1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use chain::channelmonitor;
18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use util::errors::APIError;
36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
586 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
600 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
601 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
602 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
603 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
604 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
611 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
614 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
619 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
620 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
623 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
629 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
634 let channel_value = 5000;
636 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
637 let channel_id = chan.2;
638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
639 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
640 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
642 let opt_anchors = false;
644 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
645 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
646 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
648 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
649 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
651 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
652 *feerate_lock = feerate;
654 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
656 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
662 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
664 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
666 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
667 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
668 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
669 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
670 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
671 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
675 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
676 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
679 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
680 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
683 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
685 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
686 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
687 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
695 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
696 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
698 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
699 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
700 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
701 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
705 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
706 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
707 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
710 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
712 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
713 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
714 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
715 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
717 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
718 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
719 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
720 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
722 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
724 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
727 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
730 htlc_signatures: res.1
733 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
735 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
738 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
740 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
741 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
742 //Should produce and error.
743 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
744 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
746 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
747 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
751 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
756 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
762 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
765 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
768 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
769 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
770 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
772 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
777 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
778 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
781 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
783 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
784 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
786 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
787 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
788 added_monitors.clear();
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 // node[1] has nothing to do
794 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
798 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
799 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
800 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
802 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
804 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
806 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
813 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
816 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
822 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
825 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
827 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
833 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
836 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
840 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
842 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
843 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
844 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
845 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 fn test_update_fee() {
851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
855 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
856 let channel_id = chan.2;
859 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
860 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
861 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
862 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
863 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
864 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
865 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
866 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
867 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
868 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
869 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
872 // Create and deliver (1)...
875 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
876 feerate = *feerate_lock;
877 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
879 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
882 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
883 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
884 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
885 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
886 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
892 // Generate (2) and (3):
893 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
894 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
902 // Create and deliver (4)...
904 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
905 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
907 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
910 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
911 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
913 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
922 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
923 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
925 // Handle (3), creating (6):
926 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
933 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
936 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
937 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
938 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
947 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
949 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
950 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
956 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
964 fn fake_network_test() {
965 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
966 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
970 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
972 // Create some initial channels
973 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
974 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
977 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
983 // Send some more payments
984 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
988 // Test failure packets
989 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
990 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
992 // Add a new channel that skips 3
993 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
995 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1004 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021 hops.push(RouteHop {
1022 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1024 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050 hops.push(RouteHop {
1051 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1053 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062 // Claim the rebalances...
1063 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1064 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066 // Close down the channels...
1067 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1068 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1071 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1074 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1083 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1084 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1085 // commitment dance rounds.
1086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1089 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1091 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1094 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1095 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1096 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1097 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1103 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1104 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1107 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1112 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1114 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1117 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1118 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1127 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1131 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1132 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1144 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1158 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1164 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1178 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1179 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1182 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1188 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1189 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1196 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1197 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1198 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1202 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1217 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1220 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1225 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1226 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1227 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1228 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1242 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1243 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1246 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1247 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1251 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1254 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1255 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1256 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1257 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1258 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1259 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1262 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1266 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1267 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1270 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1278 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1279 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1280 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1285 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1290 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1294 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1295 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1301 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1302 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1303 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1304 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1307 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1308 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1310 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1319 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1323 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1324 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1327 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1330 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1331 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1332 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1333 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1335 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1337 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1338 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1339 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1342 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1345 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1351 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1359 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1361 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1366 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1367 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1368 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1371 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1372 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1373 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1374 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1380 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1381 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1388 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1389 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1390 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1391 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1392 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1393 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1394 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1397 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1398 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1399 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1400 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1403 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1404 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1405 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1406 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1407 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1408 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1409 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1412 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1413 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1414 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1417 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1418 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422 amount_msat: 3460001,
1423 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1428 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1431 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1433 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1434 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1438 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1439 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1442 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1447 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1450 htlc_signatures: res.1
1453 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1454 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1455 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1458 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1461 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1467 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1470 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1471 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1476 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1482 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1484 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1485 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1486 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1491 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1492 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1493 let opt_anchors = false;
1495 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1496 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1503 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1504 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1507 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1508 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1509 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1510 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1511 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1512 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1517 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1518 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1521 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1522 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1523 let opt_anchors = false;
1525 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1526 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1527 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1528 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1529 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1530 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1534 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1535 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1538 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1539 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1541 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1542 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1543 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1544 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1545 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1546 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1549 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1550 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1551 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1552 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1556 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1557 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1559 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1560 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1566 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1567 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1568 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1569 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1570 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1575 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1576 let opt_anchors = false;
1578 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1579 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1580 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1581 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1582 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1583 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1587 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1588 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1589 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1590 // commitment transaction fee.
1591 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1594 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1595 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1598 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1599 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1600 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1601 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1605 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1606 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1607 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1608 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1609 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614 let opt_anchors = false;
1616 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1619 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1621 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1624 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1625 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1627 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1628 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1632 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1633 match msg_events[0] {
1634 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1635 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1642 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1643 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1644 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1652 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1653 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1659 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1666 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1667 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1676 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1678 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1681 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1682 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1683 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1687 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1688 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1689 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691 // Add a pending HTLC.
1692 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1693 let payment_event_1 = {
1694 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1699 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1704 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1705 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1706 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1707 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1710 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1711 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1712 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1713 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1714 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1715 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1716 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1719 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1720 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1721 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1722 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1726 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1727 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1728 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1729 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1730 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1736 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1742 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1743 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1744 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1745 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1746 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1749 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1750 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1757 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1761 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1764 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1765 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1766 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1767 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1769 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1771 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1774 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1777 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1783 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1784 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1789 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1790 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1791 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1792 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1799 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1800 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1801 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1802 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1805 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1807 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1810 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1811 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1814 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1815 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1816 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1817 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1818 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1819 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1823 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1824 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1825 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1826 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1827 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1830 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1837 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1839 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843 // adding pending output.
1844 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1845 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1846 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1847 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1848 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1849 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1850 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1851 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1852 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1855 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1856 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1859 let payment_event_1 = {
1860 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1865 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1870 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1873 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1874 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1875 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878 // split the rest to test holding cell
1879 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1880 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1881 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1882 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1885 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888 // now see if they go through on both sides
1889 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1890 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1891 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1899 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1900 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1901 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1902 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1906 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912 // flush the pending htlc
1913 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1914 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1920 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1923 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1928 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1934 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1938 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1941 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1945 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1948 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1959 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1960 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1977 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1978 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1991 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1992 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1995 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1996 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1997 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1998 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2001 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2005 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2006 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2007 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2008 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2009 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2010 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2011 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2012 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2015 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2016 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2017 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2018 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2019 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2020 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2021 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2024 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2025 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2026 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2027 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2031 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2032 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2035 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2036 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2037 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2038 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2041 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2045 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2047 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2050 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2051 // initial fulfill/CS.
2052 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2053 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2060 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2074 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2082 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2089 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2090 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2091 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2092 // on-chain as necessary).
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2101 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2104 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2107 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2111 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2114 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2115 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2121 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2141 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2151 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2154 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2158 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2159 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2160 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2164 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166 // Create some initial channels
2167 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2168 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2186 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2192 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2194 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2199 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2203 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2206 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2207 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2213 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2214 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2216 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2220 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2222 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2225 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2228 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2229 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2235 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2236 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2245 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2246 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2247 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2249 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2250 let node2_commitment_txid;
2252 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2253 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2254 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2255 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2258 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2259 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2261 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2264 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2266 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2270 // confusing us in the following tests.
2271 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2274 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2275 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2278 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2279 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2280 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2282 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2283 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2289 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2290 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2299 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2300 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2306 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2309 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2312 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2314 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2315 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2322 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2327 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2330 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2331 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2334 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2335 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2339 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2340 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2344 fn test_justice_tx() {
2345 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2346 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2347 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2348 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2349 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2350 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2351 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2352 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2353 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2354 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2355 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2356 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2357 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2361 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2362 // Create some new channels:
2363 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2365 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2366 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2367 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2368 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2369 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2376 // Revoke the old state
2377 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2387 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2388 node_txn.truncate(1);
2390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2391 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2392 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2394 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2395 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2396 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2397 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2399 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2400 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2401 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2402 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2404 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2406 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2407 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2410 // Create some new channels:
2411 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2413 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2417 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2418 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2419 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2420 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2422 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2425 // Revoke the old state
2426 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2428 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2431 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2432 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2434 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2438 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2440 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2445 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2448 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2454 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2455 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2456 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2461 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2462 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2463 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2465 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2467 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2468 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2470 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2471 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2474 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2475 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2477 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2480 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2481 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2488 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2489 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2491 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2492 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2493 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2496 // Create some new channel:
2497 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2499 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2500 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2501 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2502 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2503 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2505 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2506 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2513 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2515 //Revoke the old state
2516 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2524 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2525 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2526 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2528 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2531 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2532 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2535 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2536 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2539 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2540 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2543 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2544 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2545 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2547 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2548 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2549 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2550 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2551 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2553 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2554 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2555 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2559 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2560 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2561 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2562 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2565 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2567 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2569 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2570 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2571 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2572 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2573 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2574 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2576 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2577 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2579 //Revoke the old state
2580 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2583 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2585 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2587 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2588 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2589 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2590 match events.last().unwrap() {
2591 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2595 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2596 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2598 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2599 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2601 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2602 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2603 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2604 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2605 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2607 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2609 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2611 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2615 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2618 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2619 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2620 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2621 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2623 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2624 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2625 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2627 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2628 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2629 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2630 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2632 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2633 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2635 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2637 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2641 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2642 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2643 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2644 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2645 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2646 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2647 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2648 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2649 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2651 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2652 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2653 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2654 // PaymentSent event).
2656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2659 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2661 // Create some initial channels
2662 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2663 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2665 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2666 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2667 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2671 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2672 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2676 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2678 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2679 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2680 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2682 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2683 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2684 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2685 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2686 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2688 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2689 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2690 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2691 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2692 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2694 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2695 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2697 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2698 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2703 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2704 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2708 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2712 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2713 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2714 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2715 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2717 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2718 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2719 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2720 added_monitors.clear();
2722 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2723 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2724 match forwarded_events[0] {
2725 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2726 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2728 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2729 match forwarded_events[1] {
2730 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2731 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2732 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2733 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2734 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2738 match forwarded_events[2] {
2739 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2740 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2741 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2742 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2743 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2747 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2749 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2750 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2751 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2753 added_monitors.clear();
2755 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2757 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2761 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2766 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2767 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2768 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2769 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2770 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2773 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2776 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2777 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2778 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2779 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2780 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2781 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2783 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2784 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2786 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2787 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2789 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2791 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2792 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2794 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2796 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2801 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2802 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2803 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2804 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2806 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2807 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2808 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2809 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2810 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2814 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2815 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2816 let commitment_spend =
2817 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2818 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2820 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2823 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2824 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2825 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2829 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2830 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2831 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2834 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2836 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2837 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2839 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2840 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2842 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2843 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2844 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2845 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2846 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2848 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2850 let mut first_claimed = false;
2851 for event in events {
2853 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2854 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2855 assert!(!first_claimed);
2856 first_claimed = true;
2858 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2859 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2862 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2863 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2867 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2870 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2871 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2872 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2873 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2874 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2875 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2877 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2882 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2883 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2884 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2885 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2887 // Create some intial channels
2888 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2889 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2891 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2892 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2895 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2897 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2898 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2899 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2900 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2902 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2905 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2906 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2908 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2909 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2910 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2911 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2917 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2918 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2920 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2921 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2922 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2923 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2924 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2926 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2927 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2928 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2929 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2930 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2934 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2938 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2939 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2941 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2944 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2946 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2950 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2954 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2955 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2956 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2957 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2960 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2962 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2963 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2964 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2965 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2966 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2967 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2974 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2976 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2977 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2979 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2980 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2981 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2982 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2983 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2984 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2989 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2990 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2991 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2993 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2994 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2996 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2998 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2999 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3000 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3001 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3002 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3003 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3004 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3008 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3009 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3010 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3011 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3015 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3016 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3017 // and fail backward accordingly.
3019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3022 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3024 // Create some initial channels
3025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3026 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3028 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3029 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3030 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3031 // Revoke the old state
3032 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3034 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3036 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3037 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3038 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3044 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3047 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3048 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3049 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3050 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3051 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3056 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3062 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3063 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3064 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3065 // commitment transaction anymore.
3066 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3067 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3068 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3069 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3070 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3071 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3073 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3074 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3075 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3076 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3077 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3081 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3083 // Create some initial channels
3084 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3085 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3087 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3088 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3089 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3090 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3091 // Revoke the old state
3092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3094 let value = if use_dust {
3095 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3096 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3097 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3100 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3101 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3102 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3104 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3115 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3117 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3120 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3121 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3129 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3130 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3131 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3137 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3138 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3139 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3141 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3142 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3144 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3145 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3148 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3149 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3150 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3153 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3154 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3155 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3156 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3162 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3163 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3164 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3166 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3169 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3173 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3177 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3180 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3181 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3183 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3186 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3188 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3189 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3191 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3192 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3195 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3196 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3202 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3203 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3208 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3209 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3212 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3215 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3216 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3217 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3218 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3221 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3222 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3223 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3224 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3232 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3233 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3234 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3240 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3241 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3242 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3243 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3244 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3245 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3246 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3248 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3254 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3257 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3258 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3259 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3260 // that we should update our routing table for.
3261 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3262 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3268 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3269 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3270 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3275 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3276 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3277 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3287 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3291 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3292 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3293 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3299 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3300 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3301 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3307 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3308 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3309 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3310 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3311 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3312 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3314 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3316 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3317 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3320 let payment_event = {
3321 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3322 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3323 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3325 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3326 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3329 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3330 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3332 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3335 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3338 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3340 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3342 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3343 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3344 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3345 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3346 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3347 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3349 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3350 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3356 onion_routing_packet,
3358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3360 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3361 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3362 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3364 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3365 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3370 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3371 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3375 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3380 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3381 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3382 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3386 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3387 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3389 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3390 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3391 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3392 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3394 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3396 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3397 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3400 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3402 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3404 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3406 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3407 // registering new transactions
3408 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3409 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3413 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3414 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3418 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3422 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3424 let mut payment_event = {
3425 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3428 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3430 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3433 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3434 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3436 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3438 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3439 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3440 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3441 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3444 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3447 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3449 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3450 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3451 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3453 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3454 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3456 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3458 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3459 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3460 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3461 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3462 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3466 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3468 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3469 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3471 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3473 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3475 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3476 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3478 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3479 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3480 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3486 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3490 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3491 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3492 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3493 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3494 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3500 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3502 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3504 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3505 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3507 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3508 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3509 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3511 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3512 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3514 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3515 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3519 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3520 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3521 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3522 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3523 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3524 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3525 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3527 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3528 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3529 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3530 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3532 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3536 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3538 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3540 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3541 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3543 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3544 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3550 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3551 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3552 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3553 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3555 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3560 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3561 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3565 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3569 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3573 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3574 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3575 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3576 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3578 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3582 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3583 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3584 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3585 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3587 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3588 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3590 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3591 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3593 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3595 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3598 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3599 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3600 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3605 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3606 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3607 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3612 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3617 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3618 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3621 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3622 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3626 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3628 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3629 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3630 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3631 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3632 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3633 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3634 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3636 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3639 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3641 let payment_event = {
3642 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3645 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3646 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3647 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3649 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3651 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3652 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3655 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3656 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3658 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3660 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3661 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3662 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3665 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3666 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3667 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3668 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3671 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3672 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3673 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3681 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3684 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3685 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3686 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3688 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3689 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3690 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3692 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3693 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3695 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3696 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3697 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3698 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3699 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3700 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3701 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3702 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3703 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3704 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3705 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3706 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3707 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3708 // Everything was delivered...
3709 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3713 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3715 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3719 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3725 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3726 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3728 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3729 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3730 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3732 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3733 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3734 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3736 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3742 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3744 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3746 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3747 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3748 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3750 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3751 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3752 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3754 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3755 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3756 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3761 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3762 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3764 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3765 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3767 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3768 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3769 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3775 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3777 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3779 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3780 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3781 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3784 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3785 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3786 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3787 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3790 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3791 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3800 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3803 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3805 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3809 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3810 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3811 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3812 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3813 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3814 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3815 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3816 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3817 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3818 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3819 // Everything was delivered...
3820 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3823 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3824 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3827 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3828 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3831 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3832 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3835 // Channel should still work fine...
3836 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3837 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3842 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3843 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3845 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3846 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3850 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3851 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3853 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3854 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3858 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3859 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3863 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3864 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3865 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3866 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3867 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3869 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3870 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3872 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3873 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3874 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3876 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3878 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3879 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3881 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3882 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3883 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3885 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3886 let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3887 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3888 let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3890 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3891 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3892 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3893 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3894 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3895 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3896 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3902 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3903 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3904 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3905 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3906 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3908 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3909 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3910 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3911 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3916 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3917 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3918 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3924 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3925 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3930 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3931 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3932 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3933 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3934 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3936 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3937 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3942 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3943 // announcement_signatures.
3944 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3945 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3946 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3947 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3948 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3949 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3955 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3956 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3958 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3959 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3961 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3962 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3963 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3968 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3969 // same channel_announcement.
3970 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3971 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3973 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3974 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3975 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3981 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3982 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3983 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3984 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3986 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3987 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3990 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3991 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3992 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3994 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3995 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3996 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3998 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3999 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4000 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4001 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4002 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4003 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4004 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4005 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4007 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4008 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4009 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4010 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4011 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4012 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4014 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4015 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4016 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4017 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4021 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4022 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4024 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4025 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4028 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4032 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4033 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4034 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4035 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4036 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4040 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4041 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4043 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4045 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4046 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4047 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4048 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4049 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4050 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4052 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4053 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4054 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4058 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4059 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4060 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4064 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4065 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4067 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4069 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4070 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4071 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4074 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4075 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4077 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4081 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4082 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4085 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4086 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4088 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4089 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4090 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4091 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4092 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4093 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4094 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4096 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4097 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4098 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4100 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4101 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4102 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4107 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4108 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4109 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4115 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4116 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4118 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4119 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4120 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4121 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4122 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4123 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4125 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4126 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4127 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4128 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4130 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4131 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4133 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4134 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4136 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4138 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4139 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4140 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4141 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4143 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4144 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4145 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4146 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4150 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4151 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4152 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4153 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4159 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4160 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4161 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4162 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4163 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4164 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4167 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4168 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4169 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4172 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4173 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4174 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4177 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4178 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4181 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4183 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4184 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4186 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4187 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4189 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4190 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4191 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4193 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4199 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4200 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4203 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4204 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4207 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4208 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4209 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4210 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4211 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4212 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4213 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4217 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4218 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4219 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4220 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4221 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4222 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4223 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4227 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4228 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4229 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4232 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4235 let mut block = Block {
4236 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4239 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4240 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4241 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4242 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4243 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4244 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4245 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4248 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4251 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4252 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4253 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4254 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4255 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4257 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4258 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4259 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4260 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4261 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4262 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4266 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4267 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4268 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4271 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4272 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4273 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4274 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4276 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4277 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4278 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4280 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4281 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4282 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4283 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4285 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4286 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4288 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4290 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4293 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4294 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4295 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4296 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4299 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4300 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4301 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4302 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4306 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4307 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4308 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4309 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4312 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4314 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4315 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4316 match fail_commit[0] {
4317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4318 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4319 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4321 _ => unreachable!(),
4323 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4325 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4327 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4328 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4329 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4330 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4331 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4332 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4337 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4338 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4339 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4343 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4344 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4345 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4346 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4347 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4348 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4349 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4350 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4351 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4352 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4354 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4356 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4358 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4359 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4360 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4361 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4363 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4364 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4365 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4366 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4367 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4368 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4369 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4370 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4371 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4372 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4374 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4375 let config = UserConfig::default();
4376 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4377 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4378 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4379 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4380 default_config: config,
4382 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4383 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4384 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4389 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4390 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4392 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4393 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4394 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4397 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4398 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4399 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4400 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4402 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4403 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4404 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4405 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4407 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4408 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4409 for node in nodes.iter() {
4410 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4411 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4412 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4415 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4419 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4420 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4424 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4425 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4426 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4427 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4428 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4429 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4431 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4432 let channel_value = 100000;
4433 let push_msat = 10001;
4434 let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4435 let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4436 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4437 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4438 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4439 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4440 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4442 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4444 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4445 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4447 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4449 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4450 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4451 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4452 added_monitors.clear();
4455 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4456 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4458 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4459 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4460 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4461 added_monitors.clear();
4463 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4468 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4469 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4470 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4471 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4473 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4474 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4475 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4476 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4477 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4478 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4479 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4480 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4481 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4482 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4484 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4485 let config = UserConfig::default();
4486 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4487 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4488 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4489 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4490 default_config: config,
4492 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4493 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4494 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4499 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4500 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4502 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4504 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4505 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4507 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4508 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4509 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4510 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4511 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4513 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4514 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4518 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4519 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4520 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4522 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4523 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4524 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4525 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4527 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4528 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4529 for node in nodes.iter() {
4530 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4531 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4532 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4539 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4540 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4543 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4544 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4545 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4546 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4547 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4549 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4551 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4552 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4556 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4557 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4558 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4560 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4561 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4562 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4563 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4564 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4565 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4566 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4567 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4568 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4569 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4571 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4572 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4573 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4574 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4575 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4576 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4578 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4579 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4580 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4585 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4586 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4588 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4589 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4592 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4594 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4595 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4599 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4600 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4604 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4605 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4606 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4607 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4608 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4609 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4610 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4611 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4612 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4614 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4615 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4616 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4617 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4618 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4621 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4623 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4624 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4626 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4627 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4628 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4629 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4631 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4633 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4634 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4635 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4636 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4637 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4640 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4641 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4642 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4643 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4644 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4645 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4648 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4649 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4650 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4651 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4652 assert!(read.is_empty());
4653 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4656 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4657 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4658 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4659 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4660 assert!(read.is_empty());
4661 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4664 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4665 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4666 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4667 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4669 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4670 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4671 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4673 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4675 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4678 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4679 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4680 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4681 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4683 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4684 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4685 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4687 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4689 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4690 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4692 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4693 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4694 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4695 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4696 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4699 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4700 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4703 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4704 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4706 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4707 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4709 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4710 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4712 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4713 let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4714 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4715 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4716 let mut found_err = false;
4717 for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4718 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4720 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4721 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4722 assert!(!found_err);
4725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4732 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4733 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4735 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4736 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4737 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4738 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4739 for event in events.drain(..) {
4741 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4742 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4743 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4744 all_outputs.push(outp);
4747 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4750 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4751 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4761 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4762 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4766 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4768 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4769 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4770 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4773 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4774 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4778 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4779 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4781 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4782 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4783 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4784 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4785 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4789 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4790 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4791 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4792 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4793 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4794 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4795 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4797 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4798 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4801 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4803 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4804 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4805 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4808 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4811 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4812 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4814 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4815 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4816 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4820 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4821 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4822 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4829 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4830 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4831 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4833 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4835 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4836 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4837 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4839 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4841 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4842 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4843 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4845 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4846 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4847 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4848 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4849 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4853 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4859 // Create some initial channels
4860 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4862 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4864 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4865 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4866 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4868 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4869 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4870 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4874 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4876 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4880 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4881 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4884 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4885 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4886 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4887 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4888 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4889 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4890 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4892 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4893 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4894 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4896 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4897 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4898 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4902 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4906 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4908 // Create some initial channels
4909 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4911 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4912 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4914 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4916 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4917 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4918 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4920 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4921 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4925 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4928 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4930 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4931 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4933 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4934 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4935 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4937 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4938 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4939 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4940 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4942 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4943 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4944 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4945 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4946 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4950 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4951 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4952 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4953 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4954 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4956 // Create some initial channels
4957 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4959 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4960 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4962 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4964 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4966 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4967 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4971 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4972 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4973 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4974 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4976 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4977 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4979 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4980 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4981 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4985 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4986 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4987 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4990 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4992 // Create some initial channels
4993 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4995 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4996 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4997 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4998 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5000 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5002 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5003 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5004 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5006 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5007 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5009 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5010 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5011 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5012 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5013 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5014 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5015 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5017 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5018 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5019 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5020 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5022 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5024 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5025 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5026 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5027 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5028 // transactions next...
5029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5030 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5032 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5033 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5034 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5035 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5037 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5038 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5041 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5042 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5044 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5045 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5047 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5048 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5049 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5050 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5051 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5055 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5056 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5057 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5060 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5062 // Create some initial channels
5063 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5065 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5066 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5067 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5068 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5070 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5071 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5073 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5075 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5076 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5077 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5079 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5080 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5082 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5083 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5084 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5085 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5087 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5088 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5089 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5091 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5092 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5093 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5094 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5096 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5098 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5099 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5101 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5102 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5103 // transactions next...
5104 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5105 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5106 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5109 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5110 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5113 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5114 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5116 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5118 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5119 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5121 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5122 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5124 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5125 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5126 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5127 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5128 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5129 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5130 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5131 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5135 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5136 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5137 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5138 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5139 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5141 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5147 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5149 // Create some initial channels
5150 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5151 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5153 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5154 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5155 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5156 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5157 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5159 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5160 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5161 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5163 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5164 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5165 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5166 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5167 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5169 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5170 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5171 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5172 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5173 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5175 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5176 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5178 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5180 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5181 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5182 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5183 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5184 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5185 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5186 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5187 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5188 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5189 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5191 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5192 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5193 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5195 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5198 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5202 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5203 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5204 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5205 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5206 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5211 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5212 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5213 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5214 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5218 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5219 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5220 match msg_events[0] {
5221 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5224 match msg_events[1] {
5225 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5228 match msg_events[2] {
5229 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5230 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5231 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5232 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5233 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5234 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5238 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5239 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5240 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5241 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5242 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5243 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5244 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5245 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5246 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5247 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5248 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5249 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5250 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5257 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5258 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5259 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5260 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5261 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5262 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5263 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5264 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5265 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5266 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5267 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5269 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5270 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5272 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5273 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5274 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5276 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5277 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5278 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5279 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5280 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5282 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5284 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5285 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5286 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5287 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5288 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5289 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5290 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5291 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5293 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5294 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5295 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5297 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5298 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5300 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5301 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5303 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5304 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5305 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5306 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5307 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5308 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5310 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5311 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5313 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5314 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5315 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5316 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5318 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5319 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5321 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5322 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5325 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5326 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5327 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5328 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5330 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5333 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5334 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5336 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5338 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5339 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5341 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5345 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5346 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5348 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5349 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5350 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5351 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5352 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5353 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5354 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5355 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5356 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5357 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5358 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5359 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5360 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5362 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5363 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5364 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5365 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5366 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5367 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5368 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5369 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5370 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5373 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5374 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5376 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5378 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5380 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5381 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5382 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5383 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5384 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5385 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5386 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5387 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5388 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5389 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5390 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5393 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5394 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5396 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5398 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5399 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5400 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5407 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5411 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5413 // Create some initial channels
5414 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5416 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5417 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5418 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5419 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5420 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5422 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5423 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5424 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5427 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5429 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5430 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5432 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5436 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5437 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5440 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5441 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5442 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5443 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5445 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5446 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5451 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5453 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5454 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5455 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5456 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5457 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5458 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5461 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5462 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5463 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5464 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5465 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5466 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5467 // use the same payment hashes.
5468 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5473 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5476 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5477 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5478 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5479 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5481 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5482 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5484 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5485 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5486 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5487 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5488 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5490 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5491 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5492 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5493 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5495 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5497 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5499 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5500 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5502 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5504 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5508 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5509 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5511 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5513 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5516 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5518 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5519 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5522 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5524 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5525 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5527 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5528 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5529 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5530 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5531 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5533 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5534 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5535 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5536 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5537 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5538 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5541 let failed_destinations = vec![
5542 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5543 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5544 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5545 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5547 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5550 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5551 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5552 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5553 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5554 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5555 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5557 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5558 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5559 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5562 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5563 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5564 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5566 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5569 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5570 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5571 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5572 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5574 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5576 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5577 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5578 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5579 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5580 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5581 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5582 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5583 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5585 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5587 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5588 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5589 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5590 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5591 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5592 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5593 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5594 if deliver_last_raa {
5595 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5597 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5600 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5601 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5602 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5603 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5605 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5606 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5607 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5609 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5610 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5611 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5613 if announce_latest {
5614 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5616 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5618 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5619 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5621 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5624 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5627 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5631 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5632 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5633 if deliver_last_raa {
5634 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5636 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5637 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5639 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5640 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5642 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5645 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5649 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5650 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5651 let mut a_done = false;
5652 for msg in cs_msgs {
5654 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5655 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5656 // should be failed-backwards here.
5657 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5658 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5659 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5660 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5662 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5667 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5668 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5669 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5671 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5672 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5675 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5676 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5677 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5678 if announce_latest {
5679 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5680 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5681 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5684 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5690 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5691 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5692 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5693 let mut as_updates = 0;
5694 for event in as_events.iter() {
5695 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5696 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5697 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5698 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5700 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5702 if network_update.is_some() {
5705 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5707 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5708 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5709 if announce_latest {
5710 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5711 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5713 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5715 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5716 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5717 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5718 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5719 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5720 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5721 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5722 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5723 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5725 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5727 if network_update.is_some() {
5730 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5732 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5733 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5734 if announce_latest {
5735 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5737 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5739 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5740 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5741 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5742 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5743 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5744 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5748 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5749 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5753 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5754 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5758 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5759 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5760 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5761 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5765 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5771 // Create some initial channels
5772 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5774 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5775 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5776 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5777 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5779 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5780 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5781 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5783 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5784 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5786 let htlc_timeout = {
5787 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5789 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5791 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5796 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5797 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5798 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5800 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5801 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5802 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5803 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5804 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5805 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5806 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5807 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5808 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5809 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5810 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5814 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5815 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5816 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5817 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5821 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5822 let seed = [42; 32];
5823 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5824 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5825 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5826 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5827 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5828 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5829 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5831 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5832 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5834 // Create some initial channels
5835 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5837 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5838 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5839 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5841 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5842 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5843 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5844 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5845 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5847 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5848 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5849 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5850 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5851 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5853 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5854 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5855 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5856 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5857 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5858 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5859 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5860 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5863 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5864 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5865 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5866 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5868 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5870 let htlc_timeout = {
5871 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5872 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5873 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5874 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5878 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5879 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5880 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5882 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5883 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5884 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5885 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5886 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5887 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5888 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5889 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5890 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5891 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5892 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5893 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5897 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5898 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5901 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5905 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5906 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5908 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5910 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5912 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5913 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5914 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5916 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5917 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5918 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5920 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5921 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5922 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5925 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5927 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5928 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5929 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5930 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5932 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5934 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5935 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5936 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5938 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5940 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5941 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5942 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5944 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5946 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5947 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5950 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5951 let mut block = Block {
5952 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5955 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5956 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5957 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5959 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5960 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5962 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5965 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5969 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5970 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5972 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5973 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5976 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5978 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5979 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5980 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5982 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5983 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5985 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5986 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5987 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5989 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5990 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5992 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5995 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5999 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6000 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6002 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6003 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6004 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6005 // actually revoked.
6006 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6007 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6008 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6012 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6013 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6014 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6016 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6017 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6019 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6021 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6023 if check_revoke_no_close {
6024 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6028 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6029 let mut block = Block {
6030 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6033 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6034 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6035 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6037 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6038 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6039 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6041 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6043 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6045 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6046 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6047 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6048 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6049 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6050 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6054 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6055 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6056 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6057 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6058 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6059 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6060 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6062 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6063 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6064 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6066 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6067 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6068 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6070 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6071 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6075 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6076 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6077 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6078 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6079 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6084 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6089 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6090 for node in nodes.iter() {
6091 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6094 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6095 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6096 let push_msat=10001;
6097 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6098 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6099 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6100 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6102 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6103 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6104 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6108 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6114 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6115 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6116 let push_msat=10001;
6117 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6119 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6120 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6121 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6122 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6123 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6125 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6126 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6127 let push_msat=10001;
6128 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6129 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6130 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6132 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6133 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6134 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6136 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6137 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6138 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6140 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6141 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6142 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6144 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6145 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6146 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6147 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6148 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6149 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6157 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6159 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6160 let push_msat=10001;
6161 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6162 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6163 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6164 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6168 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6169 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6174 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6177 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6178 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6179 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6180 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6182 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6186 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6187 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6189 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6190 // pending_update_fee.
6192 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6193 *feerate_lock += 20;
6195 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6198 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6199 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6200 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6201 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6202 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6207 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6209 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6210 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6211 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6212 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6214 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6215 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6216 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6218 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6219 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6220 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6221 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6223 // Flush the pending fee update.
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6225 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6227 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6230 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6231 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6232 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6233 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6234 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6235 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6236 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6237 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6238 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6240 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6241 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6244 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6245 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6246 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6247 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6248 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6249 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6250 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6256 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6257 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6258 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6260 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6264 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6265 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6267 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6268 // pending_update_fee.
6270 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6271 *feerate_lock += 200;
6273 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6276 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6277 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6278 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6279 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6280 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6285 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6287 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6288 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6289 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6290 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6292 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6294 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6295 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6296 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6298 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6299 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6300 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6301 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6302 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6303 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6304 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6306 // Flush the pending fee update.
6307 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6308 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6311 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6314 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6315 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6316 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6317 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6318 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6319 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6320 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6321 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6322 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6324 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6325 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6326 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6328 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6329 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6330 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6331 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6332 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6333 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6334 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6336 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6339 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6340 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6341 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6343 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6345 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6346 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6352 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6353 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6354 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6356 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6359 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6360 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6361 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6363 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6366 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6368 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6370 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6372 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6373 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6376 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6377 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6378 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6381 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6385 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6386 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6387 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6389 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6390 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6391 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6393 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6394 // pending_update_fee.
6396 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6397 *feerate_lock += 20;
6399 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6402 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6404 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6405 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6406 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6408 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6411 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6413 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6414 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6415 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6416 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6418 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6420 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6421 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6422 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6423 let payment_event = {
6424 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6430 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6434 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6437 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6438 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6440 // Flush the pending fee update.
6441 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6442 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6444 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6445 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6448 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6449 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6452 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6453 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6459 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6461 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6463 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6464 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6465 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6466 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6467 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6471 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6472 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6475 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6476 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6477 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6478 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6479 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6480 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6481 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6482 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6483 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6484 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6489 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6490 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6491 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6493 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6494 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6496 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6497 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6499 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6500 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6501 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6502 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6505 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6506 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6510 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6511 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6512 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6515 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6516 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6517 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6518 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6520 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6521 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6523 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6524 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6526 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6527 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6528 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6529 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6533 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6534 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6535 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6536 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6537 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6538 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6539 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6541 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6542 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6543 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6544 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6546 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6547 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6551 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6552 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6553 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6554 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6555 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6556 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6557 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6559 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6560 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6562 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6563 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6566 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6567 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6569 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6574 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6575 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6579 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6580 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6582 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6583 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6584 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6585 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6586 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6587 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6591 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6592 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6593 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6594 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6598 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6599 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6600 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6602 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6603 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6604 let payment_event = {
6605 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6608 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6610 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6611 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6615 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6619 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6621 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6622 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6624 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6625 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6626 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6628 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6629 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6633 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6634 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6638 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6639 let channel_value = 100000;
6640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6641 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6643 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6645 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6646 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6648 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6649 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6650 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6652 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6653 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6658 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6660 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6661 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6665 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6666 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6667 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6669 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6670 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6671 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6674 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6675 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6677 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6678 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6679 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6680 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6681 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6682 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6684 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6688 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6689 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6693 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6696 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6697 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6698 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6699 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6700 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6701 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6703 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6704 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6705 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6707 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6709 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6710 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6711 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6712 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6716 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6717 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6719 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6723 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6724 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6725 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6729 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6730 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6732 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6733 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6734 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6735 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6736 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6737 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6739 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6743 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6744 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6745 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6748 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6749 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6752 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6755 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6756 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6757 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6759 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6763 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6764 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6768 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6769 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6771 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6772 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6774 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6775 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6778 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6779 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6780 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6782 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6786 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6787 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6791 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6793 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6794 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6795 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6798 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6799 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6801 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6802 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6803 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6805 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6809 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6810 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6811 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6812 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6813 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6814 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6815 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6816 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6818 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6819 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6820 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6822 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6823 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6825 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6826 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6827 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6828 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6829 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6830 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6831 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6832 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6833 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6834 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6835 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6836 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6837 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6840 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6841 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6842 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6844 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6846 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6848 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6849 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6850 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6852 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6856 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6857 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6862 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6863 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6864 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6865 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6868 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6871 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6874 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6877 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6879 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6880 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6883 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6887 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6888 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6893 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6894 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6896 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6897 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6899 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6902 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6905 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6908 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6910 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6911 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6912 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6914 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6918 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6919 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6924 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6925 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6927 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6928 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6930 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6931 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6932 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6935 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6936 failure_code: 0x8000,
6939 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6941 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6942 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6943 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6945 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6949 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6950 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6952 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6953 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6954 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6955 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6956 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6958 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6960 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6962 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6964 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6966 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6968 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6969 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6970 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6971 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6972 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6973 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6974 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6976 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6982 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6984 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6985 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6986 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6988 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6992 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6993 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7001 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7003 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7005 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7007 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7008 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7009 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7011 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7012 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7013 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7014 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7015 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7016 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7017 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7023 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7025 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7027 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7028 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7029 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7031 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7035 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7036 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7038 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7041 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7042 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7044 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7045 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7048 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7049 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7051 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7053 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7055 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7057 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7059 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7060 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7062 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7063 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7064 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7065 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7070 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7071 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7073 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7074 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7075 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7077 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7081 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7082 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7083 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7088 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7090 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7092 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7095 let mut payment_event = {
7096 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7098 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7100 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7106 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7107 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7109 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7110 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7113 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7114 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7118 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7119 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7120 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7122 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7123 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7124 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7125 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7126 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7127 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7128 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7130 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7134 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7139 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7140 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7142 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7144 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7145 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7146 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7147 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7148 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7149 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7158 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7162 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7163 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7164 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7166 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7169 let mut payment_event = {
7170 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7172 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7176 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7177 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7179 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7180 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7183 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7184 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7186 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7188 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7189 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7191 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7192 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7193 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7194 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7203 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7204 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7205 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7206 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7210 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7212 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7217 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7218 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7220 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7221 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7223 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7224 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7226 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7227 assert!(is_permanent);
7228 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7233 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7236 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7237 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7238 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7239 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7241 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7242 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7245 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7246 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7248 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7250 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7251 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7252 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7253 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7255 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7256 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7258 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7259 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7261 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7264 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7265 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7266 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7269 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7270 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7272 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7274 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7275 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7280 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7281 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7286 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7287 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7288 if announce_latest {
7289 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7291 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7294 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7296 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7298 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7299 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7300 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7301 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7303 let mut first_failed = false;
7304 for event in events {
7306 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7307 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7308 assert!(!first_failed);
7309 first_failed = true;
7311 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7320 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7321 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7322 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7325 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7326 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7327 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7328 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7329 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7330 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7331 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7336 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7337 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7339 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7341 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7342 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7344 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7345 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7347 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7349 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7350 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7353 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7355 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7356 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7357 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7358 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7359 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7361 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7362 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7364 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7365 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7366 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7367 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7369 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7370 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7371 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7373 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7374 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7375 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7377 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7378 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7380 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7381 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7382 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7383 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7384 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7385 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7386 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7389 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7391 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7393 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7394 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7395 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7396 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7397 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7402 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7403 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7404 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7405 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7409 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7410 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7412 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7413 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7414 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7415 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7416 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7420 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7422 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7423 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7424 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7425 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7428 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7431 } else { assert!(false) }
7433 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7434 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7435 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7436 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7437 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7438 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7439 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7442 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7443 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7445 } else { assert!(false); }
7447 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7448 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7449 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7450 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7451 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7452 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7454 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7456 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7457 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7458 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7462 } else { panic!(); }
7463 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7465 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7466 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7467 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7468 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7469 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7470 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7471 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7474 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7477 } else { assert!(false); }
7480 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7481 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7482 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7483 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7484 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7491 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7492 // during signing due to revoked tx
7493 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7494 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7501 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7503 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7504 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7505 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7506 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7508 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7509 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7511 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7512 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7514 // Restore node A from previous state
7515 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7516 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7517 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7518 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7519 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7520 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7521 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7523 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7524 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7525 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7526 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7527 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7528 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7530 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7531 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7535 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7536 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7537 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7538 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7542 if reconnect_panicing {
7543 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7544 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7546 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7548 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7549 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7550 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7551 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7552 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7553 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7556 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7557 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7558 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7561 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7562 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7563 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7564 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7567 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7571 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7572 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7575 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7576 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7577 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7579 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7580 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7582 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7585 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7589 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7590 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7591 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7592 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7593 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7594 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7596 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7597 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7598 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7599 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7601 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7602 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7603 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7608 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7611 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7612 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7613 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7615 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7616 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7621 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7622 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7626 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7627 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7631 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7632 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7633 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7634 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7639 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7641 // Create some initial channels
7642 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7644 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7645 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7646 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7647 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7648 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7649 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7650 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7655 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7656 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7659 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7660 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7661 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7662 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7664 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7665 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7666 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7668 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7669 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7670 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7671 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7672 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7673 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7674 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7675 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7676 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7677 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7683 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7684 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7686 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7687 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7688 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7689 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7693 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7694 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7695 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7700 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7704 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7707 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7708 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7710 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7711 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7712 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7713 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7714 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7715 for e in msg_events {
7717 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7718 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7719 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7720 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7721 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7728 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7729 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7730 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7731 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7732 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7733 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7735 // Reestablish chan_1
7736 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7737 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7738 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7739 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7740 // Reestablish chan_2
7741 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7742 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7743 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7744 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7745 // Reestablish chan_3
7746 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7747 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7748 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7749 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7751 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7753 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7754 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7755 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7756 for e in msg_events {
7758 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7759 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7760 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7761 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7763 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7764 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7770 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7771 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7775 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7776 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7777 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7782 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7784 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7786 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7787 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7788 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7789 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7790 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7792 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7793 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7794 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7795 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7796 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7797 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7799 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7800 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7801 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7802 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7806 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7807 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7809 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7810 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7811 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7812 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7815 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7819 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7820 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7821 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7823 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7824 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7825 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7826 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7830 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7831 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7832 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7833 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7835 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7836 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7837 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7838 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7839 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7840 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7841 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7842 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7843 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7844 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7845 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7846 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7847 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7851 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7853 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7854 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7856 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7858 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7860 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7861 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7862 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7863 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7864 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7865 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7866 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7867 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7868 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7869 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7870 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7874 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7876 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7877 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7881 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7882 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7883 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7885 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7886 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7889 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7892 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7893 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7894 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7895 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7896 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7897 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7898 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7899 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7900 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7901 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7902 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7904 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7905 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7906 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7908 // Revoke local commitment tx
7909 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7911 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7912 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7913 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7914 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7916 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7917 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7919 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7920 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7921 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7923 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7924 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7925 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7927 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7928 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7929 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7930 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7932 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7933 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7934 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7935 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7936 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7937 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7938 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7939 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7940 match events.last().unwrap() {
7941 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7950 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7952 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7953 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7954 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7955 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7958 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7959 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7960 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7961 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7962 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7964 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7965 // available, which we check here:
7966 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7967 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7968 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7970 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7971 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7973 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7974 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7975 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7976 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7978 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7979 // output, checked above).
7980 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7981 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7982 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7984 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7985 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7986 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7987 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7988 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7992 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7993 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7994 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7995 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7996 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7998 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7999 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
8001 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8003 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
8004 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8005 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8007 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8008 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
8014 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8015 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8016 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8017 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8019 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8020 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8022 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8023 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8024 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8025 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8026 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8027 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8028 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8029 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8033 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8034 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8035 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8036 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8038 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8039 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8040 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8041 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8042 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8043 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8044 // up bumped justice generation.
8045 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8048 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8053 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8054 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8055 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8058 // Provide preimage for one
8059 // Check aggregation
8061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8064 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8066 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8067 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8068 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8070 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8071 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8072 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8073 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8074 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8076 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8077 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8078 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8079 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8081 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8083 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8087 let feerate_timeout;
8088 let feerate_preimage;
8090 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8091 // 5 transactions including:
8092 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
8093 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8094 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8095 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8096 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8097 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8098 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8099 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8100 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8102 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8103 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8105 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8106 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8107 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8108 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8110 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8111 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8113 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8116 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8117 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8118 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8120 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8121 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8122 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8123 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8127 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8128 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8130 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8131 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8133 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8134 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8135 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8136 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8137 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8138 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8140 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8141 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8142 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8143 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8144 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8146 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8147 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8148 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8149 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8150 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8155 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8156 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8160 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8161 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8162 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8163 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8164 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8165 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8166 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8167 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8173 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8175 let per_commitment_secret;
8176 let next_per_commitment_point;
8178 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8179 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8181 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8183 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8184 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8185 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8187 // Must revoke without gaps
8188 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8189 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8191 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8192 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8193 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8196 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8197 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8198 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8204 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8205 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8206 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8208 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8209 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8210 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8211 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8213 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8214 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8215 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8216 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8218 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8219 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8220 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8222 // Revoke local commitment tx
8223 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8225 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8226 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8228 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8231 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8233 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8235 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8236 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8237 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8238 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8239 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8240 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8244 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8245 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8246 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8248 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8249 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8250 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8255 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8256 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8257 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8262 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8264 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8265 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8266 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8268 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8270 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8271 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8274 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8276 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8277 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8278 // can get our balance.
8280 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8281 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8282 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8283 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8284 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8285 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8286 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8287 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8289 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8293 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8294 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8295 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8301 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8303 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8304 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8305 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8306 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8307 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8309 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8312 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8314 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8316 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8317 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8318 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8320 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8321 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8322 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8329 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8335 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8336 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8337 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8339 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8341 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8342 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8343 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8344 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8348 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8349 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8350 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8351 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8356 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8357 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8358 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8360 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8361 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8362 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8366 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8367 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8368 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8369 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8370 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8371 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8373 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8374 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8375 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8376 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8377 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8378 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8379 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8380 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8381 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8382 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8383 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8384 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8386 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8387 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8388 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8389 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8391 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8392 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8393 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8394 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8395 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8397 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8398 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8400 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8401 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8402 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8403 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8404 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8405 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8407 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8408 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8410 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8411 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8412 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8414 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8418 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8419 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8420 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8424 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8426 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8427 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8429 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8431 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8432 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8433 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8435 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8437 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8438 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8443 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8444 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8446 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8447 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8448 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8453 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8455 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8456 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8458 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8460 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8461 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8468 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8469 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8470 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8476 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8477 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8479 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8481 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8482 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8485 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8487 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8488 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8490 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8493 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8494 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8496 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8497 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8498 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8500 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8502 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8506 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8507 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8508 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8509 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8510 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8511 // and the channel should be closed.
8512 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8513 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8516 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8517 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8519 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8520 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8521 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8525 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8526 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8528 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8529 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8531 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8532 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8533 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8534 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8535 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8536 let accept_chan_msg = {
8538 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8539 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8541 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8543 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8545 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8546 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8548 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8549 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8551 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8552 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8554 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8555 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8556 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8557 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8558 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8559 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8564 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8568 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8569 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8570 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8571 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8574 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8576 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8577 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8579 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8581 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8582 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8583 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8585 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8587 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8588 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8589 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8591 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8592 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8594 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8595 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8601 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8602 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8603 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8605 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8606 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8607 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8614 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8615 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8616 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8617 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8618 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8620 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8621 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8623 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8624 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8626 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8627 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8632 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8633 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8637 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8639 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8640 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8641 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8642 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8644 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8645 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8646 route.paths.push(path);
8647 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8648 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8649 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8650 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8651 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8652 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8653 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8654 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8658 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8659 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8663 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8665 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8668 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8669 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8670 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8672 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8673 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8674 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8677 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8678 // values from previous calls.
8679 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8680 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8681 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8683 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8685 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8686 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8688 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8696 #[allow(deprecated)]
8697 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8698 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8699 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8705 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8707 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8709 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8710 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8711 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8712 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8713 } else { panic!(); }
8715 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8717 header: BlockHeader {
8719 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8720 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8721 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8725 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8726 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8727 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8728 } else { panic!(); }
8730 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8731 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8732 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8733 block.header.time += 1;
8734 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8735 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8736 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8739 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8740 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8742 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8743 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8744 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8745 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8747 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8748 // values from previous calls.
8749 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8750 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8751 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8753 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8754 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8755 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8756 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8763 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8764 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8770 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8772 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8773 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8774 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8775 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8777 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8778 // resulting events.
8779 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8780 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8783 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8785 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8787 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8788 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8790 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8793 // We should fail the payment back
8794 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8795 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8797 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8805 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8806 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8807 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8809 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8810 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8811 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8812 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8814 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8815 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8816 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8817 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8819 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8820 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8821 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8822 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8826 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8827 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8828 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8829 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8831 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8832 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8833 // commitment at same time.
8835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8838 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8840 // Create some initial channel
8841 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8842 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8844 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8845 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8847 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8848 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8850 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8851 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8852 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8853 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8855 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8856 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8857 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8858 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8859 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8860 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8861 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8862 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8865 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8866 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8867 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8868 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8869 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8870 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8872 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8873 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8875 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8877 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8878 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8879 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8880 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8881 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8882 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8883 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8884 } else { assert!(false); }
8885 } else { assert!(false); };
8886 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8888 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8889 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8893 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8894 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8895 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8896 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8897 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8902 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8904 // Create some initial channel
8905 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8906 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8908 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8909 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8911 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8912 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8914 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8915 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8916 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8917 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8918 let watchtower_alice = {
8919 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8920 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8921 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8922 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8923 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8924 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8925 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8926 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8929 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8930 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8931 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8932 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8933 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8934 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8936 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8938 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8939 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8943 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8944 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8945 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8946 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8947 let watchtower_bob = {
8948 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8949 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8950 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8951 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8952 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8953 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8954 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8955 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8958 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8959 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8961 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8962 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8964 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8968 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8970 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8971 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8972 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8973 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8974 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8975 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8976 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8977 } else { assert!(false); }
8978 } else { assert!(false); };
8979 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8982 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8983 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8984 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8986 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8989 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8990 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8991 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8995 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8996 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8997 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8999 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9000 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
9001 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
9006 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
9007 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
9008 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
9011 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9012 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9014 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9015 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9016 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9017 // before receiving funding_signed.
9018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9021 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9023 // Create an initial channel
9024 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9025 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9026 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9027 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9028 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9030 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9031 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9033 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9036 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9037 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9038 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9039 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9040 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9044 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9045 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9046 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9047 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9048 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9049 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9050 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9057 // Create some initial channels
9058 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9060 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9061 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9062 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9063 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9064 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9065 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9067 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9068 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9069 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9070 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9071 // this test before #653 fix.
9072 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9073 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9076 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9078 let htlc_timeout = {
9079 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9080 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9081 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9082 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9086 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9087 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9088 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9089 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9092 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9093 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9094 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9095 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9097 // Steps of the test:
9098 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9099 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9100 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9101 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9102 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9103 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9104 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9105 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9109 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9111 // Create some initial channels
9112 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9113 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9115 // Steps (1) and (2):
9116 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9117 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9119 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9120 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9121 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9122 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9123 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9124 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9125 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9127 // Steps (3) and (4):
9128 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9129 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9130 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9131 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9134 if !broadcast_alice {
9135 force_closing_node = 1;
9136 counterparty_node = 0;
9138 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9139 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9141 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9142 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9143 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9144 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9145 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9147 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9148 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9149 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9150 if broadcast_alice {
9151 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9153 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9155 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9156 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9160 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9161 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9162 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9164 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9166 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9167 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9168 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9169 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9170 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9171 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9173 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9174 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9175 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9176 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9177 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9180 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9181 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9186 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9187 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9188 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9191 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9192 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9193 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9194 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9195 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9200 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9201 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9202 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9208 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9210 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9213 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9215 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9216 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9217 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9222 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9225 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9226 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9227 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9228 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9229 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9230 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9231 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9232 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9233 if broadcast_alice {
9234 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9236 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9238 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9239 if broadcast_alice {
9240 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9241 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9242 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9243 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9245 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9246 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9248 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9249 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9254 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9255 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9257 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9258 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9259 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9260 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9262 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9263 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9264 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9266 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9267 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9268 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9269 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9270 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9271 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9272 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9274 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9275 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9281 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9282 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9283 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9284 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9285 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9289 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9290 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9291 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9293 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9294 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9295 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9296 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9302 // Create an initial channel
9303 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9304 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9305 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9306 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9308 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9309 // that it is rejected.
9310 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9312 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9315 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9316 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9317 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9318 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9319 // move forward with it.
9320 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9321 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9327 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9328 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9330 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9333 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9334 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9336 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9337 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9338 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9339 added_monitors.clear();
9341 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9343 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9344 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9346 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9349 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9350 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9351 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9352 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9353 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9355 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9358 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9359 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9360 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9361 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9362 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9368 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9369 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9370 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9371 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9372 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9373 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9375 let funding_created = {
9376 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9377 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9378 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9379 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9380 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9381 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9382 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9383 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9386 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9387 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9388 // still needs to be cleared here.
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9391 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9393 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9394 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9396 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9397 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9398 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9399 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9400 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9406 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9407 // everything is functional.
9408 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9410 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9411 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9412 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9413 added_monitors.clear();
9416 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9417 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9418 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9419 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9421 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9422 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9423 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9424 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9428 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9429 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9431 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9432 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9433 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9434 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9435 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9436 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9437 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9439 // Create some initial channels
9440 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9441 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9442 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9444 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9445 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9446 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9448 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9449 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9450 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9452 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9453 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9457 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9458 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9459 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9460 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9462 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9463 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9464 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9466 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9467 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9468 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9470 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9471 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9476 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9477 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9479 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9481 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9482 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9483 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9484 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9485 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9486 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9488 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9489 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9490 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9494 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9495 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9497 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9498 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9499 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9500 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9502 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9503 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9504 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9510 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9512 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9514 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9516 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9517 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9518 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9520 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9521 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9522 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9523 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9524 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9527 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9528 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9531 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9534 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9535 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9537 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9538 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9539 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9541 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9542 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9543 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9545 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9546 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9547 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9548 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9549 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9550 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9551 } else { panic!(); }
9552 } else { panic!(); }
9553 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9555 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9556 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9557 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9558 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9559 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9560 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9561 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9565 script_sig: Script::new(),
9566 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9567 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9569 output: vec![TxOut {
9571 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9574 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9575 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9578 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9579 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9580 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9581 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9582 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9583 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9584 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9585 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9586 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9587 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9588 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9589 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9590 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9591 // until we learned about an additional block.
9593 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9594 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9598 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9599 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9601 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9602 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9603 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9605 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9607 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9608 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9609 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9611 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9612 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9614 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9615 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9616 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9618 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9619 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9620 if test_height_before_timelock {
9621 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9622 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9623 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9624 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9626 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9627 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9628 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9629 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9630 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9631 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9633 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9634 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9636 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9637 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9638 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9639 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9640 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9644 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9645 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9646 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9647 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9648 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9649 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9650 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9652 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9657 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9658 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9659 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9663 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9664 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9665 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9667 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9672 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9673 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9674 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9675 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9676 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9677 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9679 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9680 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9681 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9684 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9685 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9686 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9688 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9690 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9692 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9693 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9694 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9697 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9699 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9700 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9701 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9703 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9705 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9707 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9708 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9709 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9711 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9712 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9713 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9714 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9715 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9717 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9718 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9719 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9720 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9722 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9723 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9724 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9725 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9726 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9727 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9728 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9729 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9731 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9732 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9733 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9734 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9735 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9736 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9737 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9739 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9740 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9741 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9742 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9746 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9747 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9749 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9750 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9751 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9754 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9755 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9756 // the commitment state.
9757 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9759 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9761 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9762 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9765 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9767 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9768 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9769 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9770 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9771 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9773 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9774 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9777 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9783 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9785 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9786 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9787 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9789 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9792 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9796 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9797 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9798 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9800 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9801 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9804 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9806 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9807 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9808 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9811 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9812 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9813 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9814 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9817 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9818 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9820 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9821 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9822 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9824 let expected_destinations = vec![
9825 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9826 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9828 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9829 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9832 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9833 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9835 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9836 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9837 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9839 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9840 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9841 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9842 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9844 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9845 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9846 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9849 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9850 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9851 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9853 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9855 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9860 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9861 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9862 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9863 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9864 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9865 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9869 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9870 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9871 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9872 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9876 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9877 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9878 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9882 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9884 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9885 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9886 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9887 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9889 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9890 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9891 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9892 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9893 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9894 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9895 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9896 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9898 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9900 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9902 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9903 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9905 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9908 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9910 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9912 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9915 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9918 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9920 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9922 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9925 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9928 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9929 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9930 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9932 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9934 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9936 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9937 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9938 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9941 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9943 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9947 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9948 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9954 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9955 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9956 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9958 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9960 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9963 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9965 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9967 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9971 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9972 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9973 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9974 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9975 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9977 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9978 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9979 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9980 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9981 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9982 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9983 final_value_msat: 10000,
9984 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9986 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9987 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9988 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9990 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9991 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9993 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9995 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9996 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9997 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10002 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
10003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10006 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10008 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10009 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10010 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10011 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10013 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10014 let route_params = RouteParameters {
10015 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10016 final_value_msat: 10000,
10017 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10019 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10020 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10021 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10022 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10023 let route = find_route(
10024 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10025 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10028 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10029 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
10030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10031 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10033 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10034 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10035 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10040 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10041 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10042 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10043 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10048 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10051 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10055 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10056 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10057 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10058 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10059 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10060 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10063 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10064 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10065 // amount of time to respond to.
10067 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10068 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10069 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10071 let failed_destinations = vec![
10072 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10073 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10077 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10079 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10080 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10083 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10085 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10087 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10088 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10089 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10091 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10094 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10095 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10096 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10097 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10098 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10099 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10100 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10102 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10103 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10104 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10106 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10107 // definitely claimed.
10108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10110 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10112 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10113 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10114 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10116 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10118 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10120 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10121 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10123 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10124 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10125 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10126 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10127 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10128 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10129 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10132 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10135 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10136 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10137 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10138 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10139 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10141 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10142 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10143 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10144 if !persist_both_monitors {
10145 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10146 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10147 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10148 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10153 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10154 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10156 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10158 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10160 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10162 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10163 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10164 // with the old ChannelManager.
10165 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10166 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10167 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10168 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10169 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10172 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10173 if persist_both_monitors {
10174 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10175 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10176 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10177 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10182 // Now restart nodes[3].
10183 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10184 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10185 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10186 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10187 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10188 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10189 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10190 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10193 let config = UserConfig::default();
10194 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10195 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10196 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10197 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10199 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10200 default_config: config,
10202 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10203 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10204 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10205 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10209 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10211 for monitor in monitors {
10212 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10213 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10214 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10218 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10219 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10221 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10222 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10223 // never finished processing.
10224 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10225 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10226 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10227 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10228 if persist_both_monitors {
10229 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10232 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10233 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10234 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10235 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10237 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10238 } else { panic!(); }
10240 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10241 if !persist_both_monitors {
10242 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10244 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10245 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10246 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10247 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10249 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10250 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10251 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10253 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10255 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10256 // claim should fly.
10257 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10259 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10260 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10262 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10263 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10264 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10266 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10267 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10276 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10281 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10282 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10283 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10286 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10287 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10288 enum ExposureEvent {
10289 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10291 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10293 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10294 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10297 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10298 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10301 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10302 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10303 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10304 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10305 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10306 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10307 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10308 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10311 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10312 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10315 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10317 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10318 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10319 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10320 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10322 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10324 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10325 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10326 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10328 let opt_anchors = false;
10330 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10333 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10334 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10338 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10339 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10342 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10345 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10346 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10347 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10349 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10350 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10351 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10352 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10354 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10355 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10357 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10358 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10360 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10361 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10364 if dust_outbound_balance {
10365 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10366 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10367 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10368 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10369 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10370 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10373 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10374 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10375 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10376 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10377 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10381 if dust_outbound_balance {
10382 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10383 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10384 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10386 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10389 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10390 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10391 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10392 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10397 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10398 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10399 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10400 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10401 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10403 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10404 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10405 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10407 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10409 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10410 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10411 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10413 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10415 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10416 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10417 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10419 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10420 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10421 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10422 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10424 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10425 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10427 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10428 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10429 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10431 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10432 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10434 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10436 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10439 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10440 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10441 added_monitors.clear();
10445 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10446 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10447 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10448 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10449 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10450 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10451 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10452 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10453 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10454 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10455 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10456 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10457 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10461 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10465 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10467 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10468 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10469 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10470 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10471 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10473 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10475 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10476 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10477 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10479 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10480 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10481 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10482 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10483 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10486 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10488 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10489 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10490 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10491 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10496 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10497 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10498 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10499 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());