Add test for coinbase funding transactions

[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / functional_tests.rs

// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.

//! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
//! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
//! claim outputs on-chain.

use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;

use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};

use regex;

use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
use core::default::Default;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};

use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;

use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;

#[test]
fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
        // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
        use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
        let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
        cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
        // funding satoshis
        let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
        let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
        let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;

        // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();

        // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
        let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
        // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
        let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
                nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
                let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
                let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
                if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
                        match action {
                                &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
                                        nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
                        }
                } else { assert!(false); }
        };

        use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;

        // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
        insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
        insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });

        insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });

        insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });

        insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });

        insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });

        insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });

        insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });

        insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
}

#[test]
fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
        // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
        // them.
        use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
                Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
                        assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
                },
                _ => panic!()
        }
}

fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
        // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
        // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
        // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
        // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();

        // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
        let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
        let feerate_per_kw = 253;
        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
        push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
        push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;

        let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        if !send_from_initiator {
                open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
                open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
        }
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);

        // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
        let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        if send_from_initiator {
                accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
                accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
        }
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
        {
                let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
                let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
                let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
                let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
                if send_from_initiator {
                        let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
                        chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
                        chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
                } else {
                        let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
                        chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
                        chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
                }
        }

        let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
        let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
        create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);

        // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
        // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
        if send_from_initiator {
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
                        // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
                        // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
                        // well as an additional HTLC.
                        - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
        } else {
                send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
        do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
        do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
}

#[test]
fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // balancing
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

        // A                                        B
        // update_fee                            ->
        // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
        //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
        // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
        // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
        //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
        // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
        //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
        //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
        // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
        //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
        // send (6) RAA                          -.
        // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
        //                                       <- RAA
        // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->

        // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let payment_event = {
                let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
        };
        assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

        // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
        let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // deliver(1), generate (3):
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
        let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
        assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
        assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
        assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
        assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
        let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
        assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
        assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
        assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
        assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
        let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
        let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        match events_2[0] {
                Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
        // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
        // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // balancing
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

        // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
                        update_fee.as_ref()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let payment_event = {
                let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
        };
        assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

        // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
        let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
}

#[test]
fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // A                                        B
        // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
        //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
        // update_fee (never committed)          ->
        // (3) update_fee                        ->
        // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
        // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
        // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
        //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
        // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
        // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
        // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
        //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
        // revoke_and_ack                        ->
        //                                          B should send no response here
        // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
        //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
        // revoke_and_ack                        ->

        // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
        let initial_feerate;
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
                *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
        let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
        // transaction:
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
        let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
                channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
                feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);

        update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
        // Deliver (3)
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);

        // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
        let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
        assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
        assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);

        // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
        let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // Delever (4)
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
        let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
        let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}

fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
        // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
        // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
        // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
        // Node objects.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
                let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
                connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
                connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
        }

        if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
        let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);

        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);

        if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
        let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
        nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                added_monitors.clear();
        }

        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);

        if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
        create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);

        if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
        confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
        create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
        expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}

#[test]
fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
        do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 25;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let channel_value = 5000;
        let push_sats = 700;
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
        let channel_id = chan.2;
        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);

        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
        // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
        // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
        // remote limit.
        let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
        let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = feerate;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());

        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);

        // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
        {
                let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();

                //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
                assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
                let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
                let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
                actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
                assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
        }

        {
                // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 4;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);

        const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;

        // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
        // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
        let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
                let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
                (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
                 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
        };
        let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
                let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
                (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
                 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
                 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
        };

        // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
        let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
                &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);

        let res = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
                let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
                let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
                        INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
                        push_sats,
                        channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
                        local_funding, remote_funding,
                        commit_tx_keys.clone(),
                        non_buffer_feerate + 4,
                        &mut htlcs,
                        &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
                );
                local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
        };

        let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                signature: res.0,
                htlc_signatures: res.1,
                #[cfg(taproot)]
                partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
        };

        let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);

        //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
        //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
        //Should produce and error.
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
        nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
                [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // balancing
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);

        // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        // node[1] has nothing to do

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here

        let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);

        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
        close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fee() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let channel_id = chan.2;

        // A                                        B
        // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
        //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
        //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
        // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
        //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
        //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
        // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
        //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
        // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
        //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
        //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
        // revoke_and_ack                        ->

        // Create and deliver (1)...
        let feerate;
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                feerate = *feerate_lock;
                *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        // Generate (2) and (3):
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // Deliver (2):
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // Create and deliver (4)...
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        // ... creating (5)
        let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

        // Handle (3), creating (6):
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

        // Deliver (5):
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // Deliver (6), creating (7):
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
        let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // Deliver (7)
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
        assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
        close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn fake_network_test() {
        // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
        // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
        let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);

        // Send some more payments
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);

        // Test failure packets
        let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
        fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);

        // Add a new channel that skips 3
        let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);

        // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
        let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
                short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
                fee_msat: 0,
                cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
        });
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
                short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
                fee_msat: 0,
                cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
        });
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
                short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
                fee_msat: 1000000,
                cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
        });
        hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
        hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
        let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;

        let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
                short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
                fee_msat: 0,
                cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
        });
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
                short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
                fee_msat: 0,
                cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
        });
        hops.push(RouteHop {
                pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
                node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
                short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
                channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
                fee_msat: 1000000,
                cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
        });
        hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
        hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
        let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;

        // Claim the rebalances...
        fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
        claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

        // Close down the channels...
        close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
        // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
        // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
        // commitment dance rounds.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
        let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);

        let mut payments = Vec::new();
        for _ in 0..50 {
                let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
                nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
        }
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
        assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());

        // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
        // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
        // another HTLC.
        {
                unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
                        ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        }

        // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
        let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
        {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        }

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
        assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
        // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);

        expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);

        // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());

        for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
        }
        nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);

        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
        for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
                match event {
                        &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
        }

        for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
                claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
        }

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
}

#[test]
fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
        // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
        // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);

        *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
        assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);

        *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
        assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
        fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
        claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
}

#[test]
fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
        // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
        // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
        // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // balancing
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);

        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
        let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);

        // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
        nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
        let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);

        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
        let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
        for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
                if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
                        has_both_htlcs += 1;
                } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
                        has_both_htlcs += 1;
                }
        }
        assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);

        check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
        check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
        let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
        let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
                (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
        } else {
                (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
        };

        assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);

        assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);

        assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
        check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
        for e in events {
                match e {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
                        },
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;

        // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
        let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
        let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
        route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
        let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
        match err {
                PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
                        if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
                        else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
        }
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
}

#[test]
fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
        // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");

        let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;

        let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
        let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
                3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
        let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
        let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 0,
                amount_msat: htlc_msat,
                payment_hash: payment_hash,
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);

        // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
        // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
        // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.

        let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);

        const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;

        // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
        // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
        let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
                // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
                chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;

                let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
                (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
                 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
                 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
                 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
        };
        let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
                let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
                (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
                 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
                 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
        };

        // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
        let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
                &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);

        // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
        // signature for the commitment_signed message.
        let local_chan_balance = 1313;

        let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
                offered: false,
                amount_msat: 3460001,
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                payment_hash,
                transaction_output_index: Some(1),
        };

        let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;

        let res = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
                let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
                        commitment_number,
                        95000,
                        local_chan_balance,
                        local_funding, remote_funding,
                        commit_tx_keys.clone(),
                        feerate_per_kw,
                        &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
                        &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
                );
                local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
        };

        let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                signature: res.0,
                htlc_signatures: res.1,
                #[cfg(taproot)]
                partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
        };

        // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
        let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();

        // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
        let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
                next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
                #[cfg(taproot)]
                next_local_nonce: None,
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
                format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
        // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
        // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
        // this situation.
        let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
        push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);

        push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;

        let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);

        // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
        // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
        for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
                let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
        }

        // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
        // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
        // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
        let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
        push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
        push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);

        // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
        for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
                let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
        }

        let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
        // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
        let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
        let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
        let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
                700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
        let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
        let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
                amount_msat: htlc_msat,
                payment_hash: payment_hash,
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
        };

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
        // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
                [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
        // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
        // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();

        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
        // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
        // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
        let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
        push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
        push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);

        let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
                + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
        // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
        // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
        // commitment transaction fee.
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);

        // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
        for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
                let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
        }

        // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
        // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
        // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
        // HTLC.
        let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
        push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
                APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });

        // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
        // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
        push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);

        let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
        match msg_events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
                        assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
        // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
        // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);

        let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
        // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);

        // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);

        // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
        // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
        // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
        let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
}

#[test]
fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
        let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);

        let feemsat = 239;
        let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
        let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);

        // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
        let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
        let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;

        // Add a pending HTLC.
        let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
        let payment_event_1 = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);

        // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
        let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
        let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
        let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
        let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
        route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;

        // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
        let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
        let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
        let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
                &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
        let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
        let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 1,
                amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
                payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
        // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
        nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
                [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
        let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
        let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
        let default_config = UserConfig::default();
        assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);

        let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
        assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
        assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);

        assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
        assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
}

fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
        (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
}

#[test]
fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
        // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);

        let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);

        let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);

        macro_rules! expect_forward {
                ($node: expr) => {{
                        let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
                        let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
                        payment_event
                }}
        }

        let feemsat = 239; // set above
        let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);

        let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;

        // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
        {
                let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
                        .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
                let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
                route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
                assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));

                unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                        ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        }

        // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
        // nodes[0]'s wealth
        loop {
                let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
                // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
                // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
                // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
                let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
                let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
                if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
                        break;
                }

                let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
                        .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
                let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
                let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);

                let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
                        get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
                        get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
                        get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
                        get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
                );

                assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
                assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
                assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
                assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
                stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
        }

        // adding pending output.
        // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
        // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
        // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
        // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
        // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
        // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
        // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
        // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
        // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
        // policy.
        let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
        let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;

        let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
        let payment_event_1 = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);

        // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
        let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
        {
                let mut route = route_1.clone();
                route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
                let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
                unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                        ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        }

        // split the rest to test holding cell
        let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
        let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
        let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
        {
                let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
                assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
        }

        // now see if they go through on both sides
        let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
        // but this will stuck in the holding cell
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);

        // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
        {
                let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
                        get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
                route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
                unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                        ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        }

        let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
        // this will also stuck in the holding cell
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        // flush the pending htlc
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
        let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);

        // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
        assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
        assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);

        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);

        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        match events[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
                        assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
                        assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
                        assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
                        match &purpose {
                                PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
                                        assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
                                        assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
                        assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
                        assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
                        assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
                        match &purpose {
                                PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
                                        assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
                                        assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);

        let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
        let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);

        let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
        let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
        assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);

        let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
        assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
}

#[test]
fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
        // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
        // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
        // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
        // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
        // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
        // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
        // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
        // To test this we:
        //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
        //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
        //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
        //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
        //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
        //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
        //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
        //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
        //    claim,
        //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
        //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
        //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
        //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
        //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        // Route the first two HTLCs.
        let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
        let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
        let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);

        // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
        let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
        let send_1 = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };

        // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
        // initial fulfill/CS.
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
        // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
        let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
        // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
        // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
        // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
        // on-chain as necessary).
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);

        // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
        // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
        // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
        let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
        let send_2 = {
                nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);

        claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
}

#[test]
fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
        // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
        // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
        let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
        let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);

        // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);

        // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        {
                let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
        let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);

        // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
        // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        {
                let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        macro_rules! claim_funds {
                ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
                        {
                                $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
                                expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
                                check_added_monitors!($node, 1);

                                let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                                match events[0] {
                                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
                                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                                assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                };
                        }
                }
        }

        // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
        // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
        nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        let node2_commitment_txid;
        {
                let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
                node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();

                // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
                claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
                check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
        assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
        // confusing us in the following tests.
        let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });

        // One pending HTLC to time out:
        let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
        // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
        // buffer space).

        let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
                connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
                let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                match events[1] {
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);

                // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
                {
                        let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        node_txn.retain(|tx| {
                                if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
                                        false
                                } else { true }
                        });
                }

                let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);

                // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
                claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);

                connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
                let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                msg.clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                match events[1] {
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);

                mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
                check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
                (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
        };
        nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
        nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

        assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
                ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
        // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
        let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
        alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
        alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
        let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
        bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
        bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
        let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        // Create some new channels:
        let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
        let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
        // Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);

        {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                {
                        let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                        node_txn.swap_remove(0);
                }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);

                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
                // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
                let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
                test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
        }
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}

#[test]
fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
        // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
        let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
        alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
        alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
        let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
        bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
        bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
        let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        // Create some new channels:
        let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
        let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
        // Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
        {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                {
                        let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output

                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                        node_txn.swap_remove(0);
                }
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);

                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
        }
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}

#[test]
fn revoked_output_claim() {
        // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
        // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
        // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
        // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);

        // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output

        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
        do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
        do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
}

fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
        // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
        // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
        // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
        // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
        let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
        let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
                WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };

        if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
                // Send a payment to move the channel forward
                send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
        }

        // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
        // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
        let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];

        // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);

        let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
        check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);

        mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
        mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
                &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
                &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);

        // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
        let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
        let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
                match balance {
                        channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
                }
        });
        // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
        let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
        let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
        assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
}


#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
        // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some new channel:
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
        // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
        let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
        let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);

        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
        check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        //Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

        {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

                let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

                let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC

                // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
                // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
        }
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}

#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
        // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
        // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
        // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
        let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
        let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);

        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);

        //Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

        {
                confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
                match events.last().unwrap() {
                        Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();

                // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);

                // Filter out any non justice transactions.
                node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
                assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);

                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);

                let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
                assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
                assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC

                // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
                // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
        }
        get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
        // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
        // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
        // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
        // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
        // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
        // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
        // commitment transaction was broadcast.
        // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
        // towards B.
        // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
        // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
        // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
        // PaymentSent event).

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
        let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);

        let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
        let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);

        // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
        // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
        assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);

        // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
        match forwarded_events[0] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
        match forwarded_events[1] {
                Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
                        assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
                        assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
                        assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
                        assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
                        assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
                },
                _ => panic!()
        }
        match forwarded_events[2] {
                Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
                        assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
                        assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
                        assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
                        assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
                        assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
                },
                _ => panic!()
        }
        let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);

        let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);

        match nodes_2_event {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        match nodes_0_event {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
                ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
                        let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
                        // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
                        // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
                        check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
                        if $htlc_offered {
                                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                                assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
                                assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
                        } else {
                                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                                assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
                                assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
                        }
                        node_txn.clear();
                } }
        }
        // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
        check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);

        // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
        // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
        let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
        let commitment_spend =
                if node_txn.len() == 1 {
                        &node_txn[0]
                } else {
                        // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
                        // FullBlockViaListen
                        if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
                                check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
                                check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
                                assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
                                &node_txn[0]
                        } else {
                                check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
                                check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
                                assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
                                &node_txn[2]
                        }
                };

        check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
        // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
        // we already checked the same situation with A.

        // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
        let mut first_claimed = false;
        for event in events {
                match event {
                        Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
                                if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
                                        assert!(!first_claimed);
                                        first_claimed = true;
                                } else {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
                                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
                                }
                        },
                        Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
                        Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
        check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
}

fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
        // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
        // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
        // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
        // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
        //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
        //            \                                  \
        //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
        *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
        *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;

        // Create some intial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);

        let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);

        // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
        nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);

        // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
        // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
                , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
        let timeout_tx = {
                let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
                } else {
                        assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
                }
                txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
                assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                txn.remove(0)
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
        do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
        do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
        do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}

#[test]
fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
        // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
        // and fail backward accordingly.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        // Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);

        let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);

                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
                        expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
        // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
        // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
        // commitment transaction anymore.
        // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
        // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
        // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
        // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
        // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
        // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
        // transactions:
        // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
        //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
        // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
        //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
        //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
        // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
        // Revoke the old state
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);

        let value = if use_dust {
                // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
                // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
                nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
                        .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
        } else { 3000000 };

        let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
        let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
        let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);

        nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
        // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2

        nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
        // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
        let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
        // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
        let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);

        if deliver_bs_raa {
                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
                // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
                // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                match events[1] {
                        Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
                // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
        }

        let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
        match events[0] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
                _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[2] {
                Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });

        if deliver_bs_raa {
                let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
                match nodes_2_event {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                                assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                                assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        match nodes_2_event {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
                        assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
                        assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        match nodes_0_event {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);

                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);

                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);

                        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
                        match events[0] {
                                Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
                                        assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
                                        // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
                                        // that we should update our routing table for.
                                        if !deliver_bs_raa {
                                                if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
                                        }
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[1] {
                                Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[2] {
                                Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
                                        assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[3] {
                                Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[4] {
                                Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
                                        assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                        match events[5] {
                                Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
        assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
        assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
}

#[test]
fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
        do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
}

#[test]
fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);

        // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
        {
                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
                        PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let payment_event = {
                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };
                assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
        }

        // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
        let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
        {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);

                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        }

        // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
        {
                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);

                let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
                let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
                let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
                        &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
                let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
                let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();

                // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
                let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                        channel_id: chan.2,
                        htlc_id: 0,
                        amount_msat: 0,
                        payment_hash,
                        cltv_expiry,
                        onion_routing_packet,
                        skimmed_fee_msat: None,
                };
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
        }
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
        // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
        match events[0] {
                Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[2] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
        // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
        // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
                // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
                // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
                // connect_style.
                return;
        }
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
        nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());

        let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
        // registering new transactions
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
}

#[test]
fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
        // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);

        let mut payment_event = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
        // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
        // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).

        nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let tx = {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
                // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
                // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                node_txn.remove(0)
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);

        // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
        {
                get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
                        .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
        }
        mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
        let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success

        check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
}

#[test]
fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
        // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
        // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
        // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
        // update_fulfill_htlc message.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
        reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
        reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
}

#[test]
fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
        // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
        // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
        // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
        let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
        let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);

        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
        assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());

        let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);

        // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
        // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
        // broadcasted.
        {
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
        }

        // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
        // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
                , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
                , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}

#[test]
fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
        // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
        reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
        reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);

        let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
        let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
        fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));

        let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
        let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
        let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
        let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
        fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);

        let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
        reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
        reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
        reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        {
                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
                match events[0] {
                        Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                match events[1] {
                        Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                match events[2] {
                        Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
                                assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
                match events[3] {
                        Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
        fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
}

fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
        // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let mut as_channel_ready = None;
        let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
                let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
                as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
                // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
                // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
                // it before the channel_reestablish message.
                chan_id
        } else {
                create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
        };

        let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);

        let payment_event = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);

        if messages_delivered < 2 {
                // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
        } else {
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                if messages_delivered >= 3 {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                        let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

                        if messages_delivered >= 4 {
                                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
                                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                                if messages_delivered >= 5 {
                                        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
                                        let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                                        if messages_delivered >= 6 {
                                                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
                                                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        if messages_delivered < 3 {
                if simulate_broken_lnd {
                        // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
                        // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
                        //
                        // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
                        // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
                        // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
                        //
                        // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
                        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
                }
                // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
                // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
                // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
                reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
                // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
                // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
                // Everything was delivered...
                reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
        }

        let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        if messages_delivered == 0 {
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
                match events_1[0] {
                        Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
                match events_1[1] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
        } else {
                assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
                match events_1[0] {
                        Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
        }

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));

        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

        let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        match events_2[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
                        assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
                        assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
                        match &purpose {
                                PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
                                        assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
                                        assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);

        let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
        let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                        (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        if messages_delivered >= 1 {
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);

                let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
                match events_4[0] {
                        Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
                                assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }

                if messages_delivered >= 2 {
                        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                        let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                        if messages_delivered >= 3 {
                                nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
                                assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                                if messages_delivered >= 4 {
                                        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
                                        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                                        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                                        if messages_delivered >= 5 {
                                                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
                                                assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                                                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                                        }
                                }
                        }
                }
        }

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        if messages_delivered < 2 {
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
                if messages_delivered < 1 {
                        expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
                } else {
                        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
                }
        } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
                // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
                reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
                // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
                // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
                let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
                reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
                reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
        } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
                // Everything was delivered...
                reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
        }

        if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
                expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        }
        if messages_delivered <= 5 {
                nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        }
        reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));

        if messages_delivered > 2 {
                expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        }

        // Channel should still work fine...
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
}

#[test]
fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
        do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
        // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
        // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
        // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
        // channel_ready immediately instead.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;

        let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);

        let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
        let block_txn = [funding_tx];
        let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
        let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
        nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);

        // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
        let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
}

#[test]
fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
        // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
        // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);

        // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
        let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
        match events_1[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        match events_2[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fee.is_none());

                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                        let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
                        match events_3[0] {
                                Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                                        assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
                                        assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }

                        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
                        let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, true).unwrap();
        let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, false).unwrap();
        let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
        let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
        let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

        assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
        assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());

        assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
        assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());

        assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);

        assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
        let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
        let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
        let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
        let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
        match events_5[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
                        match &purpose {
                                PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
                                        assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
                                        assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
}

fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
        // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
        // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
                let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
                // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
                // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
                let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
                let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
                let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
                nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
                        &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
                // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
                pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
                our_payment_hash
        } else {
                route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
        };

        let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
        let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
        for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
                block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
                connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
                connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
        }

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
        // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
        let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
        expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_timeout() {
        do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
        do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
}

fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
        // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);

        // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
        let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
        let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
        let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
        sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        if forwarded_htlc {
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        }
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);

        if forwarded_htlc {
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
                match fail_commit[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
                        },
                        _ => unreachable!(),
                }
                expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
        } else {
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
        do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
        do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
}

macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
        ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
                {
                        let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        let mut txn = Vec::new();
                        let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
                        let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
                        for event in events.drain(..) {
                                match event {
                                        Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
                                                for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
                                                        txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
                                                        all_outputs.push(outp);
                                                }
                                        },
                                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                                };
                        }
                        if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
                                if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
                                        txn.push(tx);
                                }
                        }
                        txn
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
        // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
}

#[test]
fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
        // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
        // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
        nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}

#[test]
fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
        // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
        // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
        check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
}

#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);

        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());

        // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
        }

        // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}

#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);

        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);

        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());

        // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
        check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
}

#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
}

#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);

        // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
        assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout

        // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
        // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
        // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
        // transactions next...
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);

        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
        if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
                assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
        } else {
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
                assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
        }

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
}

#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());

        // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);

        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);

        // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();

        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

        // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
        let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH

        // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success

        // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
        // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
        // transactions next...
        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
        if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
        } else {
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
        }

        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
        // didn't try to generate any new transactions.

        // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
        assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
        check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
}

#[test]
fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
        // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
        // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
        // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
        // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
        // channel.
        // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
        // gets broadcast.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
        let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);

        // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());

        mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
        assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
        assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx

        // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        match events[0] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
                        assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
                        assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
                        assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
                        assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
                        assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
        let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
        let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);

        match nodes_2_event {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        match nodes_0_event {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
        match msg_events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
        let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
        assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
        assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
        assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx

        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
        // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
        // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
        // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
        // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
        // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
                &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);

        let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);

        let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);

        let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
        // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
        // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
        // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
                .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);

        let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
        assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        let htlc_timeout_tx;
        { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
                let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
                assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);

                check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);

                if node_txn.len() > 2 {
                        check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);

                        check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
                } else {
                        check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
                        assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
                }

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
                // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
                if node_txn.len() > 2 {
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                        htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
                } else {
                        htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
                }
        }

        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
        }
        let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
        check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
        check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
        assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
        let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
        assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        {
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
        }
        expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);

        // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
        expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
        assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
        assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
}

#[test]
fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
        let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);

        // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
        }
        let node_tx = {
                let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
                node_txn[0].clone()
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);

        // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
}

fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
        // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
        // unrevoked commitment transaction.
        // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
        // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
        // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
        // use the same payment hashes.
        // Thus, we use a six-node network:
        //
        // A \         / E
        //    - C - D -
        // B /         \ F
        // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
        // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
        // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
                &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
        let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
        let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
        let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
        let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
        let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);

        // Rebalance and check output sanity...
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
        send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
        assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);

        let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
                .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
        // 0th HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
        // 1st HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
        // 2nd HTLC:
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
        // 3rd HTLC:
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
        // 4th HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
        // 5th HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
        // 6th HTLC:
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
        // 7th HTLC:
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());

        // 8th HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
        // 9th HTLC:
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee

        // 10th HTLC:
        let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
        // 11th HTLC:
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());

        // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
        // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
        // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
        assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);

        // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
        // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
        nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
        nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
        nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
        nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);

        let failed_destinations = vec![
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
        ];
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);

        let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);

        // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
        nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
        nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);

        let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
        ];
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);

        let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);

        let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);

        // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
        let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
                HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
        ];
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
        let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
        if deliver_last_raa {
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
        } else {
                let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
        }

        // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
        // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
        // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
        // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
        //
        // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
        // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
        // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
        //
        // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
        // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
        let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);

        if announce_latest {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
        } else {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
        }
        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
                events.last().clone().unwrap()
        } else {
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                events.last().clone().unwrap()
        };
        match close_event {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
        if deliver_last_raa {
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);

                let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
                expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
        } else {
                let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
                        repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
                } else {
                        repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
                };

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
        }
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);

        let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
        let mut a_done = false;
        for msg in cs_msgs {
                match msg {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                                // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
                                // should be failed-backwards here.
                                let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
                                        // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
                                        for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
                                                assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
                                        }
                                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
                                        assert!(!a_done);
                                        a_done = true;
                                        &nodes[0]
                                } else {
                                        // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
                                        for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
                                                assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
                                        }
                                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
                                        &nodes[1]
                                };
                                target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                                target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
                                target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
                                if announce_latest {
                                        target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
                                        if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
                                                target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
                                        }
                                }
                                commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
        let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
        let mut as_updates = 0;
        for event in as_events.iter() {
                if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
                        assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
                        if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
                                assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
                        } else {
                                assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
                        }
                        if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
                                as_updates += 1;
                        }
                } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
                } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
        }
        assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
        assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
        if announce_latest {
                assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
                assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
        }
        assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));

        let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
        let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
        let mut bs_updates = 0;
        for event in bs_events.iter() {
                if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
                        assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
                        if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
                                assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
                        } else {
                                assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
                        }
                        if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
                                bs_updates += 1;
                        }
                } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
                } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
        }
        assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
        assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
        if announce_latest {
                assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
        }
        assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));

        // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
        // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
        // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
        // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
        assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
        assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
}

#[test]
fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
        do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
}

#[test]
fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
        do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
}

#[test]
fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
        do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
        // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
        // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
}

#[test]
fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
        let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);

        // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        let htlc_timeout = {
                let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
                node_txn[0].clone()
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);

        // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
        assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
                spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
}

#[test]
fn test_key_derivation_params() {
        // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
        // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
        // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
        // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);

        // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
        let seed = [42; 32];
        let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
        let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
        let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
        let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
        let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
        let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
        let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        node_cfgs.remove(0);
        node_cfgs.insert(0, node);

        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
        // for node 0
        let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);

        // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
        let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);

        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
        let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
        let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);

        // We check funding pubkey are unique
        let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
        let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
        if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
            || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
            || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
            || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
                panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
        }

        // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        let htlc_timeout = {
                let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
                node_txn[0].clone()
        };

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);

        // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
        let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
        assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
                spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
}

#[test]
fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
        let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);

        let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
        assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
        check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
}

fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });

        // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
        // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });

        let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);

        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
        let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
        for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
                connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
                block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
        }
        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
        // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
        // to "time out" the HTLC.

        let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
        let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());

        for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
                connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
                block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
        }
        test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
        // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
        // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
        // actually revoked.
        let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
        nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        if check_revoke_no_close {
                nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        }

        let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
        let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
        for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
                connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
                block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
        }
        if !check_revoke_no_close {
                test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
                check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        } else {
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
        }
}

// Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
// There are only a few cases to test here:
//  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
//    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
//  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
//  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
// We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
// non-dust HTLCs.
// Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
// assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
// tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
#[test]
fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
        do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
        do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);

        do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
        do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
}

#[test]
fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
        do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
        do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
        do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
        do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
}

#[test]
#[should_panic]
fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
        for node in nodes.iter() {
                *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
        }

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
        let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
        let push_msat=10001;
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
        let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
        get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
        // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
        assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
}

#[test]
fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
        let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
        let push_msat=10001;
        assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
        let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
        // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
        let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
        assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
        let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
        let push_msat=10001;
        assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
        let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
        // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
        assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
        assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
        assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
        let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
        assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);

        // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
        assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
        assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
        assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
        assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
        assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
}

#[test]
fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
        let push_msat=10001;
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
        node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        let err_msg = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
                        msg.clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
}

// Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
// originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
// free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
// is no longer affordable once it's freed.
#[test]
fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
        // pending_update_fee.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 20;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);

        // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
        let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);

        // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);

        // Flush the pending fee update.
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
        // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
        // us to surface its failure to the user.
        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);

        // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        match &events[0] {
                &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
                        assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
                        assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
                        assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match &events[1] {
                &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

// Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
// valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
// successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
#[test]
fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
        // pending_update_fee.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 200;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);

        // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
        let amt_1 = 20000;
        let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
        let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
        let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);

        // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
        let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);

        // Flush the pending fee update.
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);

        // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
        // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
        // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);

        // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        match &events[0] {
                &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
                        assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
                        assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match &events[1] {
                &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
        let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
                let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
                (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
        };
        let raa = match send_raa_event {
                MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);

        let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
        expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
}

// Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
// HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
// our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
// once it's freed.
#[test]
fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
        config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
        let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);

        // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
        // pending_update_fee.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock += 20;
        }
        nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());

        let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
        let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);

        // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
        let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
        let payment_event = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);

                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
        assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);

        // Flush the pending fee update.
        nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
        let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);

        // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);

        let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
                &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
                        msg.clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
        let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
        match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
                &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
        let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
        let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
                &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
                        assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);

        // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
        let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
        let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
        let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
                &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
        expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}

// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
// BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
//TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;

        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
                true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
                assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));

        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
                [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
        //It is enforced when constructing a route.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);

        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
                .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
        route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
                assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
        let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
                .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;

        // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
        for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
                let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
                let payment_event = {
                        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                        if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
                                assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
                        } else {
                                assert!(false);
                        }
                        SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
                };
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
        }
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});

        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let channel_value = 100000;
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
        let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);

        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
        // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
        // limits us to.
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
}

// BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
        let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
        {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
                htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
        }

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
        let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
        // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
        let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);

        let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
        // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
        // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);

        let send_amt = 3999999;
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
        let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
        let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
        let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
                &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
        let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();

        let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 0,
                amount_msat: 1000,
                payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
                cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
                onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
                skimmed_fee_msat: None,
        };

        for i in 0..50 {
                msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
        }
        msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);

        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
        //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
        //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
        //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
        // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
        // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        //Disconnect and Reconnect
        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, true).unwrap();
        let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, false).unwrap();
        let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

        //Resend HTLC
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 0,
                payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
        };

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);

        let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 0,
                reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
        };

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
                channel_id: chan.2,
                htlc_id: 0,
                sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
                failure_code: 0x8000,
        };

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        };

        update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        };

        update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();

        let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        };
        update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);

        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
        let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
        //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
        //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);

        //First hop
        let mut payment_event = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

        //Second Hop
        payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);

        let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
        let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
                match events_3[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                                assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
                                assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
                                assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                                (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);

        //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
        match events_4[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);

        let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);

        // First hop
        let mut payment_event = {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
        };

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);

        // Second Hop
        payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);

        let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
        match events_3[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
                        let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
                        // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
                        update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;

                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
                vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
                        node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
        let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        match events_4[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);

        // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
        // the node originating the error to its next hop.
        match events_5[0] {
                Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
                } => {
                        assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
                        assert!(is_permanent);
                        assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events_5[1] {
                Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
}

fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
        // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
        // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
        // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA

        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
                .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;

        // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
        let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
        let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);

        // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
        let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);

        // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
        nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
        let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
        // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
        if announce_latest {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
        } else {
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
        }

        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);

        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
        let mut first_failed = false;
        for event in events {
                match event {
                        Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
                                if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
                                        assert!(!first_failed);
                                        first_failed = true;
                                } else {
                                        assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
                                }
                        },
                        Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
        do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
        do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
}

fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
        // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
        // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
        // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
        // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
        // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
        // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
                .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;

        let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
        let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);

        let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
        let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);

        // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
        if revoked {
                let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
        }

        let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
        if local {
                // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);

                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
                check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
                timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
                assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
        } else {
                // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
                check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);

                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
                timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
                        .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
                check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
                // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
                // dust HTLC should have been failed.
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);

                if !revoked {
                        assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                } else {
                        assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
                }
                // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
                mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
                assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
                connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
        do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
        do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
        do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
        // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay

        let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
        low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
        let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
        high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
        let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
        if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
                &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
                &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
        {
                match error {
                        APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        } else { assert!(false) }

        // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
        nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
        if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
                &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
                &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
        {
                match error {
                        ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        } else { assert!(false); }

        // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
        let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
        let reason_msg;
        if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
                match action {
                        &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
                                assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
                                reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
                        },
                        _ => { panic!(); }
                }
        } else { panic!(); }
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);

        // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
        nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
        if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
                &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
                &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
        {
                match error {
                        ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        } else { assert!(false); }
}

#[test]
fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
        // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
        // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
        // to B, B should refuse payment.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
        let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
        let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

        // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
        // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);

        // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
        // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
                        assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                        assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                        assert!(update_fee.is_none());
                        (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);

        // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
        let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
        expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
}

#[test]
fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
        // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
        // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);

        // Disconnect peers
        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        }
        let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
        let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
        for e in msg_events {
                match e {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
                                // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
                                if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
                                        panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
                                }
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
        // Reconnect peers
        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, true).unwrap();
        let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        }, false).unwrap();
        let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
        assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);

        // Reestablish chan_1
        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
        // Reestablish chan_2
        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
        // Reestablish chan_3
        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
        handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);

        for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        }
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
        for e in msg_events {
                match e {
                        MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
                                match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
                                        // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
                                        // the old one.
                                        Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
                                        None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
                                }
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
        // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
        assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
        // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
        // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);

        let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
                .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
        send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);

        let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
        // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
        assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
        assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
        let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();

        let mut penalty_sum = 0;
        for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
                if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
                        penalty_sum += outp.value;
                }
        }

        // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
        let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);

        // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
        let penalty_1;
        let feerate_1;
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
                let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
                penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
                node_txn.clear();
        };

        // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
        let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
        let mut feerate_2 = 0;
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
                        penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
                        // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
                        assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
                        let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                        feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
                        // Verify 25% bump heuristic
                        assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
                        node_txn.clear();
                }
        }
        assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);

        // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        let penalty_3;
        let mut feerate_3 = 0;
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
                        assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
                        check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
                        penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
                        // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
                        assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
                        let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                        feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
                        // Verify 25% bump heuristic
                        assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
                        node_txn.clear();
                }
        }
        assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);

        nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
}

#[test]
fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
        // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
        // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration

        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
        // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
        let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
        let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
                3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
        let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
                3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
        send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);

        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());

        // Revoke local commitment tx
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);

        // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
        connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)

        let revoked_htlc_txn = {
                let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);

                assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);

                assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);

                txn
        };

        // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
        let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
        let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
        let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
        match events.last().unwrap() {
                Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        let first;
        let feerate_1;
        let penalty_txn;
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
                // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn

                // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
                // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
                // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
                // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
                // future).
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);

                // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
                // available, which we check here:
                assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
                assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
                assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);

                // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
                // output, checked above).
                assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);

                first = node_txn[3].txid();
                // Store both feerates for later comparison
                let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
                feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
                penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
                node_txn.clear();
        }

        // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
        let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
        let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);

        // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
        assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
        let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
        let node_txn = {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);

                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
                // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
                assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
                let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
                assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
                let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
                node_txn.clear();
                txn
        };
        // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
                // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
                // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
                // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
                // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
                // up bumped justice generation.
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
                node_txn.clear();
        }
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
        // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
        // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration

        // Create 2 HTLCs
        // Provide preimage for one
        // Check aggregation

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
        route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;

        // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
        let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());

        // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires

        // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
        let timeout;
        let preimage;
        let preimage_bump;
        let feerate_timeout;
        let feerate_preimage;
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                // 3 transactions including:
                //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);

                preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
                let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
                let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;

                let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
                        (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
                } else {
                        (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
                };

                preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
                check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);

                timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
                let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
                let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
                feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;

                node_txn.clear();
        };
        assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
        assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);

        // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);

                let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
                let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
                let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
                assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
                assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());

                let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
                let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
                let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
                assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
                assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());

                node_txn.clear();
        }

        nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
}

#[test]
fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
        // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
        // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
        // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
        // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
        // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
        // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
        // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
        // implement that).
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;

        let per_commitment_secret;
        let next_per_commitment_point;
        {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();

                const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;

                // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
                keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
                per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);

                // Must revoke without gaps
                keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
                keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);

                keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
                next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
                        &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
        }

        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
                &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
                        channel_id,
                        per_commitment_secret,
                        next_per_commitment_point,
                        #[cfg(taproot)]
                        next_local_nonce: None,
                });
        assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
                , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
        // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
        // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
        // Lock HTLC in both directions
        let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
        let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);

        let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());

        // Revoke local commitment tx
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);

        // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);

        mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        let penalty_txn = {
                let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
                let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
                node_txn.clear();
                penalty_txn
        };
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        {
                let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
                assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
                assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
        // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
        // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);

        // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
        // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
        // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
        let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
        match close_ev[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_override_channel_config() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
        let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
        override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();

        // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
        assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
}

#[test]
fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
        let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
        zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
        // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
        // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
        // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
        // 90% of the `channel_value`.
        // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.

        let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
        config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
        let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
        config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
        let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
        config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
        let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
        config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
        config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
        let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
        let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
        let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
        let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
        let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;

        let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
        let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);

        // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
        // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
        assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
        // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
        // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
        assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);

        // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
        // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
        // `channel_value`.
        assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
        // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
        // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
        // `channel_value`.
        assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
}

#[test]
fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
        let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
        manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);

        // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
        // accepting the inbound channel request.
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        match events[0] {
                Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);

        match accept_msg_ev[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();

        let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        match events[0] {
                Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
        let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
        manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);

        // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
        // rejecting the inbound channel request.
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        match events[0] {
                Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);

        match close_msg_ev[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}

#[test]
fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
        let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
        manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
        let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);

        // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
        // accepting the inbound channel request.
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        match events[0] {
                Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
                        let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
                        match api_res {
                                Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
                                        assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
                                },
                                Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
                                Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
                        }
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }

        // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
        let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);

        match accept_msg_ev[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                }
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
        let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
        let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);

        let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
        let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
        match api_res {
                Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
                        assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
                },
                Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
                Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
        // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
        // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
        // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
        // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
        // a PaymentClaimable event too early
        let node_count = 4;
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;

        let total_msat = 100_000;
        let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
        let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();

        let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
        path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
        path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
        path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
        path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
        path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
        route.paths.push(path_1);

        let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
        path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
        path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
        path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
        path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
        path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
        route.paths.push(path_2);

        // Send payment
        let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
        let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
        nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());

        // First path
        let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
        let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];

        for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
                assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);

                if idx == 0 { // routing node
                        let session_priv = [3; 32];
                        let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
                        let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
                        let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
                        let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
                        // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
                        // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
                        if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
                                *amt_msat = 99_000;
                        } else { panic!() }
                        let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
                        payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
                }

                node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);

                if idx == 0 {
                        let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
                        check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
                        payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
                        assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
                } else {
                        let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                        assert!(events_2.is_empty());
                }

                prev_node = node;
        }

        // Second path
        let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);

        claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
}

fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {

        let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
        let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
        let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let src_idx = 0;
        let dst_idx = 1;

        // Create channels for each amount
        let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
        let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
        let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
        for i in 0..routing_node_count {
                let routing_node = 2 + i;
                let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
                src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
                let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
                dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
                let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
                expected_paths.push(path);
        }
        let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();

        // Create a route for each amount
        let example_amount = 100000;
        let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
        let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
        for i in 0..routing_node_count {
                let routing_node = 2 + i;
                let mut path = sample_path.clone();
                path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
                path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
                path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
                path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
                path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
                route.paths.push(path);
        }

        // Send payment with manually set total_msat
        let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
        let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
        nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());

        let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
        let mut amount_received = 0;
        for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
                let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);

                let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
                amount_received += current_path_amount;
                let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
                pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
        }

        claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
}

#[test]
fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
        do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
        do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
}

#[test]
fn test_simple_mpp() {
        // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
        let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;

        let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
        let path = route.paths[0].clone();
        route.paths.push(path);
        route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
        route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
        route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
        route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
        route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
        route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
        claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
}

#[test]
fn test_preimage_storage() {
        // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;

        {
                let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
                let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        }
        // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
        // values from previous calls.
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
                        match &purpose {
                                PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
                                        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
                                },
                                _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
                        }
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
        // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;

        let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
        let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
        let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
        let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);

        // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
        // resulting events.
        macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
                ($payment_hash: expr) => {
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                        // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
                        // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
                        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
                        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                        // We should fail the payment back
                        let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                        match events.pop().unwrap() {
                                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
                                        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
                                },
                                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                        }
                }
        }

        let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
        // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
        let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];

        // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);

        // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);

        // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
}

#[test]
fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
        // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
        // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
        // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
        // error.
        //
        // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
        // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
        // commitment at same time.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channel
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };

        // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);

        // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
        let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);

        // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
        let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
        let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
        let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
        let watchtower = {
                let new_monitor = {
                        let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
                        let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
                                        &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
                        assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
                        new_monitor
                };
                let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
                assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                watchtower
        };
        let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
        // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
        // transaction lock time requirements here.
        chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
        watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);

        // Try to update ChannelMonitor
        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);

        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        {
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
                let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
                if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
                        assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                } else { assert!(false); }
        }
        // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
}

#[test]
fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
        // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
        // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
        // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
        // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channel
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };

        // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);

        // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
        route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;

        // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
        let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
        let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
        let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
        let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
                Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
        );
        let watchtower_alice = {
                let new_monitor = {
                        let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
                        let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
                                        &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
                        assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
                        new_monitor
                };
                let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
                assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                watchtower
        };
        let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
        // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
        // requirements here.
        const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
        alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
        watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);

        // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
        let alice_state = {
                let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                txn.remove(0)
        };

        // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
        let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
        let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
        let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
        let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
        let watchtower_bob = {
                let new_monitor = {
                        let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
                        let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
                                        &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
                        assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
                        new_monitor
                };
                let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
                assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                watchtower
        };
        watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);

        // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
        let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
        {
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
                let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
                if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
                        // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
                        assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
                        assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                        assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
                } else { assert!(false); }
        }
        // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
        watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);

        // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
        let bob_state_y;
        {
                let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
                bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
        };

        // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
        let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
        check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
        check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
                [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
        {
                let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
                assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
                check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
                // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
                // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
                check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
        // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
        // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
        // message).
        //
        // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
        // registration, violating our API guarantees.
        //
        // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
        // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
        // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
        // before receiving funding_signed.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create an initial channel
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
        let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);

        // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);

        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);

        let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
        nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
        assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
                [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
        // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
        // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
        // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
        // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
        // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
        // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
        let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
        let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
        assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
        check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);

        // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
        let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
        connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
        // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
        // this test before #653 fix.
        chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);

        let htlc_timeout = {
                let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
                check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
                node_txn[0].clone()
        };

        connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
        expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
}

fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
        // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
        // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
        // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
        //
        // Steps of the test:
        // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
        // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
        // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
        // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
        // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
        //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
        // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
        // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);

        // Steps (1) and (2):
        // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
        let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);

        // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
        let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
        check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
        assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
        check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
        assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
        assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);

        // Steps (3) and (4):
        // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
        // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
        let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
        let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes

        // Bob force-closes
        if !broadcast_alice {
                force_closing_node = 1;
                counterparty_node = 0;
        }
        nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
                let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
                        true => alice_txn.clone(),
                        false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
                };
                connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
                if broadcast_alice {
                        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                }
        }

        // Step (5):
        // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
        // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);

        let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
        assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
        assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);

        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
        expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
        // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
        if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
                let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
                                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                };
        }
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
        // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
        // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);

        let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
                        (*msg).clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        let bob_updates = match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
                        (*updates).clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                        (*msg).clone()
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

        // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
        // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
        let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
        if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
        if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
                connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
                // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
                if broadcast_alice {
                        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                }
                let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
                if broadcast_alice {
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
                        check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
                } else {
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
                        check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
                }
        }

        // Step (6):
        // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
        // broadcasted commitment transaction.
        {
                let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
                        true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
                        false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
                };
                // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
                // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
                // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
                let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
                if broadcast_alice {
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
                        check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
                } else {
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
                        check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
                        assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
        do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
        do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
        do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
        do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
}

#[test]
fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
        // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
        // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create an first channel channel
        nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Create an second channel
        nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
        // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
        open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;

        // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
        // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
        nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
        {
                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match &events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
        {
                let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match &events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
                                assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
                                assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
        // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
        // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
        //
        // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
        // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
        // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
        // updating logic for the existing channel.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create an initial channel
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

        // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
        // that it is rejected.
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
        {
                let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
                                // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
                                // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
                                // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
                                // move forward with it.
                                assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);

        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);

        let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
        let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();

        // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
        // temporary one).

        // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
        // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
        // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
        open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
        {
                let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
                                // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
                                // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
                                assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
        create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event

        let (_, funding_created) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
                // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
                // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
                // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
                let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
                let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
                as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
        };
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
        // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
        // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);

        // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
        {
                let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                match events[0] {
                        MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
                                // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
                                // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
                                assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
                                assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        },
                        _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
                }
        }

        // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
        // everything is functional.
        nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
        {
                let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
                assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
                added_monitors.clear();
        }
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);

        let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
        let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
        update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
}

#[test]
fn test_error_chans_closed() {
        // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
        //
        // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
        // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
        // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Create some initial channels
        let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
        let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
        let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);

        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
        assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);

        // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
        nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);

        // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
        nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
                [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);

        // A null channel ID should close all channels
        let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
        nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
                [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                        assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        match events[1] {
                MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
                        assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
        // peer_disconnected.
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);

        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
}

#[test]
fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
        // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
        //
        // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
        // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
        // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
        // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
        //
        // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
        // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
        // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

        let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

        // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
        // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
        // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
        // its length.
        let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
        let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
        for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
                // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
                output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
        }

        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);

        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
        nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();

        let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
        confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
                [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
        if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
                assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
                        assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
                } else { panic!(); }
        } else { panic!(); }
        assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

        // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
        // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
        // as its not 32 bytes long.
        let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
                version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
                input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
                        previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
                                txid: tx.txid(),
                                vout: idx as u32,
                        },
                        script_sig: Script::new(),
                        sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
                        witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
                }).collect(),
                output: vec![TxOut {
                        value: 1000,
                        script_pubkey: Script::new(),
                }]
        };
        check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
        mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

#[test]
fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
        // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
        // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
        // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
        // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
        //
        // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
        // immediately operational after opening.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
        let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);

        // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);

        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
        let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
        confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
        // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
        // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
        // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
        let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));

        confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
        assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
        connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
        expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
        // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
        // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
        // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
        // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
        // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
        // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
        // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
        // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
        // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
        // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
        // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
        // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
        // until we learned about an additional block.
        //
        // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
        // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
        let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
        let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
        assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);

        let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
        if !test_height_before_timelock {
                connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
        }
        nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
                &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
        if test_height_before_timelock {
                // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
                // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
                assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
                assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
        } else {
                // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
                let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
                assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
                assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
                check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
                // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
                // timelock is up).
                let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
                assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);

                // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
                // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
                // additional block built on top of the current chain.
                nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
                        &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
                assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
                assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
                expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
        do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
        do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
}

fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);

        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
                .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();

        let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);

        {
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        }
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
        expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);

        {
                // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
                nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
                // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
                // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
                // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
                // the first HTLC delivered above.
        }

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
        nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

        if test_for_second_fail_panic {
                // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
                nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);

                let expected_destinations = vec![
                        HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
                        HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
                ];
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
                nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);

                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);

                let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
                assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
                if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
                if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
                if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
                if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
        } else {
                // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
                nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);

                expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
        // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
        // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
        // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
        // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
        do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
}

#[test]
fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
        // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
        // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
        do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
}

#[test]
fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
        // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
        // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
        let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);

        let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
                .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
        let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
        route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
                // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
                if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
                        core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
        });

        let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);

        let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
        let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);

        let session_privs = {
                // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
                // ultimately have, just not right away.
                let mut dup_route = route.clone();
                dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
                nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
        };
        nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
                &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        {
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
        }
        assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());

        nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        {
                let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());

                nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);

                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

                let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());

                nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);

                // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
                // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
                // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
        }
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
        nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
        nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();

        check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);

        let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);

        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);

        let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);

        expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());

        nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
                &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);

        do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
        expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
}

#[test]
fn test_double_partial_claim() {
        // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
        // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
        // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
        // amount.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);

        let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
        assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
        route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
                // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
                if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
                        core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
        });

        send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
        // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
        // amount of time to respond to.

        // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
        connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
        connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later

        let failed_destinations = vec![
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
                HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
        ];
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);

        pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);

        // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);

        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
        let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
        pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);

        // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
        // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
        nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
        assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
}

/// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
enum ExposureEvent {
        /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
        AtHTLCForward,
        /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
        AtHTLCReception,
        /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
        AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
}

fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
        // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
        // policy.
        //
        // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
        // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
        // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
        // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
        // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
        // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
        // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
        // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.

        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
        config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
                // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
                // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
                // originally written.
                MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
        } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
        let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
        open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
        if on_holder_tx {
                open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
        }
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
        let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);

        let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();

        let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);

        if on_holder_tx {
                let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
                let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
                let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
                chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
        }

        nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
        nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

        nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

        let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
        let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
        update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);

        // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
        let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);

        let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
                (chan.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
                chan.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
        };
        let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
        let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;

        let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
        let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;

        let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
        let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;

        if on_holder_tx {
                if dust_outbound_balance {
                        // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
                        // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
                        // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
                        for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
                                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
                                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                        }
                } else {
                        // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
                        // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
                        // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
                        for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
                                route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
                        }
                }
        } else {
                if dust_outbound_balance {
                        // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
                        // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
                        for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
                                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
                                nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                        }
                } else {
                        // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
                        // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
                        for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
                                route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
                        }
                }
        }

        if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
                route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
                        if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
                // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
                if on_holder_tx {
                        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
                                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                } else {
                        unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
                                ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
                }
        } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
                let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
                nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                        RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
                assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
                let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
                // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
                if on_holder_tx {
                        // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
                        let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
                        let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
                        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
                } else {
                        // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
                        nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
                                format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
                                        dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
                                        max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
                }
        } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
                route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
                // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
                // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
                // to cross the threshold.
                for _ in 0..20 {
                        let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
                        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
                }
                {
                        let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                        *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
                }
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
                nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
        }

        let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
        added_monitors.clear();
}

fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
}

#[test]
fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
        do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
}

#[test]
fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
        let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);

        let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();

        let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let mut tx = match events[0] {
                Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
                        // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
                        Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
                                value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
                        }]}
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
        // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
        match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
                Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
                        assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
                },
                _ => panic!()
        }

        // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
        tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
        get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}

#[test]
fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
        // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
        // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
        // later, but for now we only accept the update.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);

        // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = 5000;
        }

        // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = 1000;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
        // it.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = 2000;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
                        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
        // channel.
        {
                let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
                *feerate_lock = 1000;
        }
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
                        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
                        check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
                                err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
                                [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
                        check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
                        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };
}

fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
        let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
        let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
                min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
        let recv_value = 100_000;

        create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);

        let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
        let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
                let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
                        Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
                (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
        } else {
                let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
                (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
        };
        let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
        nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
        let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
        commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
        expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);

        if valid_delta {
                expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
                        None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());

                claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
        } else {
                expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);

                check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);

                let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);

                expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
        do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
        do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
        do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
        do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
}

#[test]
fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
        // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
        // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
        let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
        let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
                let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
                        if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
                                if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
                                        Some(())
                                } else {
                                        None
                                }
                        } else {
                                None
                        }
                );
                assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
        };

        // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
        // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
        let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
                // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
                check_disconnect_event(node, false);

                // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
                for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
                        node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
                        check_disconnect_event(node, false);
                }

                // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
                node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_disconnect_event(node, true);

                // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
                node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_disconnect_event(node, true);
        };

        create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);

        // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
        *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
        let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
        nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);

        // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
        let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);

        // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
        // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
        // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
        let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);

        // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
        //
        // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
        // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
        nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        let bob_init = msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        };
        nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
        let alice_init = msgs::Init {
                features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
        };
        nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();

        // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
        // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
        // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
        let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
                nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
        );
        nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
        check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);

        // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
        let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
                if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
                        assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                        Some(msg.clone())
                } else {
                        None
                }
        ).unwrap();
        nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);

        // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
        for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
        }

        // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
        // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
        check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);

        // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
        nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);

        // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
        // waiting on any messages.
        for node in &nodes {
                for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
                        node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
                        check_disconnect_event(node, false);
                }
        }
}

#[test]
fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
        let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
        let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
        };

        // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
        check_outbound_channel_existence(true);

        // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
        for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
                nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
        }

        // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
        nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_outbound_channel_existence(false);

        let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
        match msg_events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
                        assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

#[test]
fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
        let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
        let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
        let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
        nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
        match events[0] {
                Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        };

        // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
        let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
                let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
                let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
                assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
        };

        // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
        check_inbound_channel_existence(true);

        // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
        for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
                nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
                check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
        }

        // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
        nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
        check_inbound_channel_existence(false);

        let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
        assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
        match msg_events[0] {
                MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
                        assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
                },
                _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
        }
        check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}

fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
        // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
        // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
        // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
        //
        // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
        // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
        // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let (persister, chain_monitor);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let nodes_0_deserialized;
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);

        let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
        let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;

        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
        send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);

        let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
        let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);

        nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);

        nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
        check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
        expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);

        for dest in &[1, 2] {
                let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
                commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
                check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
        }

        let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
                get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
        let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
        nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
                RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);

        let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
        nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
        assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());

        if do_reload {
                let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
                let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
                let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
                reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);

                nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
                nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());

                reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
                reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
        }

        let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
        assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
        if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
                assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
        } else { panic!(); }
        if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
                assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
        } else { panic!(); }
        if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
        if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }

        // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
        // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
        get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
}

#[test]
fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
        do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
        do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
}