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2553         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2554         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2555
2556         //Revoke the old state
2557         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2558
2559         {
2560                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2561                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2562                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2563                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2564                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2565                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2566                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2567                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2568
2569                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2570                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2571
2572                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2573                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574
2575                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2576                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2577                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2578                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2579                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2580                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2581                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2582                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2583
2584                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2585                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2586                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2587                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2588                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2589         }
2590         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2591         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2592         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2593 }
2594
2595 #[test]
2596 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2597         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2598         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2599         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2602         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2603
2604         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2605
2606         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2607         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2608         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2609         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2610         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2611         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2612
2613         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2614         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2615
2616         //Revoke the old state
2617         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2618
2619         {
2620                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2621                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2622                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2623                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2624                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2625                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2626                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2627                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2628                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2629                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2630                 }
2631
2632                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2633                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2634
2635                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2636                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2637
2638                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2639                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2640                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2641                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2642                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2643                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2644                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2645
2646                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2648                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2649                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2650
2651                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2652                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2653                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2654
2655                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2656                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2657                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2658                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2659                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2660                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2661                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2662                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2663
2664                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2665                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2666                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2667                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2668                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2669                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2670                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2671         }
2672         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2673         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2674         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2675 }
2676
2677 #[test]
2678 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2679         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2680         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2681         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2682         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2683         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2684         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2685         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2686         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2687         // towards B.
2688         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2689         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2690         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2691         // PaymentSent event).
2692
2693         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2694         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2695         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2696         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2697
2698         // Create some initial channels
2699         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2700         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2701
2702         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2703         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2704         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2705         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2706         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2707
2708         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2709         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2710         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2711
2712         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2713         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2714
2715         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2716         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2717         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2718         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2719         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2720         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2721         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2722         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2723         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2725         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2726         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2727         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2728         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2729         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2730
2731         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2732         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2733         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2734         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2735         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2736         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2737         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2738         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2739         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2740         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2741         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2742         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2743         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2744         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2745
2746         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2747         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2748         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2749         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2750         {
2751                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2752                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2753                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2754                 added_monitors.clear();
2755         }
2756         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2757         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2758         match forwarded_events[0] {
2759                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2760                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761         }
2762         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2763         match forwarded_events[1] {
2764                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2765                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2766                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2767                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2768                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2769                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2770                 },
2771                 _ => panic!()
2772         }
2773         match forwarded_events[2] {
2774                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2775                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2776                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2777                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2778                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2779                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2780                 },
2781                 _ => panic!()
2782         }
2783         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2784         {
2785                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2786                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2787                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2788                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2789                 added_monitors.clear();
2790         }
2791         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2792
2793         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2794         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2795
2796         match nodes_2_event {
2797                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2798                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2799         }
2800
2801         match nodes_0_event {
2802                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2803                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2804                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2805                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2806                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2807                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2808                 },
2809                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2810         };
2811
2812         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2813         match events[0] {
2814                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2816         }
2817
2818         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2819                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2820                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2821                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2822                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2823                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2824                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2825                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2826                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2827                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2828                         if $htlc_offered {
2829                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2830                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2831                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2832                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2833                         } else {
2834                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2835                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2836                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2837                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2838                         }
2839                         node_txn.clear();
2840                 } }
2841         }
2842         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2843         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2844
2845         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2846         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2847         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2848         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2849         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2850         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2852         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2853         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2854         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2855         let commitment_spend =
2856                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2857                         &node_txn[0]
2858                 } else {
2859                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2860                         // FullBlockViaListen
2861                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2862                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2863                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2864                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2865                                 &node_txn[0]
2866                         } else {
2867                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2868                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2869                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2870                                 &node_txn[2]
2871                         }
2872                 };
2873
2874         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2875         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2876         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2877         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2878         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2879         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2880         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2881         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2882
2883         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2884         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2885         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2886         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2887         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2889         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2890         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2891         let mut first_claimed = false;
2892         for event in events {
2893                 match event {
2894                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2895                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2896                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2897                                         first_claimed = true;
2898                                 } else {
2899                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2900                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2901                                 }
2902                         },
2903                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2904                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2905                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2906                 }
2907         }
2908         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2909 }
2910
2911 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2912         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2913         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2914         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2915         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2916         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2917         //            \                                  \
2918         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2919
2920         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2921         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2922         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2923         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2924         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2925         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2926         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2927
2928         // Create some intial channels
2929         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2930         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2931
2932         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2933         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2934         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2935
2936         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2937
2938         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2939         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2940         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2941         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2945
2946         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2959         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2961         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2962         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2963         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2964
2965         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2966         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2967         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2968         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2969         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2970         let timeout_tx;
2971         {
2972                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2973                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2974
2975                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2976                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2977
2978                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2979                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2980                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2981                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2982
2983                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2984                 node_txn.clear();
2985         }
2986
2987         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2989         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2990
2991         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2992
2993         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2995         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2996         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2997         match events[0] {
2998                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2999                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3000                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3001                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3002                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3003                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3004                 },
3005                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3006         };
3007
3008         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3009         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3010         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3011
3012         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3013         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3014
3015         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3017         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3018         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3019         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3020         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3021         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3022 }
3023
3024 #[test]
3025 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3026         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3027         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3028         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3029 }
3030
3031 #[test]
3032 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3033         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3034         // and fail backward accordingly.
3035
3036         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3037         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3038         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3039         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3040
3041         // Create some initial channels
3042         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3043         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3044
3045         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3046         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3047         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3048         // Revoke the old state
3049         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3050
3051         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3052
3053         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3054         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3055         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3057         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3058
3059         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3061         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3062         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3063         match events[0] {
3064                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3065                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3066                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3067                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3068                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3069                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3070
3071                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3072                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3073                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3074                 },
3075                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3076         }
3077 }
3078
3079 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3080         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3081         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3082         // commitment transaction anymore.
3083         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3084         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3085         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3086         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3087         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3088         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3089         // transactions:
3090         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3091         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3092         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3093         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3094         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3098         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3099
3100         // Create some initial channels
3101         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3102         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3103
3104         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3105         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3106         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3107         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3108         // Revoke the old state
3109         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3110
3111         let value = if use_dust {
3112                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3113                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3114                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3115                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3116         } else { 3000000 };
3117
3118         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3119         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3120         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3121
3122         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3125         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3126         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3127         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3128         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3129         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3130         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3131         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3132         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3133         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3134
3135         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3136         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3139         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3140         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3141         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3142         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3143         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3145         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3147         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3148         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3149         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3151
3152         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3153         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3155         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3156         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3157         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3158         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3159         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3160         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3161         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3162         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3163         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3164         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3166         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3167         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3168         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3170
3171         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3172         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3173         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3174         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3175                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3176         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3177         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3179
3180         if deliver_bs_raa {
3181                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3182                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3183                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3184                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3185                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3186                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3187                 match events[0] {
3188                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3189                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3190                 };
3191                 match events[1] {
3192                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3193                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3194                 }
3195                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3196                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3197         }
3198
3199         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3200         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3201
3202         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3204         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3205
3206         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3207         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3208         match events[0] {
3209                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3210                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3211         }
3212         match events[1] {
3213                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3214                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3215                 },
3216                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3217         }
3218         match events[2] {
3219                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3220                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3221                 },
3222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223         }
3224
3225         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3227
3228         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3229         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3230
3231         if deliver_bs_raa {
3232                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3233                 match nodes_2_event {
3234                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3235                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3236                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3237                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3238                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3239                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3240                         },
3241                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242                 }
3243         }
3244
3245         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3246         match nodes_2_event {
3247                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3248                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3249                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3250                 },
3251                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3252         }
3253
3254         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3255         match nodes_0_event {
3256                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3257                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3258                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3259                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3260                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3261                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3262
3263                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3264                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3265                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3266
3267                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3268
3269                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3270                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3271                         match events[0] {
3272                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3273                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3274                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3275                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3276                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3277                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3278                                         }
3279                                 },
3280                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3281                         }
3282                         match events[1] {
3283                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3284                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3285                                 },
3286                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3287                         }
3288                         match events[2] {
3289                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3290                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3291                                 },
3292                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3293                         }
3294                         match events[3] {
3295                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3296                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3297                                 },
3298                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299                         }
3300                         match events[4] {
3301                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3302                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3303                                 },
3304                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305                         }
3306                         match events[5] {
3307                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3308                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3309                                 },
3310                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3311                         }
3312                 },
3313                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3314         }
3315
3316         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3317         match events[0] {
3318                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3320         }
3321
3322         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3323         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3324         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3325 }
3326
3327 #[test]
3328 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3329         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3330         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3331         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3332         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3333 }
3334
3335 #[test]
3336 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3337         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3338         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3339         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3340         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3341 }
3342
3343 #[test]
3344 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3348         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3349         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3350
3351         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3352         {
3353                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3354                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3355                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3356                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3357
3358                 let payment_event = {
3359                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3360                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3361                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3362                 };
3363                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3364                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3365         }
3366
3367         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3368         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3369         {
3370                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3371                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3372                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3373
3374                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3375         }
3376
3377         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3378         {
3379                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3380
3381                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3382                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3383                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3384                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3385                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3386                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3387                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3388
3389                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3390                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3391                         channel_id: chan.2,
3392                         htlc_id: 0,
3393                         amount_msat: 0,
3394                         payment_hash,
3395                         cltv_expiry,
3396                         onion_routing_packet,
3397                 };
3398                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3399         }
3400         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3401         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3402         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3403         match events[0] {
3404                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3405                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3406                 },
3407                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3408         }
3409         match events[1] {
3410                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3411                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3412                 },
3413                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414         }
3415         match events[2] {
3416                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3417                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3418                 },
3419                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3420         }
3421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3423 }
3424
3425 #[test]
3426 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3427         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3428         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3429         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3433         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3434                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3435                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3436                 // connect_style.
3437                 return;
3438         }
3439         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3440
3441         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3442         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3443         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3444         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3446         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3447
3448         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3449         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3450         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3451
3452         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3453         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3454         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3456         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3457
3458         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3459         // registering new transactions
3460         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3461 }
3462
3463 #[test]
3464 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3465         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3469         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3470         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3471         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3472
3473         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3474
3475         let mut payment_event = {
3476                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3477                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3479
3480                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3481                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3482                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3483         };
3484
3485         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3486         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3487
3488         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3489
3490         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3491         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3492         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3493         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3494
3495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3496         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3497         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3499         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3500
3501         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3502         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3503         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3504
3505         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3506         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3508         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3509         let tx = {
3510                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3511                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3512                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3513                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3514                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3515                 node_txn.remove(0)
3516         };
3517
3518         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3519
3520         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3523         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3524
3525         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3526         {
3527                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3528                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3529         }
3530         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3531         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3532         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3533         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3534         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3535         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3536         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3537
3538         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3539 }
3540
3541 #[test]
3542 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3543         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3544         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3545         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3546         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3547
3548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3551         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3553
3554         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3555
3556         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3557         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3559         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3560         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3561         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3562
3563         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3564         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3565
3566         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3567         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3568 }
3569
3570 #[test]
3571 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3572         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3573         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3578
3579         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3580         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3581         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3582         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3583         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3584         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3585         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3586
3587         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3588         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3589
3590         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3591
3592         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3593         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3594
3595         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3596         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3597         // broadcasted.
3598         {
3599                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3600         }
3601
3602         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3603         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3604         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3606
3607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3608         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3609 }
3610
3611 #[test]
3612 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3613         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3614         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3615         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3616         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3617         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3618         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3619         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3620
3621         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3622         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3623         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3624
3625         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3626         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3627         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3628         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3629
3630         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3631         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3632         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3633
3634         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3635         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3636         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3637         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3638
3639         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3640         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3641
3642         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3643         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3644
3645         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3646         {
3647                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3648                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3649                 match events[0] {
3650                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3651                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3652                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3653                         },
3654                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3655                 }
3656                 match events[1] {
3657                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3658                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3659                 }
3660                 match events[2] {
3661                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3662                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3663                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3664                         },
3665                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3666                 }
3667                 match events[3] {
3668                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3669                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3670                         },
3671                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3672                 }
3673         }
3674
3675         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3676         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3677 }
3678
3679 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3680         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3681         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3682         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3683         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3684         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3685
3686         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3687         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3688                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3689                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3690                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3691                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3692                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3693                 chan_id
3694         } else {
3695                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3696         };
3697
3698         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3699
3700         let payment_event = {
3701                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3702                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3703                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3704
3705                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3706                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3707                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3708         };
3709         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3710
3711         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3712                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3713         } else {
3714                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3715                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3716                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3717                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3718                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3719
3720                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3721                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3722                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3723                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3724
3725                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3726                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3727                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3728                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3729                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3730
3731                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3732                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3733                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3734                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3735                                         }
3736                                 }
3737                         }
3738                 }
3739         }
3740
3741         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3742         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3743         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3744                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3745                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3746                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3747                         //
3748                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3749                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3750                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3751                         //
3752                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3753                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3754                 }
3755                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3756                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3757                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3758         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3759                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3760                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3761         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3762                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3763                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3764         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3765                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3766                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3767         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3768                 // Everything was delivered...
3769                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3770         }
3771
3772         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3773         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3774                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3775                 match events_1[0] {
3776                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3777                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778                 };
3779                 match events_1[1] {
3780                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3781                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3782                 };
3783         } else {
3784                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3785                 match events_1[0] {
3786                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3787                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3788                 };
3789         }
3790
3791         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3792         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3793         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3794
3795         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3796
3797         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3798         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3799         match events_2[0] {
3800                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3801                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3802                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3803                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3804                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3805                         match &purpose {
3806                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3807                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3808                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3809                                 },
3810                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3811                         }
3812                 },
3813                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3814         }
3815
3816         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3818         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3819
3820         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3821         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3822         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3823                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3824                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3825                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3826                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3827                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3828                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3829                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3830                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3831                 },
3832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3833         };
3834
3835         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3836                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3837
3838                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3839                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3840                 match events_4[0] {
3841                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3842                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3843                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3844                         },
3845                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3846                 }
3847
3848                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3849                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3850                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3851                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3852
3853                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3854                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3855                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3856                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3857
3858                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3859                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3860                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3861                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3862                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3863
3864                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3865                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3866                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3867                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3868                                         }
3869                                 }
3870                         }
3871                 }
3872         }
3873
3874         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3875         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3876         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3877                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3878                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3879                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3880                 } else {
3881                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3882                 }
3883         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3884                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3885                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3886         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3887                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3888                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3889         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3890                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3891                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3892         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3893                 // Everything was delivered...
3894                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3895         }
3896
3897         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3898                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3899         }
3900         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3901                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3902                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3903         }
3904         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3905
3906         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3907                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3908         }
3909
3910         // Channel should still work fine...
3911         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3912         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3913         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3914 }
3915
3916 #[test]
3917 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3918         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3919         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3920         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3921         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3922 }
3923
3924 #[test]
3925 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3926         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3927         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3928         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3929         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3930 }
3931
3932 #[test]
3933 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3934         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3935         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3936         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3937         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3938         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3939         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3940         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3941         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3942         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3943
3944         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3945
3946         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3947         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3948         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3949         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3950         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3951         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3952
3953         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3954         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3955         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3956 }
3957
3958 #[test]
3959 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3960         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3961         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3962         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3963         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3965         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3966         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3967
3968         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3969
3970         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3971         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3972         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3973                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3974         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3975
3976         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3977         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3978         match events_1[0] {
3979                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3981         }
3982
3983         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3984         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3986
3987         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3988         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3989         match events_2[0] {
3990                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3991                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3992                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3993                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3994                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3995                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3996                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3997
3998                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3999                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4000                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4001                         match events_3[0] {
4002                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4003                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4004                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4005                                 },
4006                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4007                         }
4008
4009                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4010                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4012                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4013                 },
4014                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4015         }
4016
4017         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4018         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4019
4020         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
4021         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4022         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4023         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
4024         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4025         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4026
4027         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4028         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4029         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4030         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4031
4032         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4033         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4034
4035         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4036         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4037
4038         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4039
4040         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4041         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4042         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4043         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4044         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4045         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4046         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4047         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4048         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4050
4051         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4052         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4053         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4054         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4055         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4056         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4057         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4059
4060         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4061         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4062         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4063         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4064         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4065         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4068
4069         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4070         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4071         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4073
4074         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4075         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4076         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4078
4079         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4080         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4082
4083         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4084
4085         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4086         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4087         match events_5[0] {
4088                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4089                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4090                         match &purpose {
4091                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4092                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4093                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4094                                 },
4095                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4096                         }
4097                 },
4098                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4099         }
4100
4101         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4102         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4104
4105         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4106         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4107 }
4108
4109 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4110         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4111         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4115         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4116
4117         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4118
4119         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4120                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4121                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4122                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4123                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4124                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4125                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4126                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4127                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4128                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4129                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4131                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4133                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4134                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4135                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4136                 our_payment_hash
4137         } else {
4138                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4139         };
4140
4141         let mut block = Block {
4142                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4143                 txdata: vec![],
4144         };
4145         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4146         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4147         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4148         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4149                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4150                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4151                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4152         }
4153
4154         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4155
4156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4157         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4158         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4159         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4160         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4161         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4162
4163         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4164         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4165         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4166         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4167         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4168         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4169 }
4170
4171 #[test]
4172 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4173         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4174         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4175 }
4176
4177 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4178         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4179         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4180         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4181         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4182         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4183         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4184         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4185
4186         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4187         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4188         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4189         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4190
4191         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4192         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4193         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4194                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4195         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4197
4198         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4199         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4200         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4201         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4202                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4203         if forwarded_htlc {
4204                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4206                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4207                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4208                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4209         }
4210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4211
4212         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4213         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4214         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4215         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4216
4217         if forwarded_htlc {
4218                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4219                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4220                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4221                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4222                 match fail_commit[0] {
4223                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4224                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4225                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4226                         },
4227                         _ => unreachable!(),
4228                 }
4229                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4230         } else {
4231                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4232         }
4233 }
4234
4235 #[test]
4236 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4237         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4238         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4239 }
4240
4241 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4242         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4243                 {
4244                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4245                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4246                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4247                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4248                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4249                                 match event {
4250                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4251                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4252                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4253                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4254                                                 }
4255                                         },
4256                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4257                                 };
4258                         }
4259                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4260                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4261                                         txn.push(tx);
4262                                 }
4263                         }
4264                         txn
4265                 }
4266         }
4267 }
4268
4269 #[test]
4270 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4271         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4276
4277         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4278         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4279         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4281         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4282         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4283         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4284         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4285         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4286
4287         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4288         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4289
4290         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4291         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4292         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4293         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4294         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4295 }
4296
4297 #[test]
4298 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4299         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4300         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4301         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4302         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4303         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4304         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4305
4306         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4307         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4308         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4310         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4311
4312         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4313         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4314         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4315         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4316
4317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4318         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4320         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4321         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4322
4323         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4324         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4325         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4326 }
4327
4328 #[test]
4329 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4330         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4331         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4332
4333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4337
4338         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4339         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4340         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4342         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4343
4344         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4345         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4346         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4348         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4349
4350         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4351         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4352         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4353
4354         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4355         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4356         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4357         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4358         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4359 }
4360
4361 #[test]
4362 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4366         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4367
4368         // Create some initial channels
4369         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4370
4371         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4372
4373         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4374         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4375         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4376
4377         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4378         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4379         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4380         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4381         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4383         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4384         match events[0] {
4385                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4386                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4387         }
4388         match events[1] {
4389                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4390                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4391         }
4392
4393         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4394         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4395         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4396         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4397         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4398
4399         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4400         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4401         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4402
4403         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4404         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4405         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4406 }
4407
4408 #[test]
4409 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4413         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4414
4415         // Create some initial channels
4416         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4417
4418         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4419         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4420
4421         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4422
4423         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4424         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4425         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4426
4427         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4428         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4430         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4431         match events[0] {
4432                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4433                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4434         }
4435         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4436
4437         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4438         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4439         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4440         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4441         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4442
4443         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4444         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4445         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4446         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4447
4448         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4449         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4450         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4451         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4452         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4453 }
4454
4455 #[test]
4456 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4457         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4458         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4459         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4460         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4461
4462         // Create some initial channels
4463         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4464
4465         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4466         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4467         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4468         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4469
4470         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4471
4472         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4473         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4474         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4476
4477         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4478         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4479         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4480         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4481
4482         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4483         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4484
4485         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4486         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4487         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4488 }
4489
4490 #[test]
4491 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4492         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4493         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4497
4498         // Create some initial channels
4499         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4500
4501         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4502         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4503         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4505
4506         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4507
4508         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4509         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4510         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4512         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4513         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4514
4515         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4516         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4517         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4518         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4519         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4520         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4521
4522         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4523         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4524         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4525         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4526         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4527         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4528
4529         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4530         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4531         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4532         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4533         // transactions next...
4534         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4535         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4536
4537         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4538         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4539         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4540                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4541         } else {
4542                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4543                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4544         }
4545
4546         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4547         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4548
4549         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4550         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4551         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4552         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4553         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4554 }
4555
4556 #[test]
4557 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4558         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4559         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4562         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4563
4564         // Create some initial channels
4565         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4566
4567         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4568         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4569         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4570         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4571
4572         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4573         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4574
4575         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4576
4577         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4578         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4579         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4581         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4582         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4583
4584         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4585         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4586         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4587         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4588
4589         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4590         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4591         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4592
4593         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4594         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4595         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4596         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4598         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4599
4600         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4601         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4602
4603         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4604         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4605         // transactions next...
4606         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4607         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4608         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4609                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4610         } else {
4611                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4612                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4613         }
4614
4615         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4616         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4617
4618         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4619         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4620
4621         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4622         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4623
4624         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4625         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4626         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4627         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4628         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4629         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4630         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4631         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4632 }
4633
4634 #[test]
4635 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4636         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4637         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4638         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4639         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4640         // channel.
4641         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4642         // gets broadcast.
4643
4644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4647         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648
4649         // Create some initial channels
4650         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4651         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4652
4653         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4654         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4655         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4656         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4657         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4658
4659         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4661         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4662
4663         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4664         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4665         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4666         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4667         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4669         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4670         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4671         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4672         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4673         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4674
4675         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4676         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4678         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4679
4680         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4681         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4682         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4683         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4684         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4685         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4686
4687         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4688         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4689         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4691         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4692         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4693         match events[0] {
4694                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4695                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4696         }
4697         match events[1] {
4698                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4699                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4700                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4701                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4702                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4703                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4704                 },
4705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4706         }
4707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4709         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4710         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4711         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4712
4713         match nodes_2_event {
4714                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4715                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4716         }
4717
4718         match nodes_0_event {
4719                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4720                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4721                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4722                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4723                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4724                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4725                 },
4726                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4727         };
4728
4729         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4730         match msg_events[0] {
4731                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4733         }
4734
4735         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4736         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4737         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4738         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4739         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4740         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4741         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4742         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4743         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4744         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4745         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4746
4747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4749 }
4750
4751 #[test]
4752 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4753         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4754         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4755         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4756         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4759         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4760         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4761         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4762         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4763         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4764                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4765         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4766
4767         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4768         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4769         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4770
4771         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4772         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4773         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4774         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4775         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4776
4777         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4778
4779         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4780         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4781         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4782         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4783         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4784                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4785         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4786         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4787
4788         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4789         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4790         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4791
4792         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4793         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4795         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4796         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4797
4798         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4799         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4800                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4801                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4802                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4803
4804                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4805                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4806                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4807
4808                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4809                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4810                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4811                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4812                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4813
4814                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4815                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4816                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4817                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4818                 } else {
4819                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4820                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4821                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4822                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4823                 }
4824
4825                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4826                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4827                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4828                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4829                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4830                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4831                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4832                 } else {
4833                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4834                 }
4835         }
4836
4837         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4838         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4839
4840         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4842         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4843         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4844         match events[0] {
4845                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4846                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4847         }
4848         match events[1] {
4849                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4850                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4851         }
4852         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4853         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4854         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4855         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4856         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4857         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4858         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4859         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4860         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4861         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4862
4863         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4864         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4865         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4866         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4867         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4868         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4869         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4870         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4871         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4873
4874         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4875         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4876         {
4877                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4878         }
4879         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4880
4881         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4882         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4883         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4884         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4885         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4886         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4887         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4888         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4889         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4891
4892         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4893         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4894
4895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4896         match events[0] {
4897                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4898                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4899                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4900                 }
4901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4902         }
4903 }
4904
4905 #[test]
4906 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4907         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4908         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4910         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4911
4912         // Create some initial channels
4913         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4914
4915         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4916         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4917         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4918         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4919         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4920
4921         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4922         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4923         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4925
4926         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4928         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4929         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4930         match events[0] {
4931                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4933         }
4934         match events[1] {
4935                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4936                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4937         }
4938         let node_tx = {
4939                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4940                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4941                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4942                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4943                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4944                 node_txn[0].clone()
4945         };
4946
4947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4948         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4949
4950         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4951         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4952         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4953         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4954         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4955         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4956 }
4957
4958 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4959         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4960         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4961         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4962         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4963         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4964         // use the same payment hashes.
4965         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4966         //
4967         // A \         / E
4968         //    - C - D -
4969         // B /         \ F
4970         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4973         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4974         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4975         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4976         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4978                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4979         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4980
4981         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4982         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4983         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4984         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4985         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4986
4987         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4988         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4989         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4990         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4991
4992         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4993                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4994         // 0th HTLC:
4995         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4996         // 1st HTLC:
4997         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4998         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4999         // 2nd HTLC:
5000         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5001         // 3rd HTLC:
5002         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5003         // 4th HTLC:
5004         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5005         // 5th HTLC:
5006         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5007         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5008         // 6th HTLC:
5009         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5010         // 7th HTLC:
5011         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5012
5013         // 8th HTLC:
5014         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5015         // 9th HTLC:
5016         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5017         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5018
5019         // 10th HTLC:
5020         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5021         // 11th HTLC:
5022         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5023         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5024
5025         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5026         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5027         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5028         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5029         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5030
5031         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5032         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5033         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5034         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5035         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5036         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5038
5039         let failed_destinations = vec![
5040                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5041                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5042                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5043                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5044         ];
5045         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5047
5048         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5049         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5050         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5051         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5052         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5053         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5054
5055         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5056         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5057         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5059
5060         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5061                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5062                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5063         ];
5064         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5066
5067         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5068         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5069         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5070         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5071
5072         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5073
5074         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5075         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5076                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5077                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5078                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5079                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5080                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5081                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5082         ];
5083         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5085         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5086         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5087         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5088         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5089         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5090         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5091         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5092         if deliver_last_raa {
5093                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5094         } else {
5095                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5096         }
5097
5098         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5099         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5100         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5101         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5102         //
5103         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5104         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5105         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5106         //
5107         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5108         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5109         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5110
5111         if announce_latest {
5112                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5113         } else {
5114                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5115         }
5116         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5117         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5118                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5119                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5120         } else {
5121                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5122                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5123         };
5124         match close_event {
5125                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5127         }
5128
5129         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5130         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5131         if deliver_last_raa {
5132                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5133
5134                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5135                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5136         } else {
5137                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5138                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5139                 } else {
5140                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5141                 };
5142
5143                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5144         }
5145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5146
5147         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5148         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5149         let mut a_done = false;
5150         for msg in cs_msgs {
5151                 match msg {
5152                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5153                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5154                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5155                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5156                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5157                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5158                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5159                                         }
5160                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5161                                         assert!(!a_done);
5162                                         a_done = true;
5163                                         &nodes[0]
5164                                 } else {
5165                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5166                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5167                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5168                                         }
5169                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5170                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5171                                         &nodes[1]
5172                                 };
5173                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5174                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5175                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5176                                 if announce_latest {
5177                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5178                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5179                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5180                                         }
5181                                 }
5182                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5183                         },
5184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5185                 }
5186         }
5187
5188         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5189         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5190         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5191         let mut as_updates = 0;
5192         for event in as_events.iter() {
5193                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5194                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5195                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5196                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5197                         } else {
5198                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5199                         }
5200                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5201                                 as_updates += 1;
5202                         }
5203                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5204                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5205         }
5206         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5207         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5208         if announce_latest {
5209                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5210                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5211         }
5212         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5213
5214         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5215         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5216         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5217         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5218         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5219                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5220                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5221                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5222                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5223                         } else {
5224                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5225                         }
5226                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5227                                 bs_updates += 1;
5228                         }
5229                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5230                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5231         }
5232         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5233         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5234         if announce_latest {
5235                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5236         }
5237         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5238
5239         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5240         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5241         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5242         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5243         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5244         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5245 }
5246
5247 #[test]
5248 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5249         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5250 }
5251
5252 #[test]
5253 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5254         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5255 }
5256
5257 #[test]
5258 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5259         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5260         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5261         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5262 }
5263
5264 #[test]
5265 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5269         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5270
5271         // Create some initial channels
5272         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5273
5274         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5275         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5276         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5277         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5278
5279         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5280         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5281         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5283         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5284         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5285
5286         let htlc_timeout = {
5287                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5288                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5289                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5290                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5291                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5292                 node_txn[0].clone()
5293         };
5294
5295         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5296         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5297         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5298
5299         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5300         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5301         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5302         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5304         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5305         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5306         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5307         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5308         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5309                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5310 }
5311
5312 #[test]
5313 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5314         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5315         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5316         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5317         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5318
5319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5320
5321         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5322         let seed = [42; 32];
5323         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5324         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5325         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5326         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5327         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5328         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5329         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5330         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5331         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5332
5333         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5334         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5335
5336         // Create some initial channels
5337         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5338         // for node 0
5339         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5340         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5341         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5342
5343         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5344         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5345         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5346         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5347         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5348
5349         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5350         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5351         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5352         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5353         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5354
5355         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5356         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5357         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5358         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5359             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5360             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5361             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5362                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5363         }
5364
5365         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5366         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5367         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5370         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5371
5372         let htlc_timeout = {
5373                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5374                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5376                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5377                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5378                 node_txn[0].clone()
5379         };
5380
5381         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5382         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5383         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5384
5385         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5386         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5387         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5388         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5389         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5391         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5392         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5393         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5394         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5395         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5396                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5397 }
5398
5399 #[test]
5400 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5401         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5402         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5403         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5404         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5405
5406         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5407
5408         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5409         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5410
5411         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5412         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5414
5415         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5416         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5417         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5418
5419         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5420         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5421         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5422
5423         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5424         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5425         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5426 }
5427
5428 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5429         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5430         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5431         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5432         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5433         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5434
5435         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5436
5437         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5438         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5439         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5441         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5442
5443         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5444         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5445         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5446
5447         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5449         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5450         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5452
5453         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5454         let mut block = Block {
5455                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5456                 txdata: vec![],
5457         };
5458         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5459                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5460                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5461         }
5462         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5463         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5465         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5466 }
5467
5468 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5469         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5470         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5471         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5472         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5473         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5474
5475         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5476         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5477                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5479
5480         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5481
5482         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5483         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5484         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5485
5486         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5487         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5488
5489         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5490                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5491                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5492         }
5493         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5494         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5496         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5497 }
5498
5499 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5503         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5504         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5505
5506         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5507         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5508         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5509         // actually revoked.
5510         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5511         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5512         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5513         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5515
5516         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5517         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5518         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5520         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5521         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5523         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5524         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5525         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5526
5527         if check_revoke_no_close {
5528                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5529                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5530         }
5531
5532         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5533         let mut block = Block {
5534                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5535                 txdata: vec![],
5536         };
5537         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5538                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5539                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5540         }
5541         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5542                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5543                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5544                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5545                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5546         } else {
5547                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5548         }
5549 }
5550
5551 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5552 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5553 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5554 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5555 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5556 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5557 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5558 // non-dust HTLCs.
5559 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5560 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5561 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5562 #[test]
5563 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5564         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5565         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5566
5567         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5568         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5569 }
5570
5571 #[test]
5572 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5573         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5574         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5575         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5576         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5577 }
5578
5579 #[test]
5580 #[should_panic]
5581 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5585         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5586         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5587         for node in nodes.iter() {
5588                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5589         }
5590
5591         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5592         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5593         let push_msat=10001;
5594         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5595         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5596         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5597         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5598
5599         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5600         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5601         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5602 }
5603
5604 #[test]
5605 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5606         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5607         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5608         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5609         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5610
5611         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5612         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5613         let push_msat=10001;
5614         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5615
5616         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5617         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5618         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5619         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5620         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5621
5622         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5623         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5624         let push_msat=10001;
5625         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5626         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5627         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5628
5629         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5630         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5631         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5632
5633         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5634         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5635         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5636
5637         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5638         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5639         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5640
5641         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5642         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5643         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5644         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5645         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5646         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5647 }
5648
5649 #[test]
5650 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5651         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5654         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5655
5656         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5657         let push_msat=10001;
5658         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5659         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5660         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5661         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5662
5663         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5664         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5665         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5666                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5667                         msg.clone()
5668                 },
5669                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5670         };
5671         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5672 }
5673
5674 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5675 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5676 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5677 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5678 #[test]
5679 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5680         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5681         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5682         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5683         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5684         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5685
5686         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5687         // pending_update_fee.
5688         {
5689                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5690                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5691         }
5692         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5694
5695         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5696         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5697         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5698                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5699                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5700                 },
5701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5702         };
5703
5704         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5705
5706         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5707         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5708         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5709         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5710
5711         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5712         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5713         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5714
5715         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5716         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5717                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5718         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5719         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5720
5721         // Flush the pending fee update.
5722         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5723         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5725         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5726         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5727
5728         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5729         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5730         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5731         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5732         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5733         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5734         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5735                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5736         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5737
5738         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5739         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5740         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5741         match &events[0] {
5742                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5743                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5744                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5745                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5746                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5747                 },
5748                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5749         }
5750         match &events[1] {
5751                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5752                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5753                 },
5754                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5755         }
5756 }
5757
5758 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5759 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5760 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5761 #[test]
5762 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5768
5769         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5770         // pending_update_fee.
5771         {
5772                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5773                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5774         }
5775         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5777
5778         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5779         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5780         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5781                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5782                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5783                 },
5784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5785         };
5786
5787         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5788
5789         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5790         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5791         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5792         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5793
5794         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5795         let amt_1 = 20000;
5796         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5797         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5798         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5799
5800         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5801         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5802                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5803         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5804         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5805         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5806         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5807                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5808         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5809         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5810
5811         // Flush the pending fee update.
5812         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5813         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5815         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5816         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5818
5819         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5820         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5821         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5822         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5823         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5824         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5825         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5826                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5827         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5828
5829         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5830         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5831         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5832         match &events[0] {
5833                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5834                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5835                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5836                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5837                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5838                 },
5839                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5840         }
5841         match &events[1] {
5842                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5843                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5844                 },
5845                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5846         }
5847
5848         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5849         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5850                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5851                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5852                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5853         };
5854         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5855                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5856                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5857         };
5858         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5860         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5861         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5862         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5864         match events[0] {
5865                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5867         }
5868         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5869         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5870         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5871         match events[0] {
5872                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5873                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5874         }
5875         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5876         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5877         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5878
5879         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5880         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5881         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5882         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5883 }
5884
5885 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5886 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5887 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5888 // once it's freed.
5889 #[test]
5890 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5891         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5893         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5894         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5895         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5896         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5897         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5898         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5899         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5900         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5901
5902         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5903         // pending_update_fee.
5904         {
5905                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5906                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5907         }
5908         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5910
5911         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5914                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5916                 },
5917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5918         };
5919
5920         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5921
5922         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5923         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5924         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5925         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5926
5927         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5928         let feemsat = 239;
5929         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5930         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5931         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5932         let payment_event = {
5933                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5934                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5935                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5936
5937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5939
5940                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5941         };
5942         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5944         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5945         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5946
5947         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5948         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5949
5950         // Flush the pending fee update.
5951         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5952         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5954         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5955         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5957
5958         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5959         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5960         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5961
5962         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5963                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5964                         msg.clone()
5965                 },
5966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967         };
5968
5969         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5971         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5972
5973         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5974         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5975         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5976         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5977                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5978                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5979         }
5980
5981         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5982         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5984
5985         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5986         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5987         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5988         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5989                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5990                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5991                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5992                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5993                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5994                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5995                 },
5996                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5997         };
5998
5999         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6000         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6001         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6002
6003         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6004         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6006         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6007         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6008         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6009         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6010         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6011         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6012                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6014         };
6015         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6016         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6018 }
6019
6020 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6021 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6022 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6023
6024 #[test]
6025 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6026         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6030         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6031         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6032
6033         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6034         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6035
6036         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6037                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6038                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6039                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6040         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6041         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6042 }
6043
6044 #[test]
6045 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6046         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6050         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6051         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6052
6053         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6054         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6055         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6056                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6057                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6058                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6059
6060         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6061         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6062 }
6063
6064 #[test]
6065 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6066         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6067         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6068         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6069         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6070         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6071         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6072
6073         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6074         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6075                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6077         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6078         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6079
6080         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6081         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6082         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6084         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6085 }
6086
6087 #[test]
6088 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6089         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6090         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6094         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6095         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6096
6097         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6098                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6099         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6100         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6101         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6102                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6103                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6104                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6105 }
6106
6107 #[test]
6108 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6109         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6110         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6111         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6115         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6116         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6117         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6118                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6119
6120         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6121                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6122                 let payment_event = {
6123                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6124                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6125                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6126
6127                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6128                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6129                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6130                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6131                         } else {
6132                                 assert!(false);
6133                         }
6134                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6135                 };
6136                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6138                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6139
6140                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6141                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6142         }
6143         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6144         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6145                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6146                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6147                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6148
6149         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6150         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6151 }
6152
6153 #[test]
6154 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6155         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6159         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6160         let channel_value = 100000;
6161         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6162         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6163
6164         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6165
6166         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6167         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6168         // limits us to.
6169         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6170         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6171                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6172                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6173                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6174
6175         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6176         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6177
6178         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6179 }
6180
6181 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6182 #[test]
6183 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6184         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6188         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6189         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6190         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6191         {
6192                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6193                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6194                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6195                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6196         }
6197
6198         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6199         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6200                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6202         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6203         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6204         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6205         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6206         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6207         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6209         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6210 }
6211
6212 #[test]
6213 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6214         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6218         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6219         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6220
6221         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6222         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6223         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6224         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6225         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6226         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6227
6228         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6229         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6230         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6231                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6233         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6234
6235         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6236         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6237         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6238         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6239         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6240
6241         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6242         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6243         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6246 }
6247
6248 #[test]
6249 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6250         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6251         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6252         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6255         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6256         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6257
6258         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6259         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6260         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6261         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6262         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6263                 &route.paths[0], 3999999, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6264         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6265
6266         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6267                 channel_id: chan.2,
6268                 htlc_id: 0,
6269                 amount_msat: 1000,
6270                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6271                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6272                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6273         };
6274
6275         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6276                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6277                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6278         }
6279         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6280         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6281
6282         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6283         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6284         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6285         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6286         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6287 }
6288
6289 #[test]
6290 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6291         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6295         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6296         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6297
6298         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6299         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6300                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6302         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6304         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6305
6306         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6307         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6308         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6311 }
6312
6313 #[test]
6314 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6315         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6316         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6317         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6318         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6319         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6320
6321         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6322         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6323         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6324                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6326         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6327         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6328         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6329
6330         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6331         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6332         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6334         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6335 }
6336
6337 #[test]
6338 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6339         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6340         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6341         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6346
6347         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6348         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6349         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6350                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6354
6355         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6356         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6358         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6359         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6360         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6361         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6362         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6363         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6364         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6365         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6366         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6367         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6368
6369         //Resend HTLC
6370         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6371         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6372         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6374         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6375
6376         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6377
6378         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6379         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6380         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6381         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6382         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6383 }
6384
6385 #[test]
6386 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6387         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6388
6389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6392         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6394         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6395         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6396                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6397
6398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6399         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6400         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6401
6402         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6403                 channel_id: chan.2,
6404                 htlc_id: 0,
6405                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6406         };
6407
6408         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6409
6410         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6411         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6412         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6413         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6414         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6415 }
6416
6417 #[test]
6418 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6419         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6420
6421         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6422         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6423         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6424         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6425         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6426
6427         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6428         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6429                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6431         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6432         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6433
6434         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6435                 channel_id: chan.2,
6436                 htlc_id: 0,
6437                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6438         };
6439
6440         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6441
6442         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6443         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6444         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6446         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6447 }
6448
6449 #[test]
6450 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6451         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6452
6453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6456         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6457         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6458
6459         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6460         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6461                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6465         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6466                 channel_id: chan.2,
6467                 htlc_id: 0,
6468                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6469                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6470         };
6471
6472         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6473
6474         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6475         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6476         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6478         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6479 }
6480
6481 #[test]
6482 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6483         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6484
6485         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6489         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6490
6491         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6492
6493         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6494         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6495         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6496
6497         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6498         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6499         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6500                 match events[0] {
6501                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6502                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6503                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6504                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6505                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6506                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6507                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6508                         },
6509                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6510                 }
6511         };
6512
6513         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6514
6515         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6516
6517         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6519         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6522 }
6523
6524 #[test]
6525 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6526         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6527
6528         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6531         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6532         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6533
6534         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6535
6536         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6538         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6539
6540         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6541         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6542         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6543                 match events[0] {
6544                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6545                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6546                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6547                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6548                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6549                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6550                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6551                         },
6552                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6553                 }
6554         };
6555
6556         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6557
6558         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6559
6560         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6561         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6562         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6564         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6565 }
6566
6567 #[test]
6568 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6569         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6570
6571         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6574         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6575         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6576
6577         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6578         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6579                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6580         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6581
6582         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6583         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6584
6585         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6587         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6588
6589         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6590
6591         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6592                 match events[0] {
6593                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6594                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6595                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6596                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6597                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6598                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6599                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6600                         },
6601                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6602                 }
6603         };
6604         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6605         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6606
6607         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6608         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6609         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6611         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6612 }
6613
6614 #[test]
6615 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6616         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6617         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6618
6619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6622         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6623         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6624         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6625
6626         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6627
6628         //First hop
6629         let mut payment_event = {
6630                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6631                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6632                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6633                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6634                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6635                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6636         };
6637         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6639         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6640         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6641         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6642         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6644         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6645         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6646
6647         //Second Hop
6648         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6649         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6651         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6652
6653         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6654         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6655         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6656                 match events_3[0] {
6657                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6658                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6659                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6660                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6661                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6662                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6663                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6664                         },
6665                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6666                 }
6667         };
6668
6669         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6670
6671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6672         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6673         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6674         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6675         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6676
6677         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6678         match events_4[0] {
6679                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6680                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6681                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6682                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6683                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6684                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6685                 },
6686                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6687         };
6688
6689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6690 }
6691
6692 #[test]
6693 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6694         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6695         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6697         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6698         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6699         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6700
6701         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6702
6703         // First hop
6704         let mut payment_event = {
6705                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6706                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6708                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6709         };
6710
6711         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6712         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6713         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6714         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6715         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6716         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6717
6718         // Second Hop
6719         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6720         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6722         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6723
6724         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6725         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6726         match events_3[0] {
6727                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6728                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6729                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6730                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6731
6732                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6733                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6734                 },
6735                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6736         }
6737
6738         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6739                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6740                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6741         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6742         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6744
6745         match events_4[0] {
6746                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6747                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6748                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6749                 },
6750                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6751         }
6752
6753         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6754         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6755
6756         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6757         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6758         match events_5[0] {
6759                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6760                 } => {
6761                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6762                         assert!(is_permanent);
6763                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6764                 },
6765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6766         }
6767         match events_5[1] {
6768                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6769                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6770                 },
6771                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6772         }
6773
6774         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6775 }
6776
6777 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6778         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6779         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6780         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6781
6782         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6783         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6787         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6788
6789         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6790                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6791
6792         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6793         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6794         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6795         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6796
6797         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6798         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6799
6800         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6801         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6803         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6805
6806         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6807         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6808         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6810
6811         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6812         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6813
6814         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6815         match events[0] {
6816                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6817                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6818                 },
6819                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6820         }
6821         match events[1] {
6822                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6823                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6824                 },
6825                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826         }
6827
6828         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6829         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6830         if announce_latest {
6831                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6832         } else {
6833                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6834         }
6835
6836         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6838         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6839
6840         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6841         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6842         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6843         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6844         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6845         let mut first_failed = false;
6846         for event in events {
6847                 match event {
6848                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6849                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6850                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6851                                         first_failed = true;
6852                                 } else {
6853                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6854                                 }
6855                         },
6856                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6857                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6858                 }
6859         }
6860 }
6861
6862 #[test]
6863 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6864         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6865         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6866 }
6867
6868 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6869         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6870         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6871         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6872         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6873         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6874         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6875
6876         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6879         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6880         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6881
6882         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6883                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6884
6885         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6886         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6887
6888         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6889         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6890
6891         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6892         if revoked {
6893                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6894                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6895         }
6896
6897         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6898         if local {
6899                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6900                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6901                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6902                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6903                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6904
6905                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6906                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6907                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6908                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6909                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6910                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6911                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6912                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6913                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6914                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6915                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6916         } else {
6917                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6918                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6919                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6920                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6921                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6922                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6923
6924                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6925                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6926                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6927                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6928                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6929                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6930                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6931
6932                 if !revoked {
6933                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6934                 } else {
6935                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6936                 }
6937                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6938                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6939                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6940                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6941                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6942         }
6943 }
6944
6945 #[test]
6946 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6947         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6948         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6949         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6950 }
6951
6952 #[test]
6953 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6954         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6955
6956         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6957         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6958         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6959         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6960         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6961         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6962         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6964         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6965
6966         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6967         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6968                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6969                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6970         {
6971                 match error {
6972                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6973                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6974                 }
6975         } else { assert!(false) }
6976
6977         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6978         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6979         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6980         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6981         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6982                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6983                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6984         {
6985                 match error {
6986                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6987                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6988                 }
6989         } else { assert!(false); }
6990
6991         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6992         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6993         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6994         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6995         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6996         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6997         let reason_msg;
6998         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6999                 match action {
7000                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7001                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7002                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7003                         },
7004                         _ => { panic!(); }
7005                 }
7006         } else { panic!(); }
7007         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7008
7009         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7010         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7011         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7012         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7013         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7014                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7015                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7016         {
7017                 match error {
7018                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7019                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7020                 }
7021         } else { assert!(false); }
7022 }
7023
7024 #[test]
7025 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7026         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7027         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7028         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7029
7030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7034
7035         // Create some initial channels
7036         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7037
7038         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7039         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7040         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7041         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7042         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7043         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7044         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7045                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7046         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7047
7048         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7049         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7050         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7051         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7052         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7053
7054         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7055         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7056         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7057         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7058
7059         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7060         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7061         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7062
7063         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7064         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7065         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7066                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7067                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7068                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7069                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7070                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7071                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7072                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7073                 },
7074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7075         };
7076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7077
7078         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7079         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7080
7081         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7082         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7083         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7084         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7085 }
7086
7087 #[test]
7088 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7089         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7090         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7091
7092         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7093         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7094         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7095         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7096
7097         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7098         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7099         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7100
7101         // Disconnect peers
7102         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7103         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7104
7105         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7106         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7107         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7108         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7109         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7110         for e in msg_events {
7111                 match e {
7112                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7113                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7114                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7115                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7116                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7117                                 }
7118                         },
7119                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7120                 }
7121         }
7122         // Reconnect peers
7123         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7124         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7125         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7126         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7127         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7128         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7129
7130         // Reestablish chan_1
7131         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7132         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7133         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7134         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7135         // Reestablish chan_2
7136         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7137         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7138         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7139         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7140         // Reestablish chan_3
7141         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7142         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7143         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7144         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7145
7146         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7147         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7148         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7149         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7150         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7151         for e in msg_events {
7152                 match e {
7153                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7154                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7155                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7156                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7157                                         // the old one.
7158                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7159                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7160                                 }
7161                         },
7162                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7163                 }
7164         }
7165         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7166         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7167 }
7168
7169 #[test]
7170 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7171         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7172         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7173
7174         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7175         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7177         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7178
7179         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7180
7181         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7182         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7183                 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7184         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7185         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7186
7187         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7188         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7189         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7190         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7191         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7192         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7193
7194         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7195         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7196                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7197                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7198                 }
7199         }
7200
7201         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7202         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7203
7204         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7205         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7206         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7207         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7209
7210         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7211         let penalty_1;
7212         let feerate_1;
7213         {
7214                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7215                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7216                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7217                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7218                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7219                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7220                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7221                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7222                 node_txn.clear();
7223         };
7224
7225         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7226         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7227         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7228         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7229         {
7230                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7231                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7232                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7233                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7234                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7235                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7236                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7237                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7238                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7239                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7240                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7241                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7242                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7243                         node_txn.clear();
7244                 }
7245         }
7246         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7247
7248         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7249         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7250         let penalty_3;
7251         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7252         {
7253                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7254                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7255                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7256                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7257                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7258                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7259                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7260                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7261                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7262                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7263                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7264                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7265                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7266                         node_txn.clear();
7267                 }
7268         }
7269         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7270
7271         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7272         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7273 }
7274
7275 #[test]
7276 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7277         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7278         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7279
7280         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7281         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7284         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7285
7286         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7287         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7288         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7289         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7290         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7291         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7292                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7293         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7294         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7295         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7296                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7297         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7298
7299         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7300         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7301         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7302
7303         // Revoke local commitment tx
7304         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7305
7306         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7307         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7308         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7313
7314         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7315         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7316
7317         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7318         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7319         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7320
7321         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7322         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7323         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7324         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7325
7326         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7327         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7328         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7329         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7330         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7331         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7332         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7333         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7334         match events.last().unwrap() {
7335                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7337         }
7338         let first;
7339         let feerate_1;
7340         let penalty_txn;
7341         {
7342                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7343                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7344                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7345
7346                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7347                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7348                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7349                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7350                 // future).
7351                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7352                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7353                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7354                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7355                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7356                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7357
7358                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7359                 // available, which we check here:
7360                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7361                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7362                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7363
7364                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7365                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7366
7367                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7368                 // output, checked above).
7369                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7370                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7371                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7372
7373                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7374                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7375                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7376                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7377                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7378                 node_txn.clear();
7379         }
7380
7381         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7382         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7383         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7384         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7385         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7386
7387         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7388         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7389         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7390         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7391         let node_txn = {
7392                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7393                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7394
7395                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7396                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7397                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7398                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7399                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7400                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7401                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7402                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7403                 node_txn.clear();
7404                 txn
7405         };
7406         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7407         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7408         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7409         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7410         {
7411                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7412                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7413                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7414                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7415                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7416                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7417                 // up bumped justice generation.
7418                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7419                 node_txn.clear();
7420         }
7421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7423 }
7424
7425 #[test]
7426 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7427         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7428         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7429
7430         // Create 2 HTLCs
7431         // Provide preimage for one
7432         // Check aggregation
7433
7434         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7435         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7436         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7437         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7438
7439         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7440         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7441         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7442
7443         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7444         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7445         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7446         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7447         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7448
7449         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7450         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7451         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7452         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7454         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7455
7456         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7457         let timeout;
7458         let preimage;
7459         let preimage_bump;
7460         let feerate_timeout;
7461         let feerate_preimage;
7462         {
7463                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7464                 // 3 transactions including:
7465                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7466                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7467                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7468                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7469                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7470                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7471                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7472                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7473
7474                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7475                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7476                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7477                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7478
7479                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7480                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7481                 } else {
7482                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7483                 };
7484
7485                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7486                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7487                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7488
7489                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7490                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7491                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7492                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7493
7494                 node_txn.clear();
7495         };
7496         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7497         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7498
7499         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7500         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7501         {
7502                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7503                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7504                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7505                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7506                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7507                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7508
7509                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7510                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7511                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7512                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7513                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7514
7515                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7516                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7517                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7518                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7519                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7520
7521                 node_txn.clear();
7522         }
7523
7524         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7525         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7526 }
7527
7528 #[test]
7529 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7530         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7531         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7532         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7533         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7534         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7535         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7536         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7537         // implement that).
7538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7541         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7542         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7543
7544         let per_commitment_secret;
7545         let next_per_commitment_point;
7546         {
7547                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7548                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7549                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7550
7551                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7552
7553                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7554                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7555                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7556
7557                 // Must revoke without gaps
7558                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7559                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7560
7561                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7562                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7563                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7564         }
7565
7566         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7567                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7568         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7570         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7571 }
7572
7573 #[test]
7574 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7575         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7576         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7577
7578         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7581         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7582
7583         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7584         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7585         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7586         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7587
7588         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7589         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7590         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7591
7592         // Revoke local commitment tx
7593         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7594
7595         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7596         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7597         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7598         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7599
7600         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7601         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7602         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7603         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7604         let penalty_txn = {
7605                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7606                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7607                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7608                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7609                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7610                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7611                 node_txn.clear();
7612                 penalty_txn
7613         };
7614         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7615         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7616         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7617         {
7618                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7619                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7620                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7621         }
7622 }
7623
7624 #[test]
7625 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7626         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7627         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7628         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7631         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7632         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7633
7634         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7635         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7636         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7638         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7639
7640         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7641         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7642         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7643         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7644         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7645
7646         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7647         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7648         // can get our balance.
7649
7650         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7651         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7652         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7653         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7654         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7655         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7656         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7657         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
7658                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7659
7660         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7661 }
7662
7663 #[test]
7664 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7665         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7666         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7667         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7668         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7669         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7670         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7671
7672         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7673
7674         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7675         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7676         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7677         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7678         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7679
7680         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7681         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7683         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7684
7685         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7686         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7687         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7688         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7689         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7690         match close_ev[0] {
7691                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7692                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7693                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7694                 },
7695                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7696         }
7697 }
7698
7699 #[test]
7700 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7701         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7702         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7703         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7704         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705
7706         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7707         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7708         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7709
7710         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7711
7712         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7713         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7714         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7715         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7716 }
7717
7718 #[test]
7719 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7720         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7721         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7726
7727         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7728         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7729         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7730
7731         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7732         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7733         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7734 }
7735
7736 #[test]
7737 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7738         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7739         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7740         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7741         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7742         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7743
7744         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7745         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7746         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7747         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7748         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7749         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7750         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7751         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7752         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7753         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7754         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7755         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7756
7757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7760         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7761
7762         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7763         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7764         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7765         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7766         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7767
7768         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7769         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7770
7771         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7772         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7773         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7774         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7775         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7776         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7777
7778         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7779         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7780         // `channel_value`.
7781         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7782         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7783         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7784         // `channel_value`.
7785         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7786 }
7787
7788 #[test]
7789 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7790         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7791         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7792         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7793         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7794         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7795         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7796
7797         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7798         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7799
7800         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7801
7802         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7803         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7804         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7805
7806         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7807         match events[0] {
7808                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7809                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7810                 }
7811                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7812         }
7813
7814         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7815         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7816
7817         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7818                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7819                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7820                 }
7821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7822         }
7823
7824         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7825
7826         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7827         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7828
7829         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7830         match events[0] {
7831                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7832                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7833                 }
7834                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7835         }
7836 }
7837
7838 #[test]
7839 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7840         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7841         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7843         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7844         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7845         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7846
7847         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7848         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7849
7850         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7851
7852         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7853         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7854         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7855
7856         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7857         match events[0] {
7858                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7859                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7860                 }
7861                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7862         }
7863
7864         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7865         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7866
7867         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7868                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7869                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7870                 }
7871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7872         }
7873         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7874 }
7875
7876 #[test]
7877 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7878         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7879         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7880         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7881         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7882         // and the channel should be closed.
7883         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7884         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7885         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7888         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7889
7890         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7891         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7892         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7893
7894         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7895
7896         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7897         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7898
7899         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7900         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7901
7902         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7903         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7904         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7905         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7906         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7907         let accept_chan_msg = {
7908                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7909                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7910                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7911                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7912         };
7913         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7914
7915         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7916
7917         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7918         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7919
7920         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7921         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7922
7923         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7924         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7925
7926         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7927         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7928                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7929                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7930                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7931                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7932                 }
7933                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7934         }
7935
7936         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7937 }
7938
7939 #[test]
7940 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7941         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7942         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7943         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7944         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7945         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7946         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7947
7948         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7949         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7950
7951         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7952
7953         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7954         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7955         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7956
7957         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7958         match events[0] {
7959                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7960                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7961                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7962                         match api_res {
7963                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7964                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7965                                 },
7966                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7967                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7968                         }
7969                 }
7970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7971         }
7972
7973         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7974         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7975         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7976
7977         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7978                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7979                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7980                 }
7981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7982         }
7983 }
7984
7985 #[test]
7986 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7987         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7988         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7989         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7990         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7991
7992         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7993         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7994         match api_res {
7995                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7996                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7997                 },
7998                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7999                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8000         }
8001 }
8002
8003 #[test]
8004 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8005         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8006         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8007         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8008         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8009         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8010         let node_count = 4;
8011         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8012         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8014         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8015
8016         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8017         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8018         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8019         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8020
8021         let total_msat = 100_000;
8022         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8023         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8024         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8025
8026         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8027         path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8028         path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8029         path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8030         path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8031         path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8032         route.paths.push(path_1);
8033
8034         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8035         path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8036         path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8037         path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8038         path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8039         path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8040         route.paths.push(path_2);
8041
8042         // Send payment
8043         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8044         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8045                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8046         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8047                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8048         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8049
8050         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8051         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8052
8053         // First path
8054         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8055         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8056         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8057
8058         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8059                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8060
8061                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8062                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8063                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8064                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8065                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8066                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8067                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8068                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8069                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8070                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8071                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
8072                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8073                 }
8074
8075                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8076                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8077                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8078                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8079
8080                 if idx == 0 {
8081                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8082                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8083                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8084                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8085                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8086                 } else {
8087                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8088                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8089                 }
8090
8091                 prev_node = node;
8092         }
8093
8094         // Second path
8095         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8096         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8097
8098         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8099 }
8100
8101 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8102
8103         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8104         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8105
8106         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8107         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8109         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8110
8111         let src_idx = 0;
8112         let dst_idx = 1;
8113
8114         // Create channels for each amount
8115         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8116         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8117         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8118         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8119                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8120                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8121                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8122                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8123                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8124                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8125                 expected_paths.push(path);
8126         }
8127         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8128
8129         // Create a route for each amount
8130         let example_amount = 100000;
8131         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8132         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8133         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8134                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8135                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8136                 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8137                 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8138                 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8139                 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8140                 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8141                 route.paths.push(path);
8142         }
8143
8144         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8145         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8146         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8147                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8148         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8149                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8151
8152         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8153         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8154         let mut amount_received = 0;
8155         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8156                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8157
8158                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8159                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8160                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8161                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8162         }
8163
8164         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8165 }
8166
8167 #[test]
8168 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8169         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8170         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8171 }
8172
8173 #[test]
8174 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8175         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8179         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180
8181         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8182         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8183         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8184         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8185
8186         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8187         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8188         route.paths.push(path);
8189         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8190         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8191         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8192         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8193         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8194         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8195         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8196         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8197 }
8198
8199 #[test]
8200 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8201         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8205         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8206
8207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8208
8209         {
8210                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8211                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8212                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8213                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8215                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8216                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8217                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8218                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8219         }
8220         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8221         // values from previous calls.
8222         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8223         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8224         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8225         match events[0] {
8226                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8227                         match &purpose {
8228                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8229                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8230                                 },
8231                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8232                         }
8233                 },
8234                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8235         }
8236 }
8237
8238 #[test]
8239 #[allow(deprecated)]
8240 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8241         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8242         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8243         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8246         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8247
8248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8249
8250         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8251
8252         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8253         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8254         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8255                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8256         } else { panic!(); }
8257         let mut block = {
8258                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8259                 Block {
8260                         header: BlockHeader {
8261                                 version: 0x2000000,
8262                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8263                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8264                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8265                         txdata: vec![],
8266                 }
8267         };
8268         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8269         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8270                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8271         } else { panic!(); }
8272
8273         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8274         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8275         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8276         block.header.time += 1;
8277         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8278         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8279         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8280
8281         {
8282                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8283                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8284                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8286                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8287                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8288                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8289                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8290         }
8291         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8292         // values from previous calls.
8293         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8294         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8295         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8296         match events[0] {
8297                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8298                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8299                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8300                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8301                 },
8302                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8303         }
8304 }
8305
8306 #[test]
8307 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8308         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8309         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8310         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8311         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8312         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8313
8314         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8315
8316         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8317         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8318         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8319         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8320
8321         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8322         // resulting events.
8323         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8324                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8325                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8326                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8327                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8328                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8329                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8330
8331                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8332                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8333                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8334                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8335                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8336
8337                         // We should fail the payment back
8338                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8339                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8340                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8341                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8342                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8343                                 },
8344                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8345                         }
8346                 }
8347         }
8348
8349         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8350         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8351         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8352
8353         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8354         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8355                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8356         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8357         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8358
8359         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8360         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8361                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8362         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8363         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8364
8365         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8366         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8367                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8368         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8369         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8370 }
8371
8372 #[test]
8373 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8374         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8375         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8376         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8377         // error.
8378         //
8379         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8380         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8381         // commitment at same time.
8382
8383         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8386         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8387
8388         // Create some initial channel
8389         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8390         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8391
8392         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8393         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8394
8395         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8396         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8397
8398         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8399         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8400         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8401         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8402         let watchtower = {
8403                 let new_monitor = {
8404                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8405                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8406                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8407                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8408                         new_monitor
8409                 };
8410                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8411                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8412                 watchtower
8413         };
8414         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8415         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8416         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8417         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8418         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8419         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8420
8421         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8422         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8424         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8425
8426         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8427         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8428         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8429         {
8430                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8431                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8432                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8433                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8434                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8435                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8436                 } else { assert!(false); }
8437         }
8438         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8440         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8441         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8442 }
8443
8444 #[test]
8445 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8446         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8447         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8448         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8449         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8450
8451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8455
8456         // Create some initial channel
8457         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8458         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8459
8460         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8461         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8462
8463         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8464         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8465
8466         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8467         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8468         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8469         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8470         let watchtower_alice = {
8471                 let new_monitor = {
8472                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8473                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8474                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8475                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8476                         new_monitor
8477                 };
8478                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8479                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8480                 watchtower
8481         };
8482         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8483         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8484         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8485         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8486         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8487         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8488
8489         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8490         {
8491                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8492                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8493                 txn.clear();
8494         }
8495
8496         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8497         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8498         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8499         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8500         let watchtower_bob = {
8501                 let new_monitor = {
8502                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8503                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8504                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8505                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8506                         new_monitor
8507                 };
8508                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8509                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8510                 watchtower
8511         };
8512         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8513         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8514
8515         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8516         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8517         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8518                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8520
8521         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8522         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8523         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8524         {
8525                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8526                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8527                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8528                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8529                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8530                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8531                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8532                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8533                 } else { assert!(false); }
8534         }
8535         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8537
8538         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8539         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8540         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8541
8542         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8543         let bob_state_y;
8544         {
8545                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8546                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8547                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8548                 txn.clear();
8549         };
8550
8551         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8552         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8553         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8554         {
8555                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8556                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8557                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8558         }
8559 }
8560
8561 #[test]
8562 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8563         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8564         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8565         // message).
8566         //
8567         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8568         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8569         //
8570         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8571         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8572         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8573         // before receiving funding_signed.
8574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8578
8579         // Create an initial channel
8580         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8581         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8582         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8583         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8584         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8585
8586         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8587         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8588
8589         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8591
8592         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8593         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8594         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8595         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8596         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8597 }
8598
8599 #[test]
8600 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8601         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8602         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8603         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8604         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8605         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8606         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8607
8608         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8609         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8610         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8611         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8612
8613         // Create some initial channels
8614         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8615
8616         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8617         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8618         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8619         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8620         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8621         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8622
8623         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8624         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8625         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8626         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8627         // this test before #653 fix.
8628         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8629         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8631         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8632         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8633
8634         let htlc_timeout = {
8635                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8636                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8637                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8638                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8639                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8640                 node_txn[0].clone()
8641         };
8642
8643         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8644         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8645         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8646         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8647 }
8648
8649 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8650         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8651         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8652         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8653         //
8654         // Steps of the test:
8655         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8656         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8657         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8658         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8659         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8660         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8661         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8662         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8666         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8667
8668         // Create some initial channels
8669         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8670         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8671
8672         // Steps (1) and (2):
8673         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8674         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8675
8676         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8677         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8678         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8679         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8680         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8681         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8682         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8683
8684         // Steps (3) and (4):
8685         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8686         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8687         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8688         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8689
8690         // Bob force-closes
8691         if !broadcast_alice {
8692                 force_closing_node = 1;
8693                 counterparty_node = 0;
8694         }
8695         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8696         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8698         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8699         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8700                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8701                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8702                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8703                 };
8704                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8705                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8706                 if broadcast_alice {
8707                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8708                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8709                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8710                 }
8711         }
8712
8713         // Step (5):
8714         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8715         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8716         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8718         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8719
8720         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8721         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8722         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8723         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8724         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8725         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8726
8727         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8728         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8729         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8730         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8731                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8732                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8733                 match events[0] {
8734                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8735                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8736                         },
8737                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8738                 };
8739         }
8740         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8741         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8742         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8744
8745         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8746         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8747         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8748                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8749                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8750                         (*msg).clone()
8751                 },
8752                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8753         };
8754         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8755                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8756                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8757                         (*updates).clone()
8758                 },
8759                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8760         };
8761
8762         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8764         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8766
8767         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8768         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8769         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8770                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8771                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8772                         (*msg).clone()
8773                 },
8774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8775         };
8776         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8778
8779         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8780         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8781         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8782         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8783         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8784                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8785                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8786                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8787                 if broadcast_alice {
8788                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8789                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8790                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8791                 }
8792                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8793                 if broadcast_alice {
8794                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8795                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8796                 } else {
8797                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8798                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8799                 }
8800         }
8801
8802         // Step (6):
8803         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8804         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8805         {
8806                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8807                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8808                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8809                 };
8810                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8811                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8812                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8813                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8814                 if broadcast_alice {
8815                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8816                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8817                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8818                 } else {
8819                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8820                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8821                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8822                 }
8823         }
8824 }
8825
8826 #[test]
8827 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8828         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8829         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8830         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8831         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8832 }
8833
8834 #[test]
8835 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8836         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8837         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8838         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8839         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8840         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8841         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8842
8843         // Create an first channel channel
8844         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8845         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8846
8847         // Create an second channel
8848         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8849         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850
8851         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8852         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8853         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8854
8855         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8856         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8857         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8858         {
8859                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8860                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8861                 match &events[0] {
8862                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8863                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8864                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8865                         },
8866                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8867                 }
8868         }
8869
8870         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8871         {
8872                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8873                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8874                 match &events[0] {
8875                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8876                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8877                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8878                         },
8879                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8880                 }
8881         }
8882 }
8883
8884 #[test]
8885 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8886         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8887         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8888         //
8889         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8890         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8891         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8892         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8893         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8894         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8895         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8896         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8897
8898         // Create an initial channel
8899         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8900         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8901         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8902         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8903
8904         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8905         // that it is rejected.
8906         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8907         {
8908                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8909                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8910                 match events[0] {
8911                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8912                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8913                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8914                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8915                                 // move forward with it.
8916                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8917                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8918                         },
8919                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8920                 }
8921         }
8922
8923         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8924         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8925
8926         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8928
8929         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8930         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8931         {
8932                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8933                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8934                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8935                 added_monitors.clear();
8936         }
8937         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8938
8939         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8940
8941         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8942         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8943
8944         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8945         // temporary one).
8946
8947         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8948         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8949         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8950         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8951         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8952         {
8953                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8954                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8955                 match events[0] {
8956                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8957                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8958                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8959                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8960                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8961                         },
8962                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8963                 }
8964         }
8965
8966         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8967         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8968         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8969         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8970         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8971         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8972
8973         let funding_created = {
8974                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8975                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8976                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8977                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8978                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8979                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8980                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8981                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8982                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8983         };
8984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8985         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8986         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8987         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8989
8990         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8991         {
8992                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8993                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8994                 match events[0] {
8995                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8996                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8997                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8998                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8999                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9000                         },
9001                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9002                 }
9003         }
9004
9005         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9006         // everything is functional.
9007         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9008         {
9009                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9010                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9011                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9012                 added_monitors.clear();
9013         }
9014         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9015
9016         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9017         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9018         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9020
9021         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9022         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9023         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9024
9025         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9026 }
9027
9028 #[test]
9029 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9030         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9031         //
9032         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9033         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9034         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9035         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9036         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9037         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9038         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9039
9040         // Create some initial channels
9041         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9042         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9043         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9044
9045         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9046         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9047         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9048
9049         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9050         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9051         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9052
9053         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9054         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9056         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9057         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9058         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9059         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9060         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9061         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9062
9063         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9064         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9065         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9067         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9070         match events[0] {
9071                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9072                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9073                 },
9074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9075         }
9076         match events[1] {
9077                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9078                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9079                 },
9080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9081         }
9082         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9083         // peer_disconnected.
9084         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9085         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9086
9087         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9088         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9089         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9090 }
9091
9092 #[test]
9093 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9094         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9095         //
9096         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9097         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9098         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9099         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9100         //
9101         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9102         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9103         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9106         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9107         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9108
9109         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9110         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9111         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9112
9113         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9114
9115         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9116         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9117         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9118         // its length.
9119         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9120         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9121         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9122                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9123                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9124         }
9125
9126         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9127         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9129         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9130
9131         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9133         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9134
9135         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9136         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9137
9138         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9139         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9140         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9141
9142         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9143         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9144         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9146         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9147         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9148         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9149                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9150                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9151                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9152                 } else { panic!(); }
9153         } else { panic!(); }
9154         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9155
9156         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9157         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9158         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9159         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9160                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9161                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9162                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9163                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9164                                 vout: idx as u32,
9165                         },
9166                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9167                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9168                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9169                 }).collect(),
9170                 output: vec![TxOut {
9171                         value: 1000,
9172                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9173                 }]
9174         };
9175         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9176         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9177 }
9178
9179 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9180         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9181         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9182         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9183         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9184         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9185         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9186         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9187         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9188         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9189         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9190         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9191         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9192         // until we learned about an additional block.
9193         //
9194         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9195         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9196         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9198         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9199         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9200         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9201
9202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9203         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9204         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9205         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9206         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9207
9208         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9210         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9212         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9213         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9214
9215         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9216         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9217                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9218         }
9219         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9220                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9221         if test_height_before_timelock {
9222                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9223                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9224                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9225                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9226         } else {
9227                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9228                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9229                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9230                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9231                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9232                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9233                 // timelock is up).
9234                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9235                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9236
9237                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9238                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9239                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9240                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9241                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9242                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9243                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9244
9245                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9246                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9247                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9248                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9249                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9250                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9251                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9252                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9253                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9254         }
9255 }
9256
9257 #[test]
9258 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9259         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9260         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9261 }
9262
9263 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9267         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9268
9269         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9270
9271         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9272                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9273         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9274
9275         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9276
9277         {
9278                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9279                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9281                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9283                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9284                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9285                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9286         }
9287         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9288         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9289
9290         {
9291                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9292                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9293                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9294                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9295                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9296                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9297                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9298                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9299                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9300                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9301                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9302                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9303                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9304         }
9305
9306         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9307         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9308
9309         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9310                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9311                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9312
9313                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9314                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9315                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9316                 ];
9317                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9318                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9319
9320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9321                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9322                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9323
9324                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9325                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9326                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9327
9328                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9329                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9330                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9331                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9332                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9333                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9334         } else {
9335                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9336                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9337                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9338
9339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9340                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9341                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9342                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9343
9344                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9345
9346                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9347         }
9348 }
9349
9350 #[test]
9351 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9352         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9353         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9354         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9355         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9356         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9357 }
9358
9359 #[test]
9360 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9361         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9362         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9363         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9364 }
9365
9366 #[test]
9367 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9368         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9369         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9373         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9374
9375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9376         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9378         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9379
9380         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9381                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9382         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9383         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9384         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9385                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9386                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9387                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9388         });
9389
9390         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9391
9392         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9393         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9394
9395         let session_privs = {
9396                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9397                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9398                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9399                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9400                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9401                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9402         };
9403         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9404                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9405                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9407
9408         {
9409                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9410                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9411                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9412         }
9413         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9414
9415         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9416                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9418
9419         {
9420                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9421                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9422                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9423
9424                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9425                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9426
9427                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9428                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9429
9430                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9431                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9432                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9433
9434                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9435                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9436                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9437
9438                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9439                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9440                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9441         }
9442         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9443         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9444         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9445         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9446
9447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9448
9449         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9450         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9451         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9452
9453         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9455
9456         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9457         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9458         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9459
9460         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9461
9462         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9463                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9464                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9466
9467         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9468         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9469         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9470
9471         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9472         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9473         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9474         match events[0] {
9475                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9476                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9477                 },
9478                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9479         }
9480         match events[1] {
9481                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9482                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9483                 },
9484                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9485         }
9486         match events[2] {
9487                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9488                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9489                 },
9490                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9491         }
9492 }
9493
9494 #[test]
9495 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9500
9501         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9502         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9503         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9504         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9505         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9506                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9507                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9508         };
9509         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9510         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9511         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9512
9513         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9514         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9515                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9517         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9518         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9519         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9520         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9521         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9522         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9523 }
9524
9525 #[test]
9526 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9531
9532         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9533         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9534
9535         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9536         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9537                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9538                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9539         };
9540         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9541         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9542         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9543         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9544         let route = find_route(
9545                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9546                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9547         ).unwrap();
9548
9549         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9550         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9551                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9553         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9554         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9555         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9556         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9557         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9558         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9559 }
9560
9561 #[test]
9562 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9563         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9564         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9565         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9566         // amount.
9567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9570         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9571
9572         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9573         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9574         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9575         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9576
9577         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9578         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9579         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9580                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9581                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9582                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9583         });
9584
9585         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9586         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9587         // amount of time to respond to.
9588
9589         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9590         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9591         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9592
9593         let failed_destinations = vec![
9594                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9595                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9596         ];
9597         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9598
9599         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9600
9601         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9602         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9603                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9605
9606         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9607         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9608         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9609         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9610
9611         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9612         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9613         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9615         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9616 }
9617
9618 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9619 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9620 enum ExposureEvent {
9621         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9622         AtHTLCForward,
9623         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9624         AtHTLCReception,
9625         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9626         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9627 }
9628
9629 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9630         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9631         // policy.
9632         //
9633         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9634         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9635         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9636         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9637         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9638         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9639         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9640         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9641
9642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9643         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9644         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9647         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9648
9649         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9650         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9651         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9652         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9653         if on_holder_tx {
9654                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9655         }
9656         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9657         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9658         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9659
9660         let opt_anchors = false;
9661
9662         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9663
9664         if on_holder_tx {
9665                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9666                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9667                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9668                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9669         }
9670
9671         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9672         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9674         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9675
9676         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9678         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9679
9680         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9681         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9682         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9683
9684         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9685                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9686                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9687                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9688                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9689         };
9690         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9691         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9692
9693         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9694         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9695
9696         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9697         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9698
9699         if on_holder_tx {
9700                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9701                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9702                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9703                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9704                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9705                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9706                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9707                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9708                         }
9709                 } else {
9710                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9711                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9712                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9713                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9714                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9715                         }
9716                 }
9717         } else {
9718                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9719                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9720                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9721                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9722                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9723                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9724                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9725                         }
9726                 } else {
9727                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9728                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9729                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9730                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9731                         }
9732                 }
9733         }
9734
9735         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9736         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9737                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9738                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9739                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9740                 if on_holder_tx {
9741                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9742                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9743                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9744                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9745                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9746                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9747                 } else {
9748                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9749                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9750                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9751                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9752                 }
9753         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9754                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9755                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9756                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9757                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9758                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9759                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9760                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9761                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9762                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9763                 if on_holder_tx {
9764                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9765                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9766                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9767                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9768                 } else {
9769                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9770                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9771                 }
9772         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9773                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9774                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9775                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9776                 {
9777                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9778                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9779                 }
9780                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9781                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9782                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9783         }
9784
9785         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9786         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9787         added_monitors.clear();
9788 }
9789
9790 #[test]
9791 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9792         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9793         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9794         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9795         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9796         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9797         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9798         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9799         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9800         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9801         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9802         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9803         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9804 }
9805
9806 #[test]
9807 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9808         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9809         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9810         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9811         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9812
9813         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9814         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9815         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9816         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9817         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9818
9819         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9820
9821         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9822         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9823         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9824         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9825         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9826                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9827                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9828                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9829                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9830                         }]}
9831                 },
9832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9833         };
9834         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9835         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9836                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9837                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9838                 },
9839                 _ => panic!()
9840         }
9841
9842         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9843         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9844         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9845         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9846 }
9847
9848 #[test]
9849 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9850         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9851         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9852         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9853         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9856         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9857
9858         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9859
9860         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9861         {
9862                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9863                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9864         }
9865
9866         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9867         {
9868                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9869                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9870         }
9871         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9873
9874         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9875         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9876         match events[0] {
9877                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9878                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9879                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9880                 },
9881                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9882         };
9883
9884         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9885         // it.
9886         {
9887                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9888                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9889         }
9890         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9892
9893         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9894         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9895         match events[0] {
9896                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9897                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9898                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9899                 },
9900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9901         };
9902
9903         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9904         // channel.
9905         {
9906                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9907                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9908         }
9909         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9911
9912         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9913         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9914         match events[0] {
9915                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9916                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9917                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9918                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9919                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9920                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9921                 },
9922                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9923         };
9924 }
9925
9926 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9927         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9931         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9932         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9933                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9934         let recv_value = 100_000;
9935
9936         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9937
9938         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9939         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9940                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9941                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9942                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9943         } else {
9944                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9945                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9946         };
9947         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9948         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9949                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9951         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9952         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9953         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9954         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9955         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9956         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9957
9958         if valid_delta {
9959                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9960                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9961
9962                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9963         } else {
9964                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9965
9966                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9967
9968                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9969                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9970                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9971
9972                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9973         }
9974 }
9975
9976 #[test]
9977 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9978         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9979         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9980         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9981         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9982 }