_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
  27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  63         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  64         cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 100
 101         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 102         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 118 }
 119
 120 #[test]
 121 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 122         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 123         // them.
 124         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 126         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 127         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 129         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 130
 131         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 132                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 133                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 134                 },
 135                 _ => panic!()
 136         }
 137 }
 138
 139 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 140         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 141         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 142         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 143         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 144         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 145         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 146         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 147         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 148
 149         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 150         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 151         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 152         let opt_anchors = false;
 153         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 154         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 155
 156         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 157         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 158         if !send_from_initiator {
 159                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 160                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 161         }
 162         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 163
 164         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 165         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 166         if send_from_initiator {
 167                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 168                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 169         }
 170         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 171         {
 172                 let mut lock;
 173                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 174                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 175                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 176         }
 177
 178         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 179         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 180         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 181
 182         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 183         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 184         if send_from_initiator {
 185                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 186                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 187                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 188                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 189                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 190         } else {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 192         }
 193 }
 194
 195 #[test]
 196 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 197         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 198         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 203         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 204         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 205         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 206         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 208
 209         // balancing
 210         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 211
 212         // A                                        B
 213         // update_fee                            ->
 214         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 215         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 216         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 217         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 218         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 219         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 220         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 221         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 222         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 223         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 224         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 225         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 226         //                                       <- RAA
 227         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 228
 229         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 230         {
 231                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 232                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 233         }
 234         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 236
 237         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 238         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 239         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 240                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 241                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 242                 },
 243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 244         };
 245
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 247
 248         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 249         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 250         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 252
 253         let payment_event = {
 254                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 255                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 256                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 257         };
 258         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 259         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 260
 261         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 262         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 263         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 264         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 267
 268         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 269         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 270         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 275         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 277         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 278         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 279         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 280         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 282
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 284         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 286         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 287         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 288         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 289         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 291
 292         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 293         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 294         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 296
 297         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 298         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 300
 301         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 302         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 303
 304         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 305         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 306         match events_2[0] {
 307                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 308                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 309         }
 310
 311         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 313 }
 314
 315 #[test]
 316 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 317         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 318         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 319         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 320         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 321         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 322         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 323         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 324
 325         // balancing
 326         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 327
 328         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 329         {
 330                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 331                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 332         }
 333         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 334         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 335
 336         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 337         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 338         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 339                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 340                         update_fee.as_ref()
 341                 },
 342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 343         };
 344
 345         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 346
 347         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 348         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 349         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 350         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 351
 352         let payment_event = {
 353                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 354                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 355                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 356         };
 357         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 358         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 359
 360         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 361         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 362         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 363         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 366
 367         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 369
 370         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 371 }
 372
 373 #[test]
 374 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 375         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 376         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 377         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 378         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 379         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 380
 381         // A                                        B
 382         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 383         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 384         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 385         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 386         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 387         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 388         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 389         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 390         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 391         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 392         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 393         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 394         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 395         //                                          B should send no response here
 396         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 397         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 398         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 399
 400         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 401         let initial_feerate;
 402         {
 403                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 404                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 405                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 406         }
 407         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 409
 410         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 411         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 412         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 413                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 414                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 415                 },
 416                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 417         };
 418
 419         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 420         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 421         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 422         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 424
 425         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 426         // transaction:
 427         {
 428                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 429                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 430         }
 431         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 432         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 433         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 434
 435         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 436         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 437                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 438                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 439         };
 440
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 442
 443         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 444         // Deliver (3)
 445         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 446
 447         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 448         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 449         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 450         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 451         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 452         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 453         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 454         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 455         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 456         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 457         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 458
 459         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 460         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 461         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 463         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 464
 465         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 466         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 468
 469         // Delever (4)
 470         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 471         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 473
 474         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 475         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 477
 478         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 479         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 480         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 482
 483         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 484         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 485         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 486 }
 487
 488 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 489         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 490         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 491         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 492         // Node objects.
 493
 494         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 495         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 496         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 497         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 498
 499         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 500                 let block = Block {
 501                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 502                         txdata: vec![],
 503                 };
 504                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 505                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 506         }
 507
 508         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 509         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 510         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 511
 512         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 513         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 514         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 517         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 518
 519         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 520
 521         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 522         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 524         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 527         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 528         {
 529                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 530                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 531                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 532                 added_monitors.clear();
 533         }
 534         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 537         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 538         {
 539                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 541                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 542                 added_monitors.clear();
 543         }
 544
 545         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 546         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 547
 548         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 549         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 550
 551         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 552         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 553         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 554         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 555 }
 556
 557 #[test]
 558 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 559         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 560         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 561         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 562         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 563         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 564         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 584         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 585         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 586
 587         {
 588                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 589                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 590         }
 591         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 593
 594         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 595         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 596         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 597                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 598                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 599                 },
 600                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 601         };
 602         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 603
 604         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 605         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 607
 608         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 609         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 611
 612         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 613         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 614         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 616
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 618         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 619         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 620 }
 621
 622 #[test]
 623 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 627         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 628         let channel_value = 5000;
 629         let push_sats = 700;
 630         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 631         let channel_id = chan.2;
 632         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 633         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 634
 635         let opt_anchors = false;
 636
 637         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 638         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 639         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 640         // remote limit.
 641         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 642         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 643         {
 644                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 645                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 646         }
 647         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 649         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 650
 651         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 652
 653         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 654
 655         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 656         {
 657                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 658
 659                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 660                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 661                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 662                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 663                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 664                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 665         }
 666
 667         {
 668                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 669                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 670                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 671         }
 672         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 673         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 675
 676         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 677
 678         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 679         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 680         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 681                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 682                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 683                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 684                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 685                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 686                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 687         };
 688         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 689                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 690                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 691                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 692                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 693                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 694                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 695                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 696         };
 697
 698         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 699         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 700                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 701
 702         let res = {
 703                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 704                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 705                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 706                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 707                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 708                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 709                         push_sats,
 710                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 711                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 712                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 713                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 714                         &mut htlcs,
 715                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 716                 );
 717                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 718         };
 719
 720         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 721                 channel_id: chan.2,
 722                 signature: res.0,
 723                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 724         };
 725
 726         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 727                 channel_id: chan.2,
 728                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 729         };
 730
 731         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 732
 733         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 734         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 735         //Should produce and error.
 736         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 737         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 739         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 741 }
 742
 743 #[test]
 744 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 745         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 746         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 747         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 748         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 749         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 750
 751         // balancing
 752         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 753
 754         {
 755                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 756                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 757         }
 758         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 760
 761         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 762         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 763         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 764                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 765                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 766                 },
 767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 768         };
 769         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 771         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773
 774         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 775
 776         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 777         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 778         {
 779                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 780                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 781                 added_monitors.clear();
 782         }
 783         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 784         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 785         // node[1] has nothing to do
 786
 787         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 788         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 790
 791         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 792         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 793         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 797         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 798
 799         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 800         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 801         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 802         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 803         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 804         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 805
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 807         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 809         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 810
 811         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 813         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 814
 815         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 817         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 818         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 819
 820         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 822         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 823
 824         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 825
 826         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 827         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 828         match events[0] {
 829                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 831         };
 832
 833         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 834
 835         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 836         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 837         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 838         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 839         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 840 }
 841
 842 #[test]
 843 fn test_update_fee() {
 844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 847         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 848         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 849         let channel_id = chan.2;
 850
 851         // A                                        B
 852         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 853         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 854         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 855         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 856         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 857         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 858         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 859         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 860         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 861         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 862         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 863         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 864
 865         // Create and deliver (1)...
 866         let feerate;
 867         {
 868                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 869                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 870                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 871         }
 872         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 874
 875         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 876         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 877         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 878                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 879                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 880                 },
 881                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 882         };
 883         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 884
 885         // Generate (2) and (3):
 886         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 887         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 889
 890         // Deliver (2):
 891         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 892         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 894
 895         // Create and deliver (4)...
 896         {
 897                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 898                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 899         }
 900         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 902         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 903         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 904         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 905                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 906                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 907                 },
 908                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 909         };
 910
 911         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 912         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 914         // ... creating (5)
 915         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 916         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 917
 918         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 919         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 921         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 922         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 923
 924         // Deliver (5):
 925         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 926         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 928
 929         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 930         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 931         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 932         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 933         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 934         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 935         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 936         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 938
 939         // Deliver (7)
 940         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 942         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 943         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 944
 945         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 947         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 948
 949         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 950         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 951         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 952         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 953         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 954 }
 955
 956 #[test]
 957 fn fake_network_test() {
 958         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 959         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 960         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 961         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 962         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 963         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 964
 965         // Create some initial channels
 966         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 967         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 968         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 969
 970         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 971         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 973         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 974         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 975
 976         // Send some more payments
 977         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 978         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 979         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 980
 981         // Test failure packets
 982         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 983         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 984
 985         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 986         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 987
 988         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 995
 996         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 997         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 998         hops.push(RouteHop {
 999                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1000                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1001                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1002                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1003                 fee_msat: 0,
1004                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1005         });
1006         hops.push(RouteHop {
1007                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011                 fee_msat: 0,
1012                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013         });
1014         hops.push(RouteHop {
1015                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1017                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1019                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1020                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1021         });
1022         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1024         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1025
1026         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1027         hops.push(RouteHop {
1028                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1030                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032                 fee_msat: 0,
1033                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034         });
1035         hops.push(RouteHop {
1036                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040                 fee_msat: 0,
1041                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1048                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050         });
1051         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1053         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1054
1055         // Claim the rebalances...
1056         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1057         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1058
1059         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1060         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061
1062         // Send some payments across both channels
1063         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1065         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1066
1067
1068         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1069         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1070         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1071         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1072
1073         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1074
1075         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1077         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1078
1079         // Close down the channels...
1080         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095 }
1096
1097 #[test]
1098 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1099         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1100         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1101         // commitment dance rounds.
1102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1105         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1106         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1107         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1108
1109         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1110         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1111                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1113                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114         }
1115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1123         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124         // another HTLC.
1125         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1126         {
1127                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1128                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1129                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1130                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1131         }
1132
1133         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1134         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1135         {
1136                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1138         }
1139
1140         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1141         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1142         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1143         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1147         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1148         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152
1153         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1154         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1155         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156
1157         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158
1159         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163
1164         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1167         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1174                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175         }
1176         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192
1193         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1194         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1195         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196                 match event {
1197                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1198                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199                         },
1200                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1201                 };
1202         }
1203
1204         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1205                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1206         }
1207
1208         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1209 }
1210
1211 #[test]
1212 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1213         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1214         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1218         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219
1220         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226
1227         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228
1229         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1230         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231
1232         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1233         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234
1235         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1236         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1238 }
1239
1240 #[test]
1241 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1242         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1243         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1244         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1248         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249
1250         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1251
1252         // balancing
1253         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254
1255         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256
1257         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1258         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1259         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260
1261         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1262         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1263         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1265
1266         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1267         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1268
1269         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1270         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1271         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1272                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1273                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1274                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 }
1277         }
1278         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1279
1280         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1282         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1283         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1284
1285         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1287
1288         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1289
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1291         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1292
1293         let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1294                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1295                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1296
1297                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1298
1299                 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1300                 &claim_txn[3]
1301         } else {
1302                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1303                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1304
1305                 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1306
1307                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1308
1309                 &claim_txn[7]
1310         };
1311
1312         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1313         assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1314         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1315
1316         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1317         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1318         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1319
1320         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1321         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1322         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1323         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1324
1325         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1326         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1327         for e in events {
1328                 match e {
1329                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1330                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1331                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1332                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1333                         },
1334                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1335                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1336                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1337                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1338                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1339                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1340                         },
1341                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1342                 }
1343         }
1344 }
1345
1346 #[test]
1347 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1348         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1351         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1352         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1353
1354         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1355         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1356
1357         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1358         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1359         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1360         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1361         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1362         match err {
1363                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1364                         match &fails[0] {
1365                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1366                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1367                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1368                         }
1369                 },
1370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1371         }
1372         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1373         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1374
1375         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1376 }
1377
1378 #[test]
1379 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1380         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1381         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1382         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1383         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1384         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1385
1386         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1387         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1388         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1389         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1390
1391         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1392
1393         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1394         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1395         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1396         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1397                 channel_id: chan.2,
1398                 htlc_id: 0,
1399                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1400                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1401                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1402                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1403         };
1404
1405         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1406
1407         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1408         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1409         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1410
1411         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1412
1413         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1414
1415         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1416         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1417         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1418                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1419                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1420                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1421                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1422                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1423
1424                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1425                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1426                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1427                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1428                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1429         };
1430         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1431                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1433                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1434                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1435                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1436                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1437                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1438         };
1439
1440         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1441         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1442                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1443
1444         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1445         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1446         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1447
1448         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1449                 offered: false,
1450                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1451                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1452                 payment_hash,
1453                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1454         };
1455
1456         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1457
1458         let res = {
1459                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1461                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1462                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1463                         commitment_number,
1464                         95000,
1465                         local_chan_balance,
1466                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1467                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1468                         feerate_per_kw,
1469                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1470                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1471                 );
1472                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1473         };
1474
1475         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1476                 channel_id: chan.2,
1477                 signature: res.0,
1478                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1479         };
1480
1481         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1482         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1483         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1484
1485         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1486         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1487                 channel_id: chan.2,
1488                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1489                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1490         };
1491         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1492
1493         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1494         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1495         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1496         match events[0] {
1497                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1498                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1499                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1500                 },
1501                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1502         };
1503         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1504                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1505
1506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 }
1508
1509 #[test]
1510 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1511         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1512         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1513         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1514         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1515         // this situation.
1516         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1518         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1519         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1520
1521         let opt_anchors = false;
1522
1523         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1524         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1525         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1526
1527         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1528
1529         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1530         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1531                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1532         }
1533
1534         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1535         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1536         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1537                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1538         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1539         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1540 }
1541
1542 #[test]
1543 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1544         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1545         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1549
1550         let opt_anchors = false;
1551
1552         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1553         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1554         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1555         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1556         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1557         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1558         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1559
1560         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1561         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1562                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1563         }
1564
1565         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1566         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1567         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1568         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1569         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1570         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1571         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1572         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1573         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1574                 channel_id: chan.2,
1575                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1576                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1577                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1578                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1579                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1580         };
1581
1582         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1583         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1584         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1585         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1586         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1587         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1589         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1590 }
1591
1592 #[test]
1593 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1594         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1595         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1596         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1597         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1598
1599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1601         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1602
1603         let opt_anchors = false;
1604
1605         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1606         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1607         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1608         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1609         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1610         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1611         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1612
1613         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1614                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1615         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1616         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1617         // commitment transaction fee.
1618         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1619
1620         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1621         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1622                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1623         }
1624
1625         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1626         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1627         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1628                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1629 }
1630
1631 #[test]
1632 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1633         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1634         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1635         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1636         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1639         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1640
1641         let opt_anchors = false;
1642
1643         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1644         // HTLC.
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1647         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1648                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1649
1650         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1651         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1652         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1653         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1654         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1655         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1656         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1657
1658         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1659         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1660         match msg_events[0] {
1661                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1662                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1663                 },
1664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1665         }
1666 }
1667
1668 #[test]
1669 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1670         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1671         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1677
1678         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1679         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1680         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684
1685         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1686         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691
1692         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1693         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1694         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1695         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 }
1697
1698 #[test]
1699 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1703         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1704         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1705         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1706
1707         let feemsat = 239;
1708         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1709         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1710         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1711         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1712
1713         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1714         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1715         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1716         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1717
1718         // Add a pending HTLC.
1719         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1720         let payment_event_1 = {
1721                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1722                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1723
1724                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1725                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1726                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1727         };
1728         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1729
1730         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1731         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1732         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1733         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1734         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1735
1736         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1737         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1738         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1739         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1740         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1741         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1742         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1743         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1744                 channel_id: chan.2,
1745                 htlc_id: 1,
1746                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1747                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1748                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1749                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1750         };
1751
1752         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1753         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1754         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1755         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1756         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1757         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1759         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1760 }
1761
1762 #[test]
1763 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1764         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1765         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1766         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1767         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1768         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1769         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1770         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1771         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1772         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1773
1774         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1775         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1776         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1777
1778         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780 }
1781
1782 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1783         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1784 }
1785
1786 #[test]
1787 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1788         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1789         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1790         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1791         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1792         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1793         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1794         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1795         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1796         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1797         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1798
1799         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1800         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801
1802         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1803         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1804
1805         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1806                 ($node: expr) => {{
1807                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1808                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1809                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1810                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1811                         payment_event
1812                 }}
1813         }
1814
1815         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1816         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1817         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1818         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1819
1820         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1821
1822         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1823         {
1824                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1825                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1826                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1827                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1828                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1829                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1830                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1831         }
1832
1833         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1834         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1835         loop {
1836                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1837                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1838                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1839                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1840                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1841                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1842                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1843                         break;
1844                 }
1845                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1846
1847                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1848                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1849                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1850                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1851                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1852                 );
1853
1854                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1855                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1856                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1857                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1858                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1859         }
1860
1861         // adding pending output.
1862         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1863         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1864         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1865         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1866         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1867         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1868         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1869         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1870         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1871         // policy.
1872         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1873         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1874         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1875
1876         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1877         let payment_event_1 = {
1878                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1879                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1880
1881                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1882                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1883                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1884         };
1885         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1886
1887         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1888         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1889         {
1890                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1891                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1892                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1893                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1894         }
1895
1896         // split the rest to test holding cell
1897         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1898         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1899         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1900         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1901         {
1902                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1903                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1904         }
1905
1906         // now see if they go through on both sides
1907         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1908         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1909         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1913
1914         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1915         {
1916                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1917                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1918                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1919                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1920                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1921         }
1922
1923         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1924         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1925         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1927         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929
1930         // flush the pending htlc
1931         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1932         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1934
1935         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1936         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1938         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1939
1940         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1941         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1944
1945         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1946         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1948
1949         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1950
1951         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1952         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1953         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1954
1955         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1957
1958         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1959         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1960         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1961         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1962         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1963         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1964
1965         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1966         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1967         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1968         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1969
1970         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1971         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1972
1973         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1974         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1975         match events[0] {
1976                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1977                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1978                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1979                         match &purpose {
1980                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1981                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1982                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1983                                 },
1984                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1985                         }
1986                 },
1987                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1988         }
1989         match events[1] {
1990                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1991                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1992                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1993                         match &purpose {
1994                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1995                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1996                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1997                                 },
1998                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1999                         }
2000                 },
2001                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2002         }
2003
2004         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2005         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2006         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2007
2008         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2009         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2011
2012         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2013         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2014         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2015         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2016         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2017
2018         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2019         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2020 }
2021
2022 #[test]
2023 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2024         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2025         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2026         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2027         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2028         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2029         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2030         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2031         // To test this we:
2032         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2033         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2034         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2035         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2036         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2037         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2038         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2039         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2040         //    claim,
2041         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2042         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2043         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2044         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2045         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2046         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2047         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2048         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2049         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2050         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2051
2052         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2053         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2054         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2055         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2056         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2057
2058         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2059         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2060         let send_1 = {
2061                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2062                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2063                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2064                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2065                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2066         };
2067
2068         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2069         // initial fulfill/CS.
2070         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2071         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2076         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2077         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2078         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2081
2082         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2083         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2085         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2086         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2087
2088         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2089         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2091         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2092         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2093
2094         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2097
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2104         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2105
2106         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2107         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2109         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2110         // on-chain as necessary).
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2112         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2114         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2116
2117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120
2121         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2122         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2123
2124         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2125         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2126         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2129         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2132         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2133         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2134         let send_2 = {
2135                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2138                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2139                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2140         };
2141
2142         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2143         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2148
2149         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2151         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2152
2153         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2155
2156         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2158         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2159         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2160
2161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2163         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2164
2165         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167
2168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2169         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2170
2171         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2173 }
2174
2175 #[test]
2176 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2177         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2178         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2179         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2180         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2181         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2182         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2183
2184         // Create some initial channels
2185         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2186         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2187         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2188         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2189
2190         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2191         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2192         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2193         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2194         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2195         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2196
2197         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2198         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2199         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2200         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2201         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2202
2203         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2204         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2207         {
2208                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2209                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2210                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2211                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213         }
2214         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2215         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2216         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2217         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2218         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2219
2220         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2221         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2222
2223         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2224         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2225         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2226         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2228         {
2229                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2231                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2232                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2233                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2234                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2235         }
2236         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2237         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2238         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2239         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2240         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2241
2242         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2243                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2244                         {
2245                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2246                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2247                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2248
2249                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2250                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2251                                 match events[0] {
2252                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2253                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2254                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2255                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2256                                         },
2257                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2258                                 };
2259                         }
2260                 }
2261         }
2262
2263         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2264         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2265         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2266         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2267         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2268         let node2_commitment_txid;
2269         {
2270                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2271                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2272                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2273                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2274
2275                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2276                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2277                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2278                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2279                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2280         }
2281         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2282         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2283         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2284         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2285         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2286
2287         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2288         // confusing us in the following tests.
2289         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2290
2291         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2292         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2293         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2294         // buffer space).
2295
2296         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2297                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2298                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2299                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2300                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2301                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2302                                 msg.clone()
2303                         },
2304                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305                 };
2306                 match events[1] {
2307                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2308                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2309                         },
2310                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2311                 }
2312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2313
2314                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2315                 {
2316                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2317                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2318                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2319                                         false
2320                                 } else { true }
2321                         });
2322                 }
2323
2324                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2325
2326                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2327                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2328
2329                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2330                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2331                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2332                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2333                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2334                                 msg.clone()
2335                         },
2336                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337                 };
2338                 match events[1] {
2339                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2340                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2341                         },
2342                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2343                 }
2344                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2345                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2346
2347                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2348                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2349                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2350         };
2351         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2352         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2353         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2354         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2355
2356         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2357         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2358         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2359 }
2360
2361 #[test]
2362 fn test_justice_tx() {
2363         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2364         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2365         alice_config.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
2366         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2367         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2368         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2369         bob_config.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
2370         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2371         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2372         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2373         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2374         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2375         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2376         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2377         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2378         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2379         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2380         // Create some new channels:
2381         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2382
2383         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2384         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2385         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2386         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2387         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2388         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2389         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2390         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2391         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2394         // Revoke the old state
2395         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2396
2397         {
2398                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399                 {
2400                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2401                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2402                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2403
2404                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2405                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2406                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2407                 }
2408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2409                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2410                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2411
2412                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2414                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2415                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2416                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2417                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2418                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2419                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2420                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2421         }
2422         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2423
2424         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2425         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2426
2427         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2428         // Create some new channels:
2429         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2430         {
2431                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432                 node_txn.clear();
2433         }
2434
2435         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2436         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2437         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2438         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2439         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2440         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2441         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2442         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2443         // Revoke the old state
2444         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2445         {
2446                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447                 {
2448                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2449                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2450                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2451
2452                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2454                 }
2455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2456                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2457
2458                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2459                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2460                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2461                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2462                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2463                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2464                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2465         }
2466         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2467         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2468         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2469 }
2470
2471 #[test]
2472 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2473         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2474         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2475         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2476         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2477         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2478         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2479         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2480         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2481         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2482         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2483         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2484         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2485         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2486         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2487
2488         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2489         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2491         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2492         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2493         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2494
2495         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2496         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2497
2498         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2499         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2500         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2501         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2502         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2503 }
2504
2505 #[test]
2506 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2507         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2508         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2509         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2513
2514         // Create some new channel:
2515         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2516
2517         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2518         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2519         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2520         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2521         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2522
2523         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2524         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2525         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2526         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2528         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2529         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2530         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2531         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532
2533         //Revoke the old state
2534         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2535
2536         {
2537                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2539                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2540                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2541                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2542                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2543                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2544                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2545
2546                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2547                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2548
2549                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2550                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2551
2552                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2553                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2554                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2555                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2556                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2557                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2558                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2559                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2560
2561                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2562                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2563                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2564         }
2565         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2566         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2567         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2568 }
2569
2570 #[test]
2571 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2572         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2573         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2574         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2578
2579         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2580
2581         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2582         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2583         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2584         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2585         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2586         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2587
2588         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2589         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2590
2591         //Revoke the old state
2592         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2593
2594         {
2595                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2597                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2598                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2599                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2600                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2601                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2602                 match events[1] {
2603                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2604                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2605                 }
2606
2607                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2608                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2609
2610                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2611                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2612
2613                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2615                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2617                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2618                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2619                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2620
2621                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2622                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2623                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2624                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2625
2626                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2627                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2628                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629
2630                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2631                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2632                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2634                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2635                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2636                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2637                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2638         }
2639         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2640         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2641         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2642 }
2643
2644 #[test]
2645 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2646         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2647         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2648         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2649         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2650         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2651         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2652         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2653         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2654         // towards B.
2655         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2656         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2657         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2658         // PaymentSent event).
2659
2660         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2661         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2663         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2664
2665         // Create some initial channels
2666         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2667         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2668
2669         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2670         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2671         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2672         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2673         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2674
2675         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2676         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2677         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2678
2679         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2680         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2681
2682         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2683         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2684         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2685         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2686         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2687         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2688         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2689         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2690         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2692         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2693         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2694         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2695         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2696         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2697
2698         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2699         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2701         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2702         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2703         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2704         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2705         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2706         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2707         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2708         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2709         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2711         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2713         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2714         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2715
2716         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2717         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2718         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2719         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720         {
2721                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2722                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2723                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2724                 added_monitors.clear();
2725         }
2726         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2727         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2728         match forwarded_events[0] {
2729                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2730                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731         }
2732         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2733         match forwarded_events[1] {
2734                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2735                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2736                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2737                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2738                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2739                 },
2740                 _ => panic!()
2741         }
2742         match forwarded_events[2] {
2743                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2744                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2745                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2746                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2747                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2748                 },
2749                 _ => panic!()
2750         }
2751         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752         {
2753                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2754                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2755                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2757                 added_monitors.clear();
2758         }
2759         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760         match events[0] {
2761                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2762                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2763         }
2764         match events[1] {
2765                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2767         }
2768
2769         match events[2] {
2770                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2771                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2772                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2774                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2775                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776                 },
2777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778         };
2779         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2780                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2781                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2782                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2783                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2784                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2785                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2786                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2787                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2788                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2789                         if $htlc_offered {
2790                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2792                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2793                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2794                         } else {
2795                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2796                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2798                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2799                         }
2800                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2801                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2802                         node_txn.clear();
2803                 } }
2804         }
2805         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2806         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2807         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2808         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2809
2810         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2811         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2812         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2813         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2814         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2815         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2817         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2818         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2819         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2820         let commitment_spend =
2821                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2822                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2823                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2824                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2825                         &node_txn[0]
2826                 } else {
2827                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2828                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2829                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2830                         &node_txn[2]
2831                 };
2832
2833         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2834         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2835         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2836         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2837         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2838         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2839         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2840         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2841         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2842         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2843         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2844         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2845
2846         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2847         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2848         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2849         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2850         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2852         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2854         let mut first_claimed = false;
2855         for event in events {
2856                 match event {
2857                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2858                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2859                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2860                                         first_claimed = true;
2861                                 } else {
2862                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2863                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2864                                 }
2865                         },
2866                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2867                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2868                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2869                 }
2870         }
2871         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2872 }
2873
2874 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2875         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2876         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2877         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2878         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2879         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2880         //            \                                  \
2881         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2882
2883         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2884         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2885         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2886         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2887         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2889         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2890
2891         // Create some intial channels
2892         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2893         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2894
2895         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2896         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2897         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2898
2899         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2900
2901         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2902         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2903         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2904         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2906         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2908
2909         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2910         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2911         match events[0] {
2912                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2913                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2915                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2916                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2917                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2918                 },
2919                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2920         };
2921         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2922         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2924         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2925         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2926         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2928         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2929
2930         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2931         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2932         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2933         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2934         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2935         let timeout_tx;
2936         {
2937                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2938                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2939                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2940                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2941
2942                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2943                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2944
2945                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2946                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2948                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2949
2950                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2951                 node_txn.clear();
2952         }
2953
2954         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2957         {
2958                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2959                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2960                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2961                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2962         }
2963
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2965         {
2966                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2967                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2968                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2969                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2970                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2971                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2972                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2973                 } else {
2974                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2975                 }
2976         }
2977
2978         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2980         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2981         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2982         match events[0] {
2983                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2984                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2985                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2986                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2987                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2988                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2989                 },
2990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2991         };
2992
2993         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2994         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2995         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2996
2997         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2998         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2999
3000         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3002         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3003         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3004         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3005         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3006         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3007         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3008         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009 }
3010
3011 #[test]
3012 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3013         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3014         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3015         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3016 }
3017
3018 #[test]
3019 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3020         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3021         // and fail backward accordingly.
3022
3023         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3024         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3025         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3026         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3027
3028         // Create some initial channels
3029         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3030         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3031
3032         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3033         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3034         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3035         // Revoke the old state
3036         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3037
3038         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3039
3040         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3041         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3042         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3044         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3045
3046         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3048         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3049         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3050         match events[0] {
3051                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3052                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3053                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3054                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3055                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3056                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3057
3058                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3059                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3060                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3061                 },
3062                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3063         }
3064 }
3065
3066 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3067         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3068         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3069         // commitment transaction anymore.
3070         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3071         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3072         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3073         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3074         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3075         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3076         // transactions:
3077         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3078         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3079         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3080         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3081         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3085         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3086
3087         // Create some initial channels
3088         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3089         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3090
3091         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3092         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3093         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3094         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3095         // Revoke the old state
3096         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3097
3098         let value = if use_dust {
3099                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3100                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3101                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3102         } else { 3000000 };
3103
3104         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3105         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3106         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3107
3108         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3109         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3111         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3112         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3113         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3114         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3115         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3116         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3117         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3118         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3119         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3120
3121         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3122         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3124         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3125         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3126         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3127         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3128         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3129         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3131         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3133         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3134         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3135         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137
3138         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3139         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3141         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3142         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3144         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3145         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3146         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3147         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3148         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3149         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3150         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3152         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3153         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3154         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3156
3157         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3158         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3159         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3160         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3161         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3162         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3164
3165         if deliver_bs_raa {
3166                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3167                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3168                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3171                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3172                 match events[0] {
3173                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3174                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3175                 };
3176                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3177                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3178         }
3179
3180         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3181         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3182
3183         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3185         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3186         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3187
3188         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3189         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3190         match events[0] {
3191                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3192                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3193         }
3194         match events[1] {
3195                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3196                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3197                 },
3198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199         }
3200         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3201                 match events[2] {
3202                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3203                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3204                         },
3205                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206                 }
3207                 match events[3] {
3208                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3209                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3210                 };
3211         }
3212         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3214
3215         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3216         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3217         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3218                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220         }
3221         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3222                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3223                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3224                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3225                 },
3226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3227         }
3228         if deliver_bs_raa {
3229                 match events[0] {
3230                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3231                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3232                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3233                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3234                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3235                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236                         },
3237                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3238                 }
3239         }
3240         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3241                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3242                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3243                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3244                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3245                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3247
3248                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3249                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3250                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3251
3252                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3253
3254                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3255                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3256                         match events[0] {
3257                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3258                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3259                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3260                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3261                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3262                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3263                                         }
3264                                 },
3265                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3266                         }
3267                         match events[1] {
3268                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3269                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3270                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3271                                 },
3272                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273                         }
3274                         match events[2] {
3275                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3276                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3277                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3278                                 },
3279                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3280                         }
3281                 },
3282                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283         }
3284
3285         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3286         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3287         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3288 }
3289
3290 #[test]
3291 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3292         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3293         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3294         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3295         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3296 }
3297
3298 #[test]
3299 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3300         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3301         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3302         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3303         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3304 }
3305
3306 #[test]
3307 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3311         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3312         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3313
3314         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3315         {
3316                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3317                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3318                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3319
3320                 let payment_event = {
3321                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3322                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3323                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3324                 };
3325                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3326                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3327         }
3328
3329         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3330         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3331         {
3332                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3333                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3334
3335                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3336         }
3337
3338         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3339         {
3340                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3341
3342                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3343                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3344                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3345                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3346                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3347                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3348
3349                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3350                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3351                         channel_id: chan.2,
3352                         htlc_id: 0,
3353                         amount_msat: 0,
3354                         payment_hash,
3355                         cltv_expiry,
3356                         onion_routing_packet,
3357                 };
3358                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3359         }
3360         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3361         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3362         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3363         match events[0] {
3364                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3365                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3366                 },
3367                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3368         }
3369         match events[1] {
3370                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3371                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3372                 },
3373                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3374         }
3375         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3377 }
3378
3379 #[test]
3380 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3381         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3382         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3383         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3384         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3385         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3386         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3387         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3388
3389         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3390         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3391         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3392         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3394         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3395
3396         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3397         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3398         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3399
3400         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3402         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3404         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3405
3406         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3407         // registering new transactions
3408         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3409         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3410 }
3411
3412 #[test]
3413 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3414         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3418         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3419         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3420         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3421
3422         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3423
3424         let mut payment_event = {
3425                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3426                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3427
3428                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3429                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3430                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3431         };
3432
3433         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3434         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3435
3436         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3437
3438         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3439         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3440         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3441         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3442
3443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3444         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3445         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3447         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3448
3449         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3450         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3451         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3452
3453         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3454         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3456         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3457         let tx = {
3458                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3459                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3460                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3461                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3462                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3463                 node_txn.remove(0)
3464         };
3465
3466         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3467
3468         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3469         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3471         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3472
3473         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3474         {
3475                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3476                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3477         }
3478         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3479         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3480         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3481         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3482         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3483         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3484         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485
3486         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3487 }
3488
3489 #[test]
3490 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3491         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3492         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3493         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3494         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3495
3496         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3499         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3500         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3501
3502         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3503
3504         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3505         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3507         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3508         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3509         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3510
3511         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3512         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513
3514         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3515         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3516 }
3517
3518 #[test]
3519 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3520         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3521         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3522         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3523         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3524         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3525         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3526
3527         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3528         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3529         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3530         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3533         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3534
3535         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3536         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3537
3538         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3539
3540         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3541         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3542
3543         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3544         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3545         // broadcasted.
3546         {
3547                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3548         }
3549
3550         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3551         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3552         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3553         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554
3555         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3556         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 }
3558
3559 #[test]
3560 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3561         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3562         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3563         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3564         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3565         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3566         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3567         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3568
3569         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572
3573         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3574         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3575         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3576         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3577
3578         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581
3582         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3583         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3584         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3585         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586
3587         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3588         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589
3590         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3591         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3592
3593         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3594         {
3595                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3596                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3597                 match events[0] {
3598                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3599                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3600                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3601                         },
3602                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3603                 }
3604                 match events[1] {
3605                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3606                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3607                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3608                         },
3609                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3610                 }
3611                 match events[2] {
3612                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3613                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3614                 }
3615         }
3616
3617         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3618         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3619 }
3620
3621 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3622         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3626         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3627
3628         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3629         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3630                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3631                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3632                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3633                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3634                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3635         } else {
3636                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3637         }
3638
3639         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3640
3641         let payment_event = {
3642                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3643                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3644
3645                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3646                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3647                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3648         };
3649         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3650
3651         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3652                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3653         } else {
3654                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3655                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3656                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3657                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3658                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3659
3660                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3661                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3662                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3663                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3664
3665                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3666                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3667                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3668                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3669                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3670
3671                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3672                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3673                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3674                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3675                                         }
3676                                 }
3677                         }
3678                 }
3679         }
3680
3681         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3684                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3685                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3686                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3687                         //
3688                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3689                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3690                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3691                         //
3692                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3693                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3694                 }
3695                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3696                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3697                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3698         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3699                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3700                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3701         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3702                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3703                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3704         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3705                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3706                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3707         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3708                 // Everything was delivered...
3709                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3710         }
3711
3712         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3713         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3714         match events_1[0] {
3715                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3716                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3717         };
3718
3719         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3722
3723         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3724
3725         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3726         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3727         match events_2[0] {
3728                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3729                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3730                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3731                         match &purpose {
3732                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3733                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3734                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3735                                 },
3736                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3737                         }
3738                 },
3739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3740         }
3741
3742         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3744         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3745
3746         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3748         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3749                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3750                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3751                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3752                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3753                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3754                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3755                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3756                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3757                 },
3758                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3759         };
3760
3761         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3762                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3763
3764                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3765                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3766                 match events_4[0] {
3767                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3768                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3769                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3770                         },
3771                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3772                 }
3773
3774                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3775                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3776                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3777                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3778
3779                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3780                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3781                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3782                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3783
3784                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3785                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3786                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3787                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3788                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3789
3790                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3791                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3792                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3793                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3794                                         }
3795                                 }
3796                         }
3797                 }
3798         }
3799
3800         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3803                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3805                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3806                 } else {
3807                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3808                 }
3809         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3810                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3811                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3812         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3813                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3814                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3815         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3816                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3817                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3818         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3819                 // Everything was delivered...
3820                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3821         }
3822
3823         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3824                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3825         }
3826
3827         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3828         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3830
3831         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3832                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3833         }
3834
3835         // Channel should still work fine...
3836         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3837         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3838         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3839 }
3840
3841 #[test]
3842 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3843         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3844         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3845         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3846         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3847 }
3848
3849 #[test]
3850 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3851         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3852         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3853         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3854         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3855 }
3856
3857 #[test]
3858 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3859         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3860         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3861         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3862         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3863         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3864         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3865         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3866         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3867         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3868
3869         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3870         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871
3872         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3873         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3874         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3875
3876         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3877
3878         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3879         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3880
3881         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3882         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3883         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3884
3885         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3886         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3887         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3888         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3889
3890         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3891         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3892         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3893         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3894         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3895                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3896                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3897                         msg.clone()
3898                 },
3899                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3900         };
3901
3902         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3903         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3904         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3905         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3906         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3907         let chan_id;
3908         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3909                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3910                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3911                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3912                         msg.clone()
3913                 },
3914                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3915         };
3916         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3917                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3918                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3919                         msg.clone()
3920                 },
3921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3922         };
3923         match events_4[2] {
3924                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3925                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3926                 },
3927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3928         }
3929
3930         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3931         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3932         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3933         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3934         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3935         match events_5[0] {
3936                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3937                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3938                 },
3939                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3940         };
3941
3942         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3943         // announcement_signatures.
3944         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3945         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3946         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3947         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3948                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3949                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3950                         msg.clone()
3951                 },
3952                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3953         };
3954
3955         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3956         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3957         // channel_update.
3958         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3959         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3961         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3962                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3963                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3964                 },
3965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3966         };
3967
3968         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3969         // same channel_announcement.
3970         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3971         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3973         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3974                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3975                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3976                         update_msg.clone()
3977                 },
3978                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3979         };
3980
3981         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3982         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3983         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3984         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3985
3986         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3987         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3989
3990         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3991         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3992         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3993
3994         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3995         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3996         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3997
3998         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3999         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4000         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4001         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4002         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4003         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4004                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4005         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4006
4007         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4008         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4009                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4010                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4011                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4012                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4013                         keys_manager,
4014                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4015                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4016                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4017                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4018                         channel_monitors,
4019                 }).unwrap()
4020         };
4021         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4022         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4023
4024         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4025         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4027
4028         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4029
4030         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4031         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4032         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4033         let mut found_announcement = false;
4034         for event in msgs.iter() {
4035                 match event {
4036                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4037                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4038                         },
4039                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4040                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4041                 }
4042         }
4043         assert!(found_announcement);
4044 }
4045
4046 #[test]
4047 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4048         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4049         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4050         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4051         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4055         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4056         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4057
4058         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4059
4060         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4061         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4062         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4063         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4064         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4065         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4066
4067         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4068         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4069         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4070 }
4071
4072 #[test]
4073 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4074         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4075         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4076         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4077         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4078         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4079         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4080         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4081
4082         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4083
4084         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4085         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4086         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4088
4089         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4090         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4091         match events_1[0] {
4092                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4093                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4094         }
4095
4096         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4097         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4099
4100         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4101         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4102         match events_2[0] {
4103                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4104                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4105                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4106                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4107                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4108                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4109                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4110
4111                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4112                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4113                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4114                         match events_3[0] {
4115                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4116                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4117                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4118                                 },
4119                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4120                         }
4121
4122                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4123                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4124                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4125                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4126                 },
4127                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4128         }
4129
4130         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4131         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4132
4133         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4134         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4135         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4136         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4137         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4138         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4139
4140         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4141         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4142         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4143         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4144
4145         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4146         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4147
4148         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4149         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4150
4151         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4152
4153         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4154         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4155         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4156         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4157         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4158         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4159         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4160         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4161         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163
4164         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4165         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4166         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4167         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4168         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4169         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4170         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4172
4173         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4174         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4175         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4176         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4177         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4178         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4179         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4181
4182         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4183         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4184         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4186
4187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4188         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4189         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4191
4192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4193         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4195
4196         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4197
4198         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4199         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4200         match events_5[0] {
4201                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4202                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4203                         match &purpose {
4204                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4205                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4206                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4207                                 },
4208                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4209                         }
4210                 },
4211                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4212         }
4213
4214         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4215         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4217
4218         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4219         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4220 }
4221
4222 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4223         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4224         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4225         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4226         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4227         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4228         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4229
4230         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4231
4232         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4233                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4234                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4235                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4236                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4237                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4238                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4239                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4240                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4241                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4242                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4243                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4244                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4245                 our_payment_hash
4246         } else {
4247                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4248         };
4249
4250         let mut block = Block {
4251                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4252                 txdata: vec![],
4253         };
4254         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4255         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4256         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4257         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4258                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4259                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4260                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4261         }
4262
4263         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4264
4265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4266         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4267         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4268         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4269         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4270         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4271
4272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4273         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4274         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4275         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4276         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4277         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4278 }
4279
4280 #[test]
4281 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4282         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4283         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4284 }
4285
4286 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4287         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4288         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4289         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4290         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4291         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4292         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4293         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4294
4295         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4296         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4297         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4298         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4299
4300         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4301         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4302         {
4303                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4304         }
4305         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4307
4308         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4309         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4310         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4311         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4312         if forwarded_htlc {
4313                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4314                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4315                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4316                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4317                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4318         }
4319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4320
4321         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4322         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4323         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4324         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4325
4326         if forwarded_htlc {
4327                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4329                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4330                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4331                 match fail_commit[0] {
4332                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4333                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4334                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4335                         },
4336                         _ => unreachable!(),
4337                 }
4338                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4339         } else {
4340                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4341                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4342                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4343                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4344                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4345                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4346                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4347                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4348         }
4349 }
4350
4351 #[test]
4352 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4353         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4354         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4355 }
4356
4357 #[test]
4358 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4359         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4360         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4361         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4362         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4363         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4364         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4365         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4366         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4367         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4368
4369         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4370
4371         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4372
4373         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4374         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4375         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4376                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4377
4378         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4379         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4380         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4381         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4382         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4383         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4384         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4385         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4386                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4387         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4388
4389         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4390         let config = UserConfig::default();
4391         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4392                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4393                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4394                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4395                         default_config: config,
4396                         keys_manager,
4397                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4398                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4399                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4400                         logger: &logger,
4401                         channel_monitors,
4402                 }).unwrap()
4403         };
4404         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4405         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4406
4407         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4408         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4409         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4411
4412         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4413         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4414         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4415         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4416
4417         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4418         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4419         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4420         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4421
4422         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4423         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4424         for node in nodes.iter() {
4425                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4426                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4427                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4428         }
4429
4430         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4431 }
4432
4433 #[test]
4434 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4435         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4439         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4440         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4441         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4442         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4443         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4444         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4445
4446         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4447         let channel_value = 100000;
4448         let push_msat = 10001;
4449         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4450         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4451         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4452         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4453         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4454         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4455         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4456
4457         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4458
4459         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4460         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4461
4462         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4463         {
4464                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4465                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4466                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4467                 added_monitors.clear();
4468         }
4469
4470         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4471         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4472         {
4473                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4474                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4475                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4476                 added_monitors.clear();
4477         }
4478         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4479
4480         nodes.push(node_a);
4481         nodes.push(node_b);
4482
4483         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4484         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4485         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4486         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4487
4488         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4489         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4490         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4491         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4492         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4493         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4494         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4495         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4496                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4497         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4498
4499         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4500         let config = UserConfig::default();
4501         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4502                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4503                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4504                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4505                         default_config: config,
4506                         keys_manager,
4507                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4508                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4509                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4510                         logger: &logger,
4511                         channel_monitors,
4512                 }).unwrap()
4513         };
4514         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4515         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4516
4517         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4518
4519         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4520         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4521
4522         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4523         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4524         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4525         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4526         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4527
4528         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4529         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4531
4532         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4533         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4534         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4535         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4536
4537         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4538         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4539         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4540         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4541
4542         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4543         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4544         for node in nodes.iter() {
4545                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4546                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4547                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4548         }
4549
4550         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4551 }
4552
4553 #[test]
4554 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4555         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4556         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4557         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4558         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4559         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4560         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4561         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4562         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4563         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4564         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4565
4566         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4567         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4568
4569         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4570
4571         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4572         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4573         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4574
4575         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4576         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4577         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4578         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4579         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4580         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4581         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4582         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4583                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4584         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4585
4586         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4587         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4588                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4589                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4590                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4591                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4592                         keys_manager,
4593                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4594                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4595                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4596                         logger: &logger,
4597                         channel_monitors,
4598                 }).unwrap()
4599         };
4600         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4601         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4602
4603         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4604         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4606
4607         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4608
4609         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4610         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4611 }
4612
4613 #[test]
4614 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4615         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4616         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4619         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4620         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4621         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4622         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4623         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4624         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4625         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4626         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4627         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4628
4629         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4630         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4631                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4632                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4633                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4634         }
4635
4636         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4637
4638         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4639         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4640
4641         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4642         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4643         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4644         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4645
4646         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4647         // nodes[3])
4648         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4649         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4650                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4651                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4652                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4653         }
4654
4655         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4656         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4657         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4658         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4659         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4660         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4661
4662
4663         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4664         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4665                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4666                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4667                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4668                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4669         }
4670
4671         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4672         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4673                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4674                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4675                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4676                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4677         }
4678
4679         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4680         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4681                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4682                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4683                 keys_manager,
4684                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4685                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4686                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4687                 logger: &logger,
4688                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4689         }) { } else {
4690                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4691         };
4692
4693         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4694         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4695                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4696                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4697                 keys_manager,
4698                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4699                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4700                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4701                 logger: &logger,
4702                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4703         }).unwrap();
4704         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4705         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4706
4707         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4708                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4709                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4710                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4711                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4712         }
4713
4714         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4715                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4716                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4717         }
4718         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4719         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4720
4721         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4722         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4723         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4724         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4725         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4726
4727         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4728         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4729         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4730         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4731         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4732         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4733         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4734                 match action {
4735                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4736                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4737                         },
4738                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4739                 }
4740         }
4741 }
4742
4743 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4744         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4745                 {
4746                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4747                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4748                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4749                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4750                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4751                                 match event {
4752                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4753                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4754                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4755                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4756                                                 }
4757                                         },
4758                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4759                                 };
4760                         }
4761                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4762                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4763                                         txn.push(tx);
4764                                 }
4765                         }
4766                         txn
4767                 }
4768         }
4769 }
4770
4771 #[test]
4772 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4773         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4776         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4777         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4778
4779         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4780         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4783         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4784         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4785         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4786         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4787         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4788
4789         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4790         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4791
4792         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4793         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4794         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4795         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4796         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4797 }
4798
4799 #[test]
4800 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4801         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4802         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4803         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4804         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4805         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4806         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4807
4808         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4809         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4810         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4812         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4813
4814         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4815         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4816         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4817         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4818
4819         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4823         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4824
4825         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4826         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4827         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4828 }
4829
4830 #[test]
4831 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4832         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4833         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4834
4835         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4836         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4837         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4838         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4839
4840         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4841         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4842         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4843         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4844         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4845
4846         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4847         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4848         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4850         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4851
4852         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4853         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4854         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4855
4856         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4857         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4858         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4859         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4860         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4861 }
4862
4863 #[test]
4864 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4868         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4869
4870         // Create some initial channels
4871         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4872
4873         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4874
4875         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4876         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4877         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4878
4879         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4880         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4881         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4882         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4883         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4885         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4886         match events[0] {
4887                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4889         }
4890         match events[1] {
4891                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4892                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4893         }
4894
4895         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4896         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4897         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4898         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4899         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4900         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4901         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4902
4903         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4904         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4905         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4906
4907         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4908         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4909         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4910 }
4911
4912 #[test]
4913 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4917         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4918
4919         // Create some initial channels
4920         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4921
4922         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4923         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4924
4925         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4926
4927         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4928         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4929         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4930
4931         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4932         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4934         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4935         match events[0] {
4936                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4937                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4938         }
4939         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4940
4941         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4942         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4943         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4944         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4945         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4946         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4947
4948         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4949         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4950         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4951         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4952
4953         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4954         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4955         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4956         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4957         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4958 }
4959
4960 #[test]
4961 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4962         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4963         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4964         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4965         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4966
4967         // Create some initial channels
4968         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4969
4970         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4971         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4972         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4973         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4974
4975         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4976
4977         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4978         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4980         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4981
4982         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4983         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4984         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4985         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4986
4987         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4988         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4989
4990         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4991         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4992         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4993 }
4994
4995 #[test]
4996 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4997         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4998         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5002
5003         // Create some initial channels
5004         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5005
5006         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5007         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5008         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5009         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5010
5011         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5012
5013         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5014         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5015         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5017         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5018         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5019
5020         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5021         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5022         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5023         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5024         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5025         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5026         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5027
5028         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5029         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5030         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5031         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5033         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5034
5035         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5036         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5037         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5038         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5039         // transactions next...
5040         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5041         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5042
5043         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5044         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5045         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5046                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5047         } else {
5048                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5049                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5050         }
5051
5052         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5053         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5054
5055         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5056         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5057
5058         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5059         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5060         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5061         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5062         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5063 }
5064
5065 #[test]
5066 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5067         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5068         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5071         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5072
5073         // Create some initial channels
5074         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5075
5076         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5077         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5078         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5079         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5080
5081         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5082         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5083
5084         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5085
5086         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5087         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5088         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5090         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5091         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5092
5093         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5094         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5095         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5096         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5097
5098         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5099         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5100         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5101
5102         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5103         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5104         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5105         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5108
5109         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5110         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5111
5112         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5113         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5114         // transactions next...
5115         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5116         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5117         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5118                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5119         } else {
5120                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5121                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5122         }
5123
5124         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5125         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5126
5127         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5128
5129         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5130         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5131
5132         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5133         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5134
5135         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5136         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5137         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5138         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5139         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5140         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5141         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5142         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5143 }
5144
5145 #[test]
5146 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5147         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5148         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5149         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5150         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5151         // channel.
5152         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5153         // gets broadcast.
5154
5155         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5156         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5157         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5158         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5159
5160         // Create some initial channels
5161         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5162         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5163
5164         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5165         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5166         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5167         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5168         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5169
5170         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5171         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5172         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5173
5174         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5175         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5176         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5177         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5178         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5180         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5181         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5182         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5183         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5184         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5185
5186         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5187         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5189         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5190
5191         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5192         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5193         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5194         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5195         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5196         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5197         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5198         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5199         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5200         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5201
5202         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5203         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5204         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5206         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5207         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5208         match events[0] {
5209                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5211         }
5212         match events[1] {
5213                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5214                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5215                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5216                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5217                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5218                 },
5219                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5220         }
5221         {
5222                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5223                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5224                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5225                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5226                 b_txn.clear();
5227         }
5228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5229         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5230         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5231         match msg_events[0] {
5232                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5234         }
5235         match msg_events[1] {
5236                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5237                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5238         }
5239         match msg_events[2] {
5240                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5241                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5242                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5243                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5244                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5245                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5246                 },
5247                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5248         };
5249         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5250         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5251         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5252         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5253         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5254         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5255         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5256         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5257         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5258         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5259         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5260         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5261         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5262
5263         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5265 }
5266
5267 #[test]
5268 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5269         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5270         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5271         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5272         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5273         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5274         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5275         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5276         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5277         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5278         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5280                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5281         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5282
5283         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5284         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5285         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5286
5287         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5288         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5289         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5290         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5291         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5292
5293         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5294
5295         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5296         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5297         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5298         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5299         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5300                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5301         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5302         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5303
5304         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5305         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5306         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5307
5308         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5309         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5311         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5312         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5313
5314         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5315         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5316                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5317                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5318                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5319                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5320
5321                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5322                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5323
5324                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5325                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5326                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5327                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5328
5329                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5330                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5331                 } else {
5332                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5333                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5334                 }
5335
5336                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5337                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5338                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5339                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5340                 }
5341                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5342         }
5343
5344         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5345         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5346
5347         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5348         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5349         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5350         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5351         match events[0] {
5352                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5353                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5354         }
5355         match events[1] {
5356                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5357                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5358         }
5359         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5360         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5361         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5362         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5363         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5364         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5365         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5366         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5367         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5368         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5369         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5370         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5371         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5372
5373         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5374         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5375         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5376         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5377         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5378         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5379         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5380         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5381         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5382         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5383
5384         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5385         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5386         {
5387                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5388         }
5389         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5390
5391         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5392         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5393         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5394         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5395         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5396         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5397         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5398         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5399         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5400         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5401         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5403
5404         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5405         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5406
5407         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5408         match events[0] {
5409                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5410                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5411                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5412                 }
5413                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5414         }
5415 }
5416
5417 #[test]
5418 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5423
5424         // Create some initial channels
5425         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5426
5427         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5428         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5429         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5430         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5431         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5432
5433         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5434         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5435         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5437
5438         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5440         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5441         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5442         match events[0] {
5443                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5444                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5445         }
5446         match events[1] {
5447                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5448                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5449         }
5450         let node_tx = {
5451                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5452                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5453                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5454                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5455                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5456                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5457                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5458                 node_txn[0].clone()
5459         };
5460
5461         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5462         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5463
5464         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5465         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5466         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5467         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5468         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5469         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5470 }
5471
5472 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5473         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5474         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5475         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5476         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5477         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5478         // use the same payment hashes.
5479         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5480         //
5481         // A \         / E
5482         //    - C - D -
5483         // B /         \ F
5484         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5485         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5487         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5488         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5489         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5490         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5491         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5492                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5493         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5494
5495         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5496         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5497         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5498         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5499         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5500
5501         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5502         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5503         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5504         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5505
5506         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5507         // 0th HTLC:
5508         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5509         // 1st HTLC:
5510         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5511         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5512         // 2nd HTLC:
5513         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5514         // 3rd HTLC:
5515         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5516         // 4th HTLC:
5517         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5518         // 5th HTLC:
5519         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5520         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5521         // 6th HTLC:
5522         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5523         // 7th HTLC:
5524         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5525
5526         // 8th HTLC:
5527         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5528         // 9th HTLC:
5529         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5530         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5531
5532         // 10th HTLC:
5533         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5534         // 11th HTLC:
5535         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5536         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5537
5538         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5539         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5540         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5541         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5542         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5543
5544         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5545         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5546         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5547         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5548         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5549         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5550         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5551         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5553
5554         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5555         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5556         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5557         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5558         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5559         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5560
5561         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5562         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5563         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5565         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5567
5568         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5569         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5570         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5571         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5572
5573         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5574
5575         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5577         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5578         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5579         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5580         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5581         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5582         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5583         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5584         if deliver_last_raa {
5585                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5586         } else {
5587                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5588         }
5589
5590         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5591         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5592         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5593         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5594         //
5595         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5596         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5597         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5598         //
5599         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5600         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5601         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5602
5603         if announce_latest {
5604                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5605         } else {
5606                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5607         }
5608         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5609         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5610                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5611                 events[1].clone()
5612         } else {
5613                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5614                 events[0].clone()
5615         };
5616         match close_event {
5617                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5618                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5619         }
5620
5621         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5622         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5623         if deliver_last_raa {
5624                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5625         } else {
5626                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5627         }
5628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5629
5630         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5631         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5632         let mut a_done = false;
5633         for msg in cs_msgs {
5634                 match msg {
5635                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5636                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5637                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5638                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5639                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5640                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5641                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5642                                         }
5643                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5644                                         assert!(!a_done);
5645                                         a_done = true;
5646                                         &nodes[0]
5647                                 } else {
5648                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5649                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5650                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5651                                         }
5652                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5653                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5654                                         &nodes[1]
5655                                 };
5656                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5657                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5658                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5659                                 if announce_latest {
5660                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5661                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5662                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5663                                         }
5664                                 }
5665                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5666                         },
5667                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5668                 }
5669         }
5670
5671         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5672         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5673         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5674         let mut as_updates = 0;
5675         for event in as_events.iter() {
5676                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5677                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5678                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5679                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5680                         } else {
5681                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5682                         }
5683                         if network_update.is_some() {
5684                                 as_updates += 1;
5685                         }
5686                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5687         }
5688         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5689         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5690         if announce_latest {
5691                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5692                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5693         }
5694         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5695
5696         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5697         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5698         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5699         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5700         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5701                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5702                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5703                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5704                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5705                         } else {
5706                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5707                         }
5708                         if network_update.is_some() {
5709                                 bs_updates += 1;
5710                         }
5711                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5712         }
5713         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5714         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5715         if announce_latest {
5716                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5717         }
5718         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5719
5720         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5721         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5722         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5723         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5724         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5725         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5726 }
5727
5728 #[test]
5729 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5730         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5731 }
5732
5733 #[test]
5734 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5735         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5736 }
5737
5738 #[test]
5739 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5740         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5741         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5742         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5743 }
5744
5745 #[test]
5746 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5747         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5748         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5749         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5750         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5751
5752         // Create some initial channels
5753         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5754
5755         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5756         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5757         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5758         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5759
5760         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5761         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5762         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5764         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5765         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5766
5767         let htlc_timeout = {
5768                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5769                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5770                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5771                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5772                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5773                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5774                 node_txn[1].clone()
5775         };
5776
5777         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5778         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5779         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5780
5781         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5782         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5783         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5784         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5785         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5786         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5787         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5788         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5789         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5790         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5791                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5792 }
5793
5794 #[test]
5795 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5796         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5797         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5798         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5799
5800         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5801
5802         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5803         let seed = [42; 32];
5804         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5805         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5806         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5807         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5808         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5809         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5810         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5811
5812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5813         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5814
5815         // Create some initial channels
5816         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5817         // for node 0
5818         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5819         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5820         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5821
5822         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5823         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5824         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5825         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5826         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5827
5828         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5829         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5830         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5831         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5832         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5833
5834         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5835         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5836         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5837         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5838             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5839             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5840             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5841                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5842         }
5843
5844         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5845         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5846         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5847         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5850
5851         let htlc_timeout = {
5852                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5853                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5854                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5855                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5856                 node_txn[1].clone()
5857         };
5858
5859         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5860         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5861         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5862
5863         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5864         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5865         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5866         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5867         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5868         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5869         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5870         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5871         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5872         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5873         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5874                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5875 }
5876
5877 #[test]
5878 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5879         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5880         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5881         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5882         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5883
5884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5885
5886         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5887         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5888
5889         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5890         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5891         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5892
5893         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5894         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5895         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5896
5897         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5898         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5899         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5900
5901         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5902         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5903         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5904 }
5905
5906 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5907         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5908         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5909         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5910         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5911         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5912
5913         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5914
5915         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5916         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5917         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5919         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5920
5921         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5922         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5923         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5924
5925         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5927         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5928         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5930
5931         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5932         let mut block = Block {
5933                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5934                 txdata: vec![],
5935         };
5936         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5937                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5938                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5939         }
5940         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5941         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5943         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5944 }
5945
5946 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5950         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5951         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5952
5953         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5954         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5956
5957         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5958
5959         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5960         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5961         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5962
5963         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5964         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5965
5966         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5967                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5968                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5969         }
5970         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5971         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5973         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5974 }
5975
5976 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5980         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5981         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5982
5983         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5984         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5985         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5986         // actually revoked.
5987         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5988         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5989         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5990         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5992
5993         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5994         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5995         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5997         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5998         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5999         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6000         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6002         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6003
6004         if check_revoke_no_close {
6005                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6006                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6007         }
6008
6009         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6010         let mut block = Block {
6011                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6012                 txdata: vec![],
6013         };
6014         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6015                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6016                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6017         }
6018         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6019                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6020                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6021                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6022                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6023         } else {
6024                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6025                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6026                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6027                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6028                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6029                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6030                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6031                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6032         }
6033 }
6034
6035 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6036 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6037 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6038 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6039 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6040 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6041 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6042 // non-dust HTLCs.
6043 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6044 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6045 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6046 #[test]
6047 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6048         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6049         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6050
6051         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6052         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6053 }
6054
6055 #[test]
6056 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6057         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6058         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6059         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6060         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6061 }
6062
6063 #[test]
6064 #[should_panic]
6065 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6066         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6067         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6068         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6069         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6070         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6071         for node in nodes.iter() {
6072                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6073         }
6074
6075         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6076         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6077         let push_msat=10001;
6078         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6079         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6080         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6081         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6082
6083         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6084         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6085         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6086 }
6087
6088 #[test]
6089 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6093         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6094
6095         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6096         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6097         let push_msat=10001;
6098         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6099
6100         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6101         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6102         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6103         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6104         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6105
6106         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6107         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6108         let push_msat=10001;
6109         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6110         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6111         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6112
6113         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6114         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6115         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6116
6117         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6118         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6119         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6120
6121         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6122         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6123         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6124
6125         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6126         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6127         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6128         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6129         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6130         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6131 }
6132
6133 #[test]
6134 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6135         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6136         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6137         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6138         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6139
6140         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6141         let push_msat=10001;
6142         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6143         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6144         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6145         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6146
6147         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6148         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6149         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6150                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6151                         msg.clone()
6152                 },
6153                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6154         };
6155         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6156 }
6157
6158 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6159 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6160 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6161 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6162 #[test]
6163 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6164         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6165         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6166         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6167         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6168         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6169
6170         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6171         // pending_update_fee.
6172         {
6173                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6174                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6175         }
6176         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6178
6179         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6180         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6181         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6182                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6183                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6184                 },
6185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6186         };
6187
6188         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6189
6190         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6191         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6192         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6193         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6194
6195         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6196         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6197         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6198
6199         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6200         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6201         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6202         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6203
6204         // Flush the pending fee update.
6205         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6206         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6208         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6209         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6210
6211         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6212         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6213         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6214         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6215         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6216         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6217         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6218                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6219         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6220
6221         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6222         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6223         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6224         match &events[0] {
6225                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6226                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6227                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6228                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6229                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6230                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6231                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6232                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6233                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6234                 },
6235                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6236         }
6237 }
6238
6239 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6240 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6241 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6242 #[test]
6243 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6247         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6248         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6249
6250         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6251         // pending_update_fee.
6252         {
6253                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6254                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6255         }
6256         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258
6259         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6260         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6261         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6262                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6263                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6264                 },
6265                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6266         };
6267
6268         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6269
6270         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6271         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6272         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6273         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6274
6275         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6276         let amt_1 = 20000;
6277         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6278         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6279         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6280
6281         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6282         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6283         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6284         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6285         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6286         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6287         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6288
6289         // Flush the pending fee update.
6290         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6291         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6294         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6296
6297         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6298         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6299         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6300         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6301         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6302         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6303         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6304                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6305         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6306
6307         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6308         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6309         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6310         match &events[0] {
6311                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6312                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6313                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6314                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6315                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6316                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6317                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6318                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6319                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6320                 },
6321                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6322         }
6323
6324         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6325         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6326                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6327                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6328                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6329         };
6330         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6331                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6332                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6333         };
6334         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6336         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6337         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6338         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6339         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6340         match events[0] {
6341                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6342                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6343         }
6344         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6345         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6346         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6347         match events[0] {
6348                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6349                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6350         }
6351         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6353         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6354
6355         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6356         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6357         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6358         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6359 }
6360
6361 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6362 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6363 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6364 // once it's freed.
6365 #[test]
6366 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6369         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6370         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6371         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6372         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6374         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6375         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6376         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6377
6378         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6379         // pending_update_fee.
6380         {
6381                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6382                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6383         }
6384         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6386
6387         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6388         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6389         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6391                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6392                 },
6393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6394         };
6395
6396         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6397
6398         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6399         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6400         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6401         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6402
6403         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6404         let feemsat = 239;
6405         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6406         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6407         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6408         let payment_event = {
6409                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6411
6412                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6413                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6414
6415                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6416         };
6417         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6419         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6420         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6421
6422         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6423         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6424
6425         // Flush the pending fee update.
6426         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6427         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6429         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6430         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6432
6433         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6434         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6435         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6436
6437         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6438                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6439                         msg.clone()
6440                 },
6441                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6442         };
6443
6444         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6446         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6447
6448         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6449         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6450         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6451         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6452                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6453                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6454         }
6455
6456         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6457         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6459
6460         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6461         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6462         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6463         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6464                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6465                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6466                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6467                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6468                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6469                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6470                 },
6471                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6472         };
6473
6474         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6475         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6476         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6477
6478         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6479         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6481         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6482         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6484         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6485         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6486         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6487                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6488                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6489         };
6490         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6491         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6493 }
6494
6495 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6496 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6497 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6498
6499 #[test]
6500 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6501         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6502         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6505         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6506         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6507
6508         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6509         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6510
6511         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6512                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6513         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6514         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6515 }
6516
6517 #[test]
6518 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6519         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6523         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6524         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6525
6526         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6527         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6528         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6529                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6530
6531         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6532         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6533 }
6534
6535 #[test]
6536 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6537         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6538         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6539         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6540         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6541         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6542         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6543
6544         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6545         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6547         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6548         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6549
6550         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6551         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6552         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6554         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6555 }
6556
6557 #[test]
6558 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6559         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6560         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6561         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6562         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6563         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6564         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6565         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6566
6567         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6568                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6569         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6570         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6571         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6572                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6573 }
6574
6575 #[test]
6576 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6577         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6578         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6579         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6583         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6584         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6585         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6586
6587         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6588                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6589                 let payment_event = {
6590                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6591                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6592
6593                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6594                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6595                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6596                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6597                         } else {
6598                                 assert!(false);
6599                         }
6600                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6601                 };
6602                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6603                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6604                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6605
6606                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6607                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6608         }
6609         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6610         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6611                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6612
6613         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6614         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6615 }
6616
6617 #[test]
6618 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6619         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6620         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6621         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6622         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6623         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6624         let channel_value = 100000;
6625         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6626         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6627
6628         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6629
6630         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6631         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6632         // limits us to.
6633         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6634         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6635                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6636
6637         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6638         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6639
6640         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6641 }
6642
6643 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6644 #[test]
6645 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6646         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6647         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6648         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6649         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6650         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6651         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6652         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6653         {
6654                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6655                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6656                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6657         }
6658
6659         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6660         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6662         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6663         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6665         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6667         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6669         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6670 }
6671
6672 #[test]
6673 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6674         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6675         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6676         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6677         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6678         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6679         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6680
6681         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6682         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6683         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6684         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6685         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6686         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6687
6688         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6689         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6690         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6692         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6693
6694         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6695         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6696         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6697         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6698         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6699
6700         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6701         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6702         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6704         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6705 }
6706
6707 #[test]
6708 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6709         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6710         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6711         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6712         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6713         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6714         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6715         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6716
6717         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6718         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6719         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6720         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6721         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6722         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6723
6724         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6725                 channel_id: chan.2,
6726                 htlc_id: 0,
6727                 amount_msat: 1000,
6728                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6729                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6730                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6731         };
6732
6733         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6734                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6735                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6736         }
6737         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6738         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6739
6740         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6742         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6745 }
6746
6747 #[test]
6748 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6749         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6750         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6751         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6753         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6754         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6755
6756         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6757         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6759         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6761         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6762
6763         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6764         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6765         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6767         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6768 }
6769
6770 #[test]
6771 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6772         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6776         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777
6778         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6779         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6780         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6783         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6784         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6785
6786         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6787         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6788         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6790         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6791 }
6792
6793 #[test]
6794 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6795         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6796         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6797         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6798         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6799         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6800         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6801         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6802
6803         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6805         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6807         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6808         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6809
6810         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6811         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6812         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6813         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6814         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6815         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6816         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6817         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6818         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6819         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6820         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6821         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6822         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6823
6824         //Resend HTLC
6825         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6826         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6827         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6829         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6830
6831         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6832
6833         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6834         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6835         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6837         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6838 }
6839
6840 #[test]
6841 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6842         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6843
6844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6847         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6848         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6849         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6850         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6851
6852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6853         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6854         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6855
6856         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6857                 channel_id: chan.2,
6858                 htlc_id: 0,
6859                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6860         };
6861
6862         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6863
6864         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6865         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6866         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6868         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6869 }
6870
6871 #[test]
6872 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6873         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6874
6875         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6876         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6877         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6878         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6879         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6880
6881         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6882         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6883         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6884         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6885         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6886
6887         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6888                 channel_id: chan.2,
6889                 htlc_id: 0,
6890                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6891         };
6892
6893         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6894
6895         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6896         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6897         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6899         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6900 }
6901
6902 #[test]
6903 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6904         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6905
6906         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6907         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6908         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6909         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6910         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6911
6912         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6913         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6915         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6916         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6917         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6918                 channel_id: chan.2,
6919                 htlc_id: 0,
6920                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6921                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6922         };
6923
6924         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6925
6926         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6927         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6928         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6930         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6931 }
6932
6933 #[test]
6934 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6935         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6936
6937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6940         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6941         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6942
6943         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6944
6945         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6947         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6948
6949         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6950         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6951         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6952                 match events[0] {
6953                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6954                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6955                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6956                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6957                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6958                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6959                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6960                         },
6961                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6962                 }
6963         };
6964
6965         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6966
6967         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6968
6969         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6970         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6971         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6973         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6974 }
6975
6976 #[test]
6977 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6978         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6979
6980         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6983         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6984         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6985
6986         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6987
6988         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6990         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6991
6992         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6993         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6994         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6995                 match events[0] {
6996                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6997                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6998                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6999                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7000                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7001                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7002                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7003                         },
7004                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005                 }
7006         };
7007
7008         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7009
7010         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7011
7012         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7013         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7014         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7016         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7017 }
7018
7019 #[test]
7020 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7021         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7022
7023         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7024         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7025         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7026         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7027         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7028
7029         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7030         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7032
7033         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7034         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7035
7036         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7038         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7039
7040         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7041
7042         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7043                 match events[0] {
7044                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7045                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7046                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7047                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7048                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7049                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7050                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7051                         },
7052                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7053                 }
7054         };
7055         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7056         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7057
7058         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7059         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7060         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7062         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7063 }
7064
7065 #[test]
7066 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7067         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7068         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7069
7070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7073         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7074         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7075         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7076
7077         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7078
7079         //First hop
7080         let mut payment_event = {
7081                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7082                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7083                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7084                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7085                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7086         };
7087         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7089         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7090         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7091         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7092         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7094         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7095         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7096
7097         //Second Hop
7098         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7099         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7101         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7102
7103         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7104         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7105         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7106                 match events_3[0] {
7107                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7108                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7109                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7110                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7111                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7112                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7113                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7114                         },
7115                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7116                 }
7117         };
7118
7119         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7120
7121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7122         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7124         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7125         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7126
7127         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7128         match events_4[0] {
7129                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7130                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7131                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7132                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7133                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7134                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7135                 },
7136                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137         };
7138
7139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7140 }
7141
7142 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7143         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7144         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7145         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7146
7147         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7148         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7151         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7152         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7153
7154         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7155
7156         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7157         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7158         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7159         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7160
7161         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7162         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7163
7164         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7165         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7167         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7169
7170         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7171         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7172         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7174
7175         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7176         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7177
7178         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7179         match events[0] {
7180                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7181                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7182                 },
7183                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7184         }
7185         match events[1] {
7186                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7187                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7188                 },
7189                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7190         }
7191
7192         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7193         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7194         if announce_latest {
7195                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7196         } else {
7197                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7198         }
7199
7200         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7202         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7203
7204         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7205         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7206         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7207         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7208         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7209         let mut first_failed = false;
7210         for event in events {
7211                 match event {
7212                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7213                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7214                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7215                                         first_failed = true;
7216                                 } else {
7217                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7218                                 }
7219                         }
7220                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7221                 }
7222         }
7223 }
7224
7225 #[test]
7226 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7227         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7228         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7229 }
7230
7231 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7232         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7233         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7234         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7235         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7236         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7237         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7238
7239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7242         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7243         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7244
7245         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7246
7247         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7248         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7249
7250         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7251         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7252
7253         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7254         if revoked {
7255                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7256                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7257         }
7258
7259         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7260         if local {
7261                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7262                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7263                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7264                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7265                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7266
7267                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7268                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7269                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7270                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7271                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7272                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7273                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7274                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7275                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7276                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7277                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7278         } else {
7279                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7281                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7282                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7283                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7284                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7285                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7286                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7287                 if !revoked {
7288                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7289                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7290                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7291                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7292                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7293                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7294                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7295                 } else {
7296                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7297                         // commitment tx
7298                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7299                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7300                         let first;
7301                         match events[0] {
7302                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7303                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7304                                         else { first = false; }
7305                                 },
7306                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7307                         }
7308                         match events[1] {
7309                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7310                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7311                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7312                                 },
7313                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7314                         }
7315                 }
7316         }
7317 }
7318
7319 #[test]
7320 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7321         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7322         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7323         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7324 }
7325
7326 #[test]
7327 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7328         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7329
7330         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7331         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7332         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7333         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7334         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7338         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7339
7340         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7341         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7342                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7343                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7344         {
7345                 match error {
7346                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7347                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7348                 }
7349         } else { assert!(false) }
7350
7351         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7352         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7353         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7354         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7355         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7356                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7357                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7358         {
7359                 match error {
7360                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7361                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7362                 }
7363         } else { assert!(false); }
7364
7365         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7366         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7367         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7368         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7369         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7370         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7371         let reason_msg;
7372         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7373                 match action {
7374                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7375                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7376                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7377                         },
7378                         _ => { panic!(); }
7379                 }
7380         } else { panic!(); }
7381         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7382
7383         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7384         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7385         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7386         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7387         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7388                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7389                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7390         {
7391                 match error {
7392                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7393                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7394                 }
7395         } else { assert!(false); }
7396 }
7397
7398 #[test]
7399 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7400         // We want to be sure that :
7401         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7402         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7403         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7404         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7405         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7406         let persister;
7407         let logger;
7408         let fee_estimator;
7409         let tx_broadcaster;
7410         let chain_source;
7411         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7412         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7413         // during signing due to revoked tx
7414         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7415         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7416         let monitor;
7417         let node_state_0;
7418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7420         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7421
7422         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7423
7424         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7425         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7426         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7427         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7428
7429         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7430         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7431
7432         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7433         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7434
7435         // Restore node A from previous state
7436         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7437         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7438         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7439         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7440         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7441         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7442         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7443         node_state_0 = {
7444                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7445                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7446                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7447                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7448                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7449                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7450                         logger: &logger,
7451                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7452                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7453                         channel_monitors,
7454                 }).unwrap().1
7455         };
7456         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7457         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7458         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7459         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7460
7461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7462
7463         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7464         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7465
7466         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7467
7468         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7469         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7470         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7471
7472         {
7473                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7474                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7475         }
7476
7477         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7478         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7479                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7480                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7481                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7482                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7483                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7484                         match action {
7485                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7486                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7487                                 },
7488                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7489                         }
7490                 } else {
7491                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7492                 }
7493         }
7494
7495         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7496         // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7497         // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7498         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7499         let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7500         assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7501
7502         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7503         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7504         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7505         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7506         // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7507         let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7508         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7509
7510         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7511         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7512         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7513         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7514         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7515         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7516
7517         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7518         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7519         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7520                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7521                         match action {
7522                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7523                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7524                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7525                                 },
7526                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7527                         }
7528                 } else {
7529                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7530                 }
7531         }
7532         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7533         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7534         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7536         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7537         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7538 }
7539
7540 #[test]
7541 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7542         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7543         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7544         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7545
7546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7549         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7550
7551         // Create some initial channels
7552         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7553
7554         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7555         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7556         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7557         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7558         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7559         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7560         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7562
7563         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7564         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7565         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7566         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7567         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7568
7569         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7570         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7571         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7572         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7573
7574         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7575         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7576         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7577
7578         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7579         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7580         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7581                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7582                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7583                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7584                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7585                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7586                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7587                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7588                 },
7589                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7590         };
7591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7592
7593         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7594         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7595
7596         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7597         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7598         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7599         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7600 }
7601
7602 #[test]
7603 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7604         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7605         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7606
7607         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7610         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7611
7612         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7613         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7614         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7615
7616         // Disconnect peers
7617         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7618         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7619
7620         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7621         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7622         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7623         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7624         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7625         for e in msg_events {
7626                 match e {
7627                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7628                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7629                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7630                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7631                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7632                                 }
7633                         },
7634                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7635                 }
7636         }
7637         // Reconnect peers
7638         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7639         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7640         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7641         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7642         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7643         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7644
7645         // Reestablish chan_1
7646         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7647         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7648         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7649         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7650         // Reestablish chan_2
7651         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7652         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7653         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7654         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7655         // Reestablish chan_3
7656         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7657         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7658         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7659         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7660
7661         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7662         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7663         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7664         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7665         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7666         for e in msg_events {
7667                 match e {
7668                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7669                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7670                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7671                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7672                                         // the old one.
7673                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7674                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7675                                 }
7676                         },
7677                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7678                 }
7679         }
7680         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7681         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7682 }
7683
7684 #[test]
7685 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7686         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7687         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7688
7689         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7690         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7692         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7693
7694         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7695
7696         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7697         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7698                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7699         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7700         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7701
7702         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7703         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7704         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7705         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7706         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7707         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7708
7709         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7710         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7711                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7712                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7713                 }
7714         }
7715
7716         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7717         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7718
7719         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7720         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7721         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7722         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7724
7725         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7726         let penalty_1;
7727         let feerate_1;
7728         {
7729                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7730                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7732                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7733                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7734                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7735                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7736                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7737                 node_txn.clear();
7738         };
7739
7740         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7741         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7742         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7743         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7744         {
7745                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7746                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7747                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7748                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7749                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7750                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7751                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7752                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7753                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7754                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7755                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7756                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7757                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7758                         node_txn.clear();
7759                 }
7760         }
7761         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7762
7763         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7764         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7765         let penalty_3;
7766         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7767         {
7768                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7769                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7770                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7771                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7772                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7773                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7774                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7775                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7776                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7777                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7778                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7779                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7780                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7781                         node_txn.clear();
7782                 }
7783         }
7784         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7785
7786         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7787         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7788 }
7789
7790 #[test]
7791 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7792         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7793         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7794
7795         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7796         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7799         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7800
7801         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7802         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7803         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7804         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7805         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7806         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7807                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7808         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7809         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7810         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7811                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7812         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7813
7814         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7815         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7816         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7817
7818         // Revoke local commitment tx
7819         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7820
7821         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7822         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7823         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7824         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7826         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7827         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7828
7829         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7830         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7831         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7832
7833         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7834         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7835         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7836
7837         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7838         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7839         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7840         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7841
7842         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7843         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7844         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7845         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7846         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7847         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7848         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7849         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7850         match events[1] {
7851                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7852                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7853         }
7854         let first;
7855         let feerate_1;
7856         let penalty_txn;
7857         {
7858                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7860                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7861
7862                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7863                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7864                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7865                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7866                 // future).
7867                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7868                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7869                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7870                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7871                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7872                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7873
7874                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7875                 // available, which we check here:
7876                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7877                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7878                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7879
7880                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7881                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7882
7883                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7884                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7885                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7886                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7887
7888                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7889                 // output, checked above).
7890                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7891                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7892                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7893
7894                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7895                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7896                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7897                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7898                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7899                 node_txn.clear();
7900         }
7901
7902         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7903         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7904         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7905         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7906         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7907         {
7908                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7909                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7910
7911                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7912                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7913                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7914                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7915                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7916                 } else {
7917                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7918                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7919                 }
7920
7921                 node_txn.clear();
7922         };
7923
7924         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7925         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7926         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7927         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7928         let node_txn = {
7929                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7930                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7931
7932                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7933                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7934                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7935                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7936                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7937                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7938                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7939                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7940                 node_txn.clear();
7941                 txn
7942         };
7943         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7944         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7945         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7946         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7947         {
7948                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7949                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7950                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7951                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7952                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7953                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7954                 // up bumped justice generation.
7955                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7956                 node_txn.clear();
7957         }
7958         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7960 }
7961
7962 #[test]
7963 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7964         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7965         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7966
7967         // Create 2 HTLCs
7968         // Provide preimage for one
7969         // Check aggregation
7970
7971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7974         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975
7976         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7977         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7978         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7979
7980         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7981         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7982         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7983         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7984         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7985
7986         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7987         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7988         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7989         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7991         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7992
7993         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7994         let timeout;
7995         let preimage;
7996         let preimage_bump;
7997         let feerate_timeout;
7998         let feerate_preimage;
7999         {
8000                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8001                 // 9 transactions including:
8002                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8003                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8004                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8005                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
8006                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8007                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8008                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8009                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8010                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8011
8012                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8013                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8014
8015                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8016                         preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8017                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8018
8019                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8020                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8021                 } else {
8022                         preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8023                         check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8024                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8025
8026                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8027                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8028                 }
8029
8030                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8031                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8032                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8033                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8034
8035                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8036                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8037                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8038                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8039
8040                 node_txn.clear();
8041         };
8042         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8043         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8044
8045         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8046         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8047         {
8048                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8049                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8050                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8051                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8052                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8053                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8054
8055                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8056                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8057                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8058                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8059                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8060
8061                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8062                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8063                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8064                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8065                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8066
8067                 node_txn.clear();
8068         }
8069
8070         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8071         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8072 }
8073
8074 #[test]
8075 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8076         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8077         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8078         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8079         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8080         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8081         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8082         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8083         // implement that).
8084         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8085         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8086         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8087         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8088         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8089
8090         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8091         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8092
8093         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8094
8095         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8096         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8097         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8098
8099         // Must revoke without gaps
8100         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8101         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8102
8103         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8104         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8105                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8106
8107         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8108                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8109         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8111         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8112 }
8113
8114 #[test]
8115 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8116         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8117         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8118
8119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8123
8124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8125         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8126         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8127         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8128
8129         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8130         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8132
8133         // Revoke local commitment tx
8134         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8135
8136         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8137         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8138         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8139         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8140
8141         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8142         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8144         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8145         let penalty_txn = {
8146                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8147                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8148                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8149                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8150                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8151                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8152                 node_txn.clear();
8153                 penalty_txn
8154         };
8155         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8156         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8157         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8158         {
8159                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8160                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8161                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8162         }
8163 }
8164
8165 #[test]
8166 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8167         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8168         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8169         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8170         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8171         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8172         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8173         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8174
8175         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8176         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8177         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8179         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8180
8181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8182         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8183         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8185         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8186
8187         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8188         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8189         // can get our balance.
8190
8191         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8192         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8193         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8194         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8195         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8196         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8197         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8198         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8199
8200         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8201 }
8202
8203 #[test]
8204 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8205         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8206         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8210         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211
8212         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8213
8214         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8215         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8216         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8217         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8218         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8219
8220         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8223         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8224
8225         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8226         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8227         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8228         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8229         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8230         match close_ev[0] {
8231                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8232                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8233                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8234                 },
8235                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8236         }
8237 }
8238
8239 #[test]
8240 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8244         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8245
8246         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8247         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8248         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8249
8250         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8251
8252         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8253         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8254         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8255         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8256 }
8257
8258 #[test]
8259 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8260         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8261         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8262         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8264         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8265         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8266
8267         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8268         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8269         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8270
8271         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8272         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8274 }
8275
8276 #[test]
8277 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8278         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8279         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8280         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8281         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8282         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8283
8284         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8285         config_30_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
8286         config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8287         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8288         config_50_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
8289         config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8290         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8291         config_95_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
8292         config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8293         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8294         config_100_percent.own_channel_config.announced_channel = true;
8295         config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8296
8297         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8299         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8300         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8301
8302         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8303         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8304         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8305         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8306         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8307
8308         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8309         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8310
8311         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8312         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8313         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8314         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8315         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8316         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8317
8318         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8319         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8320         // `channel_value`.
8321         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8322         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8323         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8324         // `channel_value`.
8325         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8326 }
8327
8328 #[test]
8329 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8330         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8331         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8335         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8336
8337         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8338         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8339
8340         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8341
8342         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8343         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8344         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8345
8346         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8347         match events[0] {
8348                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8349                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8350                 }
8351                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8352         }
8353
8354         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8355         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8356
8357         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8358                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8359                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8360                 }
8361                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8362         }
8363
8364         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8365
8366         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8367         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8368
8369         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8370         match events[0] {
8371                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8372                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8373                 }
8374                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8375         }
8376 }
8377
8378 #[test]
8379 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8380         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8381         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8382         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8383         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8384         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8385         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8386
8387         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8388         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8389
8390         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8391
8392         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8393         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8394         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8395
8396         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8397         match events[0] {
8398                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8399                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8400                 }
8401                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8402         }
8403
8404         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8405         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8406
8407         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8408                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8409                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8410                 }
8411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8412         }
8413         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8414 }
8415
8416 #[test]
8417 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8418         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8419         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8420         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8421         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8422         // and the channel should be closed.
8423         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8424         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8428         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8429
8430         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8431         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8432         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8433
8434         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8435
8436         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8437         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8438
8439         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8440         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8441
8442         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8443         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8444         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8445         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8446         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8447         {
8448                 let mut lock;
8449                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8450                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8451                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8452         }
8453
8454         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8455
8456         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8457         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8458
8459         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8460         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8461
8462         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8463         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8464
8465         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8466         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8467                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8468                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8469                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8470                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8471                 }
8472                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8473         }
8474
8475         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8476 }
8477
8478 #[test]
8479 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8480         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8481         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8485         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8486
8487         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8488         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8489
8490         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8491
8492         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8493         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8494         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8495
8496         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8497         match events[0] {
8498                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8499                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8500                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8501                         match api_res {
8502                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8503                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8504                                 },
8505                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8506                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8507                         }
8508                 }
8509                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8510         }
8511
8512         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8513         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8514         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8515
8516         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8517                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8518                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8519                 }
8520                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8521         }
8522 }
8523
8524 #[test]
8525 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8526         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8527         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8528         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8529         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8530
8531         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8532         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8533         match api_res {
8534                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8535                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8536                 },
8537                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8538                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8539         }
8540 }
8541
8542 #[test]
8543 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8544         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8548         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8549
8550         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8551         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8552         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8553         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8554
8555         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8556         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8557         route.paths.push(path);
8558         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8559         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8560         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8561         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8562         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8563         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8564         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8565         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8566 }
8567
8568 #[test]
8569 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8570         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8571         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8572         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8573         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8574         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8575
8576         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8577
8578         {
8579                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8580                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8581                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8582                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8583                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8584                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8585                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8586                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8587         }
8588         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8589         // values from previous calls.
8590         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8591         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8592         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8593         match events[0] {
8594                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8595                         match &purpose {
8596                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8597                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8598                                 },
8599                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8600                         }
8601                 },
8602                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8603         }
8604 }
8605
8606 #[test]
8607 #[allow(deprecated)]
8608 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8609         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8610         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8615
8616         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8617
8618         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8619
8620         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8621         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8622         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8623                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8624         } else { panic!(); }
8625         let mut block = {
8626                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8627                 Block {
8628                         header: BlockHeader {
8629                                 version: 0x2000000,
8630                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8631                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8632                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8633                         txdata: vec![],
8634                 }
8635         };
8636         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8637         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8638                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8639         } else { panic!(); }
8640
8641         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8642         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8643         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8644         block.header.time += 1;
8645         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8646         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8647         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8648
8649         {
8650                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8651                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8652                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8653                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8654                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8655                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8656                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8657         }
8658         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8659         // values from previous calls.
8660         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8661         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8662         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8663         match events[0] {
8664                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8665                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8666                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8667                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8668                 },
8669                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8670         }
8671 }
8672
8673 #[test]
8674 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8675         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8679         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8680
8681         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8682
8683         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8684         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8685         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8686         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8687
8688         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8689         // resulting events.
8690         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8691                 () => {
8692                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8693                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8694                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8695                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8696                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8697
8698                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8699                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8700                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8701                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8702                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8703
8704                         // We should fail the payment back
8705                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8706                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8707                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8708                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8709                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8710                                 },
8711                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8712                         }
8713                 }
8714         }
8715
8716         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8717         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8718         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8719
8720         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8721         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8722         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8723         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8724
8725         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8726         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8727         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8728         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8729
8730         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8731         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8732         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8733         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8734 }
8735
8736 #[test]
8737 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8738         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8739         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8740         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8741         //
8742         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8743         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8744         // commitment at same time.
8745
8746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8748         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8749         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8750
8751         // Create some initial channel
8752         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8753         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8754
8755         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8756         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8757
8758         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8759         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8760
8761         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8762         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8763         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8764         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8765         let watchtower = {
8766                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8767                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8768                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8769                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8770                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8771                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8772                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8773                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8774                 watchtower
8775         };
8776         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8777         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8778         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8779         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8780         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8781         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8782
8783         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8784         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8786         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8787
8788         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8789         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8790         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8791         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8792                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8793                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8794                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8795                 } else { assert!(false); }
8796         } else { assert!(false); };
8797         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8799         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8800         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8801 }
8802
8803 #[test]
8804 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8805         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8806         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8807         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8808         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8809
8810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8813         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8814
8815         // Create some initial channel
8816         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8817         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8818
8819         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8820         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8821
8822         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8823         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8824
8825         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8826         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8827         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8828         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8829         let watchtower_alice = {
8830                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8831                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8832                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8833                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8834                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8835                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8836                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8837                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8838                 watchtower
8839         };
8840         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8841         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8842         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8843         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8844         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8845         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8846
8847         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8848         {
8849                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8850                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8851                 txn.clear();
8852         }
8853
8854         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8855         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8856         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8857         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8858         let watchtower_bob = {
8859                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8860                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8861                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8862                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8863                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8864                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8865                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8866                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8867                 watchtower
8868         };
8869         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8870         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8871
8872         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8873         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8874         {
8875                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8876         }
8877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8878
8879         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8880         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8881         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8882         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8883                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8884                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8885                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8886                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8887                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8888                 } else { assert!(false); }
8889         } else { assert!(false); };
8890         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8892
8893         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8894         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8895         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8896
8897         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8898         let bob_state_y;
8899         {
8900                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8901                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8902                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8903                 txn.clear();
8904         };
8905
8906         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8907         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8908         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8909         {
8910                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8911                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8912                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8913                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8914                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8915                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8916         }
8917 }
8918
8919 #[test]
8920 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8921         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8922         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8923         // message).
8924         //
8925         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8926         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8927         //
8928         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8929         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8930         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8931         // before receiving funding_signed.
8932         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8933         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8934         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8935         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8936
8937         // Create an initial channel
8938         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8939         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8940         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8941         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8942         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8943
8944         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8945         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8946
8947         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8949
8950         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8951         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8952         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8953         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8954         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8955 }
8956
8957 #[test]
8958 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8959         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8960         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8961         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8962         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8963         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8964         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8965
8966         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8967         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8968         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8969         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8970
8971         // Create some initial channels
8972         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8973
8974         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8975         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8976         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8977         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8978         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8979         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8980
8981         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8982         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8983         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8984         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8985         // this test before #653 fix.
8986         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8987         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8988         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8989         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8990         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8991
8992         let htlc_timeout = {
8993                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8994                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8995                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8996                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8997                 node_txn[1].clone()
8998         };
8999
9000         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9001         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9002         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9003         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9004 }
9005
9006 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9007         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9008         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9009         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9010         //
9011         // Steps of the test:
9012         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9013         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9014         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9015         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9016         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9017         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9018         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9019         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9023         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9024
9025         // Create some initial channels
9026         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9027         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9028
9029         // Steps (1) and (2):
9030         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9031         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9032
9033         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9034         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9035         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9036         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9037         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9038         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9039         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9040
9041         // Steps (3) and (4):
9042         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9043         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9044         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9045         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9046
9047         // Bob force-closes
9048         if !broadcast_alice {
9049                 force_closing_node = 1;
9050                 counterparty_node = 0;
9051         }
9052         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9053         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9055         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9056         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9057                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9058                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9059                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9060                 };
9061                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9062                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9063                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9064                 if broadcast_alice {
9065                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9066                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9067                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9068                 }
9069                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9070                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9071         }
9072
9073         // Step (5):
9074         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9075         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9076         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9078         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9079
9080         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9081         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9082         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9083         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9084         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9085         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9086
9087         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9088         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9089         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9090         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9091                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9092                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9093                 match events[0] {
9094                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9095                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9096                         },
9097                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9098                 };
9099         }
9100         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9101         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9102         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9104
9105         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9106         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9107         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9108                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9109                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9110                         (*msg).clone()
9111                 },
9112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9113         };
9114         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9115                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9116                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9117                         (*updates).clone()
9118                 },
9119                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9120         };
9121
9122         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9124         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9126
9127         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9128         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9129         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9130                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9131                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9132                         (*msg).clone()
9133                 },
9134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9135         };
9136         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9138
9139         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9140         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9141         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9142         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9143         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9144                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9145                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9146                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9147                 if broadcast_alice {
9148                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9149                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9150                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9151                 }
9152                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9153                 if broadcast_alice {
9154                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9155                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9156                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9157                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9158                         // broadcasted.
9159                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9160                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9161                 } else {
9162                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9163                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9164                 }
9165         }
9166
9167         // Step (6):
9168         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9169         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9170         {
9171                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9172                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9173                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9174                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9175                 }
9176                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9177                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9178                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9179                 };
9180                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9181                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9182                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9183                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9184                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9185                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9186                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9187                 } else {
9188                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9189                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9190                 }
9191         }
9192 }
9193
9194 #[test]
9195 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9196         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9197         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9198         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9199         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9200 }
9201
9202 #[test]
9203 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9204         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9205         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9206         //
9207         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9208         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9209         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9210         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9212         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9213         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9214         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9215
9216         // Create an initial channel
9217         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9218         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9219         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9220         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9221
9222         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9223         // that it is rejected.
9224         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9225         {
9226                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9227                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9228                 match events[0] {
9229                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9230                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9231                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9232                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9233                                 // move forward with it.
9234                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9235                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9236                         },
9237                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9238                 }
9239         }
9240
9241         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9242         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9243
9244         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9246
9247         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9248         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9249         {
9250                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9251                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9252                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9253                 added_monitors.clear();
9254         }
9255         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9256
9257         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9258         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9259
9260         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9261         // temporary one).
9262
9263         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9264         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9265         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9266         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9267         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9268         {
9269                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9270                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9271                 match events[0] {
9272                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9273                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9274                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9275                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9276                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9277                         },
9278                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9279                 }
9280         }
9281
9282         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9283         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9284         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9285         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9286         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9287         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9288
9289         let funding_created = {
9290                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9291                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9292                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9293                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9294                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9295                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9296                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9297                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9298         };
9299         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9300         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9301         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9302         // still needs to be cleared here.
9303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9304
9305         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9306         {
9307                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9308                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9309                 match events[0] {
9310                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9311                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9312                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9313                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9314                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9315                         },
9316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9317                 }
9318         }
9319
9320         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9321         // everything is functional.
9322         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9323         {
9324                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9325                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9326                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9327                 added_monitors.clear();
9328         }
9329
9330         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9331         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9332         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9333         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9334
9335         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9336         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9337         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9338         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9339 }
9340
9341 #[test]
9342 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9343         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9344         //
9345         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9346         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9347         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9348         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9351         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9352
9353         // Create some initial channels
9354         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9355         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9356         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9357
9358         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9359         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9360         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9361
9362         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9363         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9364         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9365
9366         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9367         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9368         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9369         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9370         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9371         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9372         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9373         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9374         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9375
9376         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9377         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9378         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9380         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9381         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9382         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9383         match events[0] {
9384                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9385                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9386                 },
9387                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9388         }
9389         match events[1] {
9390                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9391                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9392                 },
9393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9394         }
9395         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9396         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9397         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9398         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9400         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9401
9402         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9403         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9404         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9405 }
9406
9407 #[test]
9408 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9409         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9410         //
9411         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9412         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9413         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9414         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9419
9420         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9421         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9422         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9423
9424         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9425         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9426                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9427                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9428         }
9429
9430         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9431         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9433
9434         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9435         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9436
9437         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9438         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9439
9440         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9441         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9442         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9443
9444         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9445         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9446         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9447         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9448         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9449         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9450         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9451                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9452                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9453                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9454                 } else { panic!(); }
9455         } else { panic!(); }
9456         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9457 }
9458
9459 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9460         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9461         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9462         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9463         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9464         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9465         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9466         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9467         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9468         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9469         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9470         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9471         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9472         // until we learned about an additional block.
9473         //
9474         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9475         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9479         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9481
9482         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9483         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9484         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9485         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9486         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9487
9488         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9489         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9490         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9492         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9493         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9494
9495         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9496         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9497                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9498         }
9499         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9500                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9501         if test_height_before_timelock {
9502                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9503                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9504                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9505                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9506         } else {
9507                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9508                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9509                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9510                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9511                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9512                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9513                 // timelock is up).
9514                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9515                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9516
9517                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9518                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9519                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9520                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9521                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9522                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9523                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9524
9525                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9526                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9527                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9528                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9529                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9530                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9531                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9532                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9533                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9534         }
9535 }
9536
9537 #[test]
9538 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9539         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9540         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9541 }
9542
9543 #[test]
9544 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9545         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9546         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9547         // HTLCs.
9548         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9549
9550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9553         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9554         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9555         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9556         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9557         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9558         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9559
9560         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9561         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9562         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9563         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9564
9565         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9566         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9567         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9568         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9569         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9570
9571         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9572
9573         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9574         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9575         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9577
9578         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9579         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9580         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9581         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9582         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9583
9584         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9585         // generated
9586         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9587
9588         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9589         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9590         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9591
9592         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9593         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9594         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9595         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9596         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9597
9598         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9599         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9600         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9601         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9602
9603         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9604         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9605                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9606         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9607         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9608         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9609                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9610         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9611
9612         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9613         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9614                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9615                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9616                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9617                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9618                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9619                         keys_manager,
9620                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9621                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9622                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9623                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9624                         channel_monitors,
9625                 }).unwrap()
9626         };
9627         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9628         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9629
9630         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9631         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9632         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9634
9635         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9636         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9637         // the commitment state.
9638         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9639
9640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9641
9642         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9643         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9644         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9645
9646         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9647         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9648         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9649         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9650         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9651         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9652         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9653
9654         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9655         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9656 }
9657
9658 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9659         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9663
9664         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9665
9666         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9667                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9668         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9669
9670         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9671
9672         {
9673                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9674                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9675                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9676                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9677                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9678                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9679                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9680         }
9681         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9682         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9683
9684         {
9685                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9686                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9687                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9688                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9689                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9690                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9691                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9692                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9693                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9694                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9695                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9696         }
9697
9698         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9699         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9700
9701         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9702                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9703                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9704
9705                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9706                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9707
9708                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9709                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9710                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9711
9712                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9713                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9714                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9715
9716                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9717                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9718                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9719                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9720         } else {
9721                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9722                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9723                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9724
9725                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9726                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9727                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9728                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9729
9730                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9731
9732                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9733         }
9734 }
9735
9736 #[test]
9737 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9738         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9739         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9740         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9741         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9742         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9743 }
9744
9745 #[test]
9746 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9747         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9748         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9749         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9750 }
9751
9752 #[test]
9753 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9754         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9755         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9757         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9758         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9759         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9760
9761         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9762         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9763         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9764         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9765
9766         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9767                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9768         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9769         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9770         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9771                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9772                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9773                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9774         });
9775         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9776
9777         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9778
9779         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9780         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9781         {
9782                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9783                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9784
9785                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9786                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9787                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9788         }
9789         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9790
9791         {
9792                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9793                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9794
9795                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9796                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9797                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9798
9799                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9800                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9801
9802                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9803                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9804
9805                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9806                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9807                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9808
9809                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9810                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9811                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9812
9813                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9814                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9815                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9816         }
9817         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9818         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9819         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9820         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9821
9822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9823
9824         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9825         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9826         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9827
9828         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9830
9831         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9832         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9833         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9834
9835         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9836
9837         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9839
9840         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9841         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9842         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9843
9844         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9845 }
9846
9847 #[test]
9848 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9852         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9853
9854         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9855         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9856         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9857         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9858         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9859                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9860                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9861                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9862         };
9863         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9864         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9865         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(), None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9866
9867         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9868         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9870         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9871         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9872         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9873         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9874         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9875         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9876 }
9877
9878 #[test]
9879 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9884
9885         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9886         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9887         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9888         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9889
9890         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9891         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9892                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9893                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9894                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9895         };
9896         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9897         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9898         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9899         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9900         let route = find_route(
9901                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph.read_only(),
9902                 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9903         ).unwrap();
9904
9905         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9906         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9908         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9909         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9910         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9911         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9912         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9913         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9914 }
9915
9916 #[test]
9917 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9918         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9919         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9920         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9921         // amount.
9922         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9923         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9924         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9925         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9926
9927         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9928         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9929         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9930         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9931
9932         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9933         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9934         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9935                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9936                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9937                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9938         });
9939
9940         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9941         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9942         // amount of time to respond to.
9943
9944         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9945         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9946         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9947
9948         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
9949
9950         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9951
9952         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9953         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9955
9956         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9958         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9959
9960         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9961         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9962         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9964         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9965 }
9966
9967 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
9968         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
9969         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
9970         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
9971         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
9972         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
9973         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
9974         //
9975         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
9976         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
9977         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
9978         //
9979         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
9980         // definitely claimed.
9981         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9982         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9983         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9984
9985         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9986         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9987         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9988
9989         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9990
9991         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9992         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9993         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9994         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9995
9996         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
9997         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9998         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9999         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10000                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10001                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10002                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10003         });
10004
10005         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10007
10008         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10009         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10010         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10011         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10012         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10013
10014         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10015         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10016         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10017         if !persist_both_monitors {
10018                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10019                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10020                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10021                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10022                         }
10023                 }
10024         }
10025
10026         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10027         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10028
10029         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10030
10031         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10033         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10034
10035         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10036         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10037         // with the old ChannelManager.
10038         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10039         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10040                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10041                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10042                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10043                 }
10044         }
10045         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10046         if persist_both_monitors {
10047                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10048                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10049                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10050                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10051                         }
10052                 }
10053         }
10054
10055         // Now restart nodes[3].
10056         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10057         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10058         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10059         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10060         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10061         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10062                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10063                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10064         }
10065
10066         let config = UserConfig::default();
10067         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10068                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10069                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10070                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10071                 }
10072                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10073                         default_config: config,
10074                         keys_manager,
10075                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10076                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10077                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10078                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10079                         channel_monitors,
10080                 }).unwrap().1
10081         };
10082         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10083
10084         for monitor in monitors {
10085                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10086                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10087                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10088         }
10089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10090
10091         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10092         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10093
10094         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10095         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10096         // never finished processing.
10097         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10098         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10099         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10100         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10101         if persist_both_monitors {
10102                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10103         }
10104
10105         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10106         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10107         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10108                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10109         {
10110                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10111         } else { panic!(); }
10112
10113         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10114         if !persist_both_monitors {
10115                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10116
10117                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10118                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10119                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10120                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10121
10122                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10123                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10124                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10125
10126                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10127
10128                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10129                 // claim should fly.
10130                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10132                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10133                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10134
10135                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10136                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10137                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10138                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10139                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10140                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10141                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10142                                 cs_updates
10143                         }
10144                         _ => panic!(),
10145                 };
10146
10147                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10148                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10149                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10150         }
10151 }
10152
10153 #[test]
10154 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10155         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10156         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10157 }
10158
10159 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10160 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10161 enum ExposureEvent {
10162         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10163         AtHTLCForward,
10164         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10165         AtHTLCReception,
10166         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10167         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10168 }
10169
10170 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10171         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10172         // policy.
10173         //
10174         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10175         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10176         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10177         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10178         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10179         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10180         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10181         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10182
10183         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10184         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10185         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10188         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10189
10190         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10191         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10192         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10193         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10194         if on_holder_tx {
10195                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10196         }
10197         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10198         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10199         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10200
10201         let opt_anchors = false;
10202
10203         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10204
10205         if on_holder_tx {
10206                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10207                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10208                 }
10209         }
10210
10211         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10212         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10213         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10214
10215         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10217
10218         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10219         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10220         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10221
10222         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10223                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10224                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10225                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10226         };
10227         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10228         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10229
10230         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10231         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10232
10233         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10234         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10235
10236         if on_holder_tx {
10237                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10238                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10239                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10240                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10241                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10242                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10243                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10244                         }
10245                 } else {
10246                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10247                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10248                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10249                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10250                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10251                         }
10252                 }
10253         } else {
10254                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10255                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10256                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10257                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10258                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10259                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10260                         }
10261                 } else {
10262                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10263                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10264                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10265                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10266                         }
10267                 }
10268         }
10269
10270         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10271         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10272                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10273                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10274                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10275                 if on_holder_tx {
10276                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10277                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10278                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10279                 } else {
10280                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10281                 }
10282         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10283                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10284                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10285                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10286                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10287                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10288                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10289                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10290                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10291                 if on_holder_tx {
10292                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10293                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10294                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10295                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10296                 } else {
10297                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10298                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10299                 }
10300         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10301                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10302                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10303                 {
10304                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10305                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10306                 }
10307                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10308                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10309                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10310         }
10311
10312         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10313         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10314         added_monitors.clear();
10315 }
10316
10317 #[test]
10318 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10319         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10320         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10321         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10322         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10323         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10324         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10325         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10326         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10327         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10328         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10329         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10330         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10331 }